Auditor–client management relationships and roles in negotiating financial reporting

We carry out an interview based field study of chief financial officer (CFO)–audit partner dyads to examine the assumption that the roles played by each side and the nature of the relationships are similar across negotiations. These dyads freely discussed with us their relationship, a specific issue negotiated and it’s resolution process. Employing the lens of social positioning negotiation research, we find these negotiations are ‘fluid’, with continual redefinition not only of the substantive issues under negotiation, but also of the negotiation roles and relationships (i.e. ‘shadow’ negotiations). The CFO’s actions and expectations in these ‘shadow’ negotiations appear to define the auditor’s role and the relationship’s parameters, but both can evolve over time. The audit partners express a desire to be in the “ideal” relationship where they assume the role of the ‘expert advisor’ (as opposed to a ‘police officer’) but they seemingly have no explicit strategy to move the relationship toward a ‘proactive’ (rather than ‘reactive’) state. Furthermore, the audit partner is always the ‘relationship manager’ whose job it is to see that client management remains “happy”. These roles and relationships negotiated in the ‘shadows’ also affect how the negotiation process unfolds, including the set of alternative accounting treatments considered during negotiations. Finally, audit firms appear to manage the assignment of partners to engagements based on CFO preferences and remove those partners who are in “poor” relationships, irrespective of why the relationship is considered by the CFO to be “poor”. Implications for the broader research program on auditor–client management negotiations are discussed.     

The effect of client gender and negotiation style on auditors' proposed audit adjustments

This study examines whether client gender affects the efficacy of two common negotiation strategies used by management when disputing a proposed audit adjustment. Eighty-two experienced auditors participated in an experiment in which CFO gender (female or male) and negotiation style (concessionary or contentious) were manipulated randomly between subjects. The results provide evidence of a gender-by-negotiation strategy interaction. Specifically, auditors are less likely to propose an audit adjustment for a male CFO who uses a contentious negotiation strategy as compared to the concessionary strategy. Conversely, auditors are more likely to propose an audit adjustment for a female CFO who uses a contentious negotiation strategy as compared to a male CFO who uses this same strategy. These findings indicate that the use of pressure-related tactics in negotiation is beneficial for male CFOs, but that female CFOs are penalized (as compared to male CFOs) for using contentious tactics.     

Rotate back or not after mandatory audit partner rotation?

Many countries have implemented rules that require an audit partner to rotate off the audit of a specific client after a certain period of time in the belief that rotation will improve independence and will allow for a fresh look at the audit. The rules are either silent on whether or when a partner can rotate back or else they specify a cooling-off period after which the rotated-off partner can resume the audit. Using archival data from China, a country with a 2-year cooling-off period, this paper explores the determinants of whether the audit partner rotates back or not when the cooling-off period expires, and whether audit quality is weakened by the audit partner rotation-back practice. We find that the audit partner rotation-back practice can be explained by factors relating to switching costs, agency conflicts, client desirability, and the audit partner’s capacity constraint considerations. Interestingly, we find that clients suffering greater audit adjustments immediately prior to the expiration of the cooling-off period are more likely to be associated with subsequent audit partner rotation-back. Furthermore, we find that rotation-back partners tend to treat former clients more favorably than non-rotation-back cases using modified audit opinions as our proxy for audit quality. Overall, our findings offer preliminary explanations for and shed light on the consequences of rotation-back practice arising from mandatory audit partner rotation requirements and lend support to regulatory concerns on rotation-back practice among audit partners.     

A comparison of auditor and client initial negotiation positions and tactics

This study examines the initial negotiation positions and tactics of auditors and clients facing a revenue recognition conflict. We investigate the degree of flexibility in auditor and client initial negotiation positions, whether auditors and clients accurately perceive the other party’s positions, and the types of negotiation tactics that may be used by both parties. The results indicate that auditors and clients approach conflict resolution in very different ways. Clients were more flexible, determined the auditor’s goals and limits more accurately, and were more likely to use negotiation tactics such as bid high/concede later and trade-off one reporting issue for another. The implications of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.     

Evidence About Auditor–Client Management Negotiation Concerning Client's Financial Reporting

We develop a model of auditor-client accounting negotiation, using the elements of negotiation examined in the behavioral negotiation literature, elaborated to include accounting contextual features indicated in the accounting literature and suggested by interviews with senior practitioners. We use a questionnaire structured according to the model to describe the elements, contextual features and associations between the two groups in a sample of real negotiations chosen by 93 experienced audit partners. The paper demonstrates important aspects of the sampled accounting negotiations and makes suggestions for further empirical and model development research.     

