Canadian Provincial Budget Outcomes: A Long–run and Short–run Perspective

This paper tests a theory of public budgeting as a long–run and short–run process. In this model, political decision makers strive to achieve budgetary balance over the long–run but are constrained in the short–run and follow incremental decision–making. First, the budget equilibrium theory is elaborated upon and is used to explain the relationship between revenues, expenditures, and debt along with control variables one being provincial general elections. Second, the interaction between these variables is tested with a vector error correction model for each of the Canadian provinces using annual data between 1961 and 2000. The results show that in the long–run the driving force of provincial budgeting was expenditure control initiatives in seven of the ten provinces. In the short–run, incrementalism occurred in all of the provinces and a political business cycle was evident in six provinces.     

The stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants and the marginal cost of public funds

This paper tests the hypothesis that the stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants increase with the marginal cost of public funds of the recipient government. We present a simple theoretical framework that shows how a lump-sum transfer stimulates the marginal expenditures of a recipient government through an income effect and a price effect. We then test the prediction of this model using Canadian provincial data and exploit the discontinuity in the equalization grants allocation formula to identify the effects of grants. Our results indicate that the stimulative effects of lump-sum grants on spending increase with the provincial government’s marginal cost of public funds (MCF). One policy implication of our results is that higher intergovernmental transfers may be welfare improving if the federal government has a lower MCF than the provinces.     

Incentive effects of bonus depreciation

This study examines the effect on capital expenditures of “bonus depreciation,” which was intended to stimulate such spending by allowing businesses to immediately expense a portion of the cost of qualified capital expenditures from late 2001 through 2004. After controlling for many previously documented determinants of capital expenditures, some of our results indicate that capital expenditures during bonus depreciation’s availability were greater than those during the time it was not available, consistent with the expected effect. However, other results indicate that bonus depreciation had an insignificant effect on capital expenditures. These mixed findings generally persist through several sensitivity analyses. We interpret these results as weakly supportive evidence that Congress attained its goal of stimulating capital spending.     

Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces

This paper examines the fiscal policy choices of Canadian provincial governments in the context of partisan and opportunistic cycles. We identify an electoral cycle in which the predilection of provincial governments of all political stripes to increase taxes is temporarily halted in election years. Opportunistic responses in spending are also present. Spending in highly visible areas (schools, roads and hockey rinks) tends to increase in election years. Partisan responses are largely absent from revenues but appear more frequently in program spending choices. Thus, Canadian political parties tend to favour differentiating amongst themselves via their spending, as opposed to their revenue, choices.     

Cutting costs without drawing blood

When looking for ways to cut costs, most managers reach for the head-count hatchet, and the markets usually roar with approval. But a company can almost always create far more sustainable value by rigorously evaluating the small-ticket capital items that often get rubber-stamped. Drawing on his experience as a consultant and providing numerous anecdotes, the author contends that those "little" requests often prove to be gold plated or unnecessary. A disciplined evaluation involves asking only eight questions and conducting postmortems--regular audits of units' capital spending. But the payoff is enormous. Because cutting the capital budget increases cash flow, the author argues that a permanent cut of just 15% in the planned level of capital spending could boost some companies' market capitalization by as much as 30%. The first three questions--Is this your investment to make? Does it really have to be new? How are our competitors meeting compliance needs?--are asked of operating managers as they assemble capital project requests. The next three are asked by senior managers of themselves and their colleagues as they examine proposals: Is the left hand duplicating investments made by the right? Are trade-offs between profit and capital spending well understood? Are there signs of budget massage? At the end of the review process, senior managers ask: Are we fully using shared assets? How fine-grained are our capacity measures? The author's suggestions for the postmortem include searching for systematic problems with whole classes of expenditures and making sure audit teams come up with specific recommendations for change.     

Budget repair or budget spectacle? The passage of Wisconsin’s Act 10

Strategic planning processes use budgets to implement control and accountability. However, budgets can also be used to generate support for strategic decisions, for example by creating a political spectacle. A political spectacle is a problem engineered to have a specific political impact. This paper investigates politicians’ use of a state budget as a political manoeuvre to defend strategic decisions regarding public employee unions in Wisconsin. The analysis shows how the 2011 state budget in Wisconsin was used to create a political spectacle to generate support for eliminating collective bargaining for public workers, especially public (state) school teachers.     

