Universal Credit: A Preliminary Analysis of Its Impact on Incomes and Work Incentives*

Alongside a series of cuts that will reduce welfare spending by £18 billion per year by 2014–15, the UK government announced in November 2010 plans to integrate and simplify means‐tested welfare benefits and in‐work tax credits for working‐age adults into a single programme, to be known as Universal Credit and to be phased in from October 2013. The aims were to make it easier for claimants to claim benefits, to make the gains to work more transparent and to reduce the amount spent on administration and lost in fraud and error. More households will see entitlements rise from the move to Universal Credit considered in isolation than will see entitlements fall; in aggregate, entitlements will rise by nearly £1.1 billion a year. Low‐income families will see their entitlements rise by more than high‐income families, on average, and couples will gain more from the reform, on average, than single‐adult families, especially if there are also children in the family. In general, those facing the weakest incentive to work at all, or the weakest incentive to increase earnings, see their incentives strengthened, including those with very low earnings and hours worked per week and those who at present experience simultaneous withdrawal of multiple means‐tested benefits and tax credits. But a Council Tax Benefit that operates separately from Universal Credit, and that has rules that vary across English local authorities, could easily undermine many of the supposed advantages of Universal Credit.     

In‐Work Credits in the UK and the US

In‐work credits grew in popularity worldwide during the late 1990s and 2000s as a means of reforming welfare systems in ways that could both encourage work and reduce poverty. This paper reviews the role of in‐work tax credits in the UK and the US, what is known and remains to be known about their impacts and distributional consequences, and the possibilities for reform. Evidence is clear that in‐work credits reduce poverty and can encourage lone parents to work, but have minimal impacts, in aggregate, on second earners. Spending on in‐work credits has grown in the UK, but there have been two major overhauls of the way these are structured so that, on current plans, the UK will not have an identifiable in‐work credit by 2023. In the US, in‐work assistance has grown in generosity and reach since the 1980s, thanks to broad political support for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the (less‐targeted) Child Tax Credit. Future debates in the UK should focus on the rise of in‐work poverty, particularly amongst couples, with some needed focus on the design of in‐work benefits, a debate where economic analysis and evidence should have a major role to play. In the US, the policy discussion should be about whether to increase substantially the EITC for those without children, and how best to maintain or expand the credit's generosity for those with children.     

Should we subsidize work? Welfare reform,the earned income tax credit and optimal transfers

During the 1990s, US income transfer and tax policies shifted towards trying to encourage work among low-income families. Optimal tax theory, however, suggests that work subsidies are usually an inefficient way to raise the incomes of poor families unless the work effort of recipients has external benefits and/or tax payer/voters prefer redistributing income to the working poor rather than the idle poor. This paper discusses the conditions under which work subsidies may be economically efficient and assesses empirical evidence that suggests that welfare reform and expansions of the EITC have increased work effort among low income families, but is inconclusive about whether the policy shift has enabled them to advance beyond entry-level jobs or benefited their children.     

How Taxes and Welfare Benefits Affect Work Incentives: A Life‐Cycle Perspective

Personal taxes and benefits affect the incentive to work over the life cycle by altering income–age profiles, insuring against adverse shocks and changing the returns to human capital. In this paper, we show how a life‐cycle perspective alters our impression of how the UK tax and benefit system affects women's work incentives. Given that actual longitudinal data conflate age effects, cohort effects and policy effects, and, in the UK, are not available covering the full life cycle, we use simulated data produced by a rich, dynamic structural model of female labour supply and human capital that incorporates family formation and fertility. We find that individuals experience considerable variability in work incentives across life that outweighs the variability across individuals. Changes in the presence of children and a partner, as well as the level of any partner's earnings, are key to explaining these patterns: work incentives vary dramatically depending on family composition and the earnings of any partner, especially for the lower‐skilled, and most women experience a number of different family types during the course of their lives.     