The effect of accounting firm mergers on the market for audit services: New Zealand evidence

This article examines the outcomes of accounting firm mergers using data about the frequency of audit switches, the numbers of partners in the respective firms, and perceptions revealed in interviews with partners. Evidence from client switches does not show any evidence that the mergers were followed by cost reductions, or of collusion to force prices up. The effects of the mergers appear to have been elsewhere—the merging firms reduced partner numbers substantially, increasing partner leverage so that individual remaining partners were better off. Data from interviews confirm these findings, and show that the culture of individual firms had a significant effect on determining which group of partners controlled the merged firm.     

The impact of auditor rotation on auditor–client negotiation

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how mandatory audit firm rotation affects auditor–client negotiations. Drawing upon process theories of negotiation, we examine the strategies used by auditors and clients as well as the outcomes of their negotiations in alternative settings in which mandatory rotation is imposed or is not imposed. We posit that mandatory rotation changes (1) the dynamics of the audit market by increasing the number of clients who are in the market for a new auditor, and (2) the political costs to a client who switches auditors. These changes, in turn, alter the willingness of the auditor and the client to cooperate during negotiation. The results suggest that with mandatory rotation auditors adopt less cooperative negotiation strategies, producing asset values that are more in line with the auditor’s preferences than with the client’s preferences and more negotiation impasses.     

The effect of gender and firm identification on auditor pre-negotiation judgments

This paper extends current auditor negotiation research by considering the effects of two dimensions of auditors' identity that are posited to be relevant to auditors' negotiation: gender and audit firm identification. Women earn over half of college degrees in accounting, and hold more than half of accounting and auditing positions in the US, yet the balance of the gender of partners at audit firms is currently not equal (AICPA, 2017). However, as more women advance into partnership positions in firms, it is increasingly important to have an understanding of how gender affects the behaviors, processes and outcomes of negotiation, and thus the quality of financial statements. The auditor-client negotiation context has features, such as ambiguity and representation of others that can “trigger” the salience of auditors' gender and firm identity. Once salient, these two dimensions of auditors' identity shape auditors' motivational orientation towards negotiations, which, in turn, affects the auditors' negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes.The study finds that male and female auditors approach the negotiation over audit adjustments differently. Although many negotiation studies find that males negotiate more aggressively than do females, auditor-client negotiation offers a unique setting that has been found to reverse this common trend. We hypothesize and find that female auditors recommend higher audit adjustments than males. However, the level of firm identification moderates female's recommended audit adjustments such that at higher levels of firm identification, the larger audit adjustments recommended by females decrease. This finding is consistent with the growing research on gender differences in auditing and the research on gender and risk tolerance, which find females to be more risk averse, but contrary to much of the negotiation research which shows males as more aggressive and achieving higher negotiated outcomes. In supplemental analysis, we find that our results hold in the senior manager subsample but not in the partner subsample. This result is consistent with theory on gender differences which suggests that the differences will disappear with increased occupational socialization (Smith & Rogers, 2000). Practical implications are discussed.     

The relative effectiveness of persuasion tactics in auditor–client negotiations

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of four persuasive arguments that auditors may use to convince clients to accept their desired position in auditor–client negotiations. In addition, we investigate how the style in which the argument is communicated by the auditor impacts its effectiveness. Our results indicate that the type of persuasion tactic used by auditors significantly impacts the amount of concessions made by clients. Specifically, we find that, while threatening to qualify the audit opinion can result in significant client concessions, a tactic of simply informing the client that other companies have handled the accounting issue in a way consistent with the auditor’s preference is as effective, or more effective, than all of the other tactics examined at eliciting significant concessions as well as engendering positive affect toward the auditor. This result is consistent with findings from the persuasion literature relating to the pervasive power of social validation. We also find that clients offer more concessions, evaluate the auditor more positively, and are more satisfied with the negotiation outcome when auditors communicate their arguments using a cooperative, as opposed to a contentious, communication style. The results of this study indicate that auditors may benefit from training in persuasion tactics in order to achieve more desirable negotiation outcomes.     

Audit partner rotation and negative information hoarding: evidence from China

We analyse the impact of mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) on negative information hoarding about audit clients using a sample of Chinese firms. Our findings suggest that the outgoing audit partners hoard negative information in pre-MAPR, as revealed by a decrease in crash risk, while the incoming audit partners disclose negative information in post-MAPR. Additional analysis suggests that the results are more pronounced among reviewing partners than engaging partners. We also find that when the outgoing audit partner has strong professional abilities or weak personal network with the client or incoming partner, there is less negative information hoarding around MAPR.     

