Use of loan loss provisions for capital, earnings management and signalling by Australian banks

This study examines whether and to what extent Australian banks use loan loss provisions (LLPs) for capital, earnings management and signalling. We examine if there were changes in the use of LLPs as a result of the implementation of banking regulations consistent with the Basel Accord of 1988, which made loan loss reserves no longer part of Tier I capital in the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. We find some evidence to indicate that Australian banks use LLPs for capital management, but we find no evidence of a change in this behaviour after the implementation of the Basel Accord. Our results indicate that banks in Australia use LLPs to manage earnings. Furthermore, listed commercial banks engage more aggressively in earnings management using LLPs than unlisted commercial banks. We also find that earnings management behaviour is more pronounced in the post‐Basel period. Overall, we find a significant understating of LLPs in the post‐Basel period relative to the pre‐Basel period. This indicates that reported earnings might not reflect the true economic reality underlying those numbers. Finally, Australian banks do not appear to use LLPs for signalling future intentions of higher earnings to investors.     

THE ROLE OF LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS IN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT,CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,AND SIGNALING: THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE

While much research has been conducted in the United States on the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) as a mechanism for managing earnings, managing capital, and as a tool for signaling future earnings strategies, there is a paucity of research in Europe. In this research, we replicate methodology used by Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1998) and examine the relative importance of key factors affecting the LLP decisions of Spanish depository institutions. Among others, we focus on the role of organizational structure. We specifically examine if and how LLPs are used prior to and after the implementation of capital adequacy regulations in the Spanish depository industry in 1992. Our results indicate that while LLPs were not used as a tool for managing capital after the new regulation came into effect, banks have now adopted a more aggressive earnings management strategy. This appears to be because the capital adequacy regulation of 1992 removed any capital constraint that hitherto acted as a disincentive to aggressive earnings management. Commercial banks appeared to adopt a more aggressive earnings management as well as capital management strategy than savings banks in the post regulatory era. Finally, we did not find evidence that LLPs were used as a signaling tool by Spanish banks to portray their intentions about future earnings.     

The bank capital channel and bank profits

This paper develops a microeconomic model of banking to highlight an endogenous loan creation process that emerges from bank profits via the capital accumulation of retained earnings and uses a simple bank capital‐loan multiplier to illustrate constraints on lending. The study also analyzes how sufficient net interest margins are important for banks to maintain lending portfolios and avoid financial fragility. The model offers support to bank capital channel (BKC) economists by illustrating how changes in interest rates may influence bank lending through the bank's internal capital accumulation growth rate and on a bank's portfolio choices.     

Income smoothing among European systemic and non-systemic banks

There is scant research on the financial reporting behaviour of global systemically-important banks (G-SIBs) and non-global systemically-important banks (non-G-SIBs). We examine the link between financial reporting and financial system stability given the understanding that income smoothing is a stability mechanism for banks. We empirically examine whether the way G-SIBs use loan loss provisions (LLPs) to smooth income differ compared to non-G-SIBs and the incentive to do so. We examine 231 European banks and find that income smoothing is pronounced among G-SIBs in the post-crisis period and pronounced among non-G-SIBs in the pre-crisis period. Also, G-SIBs exhibit greater income smoothing when they: (i) have substantial non-performing loans, (ii) are more profitable and meet/exceed minimum regulatory capital ratios (iii) engage in forward-looking loan-loss provisioning and during recessionary periods. The implication of our findings is that capital regulation and abnormal economic fluctuations create incentives for systemic banks to use accounting numbers (loan loss provisions) to smooth income, which also align with the financial system stability objective of bank regulators. Our findings are useful to accounting standard setters in their evaluation of the role of reported accounting numbers for financial system stability, given the current regulatory environment in Europe which focuses on systemic banks.     

Bank credit risk and credit information sharing in Africa: Does credit information sharing institutions and context matter?

The study examines credit information sharing through private credit bureaus and public credit registries and their effect on bank credit risk in low and high income countries in Africa. The study covers periods between 2006 and 2012 with 548 bank observations in Africa. Employing a Prais-Winsten panel data estimation, the study established that credit information sharing whether through private credit bureaus or public credit registries reduces bank credit risk in both low and high income countries and Africa as a whole. Further analyses reveal that credit information shared through public credit registries was only negatively and significantly related to bank credit risk when all countries that share credit information through public credit registries are observed as one unit but had no significant effect in low or high income countries. On the contrary, credit information shared through private credit bureaus reported a negative and significant effect on credit risk in low and high income countries as well as all countries that shared information through private credit bureaus. This suggests that credit information shared through private credit bureaus are more robust in dealing with bank credit risk regardless of a banks’ income bracket. Hence, countries that do not share credit information should do so especially through private credit bureaus so as to help reduce bank credit risk regardless of the income bracket differences. Again, governments in Africa must enact laws that expand the coverage and scope of credit information shared so as to enhance the effectiveness of information sharing.     