What is the After‐Tax Price of R&D? An Interstate Comparison*

As of 2005, 31 US states offered corporate income tax credits on research and development (R&D) expenses in order to encourage more in‐state innovation activities. Empirical questions about the efficacy of such tax breaks at the state level persist, in part because the complexity of the tax laws means that simple credit‐rate comparisons across states do not fully capture the differential variation in effective after‐tax price incentives firms face in choosing where to locate R&D activities. We are unaware of any research analysing and comparing the effective prices of R&D faced by firms, across all US states and utilising micro‐level data. Using data extracted from detailed reading of individual firms' 10‐K and S‐1 filings and of state‐level tax credit rules, we estimate the effective after‐tax price of basic and qualified research expenditure each firm would have faced in each of the 50 states had they been located there. Our methodology simulates the effective tax price of each firm's marginal dollar of research expenditure, assuming the firm chose to move all of its R&D operations to each of the 49 other states. Through Monte Carlo techniques, we consider the sensitivity of our interstate comparative results to several modelling assumptions. We find significant variation in after‐tax R&D prices across states with quite different R&D tax laws. Prices range from $0.176 to $0.520 on a marginal dollar of R&D in Virginia and Washington State, respectively. We also find that the interstate variability is generally more important – indeed, much wider than we had anticipated before investigating state‐by‐state regulations – than the inter‐firm variability within states.     

Abolishing the Tax‐Free Threshold in Australia: Simulating Alternative Reforms*

This paper examines the role of the tax‐free income tax threshold in a complex tax and transfer system consisting of a range of taxes and benefits, each with its own taper rates and thresholds. Considering a tax and benefit system with benefit taper rates whereby some benefits are received by income groups other than those at the bottom of the distribution, it is suggested that a tax‐free threshold is not a necessary requirement to achieve redistribution. Four alternative policy changes, each involving the elimination of the tax‐free threshold in Australia and designed to achieve approximate revenue neutrality, were examined using the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator. A range of implications were examined, including labour supply responses to tax changes and the effects of policy changes on inequality and social welfare. The results demonstrate that it is possible to eliminate the tax‐free threshold under approximate overall revenue and distribution neutrality, but that it is impossible to improve labour supply incentives at the same time. In order to achieve improved incentives, either revenue or distribution neutrality has to be sacrificed.     

The Labour Market Impact of the Working Families' Tax Credit

In October 1999, the working families' tax credit (WFTC) replaced family credit as the main package of in‐work support for families with children. Among a range of stated aims, the WFTC is intended to‘… improve work incentives, encouraging people without work to move into employment'. In this paper, we consider the impact of WFTC on hours and participation. To simulate labour supply responses, we use a discrete behavioural model of household labour supply with controls for fixed and childcare costs, and unobserved heterogeneity. In simulation, we experiment with a number of scenarios regarding the take‐up of the credit, entry wage level and hourly childcare price. We find participation rates among single mothers to increase by around 2.2 percentage points for the base‐case scenario, while for married women participation rates are modelled to fall. Our simulation results indicate a small increase in overall participation of around 30,000 individuals.     

Public Pension Reform in the United Kingdom: What Effect on the Financial Well‐Being of Current and Future Pensioners?*

Unlike many tax and benefit changes, reforms to public pension programmes take many years to have their full effect. This paper examines the effect of reforms to the public pension programme in the United Kingdom on the state retirement incomes of current generations of pensioners and on the prospective state incomes of future generations of pensioners. We show that, for an individual with lifetime earnings close to male average earnings, the UK pension system is at its most generous to those reaching the state pension age around the year 2000, but that the introduction of the state second pension and the pension credit postpones this peak for individuals on lower incomes and for those with substantial periods out of paid employment spent with caring responsibilities. We also consider how the ‘mix’ of benefits, particularly between the contributory and income‐tested sectors, could change over time, and the impact that this would have on incentives to save for retirement.     

Measuring the Effective Tax Burden in the Real World*

This paper argues that forward‐looking indices of the effective tax burden on income from capital – namely, effective marginal and average tax rates – are negatively biased because traditional models overlook dividend constraints associated with financial tax incentives, such as accelerated depreciation. The paper presents measures of the two indices adjusted to remove the bias and compares the new indices with the traditional ones. Numerical simulations carried out to quantify the magnitude of the bias for France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the UK give evidence of sizeable distortions in the unadjusted indices and, in turn, suggest significant mismeasurement in the current assessment of the effective tax burden.     

Tax refunds and income manipulation: evidence from the EITC

Welfare programs are important in terms of reducing poverty, although they create incentives for recipients to maximize their income by either reducing their labor supply or manipulating their taxable income. In this paper, we quantify the extent of such behavioral responses for the earned income tax credit (EITC) in the USA. We exploit the fact that US states can set top-up rates, which means that at a given point in time, workers with the same income receive different tax refunds in different states. Using event studies as well as a border pair design, we document that raising the state EITC leads to more bunching of self-employed tax filers at the first kink point of the tax schedule. While we document a strong relationship up until 2007, we find no effect during the Great Recession. These findings point to important behavioral responses to the largest welfare program in the USA.     

