The new new financial thing: The origins of financial innovations

The origins of financial innovations have attracted little empirical scrutiny. Using Wall Street Journal articles as an indicator, this paper examines which institutions were the key financial innovators between 1990 and 2002. The evidence suggests that smaller firms account for a disproportionate share of the innovations. Less profitable firms innovate more, though in the years subsequent to the introduction of the innovation, the profitability of the innovators increases significantly. Finally, older, less leveraged firms located in regions with more financial innovations innovate more. While several of the determinants of patenting are similar, small and unprofitable firms do not patent disproportionately.     

The effects of tax policy on financial markets: G3 evidence

We investigate the effects of various tax policy innovations on stock market returns. By using a vector autoregressive model that controls for the mutual causality between fiscal policy and financial market performance, we test whether financial markets serve as a transmission mechanism for tax policy innovations. Our findings indicate that indirect taxes have a larger effect on market returns than do labor taxes. Further, corporate tax innovations do not have any statistically significant effect on stock returns. We consider that this finding is a result of a firm's ability to switch between equity financing and bond financing.     

Modeling and forecasting expected shortfall with the generalized asymmetric Student-t and asymmetric exponential power distributions

Financial returns typically display heavy tails and some degree of skewness, and conditional variance models with these features often outperform more limited models. The difference in performance may be especially important in estimating quantities that depend on tail features, including risk measures such as the expected shortfall. Here, using recent generalizations of the asymmetric Student-t and exponential power distributions to allow separate parameters to control skewness and the thickness of each tail, we fit daily financial return volatility and forecast expected shortfall for the S&P 500 index and a number of individual company stocks; the generalized distributions are used for the standardized innovations in a nonlinear, asymmetric GARCH-type model. The results provide evidence for the usefulness of the general distributions in improving fit and prediction of downside market risk of financial assets. Constrained versions, corresponding with distributions used in the previous literature, are also estimated in order to provide a comparison of the performance of different conditional distributions.     

Who Controls US?

Berle and Means asserted that US corporations typically have dispersed shareholders; their evidence did not support this conclusion. Today, 59.74% of US corporations have ‘controlling shareholders’ who hold at least 10% of the shares; 24.57% are controlled and managed by a family; 16.33% are controlled by a widely‐held financial institution; 13.55% are controlled through family trusts. In all size ranges, the USA has more corporations controlled by families than by financial institutions. In almost all size ranges, it has a higher percentage of family‐controlled corporations than any of next four largest economies.     

The efficient markets hypothesis: The demise of the demon of chance?

Many commentators have suggested that economists in general and financial economists in particular have some responsibility for the recent global financial crisis. They were blinded by an irrational faith in a discredited Efficient Markets Hypothesis and failed to see the bubble in asset prices and to give due warning of its collapse. There is considerable confusion as to what this hypothesis is and what it says. The irony is that the strong implication of this hypothesis is that nobody, no practitioner, no academic and no regulator had the ability to foresee the collapse of this most recent bubble. While few economists believe it is literally true, this hypothesis is considered a useful benchmark with some important practical implications. Indeed, a case can be made that it was the failure to believe in the essential truth of this idea, which was a leading factor responsible for the global financial crisis .     

Efficient tests of stock return predictability

Conventional tests of the predictability of stock returns could be invalid, that is reject the null too frequently, when the predictor variable is persistent and its innovations are highly correlated with returns. We develop a pretest to determine whether the conventional t-test leads to invalid inference and an efficient test of predictability that corrects this problem. Although the conventional t-test is invalid for the dividend–price and smoothed earnings–price ratios, our test finds evidence for predictability. We also find evidence for predictability with the short rate and the long-short yield spread, for which the conventional t-test leads to valid inference.     

New evidence on the first financial bubble

The Mississippi Bubble, South Sea Bubble and the Dutch Windhandel of 1720 together represent the world's first global financial bubble. We hand-collect cross-sectional price data and investor account data from 1720 to test theories about market bubbles. Our tests suggest that innovation was a key driver of bubble expectations. We present evidence against the currently prevailing debt-for-equity conversion hypothesis and relate stock returns to innovations in Atlantic trade and insurance. We find evidence consistent with the innovation-driven bubble dynamics documented by Pastor and Veronesi (2009) for new economy stocks. Our evidence seems inconsistent with clientele-based theories that emphasize bubble-riding and short-sales restrictions.     