Visible Reserves in Banks – Determinants of Initial Creation,Usage and Contribution to Bank Stability

The opportunity of building up visible “Reserves for General Banking Risks” by the bank management represents a peculiarity in the German financial accounting framework for banks. We investigate German banks' motives for the creation and usage of these reserves and assess their role in financial stability. We find that banks primarily create and use GBR reserves to build up Tier 1 capital for regulatory capital management and earnings management purposes. Most importantly, however, we also reveal that banks using these reserves are less likely to experience a future distress or a bank default event. We therefore conclude that the existence of GBR reserves within the financial accounting framework represents both a convenient capital and earnings management tool for bank managers and a beneficial regulatory instrument to enhance bank stability.     

Bank Ownership and Lending: Does Bank Ownership Matter?

Using the Central and Eastern European (CEE) bank-level data covering 2004–12, this article examines the differences in foreign-owned banks’ loan growth and its determinants in comparison with privately-owned domestic banks. The results indicate the greatest differences in the context of bank capital and liquidity. Bank capital remains an important loan growth determinant only for domestic private banks during the non-crisis periods and bank liquidity is of greater importance to domestic private banks during the crisis periods. This highlights local regulatory authorities’ limited ability to harness loan growth and excessive risk-taking during the non-crisis periods and points at the benefits of multinational banking groups’ internal capital markets during the crisis periods.     

Managerial Incentives for Income Smoothing Through Bank Loan Loss Provisions

We examine alternative underlying motives of bank managers in using loan loss provisions (LLP) to smooth reported income. Based on the analytical results of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), we predict that for banks with good (poor) current performance and expected poor (good) future performance, managers will save income for (borrow income from) the future by reducing (increasing) current income through LLP. We also analyze three additional variables that could explain cross-sectional differences in the level of income smoothing. Our empirical analysis provides support for our predictions. The difference in LLP between the two groups of banks is positive as hypothesized, indicating that bank managers do save earnings through LLP in good times and borrow earnings using LLP in bad times. Similar results are obtained for analysis using discretionary LLP. When bank managers are saving earnings for the future, we provide evidence that the need to obtain external financing is an important additional variable in explaining cross-sectional differences in the extent of income smoothing. Furthermore, whether or not a bank is well capitalized is also weakly significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in income smoothing.     

Bank earnings and regulatory capital management using available for sale securities

Based on a large sample of publicly listed and non-listed US commercial banks from 1996 to 2011, we find robust evidence consistent with banks using realized available for sale (AFS) securities gains and losses to smooth earnings and increase low regulatory capital. We also find that (i) banks with positive earnings smooth earnings, and banks with negative earnings generally take big baths; (ii) regulatory capital constrains big baths; (iii) banks with more negative earnings and more unrealized beginning-of-quarter losses (gains) take big baths (smooth earnings); and (iv) banks with low regulatory capital and more unrealized gains realize more gains. Also, banks with negative earnings take big baths (avoid or reduce the earnings loss) if their unrealized gains are insufficient (sufficient) to offset the negative earnings. Our inferences apply to listed and non-listed banks, which indicates that the earnings management incentives do not derive solely from public capital markets. Our findings reveal that the accounting for AFS securities gains and losses enables banks to manage regulatory capital and earnings in a variety of ways.     

数字金融、银行信贷渠道与货币政策传导

作为新兴金融业态,数字金融发展会对既有金融体系带来怎样的冲击和影响?聚焦于货币政策传导机制这一宏观命题,立足于我国以银行信贷渠道为主导的数量型中介,运用我国商业银行、A股上市公司的微观面板数据,本文深度剖析了数字金融发展与货币政策银行信贷渠道传导之间的内在联系和影响机理。研究发现:(1)数字金融发展显著弱化了货币政策银行信贷渠道的传导效应,采用工具变量法克服内生性和控制影子银行变量等一系列稳健性检验后的结果依然支持该结论。(2)具体而言,数字金融削弱银行信贷渠道传导效果是通过改变银行资产负债结构和弱化实体企业对银行贷款的依赖而实现的。(3)上述弱化效应在以城市和农村商业银行为主的中小型金融机构以及低资本、低流动性和低报酬的银行中尤为突出。     

Measuring Integrated Market and Credit Risk in Bank Portfolios: An Application to a Set of Hypothetical Banks Operating in South Africa