Interest rate swaps

This instructional case is intended to introduce graduate and undergraduate financial accounting and finance students to derivatives using interest rate swaps. The major learning objective is to understand derivative accounting methods, using interest rate swaps, as proposed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's recent Exposure Draft. A secondary learning objective is to understand key features of a management control system for derivatives' activities. Both matched and unmatched interest rate swap examples are used in this case. The matched swap is based on an actual swap done by a bank for one of its customers. The case is written from the perspective of an audit partner writing a report summarizing interest rate swap accounting and related management controls for a client who wanted to recognize all gains and losses related to its interest rate swaps immediately in current earnings.     

Auditor rotation and the appearance of independence: Evidence from non-professional investors

We examine the impact of audit firm versus partner rotation on non-professional investors’ independence-related perceptions, extending prior research on auditor rotation and independence in fact. Arguments for mandatory audit firm rotation continue to be made by regulators and investor groups based, in part, on the idea that firm rotation will incrementally strengthen independence in appearance relative to audit partner rotation. We report the results of two experiments. The first examines 5-year audit firm versus partner rotation under relatively weak or strong audit committees. We find no statistically significant difference in beliefs about how much of an income reducing audit difference management will record, or in beliefs about auditor independence, between the two auditor rotation conditions. On the other hand, we find that non-professional investors do believe more of the audit difference will be recorded, and the auditors will be more independent, under a strong audit committee than a relatively weak audit committee. The second experiment provides further evidence on audit firm versus partner rotation by examining a setting involving a 26-year audit firm–client relationship. Again, no statistically significant differences between the two auditor rotation conditions were found. These findings suggest that compared to audit partner rotation, audit firm rotation does not strengthen independence in appearance among non-professional investors and that non-professional investors recognize the value of strong audit committees.     

Client Characteristics and the Negotiation Tactics of Auditors: Implications for Financial Reporting

Although the financial statements of an organization are considered a product of management, prior research suggests that a company's financial statements may be affected by the negotiation strategy employed by the auditor when resolving audit differences with management. However, little subsequent research discusses the potential strategies that auditors may employ during the negotiation process. Our study extends the literature by investigating, in a post–Sarbanes‐Oxley environment, whether auditors will employ a reciprocity‐based strategy for the resolution of audit differences and what client characteristics (client management's negotiating style and client retention risk) increase the extent to which it is utilized. Further, we explore the potential effect of a reciprocity‐based strategy on the quality of the financial statements. Such a strategy involves bringing inconsequential items to management and subsequently waiving these items in an effort to encourage management to be more cooperative in the posting of significant income‐decreasing adjustments. The results of experiment 1 indicate that client management's negotiating style and retention risk have an interactive effect on auditors' use of a reciprocity‐based strategy. Specifically, auditors are more likely to utilize a reciprocity‐based strategy when management's negotiating style is competitive and client retention risk is high. Experiment 2 findings suggest that the auditor's use of reciprocity during negotiation can actually result in more conservative financial statements by helping the auditor manage perceived client pressures to waive or reduce proposed adjustments.     

Client importance and audit partner independence

We use data from Taiwan where audit partners are required to sign audit reports to examine whether audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients. Uniquely, we include both listed and unlisted clients in audit partners’ client portfolios and separately study these clients for Big N and non-Big N auditors. We employ multiple proxies for auditor independence, including various abnormal accruals measures, the propensity of audit partners to issue modified audit opinions, and the probability that clients meet or just beat earnings targets. We fail to find evidence that Big N audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients; however, we find such evidence for non-Big N auditors. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. While our inferences are limited to the Taiwanese capital market, our study may be of interest to market participants and regulators in other well developed capital markets.     

Empirical Evidence on the Implicit Determinants of Compensation in Big 4 Audit Partnerships

This study investigates the implicit financial incentives of individual Big 4 audit partners by examining the association between a partner's compensation and characteristics of the audit firm, audit partner, and individual partner clientele for Big 4 firms in Sweden. Using tax and financial data for individual audit partners and clients, our empirical findings indicate that there is significant variation in the implicit determinants that are associated with compensation across the Big 4. We find that audit partners’ compensation is positively associated with the size of their clientele or the number of publicly traded clients, both of which represent revenue‐generating opportunities. Similarly, compensation and developing an industry specialization are positively related. In three firms, gaining clients is clearly related to an increase in compensation, while losing a client is associated with a reduction in partner income in only one firm. We find that audit partner income is more sensitive to performance‐related incentives, such as attracting new clients, as partners progress in their career. Finally, we find evidence that audit failures, proxied by reporting errors related to issuing a going concern opinion, are associated with lower compensation. These results should be of interest to the auditing profession, audit firms, and regulators when they consider the effects of implicit incentives of partner compensation on audit quality.     

