监管资本套利动因及对银行的影响分析——兼论对我国银行业资本监管和管理的启示

所谓监管资本套利（Regulatory Capital Arbitrage，ReA），就是银行通过证券化和其他金融创新，在几乎没有相应降低银行的总经济风险的情况下人为提高资本充足率。银行可以通过证券化和其他技术对资产重新组合，从而在银行风险并没有降低的情况下降低监管资本要求，使其水平低于巴塞尔协议8％的名义风险资本要求。     

资本充足率高代表资本充足吗？--基于中国上市银行2007～2011年季度数据分析北大核心CSSCISSCI

鉴于监管压力是我国银行被动调整资本充足率的原因,本文认为,我国商业银行资本充足率高并不一定代表资本充足的真实和有效。通过计量实证和统计方法对14家银行财务数据进行的研究,本文对提高资本充足率的两种方法——资本管理和监管资本套利进行了分析。结果表明,银行没有通过贷款损失准备进行资本管理,但是通过相互持有次级债弥补资本不足。在监管资本套利方面,我国资产规模较大的银行很可能进行了监管资本套利。在金融不断深化的背景下重新审视资本监管,重视资本充足的真实有效是未来银行监管面临的重要课题。     

商业银行监管资本套利的均衡分析

监管资本套利,产生于巴塞尔协议资本监管框架的缺陷,是一种利用资本监管制度之间的差异性以及制度内部的不协调性,运用某种手段在不改变实际风险水平的情况下提高资本充足率水平的行为。通过对以下问题的探讨:商业银行监管资本套利所获得的收益在银行与资金需求方之间的配置比例;针对某种资产的监管资本套利,对其他资产供求双方所产生的隐性套利收益的表现形式及其归属程度;由商业银行异质性所导致的监管套利顾客现象;信息不对称情况下,市场对于套利者与非套利者的逆向选择等等,认为银行监管部门应适当引导符合政策意图的套利行为,提高政策引导调控能力。     

账面资本、监管资本与经济资本

定义(一)账面资本(BookCapital)又称为可用资本、实有资本,就是指所有者权益,金额为企业合并后资产负债表中资产减去负债后的余额,包括实收资本或普通股、优先股和附属银行债。(二)监管资本(RegulatoryCapital)是指银行已经持有的或者是必须持有的符合监管当局要求的资本。巴塞尔新协议将监管资本分为两类:核心资本和附属资本。核心资本包括实收资本或普通股、公开储备,并扣除商誉因素;附属资本包括未公开储备、资产重估储备、普通准备金、混合债务资本工具、次级长期债务。根据《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》的定义,我国银监会定义的核…     

资本监管与银行贷款:影响机制及原因分析

本文使用我国175家商业银行1998-2009年间的贷款数据,分析了资本监管制度对银行贷款的影响,并结合理论与实际总结了相关原因.本文发现,资本监管制度实施之后,我国商业银行的信贷供给能力显著下降,贷款相对规模减少,信贷扩张的速度下降.进一步分析发现,资本监管之后,银行自身的资本水平对贷款发放产生了重要影响,资本充足率较高的银行信贷扩张的能力较强,而资本充足率较低的银行则放缓了信贷扩张的步伐.此外,本文还发现,受银行融资约束的影响,不同规模的银行在信贷扩张速度上存在一定的差异.     

资本监管趋势与银行的资本管理选择

金融危机发生以来,国内银行监管机构逐步提高了银行业的最低资本要求,并对核心资本补充和发行长期次级债务提出更高要求,主要商业银行的资本充足率和核心资本充足率标准实际上已提高至10%和7%.因此,有必要对银行资本监管政策的发展趋势做一分析,并针对银行的资本补充压力探讨资本管理的方式和重点.     

资产证券化与商业银行资本约束

资产证券化作为一种金融工具，由于其复杂而巧妙的交易设计，使得发起银行可以通过将信贷资产转移到表外，改善自身的资本充足率。本文通过对建行信贷资产证券化的分析，发现在资本监管的约束下，银行被要求按照“证券风险暴露”程度计提资本，这使得资产证券化对于我国商业银行改善资本充足率幻效果并不显著。     

我国商业银行资本充足率监管的有效性分析

资本充足率是衡量商业银行经营安全性和稳健性的重要指标,资本充足率监管已经成为银行监管的核心内容。本文应用计量经济软件对我国大型商业银行和股份制商业银行的2008年²013年第三季度的季度数据进行实证分析,结果表明:我国商业银行资本充足率监管是有效的,资本充足率监管有效提高了我国商业银行的资本充足率水平,也降低了银行的风险水平,但是监管的有效性还需要进一步的提高。并提出了提高资本充足率监管有效性的建议。     

贷款损失准备金与资本充足率监管——来自日本银行业的实证分析

在以资本充足率监管为核心的国际银行业监管框架内,贷款损失准备金是影响资本充足率监管有效性的重要因素。本文运用向量自回归模型实证考察了日本银行业贷款准备金政策对资本的影响,实证结果表明:(1)银行增加贷款准备金计提在短期内会对资本造成负面冲击,而长期内却有利于提高资本水平;(2)短期内贷款准备金对资本的负面冲击向长期内贷款准备金对稳定和提高资本水平均衡调整的速度很慢,意味着贷款准备金政策的缺陷严重削弱了日本银行业资本监管的有效性。本文从日本银行业贷款准备金政策的发展进一步分析了实证结果的原因,并且指出我国实施资本充足率监管在完善贷款准备金政策方面的建议。     