The banking crises of the ‘90s emphasize the need to model the connections between financial environment volatility and the potential losses faced by financial institutions resulting from correlated market and credit risks. Due to the number of variables that must be modeled and the complexity of the relationships an analytical solution is not feasible. We present here a numerical solution based on a simulation model that explicitly links changes in the relevant variables that characterize the financial environment and the distribution of possible future bank capital ratios. This forward looking quantitative risk assessment methodology allows banks and regulators to identify potential risks before they materialize and make appropriate adjustments to bank portfolio credit qualities, sector and region concentrations, and capital ratios on a bank by bank basis. It also has the potential to be extended so as to assess the risks of correlated failures among a group of financial institutions (i.e., systemic risk analyses). This model was applied by the authors to the study of the risk profile of the largest South African Banks in the context of the Financial System Stability Assessment program undertaken by the IMF in 1999. In the current study, we apply the model to various hypothetical banks operating in the South African financial environment and assess the correlated market and credit risks associated with business lending, mortgage lending, asset and liability maturity matches, foreign lending and borrowing, and direct equity, real estate, and gold investments. It is shown to produce simulated financial environments (interest rates, exchange rates, equity indices, real estate price indices, commodity prices, and economic indicators) that match closely the assumed parameters, and generate reasonable credit transition probabilities and security prices. As expected, the credit quality and diversification characteristics of the loan portfolio, asset and liability maturity mismatches, and financial environment volatility, are shown to interact to determine bank risk levels. We find that the credit quality of a bank's loan portfolio is the most important risk factor. We also show the risk reduction benefits of diversifying the loan portfolio across various sectors and regions of the economy and the importance of accounting for volatility shocks that occur periodically in emerging economies. Banks with high credit risk and concentrated portfolios are shown to have a high risk of failure during periods of financial stress. Alternatively, banks with lower credit risk and broadly diversified loan portfolios across business and mortgage lending are unlikely to fail even during very volatile periods. Asset and liability maturity mismatches generally increase bank risk levels. However, because credit losses are positively correlated with interest rate increases, banks with high credit risk may reduce overall risk levels by holding liabilities with longer maturities than their assets. Risk assessment methodologies which measure market and credit risk separately do not capture these various interactions and thus misestimate overall risk levels.     

Foreign Banks in Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence

We study how foreign bank penetration affects financial sector development in poor countries. A theoretical model shows that when domestic banks are better than foreign banks at monitoring soft information customers, foreign bank entry may hurt these customers and worsen welfare. The model also predicts that credit to the private sector should be lower in countries with more foreign bank penetration, and that foreign banks should have a less risky loan portfolio. In the empirical section, we test these predictions for a sample of lower income countries and find support for the theoretical model.     

Interaction between securitization gains and abnormal loan loss provisions: Credit risk retention and fair value accounting

This study investigates whether managers use asset securitization gains to substitute loan loss provision (LLP) management for earnings management, and, if so, whether the percentage of credit risk retained affects such a relationship. The literature provides evidence that managers have used securitization transactions to boost earnings. Using 2001?2014 data for a sample of bank holding companies, I find that managers use securitization gains and LLPs as partial substitutes and that earnings management from securitization gains grows at an increasing rate to substitute income increasing LLP management as the level of risk retention increases. These findings are consistent with the argument that the higher the level of risk retention, the greater the potential impact on achieving earnings targets, given banks’ exercise of discretion over securitization gains through estimation of fair value of retained interest. In addition, I document that the substitution effect between the two tools is non‐existent in the post‐SFAS 166/167 period. Taken together, the findings have timely implications for accounting standards by informing the effect of risk retention that I measure through earnings management techniques. Moreover, my findings provide additional support for improved disclosures on assets‐backed securities.     

Earnings expectations and the quality of financial services

Using complaint data filed by consumers with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau against financial institutions, we show that banks receive, on average, 13.3% more customer complaints in the quarter immediately after they narrowly beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. The effect is mainly driven by banks’ attempts to reduce their non-interest expenses to beat earnings benchmarks. The relationship is stronger when bank CEOs receive a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation. Overall, our paper demonstrates how capital market incentives exacerbate shareholder–customer conflicts.     

Do banks care about analysts' forecasts when designing loan contracts?

We investigate whether banks rely on the information content in equity analysts’ annual earnings forecasts when assessing the risk of potential borrowers. While a long literature finds that analysts provide useful information to market participants, it is not clear that banks, which have access to privileged information, would benefit from publicly available analysts’ forecasts. If, however, banks do rely on this information, then more precise private information in earnings forecasts may inform banks. We focus our analysis on the requirement of collateral because it is a direct measure of default risk, whereas other loan terms such as interest spread and debt covenants can also protect against other risks, such as asset misappropriation. The direct link between collateral and default risk allows us to examine whether information from analysts is relevant to banks when designing loan contracts. Consistent with our predictions, we find that higher precision of the private information in analysts’ earnings forecasts is associated with a lower likelihood of requiring collateral, and this effect is larger when a borrower does not have a prior relationship with the lender or their accounting or credit quality is low. We also find that this association disappears after the implementation of Regulation FD, consistent with this regulation reducing analysts’ access to private information.     