Understanding the Restatement Process

Much research examines investors' reactions to restatements and the effects of restatements on chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and auditor turnover; however, little research explores the process of restating financial reports. In this study, we investigate the process of issuing a restatement. We specifically focus on the interactions among the parties involved (e.g., CFO, board, audit committee, audit partner, and regulators) in determining and ultimately resolving a restatement, as well as the impact of the restatement on the relationships among these parties. We investigate the restatement process via semi‐structured interviews. We immersed ourselves in the restatement process by interviewing all parties typically involved, such as CFOs, auditors, and regulators. Given the findings in the auditor–client management negotiation area, which suggest that negotiation of accounting treatment and disclosure is frequent, our findings indicate that negotiations and/or difficult discussions take place among the parties involved when determining whether a restatement is necessary as well as in achieving the ultimate restatement outcome. Our findings (based on a small sample) suggest that the restatement process may influence or be influenced by such factors as the nature of the misstatement, the party that identified the misstatement, the reaction of the various parties to the misstatement, disagreement among the parties on whether to restate, communication with the regulator, the press release, client size, the personality of the CFO, audit committee strength, and the relationships among the parties subsequent to the restatement.     

Effects of audit partners on clients’ business risk disclosure

We empirically investigate audit engagement partners’ involvement in business risk disclosure. Specifically, we examine whether the quality of business risk disclosure is influenced by engagement partner tenure and knowledge. We also examine whether the effects of partner tenure and knowledge are similar for Big 4 audit firms and non-Big 4 firms. Since fiscal year 2003, listed companies in Japan have been required to disclose business risk information. Although the business risk information is not audited, auditors concerned about their audit quality may seek to influence clients’ business risk disclosure practices. Giving advice to management on the narrative business risk disclosure can contribute to improving the perceived value of the auditor’s services which can be a competitive advantage. Using a sample of Japanese listed companies from 2003 to 2010, we find that if the engagement partners’ tenure is shorter, a company discloses more business risk information and the disclosure is more detailed. Furthermore, companies with audit partners who have a larger number of client engagements disclose larger amounts of business risk information in more detail. However, the engagement partner effects are mitigated if they belong to a Big 4 firm.     

Client Importance and Audit Quality at the Individual Audit Partner,Office, and Firm Levels

We investigate whether audit partner level data provides a more powerful measure than office or firm level measures of client importance. We find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of audit fees to the total audit fees received by audit partners from all their clients. We also find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of non-audit services fees from a client to total non-audit service fees, and the proportion of total audit and non-audit service fees from a client to total fees from all their clients at the office and firm levels. Our findings provide evidence to regulators, audit clients, and stakeholders that audit partners do not succumb to pressure from economically more important clients as audit quality has a positive association with client importance.     

客户重要性与审计谈判

审计谈判对审计质量和会计信息质量具有十分重要的影响。本文运用实验经济学的方法研究了客户重要性对审计谈判的影响。研究发现,在与重要的客户谈判时,审计人员接受的客户最终的资产价值比较高,与客户在谈判中达成一致的比例也比较高;在与非重要客户谈判时,审计人员接受的客户最终的资产价值比较低,与客户在谈判中达成一致的比例也比较低。同时还发现,在与重要客户谈判时,审计人员更倾向于采用合作型谈判策略;在与非重要客户谈判时,审计人员更倾向于采用竞争型谈判策略。本文的发现表明,客户重要性明显地影响了审计质量。     

Toward an Archival Measure of the Likelihood of Auditor–Client Management Negotiation: An Exploration of the Audit Lag Measures Conjecture*

Salterio (2012) hypothesized that adaptations of an audit efficiency measure, audit report lag (the length of time between the financial statement year‐end date and the auditor's report date), could provide measures of underlying auditor–client management (ACM) negotiation likelihood. Salterio argued that these measures would enable archival researchers to examine issues that heretofore were the exclusive domain of experimental and field researchers. Using an audit report lag measure and a measure of abnormal audit report lag lags (the residual based on audit report lag determinants model), we show that a larger lag is associated with higher audit fees after controlling for other known determinants of audit fees. We also show that larger lags are associated with higher levels of discretionary accruals—that is, lower accrual quality. Based on our findings, we suggest that there is support for Salterio's hypothesis that audit report lags and abnormal audit report provide valid archival proxies for the differences in year‐end ACM negotiation likelihood. We suggest that this proxy will allow researchers to study issues related to published accounting numbers in light of whether negotiations are likely to have occurred in addition to providing regulators and others the means to determine what clients of audit firms are more likely to have different types of ACM relationships.