Dividend valuation,trading and transactions costs: the 1997 partial abolition of dividend tax credit repayments

Although UK resident tax-exempt shareholders lost the right to repayment of tax credits on dividends paid by UK resident companies in July 1997, they could continue to receive tax credit repayments in respect of dividends received from Irish resident companies until December 1998. In July 1997 the rate of tax credit on Irish companies' dividends was 21%, and this was reduced to 11% in December 1997. We obtain insights into the incentives and behaviour of UK tax-exempt investors in response to these changes in the relative ‘tax attractiveness’ of investments in Irish resident companies. We find that only at its highest rate, 21%, was the level of dividend tax credit on Irish companies' dividends sufficient to induce changes in UK tax-exempt shareholders' investment strategies; and that the propensity for dividend capture by tax-exempt investors is heightened when the dividend tax credit yield is of the order of 0.8 or more and dividend yield is of the order of 2.6% or more.     

Use of credit and arrears on debt among low‐income families in the United Kingdom

Household accumulation of debt and arrears on debt, especially among low‐income families, is an extremely topical issue in the UK media and in policy circles. This paper utilises data from the UK's Survey of Low Income Families in order to examine use of credit, and default and arrears, among low‐income families with children. It shows how credit use and accumulation of arrears differ between single parents and couples with children, and also between homeowners and renters. It also briefly examines the persistence of arrears on specific forms of credit using the panel element of the data‐set, now named the Families and Children Survey.     

On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code

This paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor productivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution. A progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare. These beneficial effects of a progressive tax system have to be traded off against the efficiency loss arising from distorting endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions.Using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we find that the optimal US income tax is well approximated by a flat tax rate of 17.2% and a fixed deduction of about $9,400. The steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 1.7% higher consumption in each state of the world. An explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates that a majority of the population currently alive (roughly 62%) would experience welfare gains, suggesting that such fundamental income tax reform is not only desirable, but may also be politically feasible.     

The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECD Countries*

In social project appraisal, the policy profile of both distributional welfare weights and the social discount rate has risen considerably in recent years. This fact has important implications for the allocation of funds to social projects and policies in countries, and in unions of countries such as the EU. A key component in the formulae for both welfare weights and the social discount rate is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, e. A critical review of existing evidence on e suggests that the UK Treasury's preferred value of unity is too low. New evidence presented in this paper, based on the structure of personal income tax rates, suggests that, on average, for developed countries e is close to 1.4. This particular approach to the estimation of e has previously been under‐utilised by researchers.     

Tax credits,income support,and partnership decisions

This paper considers the potential impact of welfare benefits on the partnership status of women in the UK. Using recent policy reforms to identify the response rate, it was found that a ￡100/week welfare benefit “partnership penalty” reduces the probability of a woman having a partner by seven percentage points. The model is also used to explore the potential effects of the recent tax credit reforms on partnership rates; it was found that while the 1999 WFTC reform improved partnership incentives, this effect was effectively undone by the 2003 WTC/CTC reform.      

Changes in Income Distributions and the Role of Tax‐Benefit Policy During the Great Recession: An International Perspective

In this paper, we examine the impact of the economic crisis and the policy reaction on inequality and relative poverty in four European countries: France, Germany, Ireland and the UK. The period examined, 2008–13, was one of great economic turmoil, yet it is unclear whether changes in inequality and poverty rates over this time period were mainly driven by changes in market income distributions or by tax‐benefit policy reforms. We disentangle these effects by producing counterfactual (‘no reform') scenarios using tax‐benefit microsimulation and representative household surveys for each country. For the first stage of the Great Recession, we find that the policy reaction contributed to stabilising or even decreasing inequality and relative poverty in the UK, France and, especially, Ireland. Market income changes nonetheless pushed up inequality and relative poverty in France. Relative poverty increased in Germany as a result of policy responses combined with market income changes. Subsequent policy reforms, in the later stage of the crisis, had markedly different cross‐country effects, decreasing overall poverty in France, increasing it in Ireland, and giving mixed effects for different subgroups in Germany and the UK.     