Securitization and Bank Performance

Using predominantly precrisis U.S. commercial bank data, this paper employs a propensity score matching approach to analyze whether individual banks did improve their performance through securitization. On average, our results show that securitizing banks tend to be more profitable institutions, with higher credit risk exposure. Despite a more diversified funding structure, they face higher funding costs. We also find that securitizing banks tend to hold larger and less diversified loan portfolios, have less liquidity, and hold less capital. However, our analysis does not provide evidence to suggest that securitization had an impact upon bank performance.     

Information content of credit ratings in pricing of future earnings

This paper examines whether credit ratings convey information about the firm’s future earnings to the capital markets. Using the future earnings response coefficient methodology, we find that the current stock returns of rated firms reflect more future earnings than do the stock returns of non-rated firms. We also find that the market reflect more future earnings in current returns for higher-rated firms. In addition, we present evidence that returns impound future earnings to a greater extent after a ratings initiation or upgrade. We empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by earnings smoothing, market liquidity or omitted default risk factors associated with ratings. Our results are robust to controlling for potential omitted variables, endogeneity bias, loss versus profit firms, and serial correlation of error terms. Overall, the evidence suggests that credit ratings help disseminate private information to reduce information uncertainty about the firm’s future profitability among market participants.     

Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach

This paper proposes a new method to measure and monitor the risk in a banking system. Standard tools that regulators require banks to use for their internal risk management are applied at the level of the banking system to measure the risk of a regulator’s portfolio. Using a sample of international banks from 1988 until 2002, I estimate the dynamics and correlations between bank asset portfolios. To obtain measures for the risk of a regulator’s portfolio, I model the individual liabilities that the regulator has to each bank as contingent claims on the bank’s assets. The portfolio aspect of the regulator’s liability is explicitly considered and the methodology allows a comparison of sub-samples from different countries. Correlations, bank asset volatility, and bank capitalization increase for North American and somewhat for European banks, while Japanese banks face deteriorating capital levels. In the sample period, the North American banking system gains stability while the Japanese banking sector becomes more fragile. The expected future liability of the regulator varies substantially over time and is especially high during the Asian crisis starting in 1997. Further analysis shows that the Japanese banks contribute most to the volatility of the regulator’s liability at that time. Larger and more profitable banks have lower systemic risk and additional equity capital reduces systemic risk only for banks that are constrained by regulatory capital requirements.     

Financial Turmoil, Failed Bank Acquisitions, and Bank Business Lending Behavior

This paper utilizes bank Call Report and FDIC receivership data from 1987 to 1991 to examine the impact of a failed bank acquisition on the growth rate of commercial and industrial (C&I) lending at the acquiring institutions. Using a two-stage least squares model with fixed effects, we find that banks acquiring a failed bank's assets experience a significant decline in both the growth rate of C&I lending and their capital asset ratios in the period of the acquisition. The results support anecdotal evidence that failed-bank borrowers may experience difficulties in accessing credit once their bank fails and underscores the importance of bank-borrower relationships in C&I lending. Finally, the paper provides an alternative explanation for banks' stagnant or declining business lending activity during this period of financial turmoil.     

Loan Loss Provisions, Earnings Management and Capital Management under IFRS: The Case of EU Commercial Banks

Prior research has shown that loan loss provisions are primarily used as a tool for earnings management and capital management by listed banks. Effective 2005 all listed companies in the European Union (EU) are required to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Adherence to IFRS, it is claimed, should enhance transparency of reporting practices relative to local General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The overall objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the implementation of IFRS on the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) to manage earnings and capital. We use a sample of 91 EU listed commercial banks covering a period of 10 years (before and after implementation of IFRS). Since early adopters may have different incentives and motivations relative to those who adopt mandatorily, we dichotomize our sample into early and late adopters. Overall, we find that earnings management (using loan loss provisions) for both early and late adopters while significant over the estimation window is significantly reduced after implementation of IFRS. We also find that, for risky banks, earnings management behavior is more pronounced when compared to the less risky banks, but is significantly reduced in the post IFRS period. Capital management behavior by bank managers is not significant in both pre and post IFRS regimes. Overall, we conclude that the implementation of IFRS in the EU appears to have improved earnings quality by mitigating the tendency of bank managers of listed commercial banks to engage in earnings management using loan loss provisions.