New development: How MPs in the Dutch parliament strengthened their budgetary and accounting powers

After experiencing a lack of political interest for financial and performance information in the Dutch House of Representatives, the author, a member of parliament, introduced a systematic approach for parliamentarians to review the country’s national budget and accounts. Drawing on corporate experience, the approach is a parliamentary version of a corporate audit committee working with a standardized review questionnaire. It gained wide support and is now used by several parliamentary committees. Nevertheless, the author raises various questions to the public accounting and control research community to improve the method and ensure its long-term use by politicians.     

Too close for comfort? Geographic propinquity to political power and stock returns

We show that firm headquarters’ geographic proximity to political power centers (state capitals) is associated with higher abnormal returns. Consistent with the notion that this effect is rooted in social network links, we find it is more pronounced in communities with high levels of sociability and political values’ homophily, and that it dissipates when firms move their headquarters to another state. Finally, in line with the view that investors perceive such networks to be associated with political risk, we find that this effect is particularly strong when there are substantial levels of corruption, dependency on government spending, and politicians’ turnover.     

Voluntary disclosure of corporate political spending

In this paper, we study voluntary political spending disclosure, a widespread yet relatively unexplored corporate voluntary disclosure practice. Using an index created by the CPA-Zicklin Center that measures the level of voluntary political spending disclosure for S&P 500 firms, we examine firm-level characteristics associated with such disclosures, and their importance. We find that firms with greater political expenditures, direct political connections, higher investor activism, better corporate social responsibility performance and governance, and more industry competition tend to have a higher level of political spending disclosure. We also find that a higher level of political spending disclosure is positively associated with both the number of institutional investors and the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors, particularly socially responsible institutional investors, after controlling for the quality of other disclosures. The level of political spending disclosure is also associated with a higher analyst following, lower forecast error, and smaller forecast dispersion. Finally, we find that political spending disclosure enhances the positive relationship between annual corporate political spending and firm financial performance. Together, these results are consistent with the view that voluntary political spending disclosure helps align managers’ interests with those of shareholders.     

Political geography and corporate political strategy

We examine the relationship between political geography and corporate political strategy by considering lobbying expenditures. We find that firms increase their lobbying intensity when local politicians cannot provide a direct link to the governing elite, i.e. when firm location on the political map shifts to an area that is not closely aligned with the president. Our results indicate that firm lobbying is a means for exerting influence on political power and is primarily geared toward building valuable political capital in order to exploit short-term opportunities. Lobbying expenditures are a matter of expediency for politically active firms that tend to spend less on lobbying when there is an alignment of power and more when there is misalignment of power. We also find that more sophisticated, better informed institutional investors recognize and/or encourage corporate political strategies that involve adjusting lobbying efforts in response to changes in political geography.     

Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China

This paper shows that incentives created by the impending turnover of local politicians can accelerate the pace of initial public offering (IPO) activity in certain politicized environments. Focusing on China, we exploit a research setting where politicians are rewarded for capital market development, firms rely on political connections for access to capital, rent-seeking behavior is rampant, and the objectives of the state might not be to maximize capital market efficiency. We find that the rate of exchange eligible firms engaging in an IPO temporarily increases in advance of impending political promotion events. This effect holds for both state-owned and non-state-owned entities. For state-owned firms, the effect is strongest in those provinces where the politicians are more likely to be rewarded for market development activity. For non-state-owned firms, the temporary increase in IPO activity appears to be (rationally) opportunistic in nature, with the effect stronger around events more likely to disrupt the firms' political connections. Promotion period IPOs underperform non-promotion period IPOs in terms of both future financial performance and long-run stock returns, have controlling shareholders who retain a larger fraction of the company, and are more likely to divert proceeds away from their intended use after the offering.     

Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high‐level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three‐month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.     

Does political pressure matter in bank lending? Evidence from China

Using provincial data from China between 2002 and 2011, we find substantial evidence indicating a positive association between the growth of bank loans issued by commercial banks and the political pressures faced by provincial leaders. This association is particularly true for state‐owned banks, which are much more politically pressurized than others, but is relatively attenuated in provinces with a more developed banking sector. We also find that bank loans issued under greater political pressures are less commercially oriented and have lower quality. Our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses and alternative measures of political pressure. Overall, our study contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the role of the political incentives of government officials in fuelling economic growth through credit allocation.     

