Information sharing,neighborhood demarcation,and yardstick competition: an empirical analysis of intergovernmental expenditure interaction in Japan

The Japanese government provides information on local fiscal performance through the Fiscal Index Tables for Similar Municipalities (FITS-M). The FITS-M categorize municipalities into groups of “similar localities” and provide them with the fiscal indices of their group members, enabling municipalities to use the tables to identify their “neighbors” (i.e., those in the same FITS-M group) and refer to their fiscal information as a “yardstick” for fiscal planning. We take advantage of this system to estimate municipal spending function. In particular, we examine whether the FITS-M help identify a defensible spatial weights matrix that properly describes municipal spending interactions. Our analysis shows that they do. In particular, geographical proximity is significant only between a pair of municipalities within a given FITS-M group, and it does not affect competition between pairs belonging to different groups even if they are located close to each other. This would suggest that the FITS-M work as intended, indicating that spending interaction among Japanese municipalities originates from yardstick competition and not from other types of fiscal competition.     

Fueling fiscal interactions: commodity price shocks and local government spending in Colombia

This paper explores fiscal interactions in a developing country. We analyze whether public expenditures in neighboring municipalities influence local spending decisions within a comprehensive set of expenditure categories. Our analysis is based on panel data covering the universe of Colombian municipalities from 2000 to 2010. We offer a quasi-experimental identification strategy exploiting exogenous variation in municipalities’ exposure to changes in the world market price of oil, depending on the municipalities’ endowment with oil resources and controlling for municipality fixed effects. While we find evidence of strong spatial autocorrelation of total local public spending as well as in almost all expenditure categories, the quasi-experimental approach reveals that there are no significant causal fiscal interaction effects between municipalities. This highlights the importance of using additional sources of exogenous variation for the identification of fiscal interactions. In the developing country context, our findings suggest that fiscal decentralization policies do not lead to a race to the bottom in local public expenditures.     

Unemployment,Government Spending and the Laffer Effect*

The paper studies the effects of income tax rate changes in a general equilibrium model with frictional unemployment. Laffer curve effects, by which a tax rate reduction may increase the level of government spending or its share in output, are shown to be possible under certain conditions. These are the presence of unemployment benefit payments, government budget balance through fiscal spending adjustment and limited quantitative importance of labour reallocation costs. Endogenous government spending acts as a fiscal accelerator if the fiscal burden of unemployment benefit payments is large, but reduces the employment effects of tax rate cuts if it is low.     

Toward an understanding of year-over-year changes in municipal management discussion and analysis disclosures

SynopsisUsing a unique setting in which the standard setter (the Governmental Accounting Standards Board) provides guidance on the content of Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosures, we investigate the determinants of content changes in municipal government MD&A. We do so in terms of economic changes, turnover, and regulatory characteristics. We use a sample of 1142 municipal MD&A disclosures from fiscal year 2011 to 2015 to calculate a difference score based on the degree to which municipal MD&As change from the previous year. Our empirical analysis highlights that MD&A content changes vary directly with changes in the unemployment rate, fund balance from governmental funds, and auditor turnover. Furthermore, we find evidence that MD&A content changes might be more likely in states without formal GAAP mandates, possibly implying that municipal managers increase transparency by complementing reported financial information with additional qualitative commentary in narrative disclosures when states do not centralize fiscal control over municipalities. Overall, our analysis provides insight on the use of qualitative disclosure by municipal managers, and highlights a need for enhanced commentary on certain items (such as debt and capital expenditures) in order to create greater credibility with and accountability to citizens and other financial statement users. This research is especially timely as GASB re-examines the disclosure mandates of GASB 34.     

House Prices and Government Spending Shocks

We show that dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with housing and collateralized borrowing predict a fall in house prices following positive government spending shocks. By contrast, we show that house prices in the United States rise persistently after identified positive government spending shocks. We clarify that the incorrect house price response is due to a general property of DSGE models—approximately constant shadow value of housing—and that modifying preferences and production structure cannot help in obtaining the correct house price response. Properly accounting for the empirical evidence on government spending shocks and house prices using a DSGE model therefore remains a significant challenge.     

State regulation of accounting practices and municipal borrowing costs

This article examines the association between state regulation of accounting practices and municipal borrowing costs. The results demonstrate that stringent accounting regulations do have an effect on borrowing costs after abstracting the effects of other explanatory variables. The direction of the observed effect is difficult to assess due to presence of multicollinearity in the model. However, lower borrowing costs are suggested by the analysis.     

