Bank Capital Adequacy versus Deposit Insurance

This paper re-evaluates the Diamond-Dybvig analysis of deposit insurance by constructing a model in which an agent not in need of liquidity sets up a financial intermediary to sell liquidity insurance to other agents who desire such insurance. This intermediary resembles a real-world bank in that it is financed by both demand deposits and equity. It also dominates the Diamond-Dybvig intermediary, which is funded only by demand deposits. Provided the intermediary has adequate capital, it also is perfectly safe. Deposit insurance then is both unnecessary and incapable of achieving a superior outcome to that which private agents could achieve on their own.     

Valuation,Capital Structure,and Shareholder Unanimity for Depository Financial Intermediaries

The theory of corporate finance is not directly applicable to financial intermediary decision-making. The lack of applicability stems largely from the particular conditions that distinguish intermediary operations from those of the nonfinancial firm. First, when intermediaries accept deposit financing, they must produce services such as liquidity and convenience at considerable expense for real resources. Second, the introduction of intermediation is likely to be accompanied by incomplete markets so that shareholder unanimity is not in general valid. In this paper, a model with incomplete markets is developed and a shareholder approved rule for intermediary capital structure decisions is derived.     

金融中介效率对货币政策效果的影响——基于动态随机一般均衡模型的研究

本文运用新凯恩斯框架下的DSGE模型研究金融中介效率对货币政策效果的影响,研究结果表明:(1)无论是利率规则还是数量规则,金融中介效率的提高都会弱化货币政策对产出、消费和通货膨胀的影响;(2)在利率规则下,金融中介效率提高还会平滑劳动的波动,并最终减少社会福利损失,而在数量规则下,金融中介效率提高会放大货币政策冲击造成的劳动的波动,并最终放大社会福利损失。因此,货币政策的中介目标应当由货币供应量向利率转变。     

Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational,Governance, and Financial Engineering

Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.     

金融创新、基本普尔分析与我国货币政策中介目标选择

本文将金融创新因素纳入基本普尔分析之中,对货币政策中介目标选择问题进行了分析,并得出了两个基本结论:(1)在金融创新发展的初期,总需求冲击方差相对于货币需求冲击方差仍然较大,同时IS曲线相对LM曲线会变得更加陡峭,此时中央银行将优先选择货币供给量作为中介目标;(2)在金融创新的快速发展阶段,货币需求函数将变得极不稳定,以致于货币需求冲击远远超过总需求冲击时,无论IS曲线和LM曲线的斜率如何,选择利率充当中介目标将变得更加有吸引力。就我国而言,现阶段货币供给量作为中介目标还是较优的选择;长期来看,利率作为中介目标也会因金融创新而失效,一个可行的选择是通货膨胀目标制度。     

Aspects of insurance,intermediation and finance

This paper is concerned with the role of the insurance company as a financial intermediary which offers securities to uninformed retail investors. The search costs of retail investors cause the demand for the securities offered by intermediaries to be inelastic, making possible an intermediary spread, the difference between the returns on primary securities and the rates offered on the secondary securities sold by intermediaries. It is argued that the intermediary spread is economically significant, and a simple model of its determination is offered: the spread is shown to be an increasing function of interest rates. The bonus policy of life insurance companies is analyzed and is shown to be inefficient under simple assumptions about asset returns.     

On the pricing of intermediated risks: Theory and application to catastrophe reinsurance

We model the equilibrium price and quantity of risk transfer between firms and financial intermediaries. Value-maximizing firms have downward sloping demands to cede risk, while intermediaries, who assume risk, provide less-than-fully-elastic supply. We show that equilibrium required returns will be “high” in the presence of financing imperfections that make intermediary capital costly. Moreover, financing imperfections can give rise to intermediary market power, so that small changes in financial imperfections can give rise to large changes in price.     

Evaluating the Financial Performance of Pension Funds: An Individual Investor's Perspective

Pension funds require the managerial expertise of financial intermediaries, who must be paid a fee or spread. The spread significantly reduces the value of the pension fund over longer holding periods, and implies significantly greater incentive conflicts for defined contribution-funded pension funds than for defined benefit-funded pension funds. The magnitude of the intermediary spread and those factors affecting the demand for financial intermediary reputation and the marginal fee for this reputation are examined for a sample of 66 defined contribution and 54 defined benefit Australian pension funds during 1991–93. The intermediary spread significantly reduces the average net return provided to individual investors, particularly for defined contribution pension funds. Agency-related factors affecting the demand for financial intermediary reputation and its marginal fee reflect underlying contract-based differences between these types of fund.     

中国金融市场化进程对投资的影响研究

本文从考查金融市场化这一中国经济转型期制度变迁的主要方面出发,在引入金融市场化指数的Ndikumana模型基础上,应用Panel Data模型分析方法对金融市场化进程及其相关四个方面(金融中介市场化、政府行为市场化改革、金融市场自由化、金融对外开放)与投资间的影响以及东中西部间差异进行了研究。结论认为:首先,中国金融市场化对投资存在显著影响;其次,在全国层面上,金融市场化对投资的影响大于其他四个方面,而且金融结构的不同对投资的影响存在差异性;其三,在地区层面上,东中西部的金融市场化进程对地区投资的影响显著,地区间总体的差异呈现西部和中部大于东部的趋势。     

Efficiency and Demutualization: Evidence From the U.S. Life Insurance Industry in the 1980s and 1990s

This article examines the efficiency changes of U.S. life insurers before and after demutualization in the 1980s and 1990s. We use two frontier approaches (the value‐added approach and the financial intermediary approach) to measure the efficiency changes. In addition, we use Malmquist indices to investigate the efficiency and productivity change of converted life insurers over time. The results using the value‐added approach indicate that demutualized life insurers improve their efficiency before demutualization. On the other hand, the evidence using the financial intermediary approach shows the efficiency of the demutualized life insurers relative to mutual control insurers deteriorates before demutualization and improves after conversion. The difference in the results between the two approaches is due to the fact that the financial intermediary approach considers financial conditions. The results of both approaches suggest that there is no efficiency improvement after demutualization relative to stock control insurers. There is, however, efficiency improvement relative to mutual control insurers when the financial intermediary approach is used.