Reinsurance and corporate taxation in the United Kingdom life insurance industry

There are two main tax-related arguments regarding the use of reinsurance – the income volatility reduction and the income level enhancement arguments. The income volatility reduction argument contends that firms facing convex tax schedules have incentives to hedge in order to reduce the volatility of their annual taxable income and thereby lower expected tax liabilities [Smith, C.W., Stulz, R.M., 1985. Optimal hedging policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 19, 127–140]. The income level enhancement argument, advanced by Adiel [Adiel, R., 1996. Reinsurance and the management of regulatory ratios and taxes in the property–casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22, 207–240], is more specific to hedging via reinsurance. This perspective holds that reinsurance enhances current reported earnings via the receipt of reinsurance commissions and so increases tax liabilities. Consequently, insurance firms with high marginal tax rates should use less reinsurance than those with low marginal tax rates if tax matters. Prior studies using data on financial derivatives have produced mixed results on the validity of the first argument, while Adiel (1996) finds the second argument insignificant in his study of the use of reinsurance by a sample of United States (US) property–liability insurance firms. This study tests the two tax-related arguments using 1992–2001 data for a sample of United Kingdom (UK) life insurance firms. We find that UK life insurers with low before-planning marginal tax rates tend to use more reinsurance; in contrast, tax convexity is found to have no significant impact on the purchase of reinsurance and so the volatility-reduction argument is not supported.     

The Elasticity of Taxable Income in New Zealand*

This paper reports estimates of the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net‐of‐tax rate for New Zealand taxpayers. The relative stability of the New Zealand personal income tax system, in terms of marginal rates, thresholds and the tax base, provides helpful conditions for deriving these estimates. The elasticity of taxable income was estimated to be substantially higher for the highest income groups. Changes in the timing of income flows for the higher income recipients were found to be an important response to the announcement of a new higher rate bracket. The marginal welfare costs of personal income taxation were consistent across years, being relatively small for all but the higher tax brackets. For the top marginal rate bracket of 39 per cent, the welfare cost of raising an extra dollar of tax revenue was estimated to be well in excess of a dollar. Implications of the findings are that: disincentive effects of high top marginal rates can be substantial even when labour supply responses are small; the welfare costs of increases in top marginal tax rates can be high; and announcement effects of tax policy changes can lead to considerable income shifting between time periods.     

Removing Homeownership Bias in Taxation: The Distributional Effects of Including Net Imputed Rent in Taxable Income

The income tax systems of most countries entail a favourable treatment of homeownership, compared to rental‐occupied housing. Such ‘homeownership bias’ and its consequences for a wide range of economic outcomes have long been recognised in the economic literature. Although a removal of the homeownership bias is generally advocated on efficiency grounds, its distributional implications are often neglected, especially in a cross‐country perspective. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by investigating the first‐order effects, in terms of distribution of income and work incentives, of removing the income tax provisions favouring homeownership. We consider six European countries – Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK – that exhibit important variation in terms of income tax treatment of homeowners. Using the multi‐country tax benefit model EUROMOD, we analyse the distributional consequences of including net imputed rent in the taxable income definition that applies in each country, together with the removal of existing special tax treatments of incomes or expenses related to the main residence; thus, we provide a measure of the homeownership bias. We implement three tax policy scenarios. In the first, imputed rent is included in the taxable income of homeowners, while at the same time existing mortgage interest tax relief schemes and taxation of cadastral incomes are abolished. In the two further revenue‐neutral scenarios, the additional tax revenue raised through the taxation of imputed rent is redistributed to taxpayers, through either a tax rate reduction or a tax exemption increase. The results show how including net imputed rent in the tax base might affect inequality in each of the countries considered. Housing taxation appears to be a promising avenue for raising additional revenues, or lightening taxation of labour, with no inequality‐increasing side effects.     

Inequality and two decades of British tax and benefit reforms

Microsimulation methods are used to identify the contribution of tax and benefit reforms to the significant growth in UK income inequality since 1979. The total effect turns out to depend crucially on the counterfactual against which the reforms are assessed: compared with the alternative of pure price‐indexation, the total effect of reform is small; by contrast, compared with a counterfactual in which benefits rose in line with national income (historically the case before 1979), the effect is substantial – approximately half the total rise in income inequality is explained. The impact of reforms on inequality has varied significantly over time: income tax cuts in the late 1970s and late 1980s increased inequality; direct tax rises in the early 1980s and 1990s, together with increases in means‐tested benefits in the late 1990s, reduced it. The robustness of the results to sampling variation and to the measure of inequality used is also investigated.