The unintended consequences of the zero lower bound policy

We study the impact of the zero lower bound interest rate policy on the industrial organization of the U.S. money fund industry. We find that in response to policies that maintain low interest rates, money funds: change their product offerings by investing in riskier asset classes; are more likely to exit the market; and reduce the fees they charge their investors. The consequence of fund closures resulting from interest rate policy is the relocation of resources in affected fund families and in the asset management industry in general, as well as decline in capital of issuers borrowing from money funds.     

Secured Loans and Risky Assets in a Monetary Economy

We study the implication of secured credit with a default option for monetary equilibrium. The intermediary structure has the feature of costly state verification, with the monitoring cost interpreted as the cost of foreclosing assets once a default occurs. Without monitoring costs, uncertainty in asset payoffs does not matter for allocation. The asset price can exhibit a liquidity premium because more assets as collateral raises the borrower's credit limit. When there are monitoring costs, the asset's liquidity premium is strictly positive because pledging more assets reduces the default probability and thus the chance to incur monitoring costs. Under some circumstances, increased risk to dividends of the pledged asset may decrease the marginal borrowing cost to such an extent that bank lending rises, and higher default rates are accompanied by larger aggregate liquidity.     

Immigration and local spending in social services: evidence from a massive immigration wave

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between immigration and redistributive public spending by using the recent, massive arrival of immigrants in Spain. Specifically, we focus our analysis on the effect of 1998–2006 changes in local immigrant density on contemporaneous changes in municipal spending in social services. To address the potential endogenous location of immigrants, we adopt an instrumental variables approach that uses the distribution of rental housing in 1991 to predict the location of immigrant inflows. The results indicate that (per capita) social spending increased less in those municipalities that recorded the largest increases in immigrant density. We interpret our results as a reduction in natives’ demand for redistributive public spending.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.     

THE COST OF INCLUDING A CALL PROVISION IN MUNICIPAL DEBT CONTRACTS

Municipal bond market studies testing for the effect of a call provision on new-issue borrowing cost fail to examine if the cost of the call provision is sensitive to expected changes in interest rates. This may explain why some studies find that the presence of a call provision increases municipal borrowing costs while others find no effect. Another possible reason for the contradictory findings may be a failure to correct for a self-selection bias that results when some issuers choose to include a call provision and others do not. To correct for the potential self-selection problem, a two-stage probit switching regression technique is used here to estimate the cost of a call provision to municipal issuers. Results indicate municipal issuers pay a premium for the call privilege at the time of issue and that the size of the premium is sensitive to expected changes in interest rates.     

Fiscal-audit separation and government disclosure quality

We show that the separation of the fiscal and audit offices of China’s province-level governments leads to high fiscal disclosure quality, an effect that is more pronounced when the political rank of the official in charge of auditing is higher than that of the official in charge of fiscal matters. Dynamically, disclosure quality decreases when fiscal office and audit office go from being separated to being integrated and improves when they go from being integrated to being separated. Finally, fiscal disclosure quality reduces the cost of debt and improves credit ratings of municipal investment and development bonds. We demonstrate an aspect of China’s governance that, even without adequate monitoring from the oppositions or the media, local governments can improve efficiency via horizontal separations of fiscal and audit offices.     

我国财政政策变迁的路径依赖及其原因阐释

财政政策作为一种政府主导的制度安排,其变迁的方向不是随机的,而是存在着路径依赖。20世纪90年代以来,我国的财政政策变迁虽说是基于经济发展周期和宏观调控目标所作的阶段性调整,但在一定程度上具有强调收入功能、对宏观经济波动适度调节、依赖国债和财政赤字的路径依赖特征。分析表明,我国财政政策变迁形成路径依赖的原因在于政府对财政目标的偏好与财政压力的叠加影响、政府主导的财政政策博弈均衡和较高的政策变迁成本的影响。     

House prices, consumption, and monetary policy: a financial accelerator approach

We consider a general equilibrium model with frictions in credit markets used by households. In our economy, houses provide housing services to consumers and serve as collateral to lower borrowing cost. We show that this amplifies and propagates the effect of monetary policy shocks on housing investment, house prices and consumption. We also consider the effect of a structural change in credit markets that lowers the transaction costs of additional borrowing against housing equity. We show that such a change would increase the effect of monetary policy shocks on consumption, but would decrease the effect on house prices and housing investment.     