巴塞尔资本协议中资产证券化监管框架的演变

资产证券化20世纪70年代发源于美国,成为当前全球金融市场最具活力的金融创新之一,其发展与巴塞尔资本协议有密切的关系.从1988年的巴塞尔资本协议推动银行利用资产证券化进行资本套利,到1999年6月巴塞尔资本协议第一次征询意见稿正式将资产证券化列人监管范围,再到巴塞尔委员会对资产证券化处理几易其稿,资产证券化框架至今仍在讨论之中.巴塞尔资本协议在推动资产证券化发展的同时,又引发了对巴塞尔资本协议本身的不断修订.实际上在早期阶段,巴塞尔资本监管框架并没有把资产证券化列入,但随着监管框架的不断完善,巴塞尔监管委员会认为"资产证券化的处理是巴塞尔新资本协议不可或缺的部分,如果缺少了该部分,巴塞尔新资本协议将达不到监管的目的"1.资产证券化在监管框架中的相对地位的变化由此可见一斑.     

Credit Card Securitization and Regulatory Arbitrage

This paper explores the motivations and desirability of off-balance sheet financing of credit card receivables by banks. We explore three related issues: the degree to which securitizations result in the transfer of risk out of the originating bank, the extent to which securitization permits banks to economize on capital by avoiding regulatory minimum capital requirements, and whether banks' avoidance of minimum capital regulation through securitization with implicit recourse has been undesirable from a regulatory standpoint. We show that regulatory capital arbitrage is an important consequence of securitization. The avoidance of capital requirements could be motivated either by efficient contracting or by safety net abuse. We find that securitizing banks set their capital relative to managed assets according to market perceptions of their risk, and seem not to be motivated by maximizing implicit subsidies relating to the government safety net when managing their risk. This evidence is more consistent with the efficient contracting view of securitization with implicit recourse than with the safety net abuse view.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.     

The Determinants of Bank Capital Ratios in a Developing Economy

This paper reports new findings on the determinants of bank capital ratios. The results are from an unbalanced panel data set spanning eight years around the period of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. Test results suggest a strong positive link between regulatory capital and bank management’s risk-taking behaviour. The risk-based capital standards of the regulators did not have an influence on how regulatory capital is adjusted by low-capitalized banks, perhaps due to the well-documented banking fragility during the test period. Finally, bank capital decisions seem not to be driven by bank profitability, which finding is inconsistent with developed country literature that has for long stressed the importance of banks’ earnings as driving capital ratios. Although the study focuses only on one developing economy, these findings may help to identify the correlates of bank capital ratios in both developed and developing economies since this topic has received scant attention of researchers. These findings are somewhat consistent with how banks engaging in risky lending across the world could have brought on the 2007–2008 banking liquidity and capital erosion crisis.     

Securitization and Bank Performance

Using predominantly precrisis U.S. commercial bank data, this paper employs a propensity score matching approach to analyze whether individual banks did improve their performance through securitization. On average, our results show that securitizing banks tend to be more profitable institutions, with higher credit risk exposure. Despite a more diversified funding structure, they face higher funding costs. We also find that securitizing banks tend to hold larger and less diversified loan portfolios, have less liquidity, and hold less capital. However, our analysis does not provide evidence to suggest that securitization had an impact upon bank performance.     

Bank Capital Requirements, Capital Structure and Regulation

This paper studies the impact of capital requirements, deposit insurance and franchise value on a bank’s capital structure. We find that properly regulated banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required. Central to this decision is both firm franchise value and the ability of regulators to place banks in receivership stripping equity holders of firm value. These features of our model help explain both the capital structure of the large mortgage Government Sponsored Enterprises and the recent increase in risk taking through leverage by financial institutions. The insights gained from the model are useful in guiding the discussion of financial regulatory reforms.     

Banking in a Matching Model of Money and Capital

We introduce banks in a model of money and capital with trading frictions. Banks offer demand deposit contracts and hold primary assets to maximize depositors’ utility. If banks’ operating costs are small, banks reallocate liquidity eliminating idle balances and improving the allocation. At moderate costs, idle balances are reduced but not eliminated. At larger costs, banks are redundant. A central bank policy of paying interest on bank reserves can reverse inflation's distortionary effects, and increase welfare, but only when costs are small. The threshold levels of banks’ costs increase with inflation, suggesting inflation and banks’ utilization are positively associated.     

Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?

Banks can choose to keep loans on balance sheet as private debt or transform them into public debt via asset securitization. Securitization transfers credit and interest rate risk, increases liquidity, augments fee income, and improves capital ratios. Yet many lenders still retain a portion of their loans in portfolio. Do lenders exploit asymmetric information to sell riskier loans into the public markets or retain riskier loans in portfolio? If riskier loans are indeed retained in portfolio, is this motivated by regulatory capital incentives (regulatory capital arbitrage), or a concern for reputation? We examine these questions empirically and find that securitized mortgage loans have experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained in portfolio, providing evidence consistent with either the capital arbitrage or reputation explanation for securitization.     

资产透明度、监管套利与银行系统性风险

资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。     

Capital incentives and adequacy for securitizations

This paper analyzes the capital incentives and adequacy of financial institutions for asset portfolio securitizations. The empirical analysis is based on US securitization rating and impairment data. The paper finds that regulatory capital rules for securitizations may be insufficient to cover implied losses during economic downturns such as the Global Financial Crisis. In addition, the rating process of securitizations provides capital arbitrage incentives for financial institutions and may further reduce regulatory capital requirements. These policy-relevant findings assume that the ratings assigned by rating agencies are correct and can be used to build a test for the ability of Basel capital regulations to cover downturn losses.