Policy and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital

This paper investigates the effect of voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies/oversight of corporate political activities/spending on the cost of equity capital for S&P 500 firms over the period 2015–2018. Using the CPA-Zicklin Index to measure the level of policies, oversight, and disclosure of corporate political activities, we find that firms with a greater level of policies and oversight enjoy a lower cost of equity capital. We also document that a higher index is associated with higher stock liquidity. The negative relation is more pronounced among firms with higher exposure to political risk and firms with higher dependence on government spending. We also find that a firm’s information environment plays an important role in moderating the relation between policies and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies and oversight mitigates risks and uncertainties related to firms’ political activities, thereby reducing information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital.     

Government spending on research and development in the UK

This paper explores the extent of current UK government spending on science and technology placed in its recent historical context. The allocation of this spending across the different arms of government, the primary purposes of the expenditures undertaken and the extent to which the government performs as well as funds R&D are also explored, with some international comparisons analysed. The political and institutional processes that determine the revealed patterns of expenditure in the UK, the rationales behind such spending and the aims and objectives of the main spending departments are discussed, as is the interaction with EU expenditures on science and technology. The effectiveness of or pay-off to government support of this kind is also considered before future spending plans are addressed.     

财政竞争、地方政府政策选择与经济增长——基于中国省际面板数据的实证研究

分税制背景下财政分权体制使得地方政府之间存在着激烈的财政竞争,其典型特征表现为税负、公共投入支出和公共服务支出三种政策工具之间的策略互动,从而影响各地区的经济增长。基于1997～2009年中国省级面板数据,通过估计交互项系数的符号,结果发现:地方政府的三种政策工具是相辅相成的;交互项的作用也存在着地区的差异;税负、公共服务支出和公共投入支出对经济增长有着不同的边际影响。     

Does the budget process matter for infrastructure spending? Capital budgeting in local government

Investment in long-term capital projects plays an increasingly important role in improving the quality of many public services, as well as promoting economic development. Using data on capital spending and capital budget structures in county governments in Georgia, USA, this paper explains how a separate capital budget protects infrastructure spending in times of fiscal distress. The author found little evidence that county governments with a separate capital budget spent more than those without a capital budget.     

Public education spending in a globalized world:

This paper studies the effect of globalization on public expenditures allocated to different stages of education. First, we derive theoretically that globalization’s influence on education expenditures depends on the type of government. For benevolent governments, the model suggests that expenditures for higher education will increase and expenditures for basic education will decline with deepening economic integration. For Leviathan governments, on the other hand, the effects of globalization on public education spending cannot be unambiguously predicted. In the second part of the paper, we empirically analyze globalization’s influence on primary, secondary, and tertiary education expenditures with panel data covering 104 countries over the 1992–2006 period. The results indicate that globalization has led in both industrialized and developing countries to more spending for secondary and tertiary and to less spending for primary education.     

Political institutions and government spending behavior: theory and evidence from Iran

This study examines how the quality of political institutions affects the distribution of the government budget in Iran. We first introduce a mechanism through which democracy can shift government expenditure from national defense (military) to productivity-enhancing public spending (e.g., education). Using impulse response functions and a variance decomposition analysis on the basis of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, our results imply that the response of military spending to an improvement (a deterioration) of democratic institutions is negative (positive) and statistically significant, whereas that of education spending is positive (negative) and significant. Our results are robust to other indicators of political institutions, different orderings of variables in the VAR, and alternative specifications of government spending categories.     

How do politicians shape and use budgets to govern public sector organizations? A position-practice approach

This paper examines politicians’ influence on budgets in governing public sector organizations. Theoretical reasoning is based on the position-practice concept applied in structuration theory. Research took place in a hospital district in Finland from 2009 to 2015. The findings show that politicians set coercive budgetary policies, but there was no direct relationship between budgets and actual medical practices. As a result, the budget was simply a ‘ceremonial’ tool of political governance, as medical professionals concentrate on delivering healthcare services.