The Advantage of Flexible Targeting Rules

This paper investigates the consequences of debt stabilization for inflation targeting. If the fiscal authority holds constant the real value of debt at maturity under strict inflation targeting, the equilibrium dynamics are indeterminate for a wide range of parameters and steady‐state fiscal stances. “Flexible” targeting rules that include a concern for stabilization of the output gap can restore determinacy of the equilibrium. Flexible inflation targeting appears to be more robust than flexible debt targeting to alternative parameterizations. The fiscal authority can prevent indeterminacy under strict targeting rules by committing to hold constant debt net of interest rate spending.     

Determinants of municipal loan spreads: empirical evidence from Switzerland

This is the first study to investigate the determinants of risk premia paid by Swiss municipalities in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. This paper draws on a unique data set for Swiss municipalities collected during four surveys. Our results show that fiscal soundness has almost no impact on risk premia and that the introduction of a no-bailout policy did not result in higher spreads. On the other hand, investors’ general risk aversion, as well as interest rate levels, are strongly related to spread levels.     

Analyzing state government spending: balanced budget rules or forward-looking decisions?

We analyze US state government spending behavior with a general intertemporal model allowing for asymmetry in balanced budget rules in a panel data setting. We find no strong evidence for forward-looking behavior in state spending; balanced budget rules are a significant constraint. States with budget rules imposing lighter restrictions are more likely to exhibit habit formation, while those with stricter rules demonstrate asymmetric responses to revenue changes. Evidence for a precautionary savings motive is limited. Balanced budget requirements trigger substantial pro-cyclical spending, possibly amplifying state economic volatility for states with tight fiscal rules, especially after revenue increases.

     

Voters prefer more qualified mayors,but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany

This paper studies the importance of politicians’ qualification, in terms of education and experience, for fiscal outcomes. The analysis is based on a large panel for 2031 German municipalities for which we have collected information on municipal budgets as well as the election results and qualification levels of mayoral candidates. We principally use a regression discontinuity design focusing on close elections to estimate causal effects. We find that mayors with prior experience in office have a tendency to reduce the level of local public debt, lower total municipal expenditures and decrease the local taxes, even though these results are only significant in some specifications. In contrast, the education level of the mayor exerts no significant effects on the overall fiscal performance of the municipality. The results are partly surprising as both education and experience are shown to matter greatly in the electoral success of mayoral candidates.     

Do Governments Hide Resources from Unions? The Influence of Public Sector Unions on Reported Discretionary Fund Balance Ratios

We explore whether municipalities with public sector unions exploit aspects of governmental (or “fund”) accounting to obscure the availability of discretionary resources in fund balance accounts, relative to municipalities without public sector unions. We first investigate whether governments with unions report higher proportions of discretionary resources outside of the general fund, a primary measure of financial health, and instead within less prominent fund types. Second, we explore whether governments with unions report lower ratios within accessible general fund balance account categories – that is, report lower proportions of unreserved fund balance. Primary findings are consistent with both hypotheses. Although somewhat mixed, cross-sectional analyses reveal that effects are magnified when unions have more bargaining power, as proxied by the ability to strike or the absence of state right-to-work laws. Further analysis corroborates cross-sectional findings by examining difference-in-differences specifications surrounding the quasi-exogenous shock of Wisconsin's 2011 weakening of state public sector union laws and Ohio's time-varying union contract negotiations. Overall, the evidence suggests that governments with unions shelter resources to avoid the appearance of large discretionary amounts available.     

Fiscal policy with banks and financial frictions

We assess the role of banks to the transmission of optimal and exogenous changes in fiscal policy to the economy. We built-up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with patient and impatient agents, banks and a government to find that banks and their associated capital-adequacy constraint mitigate the negative spill-over effects to the economy from higher taxes. Specifically, we confirm that labour income tax is the most distortionary fiscal instrument. The optimal choice of a housing tax is the most favorable funding source to a temporary increase in public spending. The combination of housing and labour taxes is the most preferred tax bundle to be optimally chosen under negative output shocks. Moreover, a permanent increase in housing tax is beneficial if it is welfare enhancing and the existence of banks benefits mainly impatient households under permanently higher consumption taxes. Finally, these results remain robust to various robustness checks.