Missing elements in US financial reform: A Kübler-Ross interpretation of the inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act

The success of any treatment plan depends on how completely the problems it targets have been diagnosed. The precrisis bubble in securitization can be traced to incentive conflict that allows national safety nets to subsidize leveraged risk-taking. Safety-net subsidies encouraged regulation-induced innovations that enabled firms to take hard-to-monitor risks and to make themselves politically, administratively, and economically difficult for government officials to fail and unwind.This paper summarizes the incentive conflicts that led creditors and internal and external supervisors to short-cut and outsource due diligence. The Dodd-Frank strategy of reform does not adequately acknowledge or address these conflicts. The key step needed is to develop an effective statistical metric for measuring the ex ante value of safety-net support in the aggregate and at individual institutions. To accomplish this, government and industry need to rethink the informational obligations that insured financial institutions and their regulators owe to taxpayers as de facto investors and to change the way that information on industry balance sheets and risk exposures is reported, verified, and used. Without reforms in the practical duties imposed on industry and governmental officials and in the way these duties are enforced, financial safety nets will continue to expand and their expansion will undermine financial stability by generating large rewards for creative and aggressive risk-takers that are smart enough to cash in their share of safety-net benefits before they evaporate.     

Peer performance and stock market entry

Peer performance can influence the adoption of financial innovations and investment styles. We present evidence of this type of social influence: recent stock returns that local peers experience affect an individual's stock market entry decision, particularly in areas with better opportunities for social learning. The likelihood of entry does not decrease as returns fall below zero, consistent with people not talking about decisions that have produced inferior outcomes. Market returns, media coverage, local stocks, omitted local variables, short sales constraints, and stock purchases within households do not seem to explain these results.     

The Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure: Evidence from France,Germany and the UK

We examine the determinants of the debt maturity structure of French, German and British firms. These countries represent different financial and legal traditions that may have implications on corporate debt maturity structure. Our model incorporates the factors representing three major theories (tax considerations, liquidity and signalling, and contracting costs) of debt maturity. It also controls for capital market conditions. The results confirm the applicability of most theories of debt maturity structure for the UK firms. However, the evidence from France and Germany are mixed. Overall the findings suggest that the debt maturity structure of a firm is determined by firm‐specific factors and the country's financial systems and institutional traditions in which it operates.     

Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence

Using aggregate balance sheet data from banks across the EU-25 over the period from 1997 to 2005 we provide empirical evidence that national banking market concentration has a negative impact on European banks’ financial soundness as measured by the Z-score technique while controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory, and institutional factors. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that Eastern European banking markets exhibiting a lower level of competitive pressure, fewer diversification opportunities and a higher fraction of government-owned banks are more prone to financial fragility whereas capital regulations have supported financial stability across the entire European Union.     

Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.     

A Reconsideration of Tax Shield Valuation

A quarter‐century ago, Miles and Ezzell (1980) solved the valuation problem of a firm that follows a constant leverage ratio L = D/S. However, to this day, the proper discounting of free cash flows and the computation of WACC are often misunderstood by scholars and practitioners alike. For example, it is common for textbooks and fairness opinions to discount free cash flows at WACC with beta input β _S = [1 + (1 ? τ)L]β_u, although the latter is not consistent with the assumption of constant leverage. This confusion extends to the valuation of tax shields and the proper implementation of adjusted present value procedures. In this paper, we derive a general result on the value of tax shields, obtain the correct value of tax shields for perpetuities, and state the correct valuation formulas for arbitrary cash flows under a constant leverage financial policy.     

The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging: Does Foreign Currency Debt Induce a Bias?

In this paper we use UK data to present strong empirical evidence that explains the mixed results in previous studies with respect to the effect of financial distress on the demand for corporate hedging. We build on recent studies that have identified a strong link between foreign currency (FC) debt use and leverage. Given this relationship, we show that using leverage variables as proxies for financial distress and the failure to distinguish between FC debt users and non‐users causes misleading inference. More specifically, when we partition our sample of FC hedgers into firms that use and do not use foreign debt, we show that leverage variables are significantly related to the FC hedging decision for firms that use FC debt either in isolation or in combination with FC derivatives but not for firms that only use FC derivatives. This suggests that FC debt users are influencing these results. However, we also find that other financial distress cost proxies with no obvious link to FC debt use are significant determinants in the corporate demand for FC hedging, including derivatives use.     

Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans

Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests has an inverted U‐shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors.     

The impact of regulatory reforms on cost structure,ownership and competition in Indian banking

This paper evaluates the impact of financial sector reforms on the cost structure characteristics and on the ownership–cost efficiency relationship in Indian banking. It also examines the impact of reforms on the dynamics of competition in the lending market. We find evidence that deregulation improves banks performance and fosters competition in the lending market. Results suggest technological progress, once Indian commercial banks have adjusted to the new regulatory environment. This, however, does not translate in efficiency gains. There is also evidence of an ownership effect on the level and pattern of efficiency change. Finally, competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period and technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance Press News on Stock Market Returns

Stock market prices reflect information regarding firms’ business environments, operations and, in general, their fundamentals. Recently, various studies have analysed the link between news coverage and stock prices but no evidence exists on how channels and ways of communication of information affect investors’ behaviour. We analyses these aspects focussing on a large sample of corporate governance news published between 2003 and 2007 in ‘Il Sole 24 Ore’, Italy's major financial newspaper. We show that before news is made public investors are only able to assess the type of corporate governance event underlying it. After publication, investors are influenced by the content (positive or negative) and the tone of communication (strong or weak) of the news.     

Endogenous Financial Constraint and Investment‐Cash‐Flow Sensitivity

This paper studies a dynamic investment model with moral hazard. The moral hazard problem implies an endogenous financial constraint on investment that makes the firm's investment sensitive to cash flows. I show that the production technology and the severity of the moral hazard problem substantially affect the dependence of the investment‐cash‐flow sensitivity on the financial constraint. Specifically, if the production technology exhibits almost constant returns to scale in capital or the moral hazard problem is relatively severe, the dependence is negative. Otherwise, the pattern is reversed to some extent. Moreover, the calibrated benchmark model can quantitatively account for the negative dependence of investment and Tobin's Q on size and age observed in the data.     

Comparative analysis on the effects of the Asian and global financial crises on precious metal markets

The global financial crisis has vigorously struck major financial markets around the world, in particular in the developed economies since they have suffered the most. However, some commodity markets, and in particular the precious metal markets, seem to be unscathed by this financial downturn. This paper investigates therefore the nature of volatility spillovers between precious metal returns over fifteen years (1995-2010 period) with the attention being focused on these markets’ behavior during the Asian and the global financial crises. Daily closing values for precious metals are analyzed. In particular, the variables under study are the US$/Troy ounce for gold, the London Free Market Platinum price in US$/Troy ounce, the London Free Market Palladium price in US$/Troy once, and the Zurich silver price in US$/kg. The main sample is divided into a number of sub periods, prior to, during and after the Asian crisis. The aim of this division is to provide a wide and deep analysis of the behavior of precious metal markets during this financial event and of how these markets have reacted during times of market instability. In addition, this paper also looks at the effects of the global financial crisis from August 2007 to November 2010 using GARCH and EGARCH modeling. The main results show that there is clear evidence of volatility persistence between precious metal returns, a characteristic that is shared with financial market behavior as it has been demonstrated extensively by the existing literature in the area. In terms of volatility spillover effects, the main findings evidence volatility spillovers running in a bidirectional way during the periods; markets are not affected by the crises, with the exception of gold, that tends to generate effects in all other metal markets. However, there is little evidence in the case of the other precious metals generating any kind of influence on the gold market. On the other hand, there is little evidence of spillover effects during the two crisis episodes. Finally, the results from asymmetric spillover effects show that negative news/information have a stronger impact in these markets than positive news, again a characteristic that has been also exhibited by financial markets.     

Financial market development and the importance of internal cash: Evidence from international data

We examine the impact of financial market development on the extent to which firms have to rely on internal capital for making investments. Using international data from 31 countries for the 1987–1997 period, we find evidence of a negative relationship between financial market development and the importance of internal capital. The evidence is consistent across different estimation procedures, alternative measures of financial constraints and cash flow, and the use of bootstrapped standard errors. Finally, we find that the distortionary effect of negative cash flow observations reported earlier for US data extends to international data as well.