防范关联交易风险 保护银行债权安全

随着关联企业这种企业联合体的产生与推广，关联交易已经渗透到经济生活的各个领域，并产生了深刻的影响。在肯定关联交易积极作用的同时，我们也应该注意到不正当关联交易给银行债权带来的潜在风险。例如，关联企业之间通过不正当的关联交易来转移资产、逃避债务，从而使银行债权落空的情况在中国屡见不鲜。因此，如何防范关联交易风险、维护银行债权安全就成为一个亟待解决的问题。在本文中，笔者着力研究了不正当关联交易给银行债权带来的危害及其成因，提出了防范关联交易风险、保护银行债权的对策，并对完善我国公司法提出了一些立法建议。     

防范关联交易风险 保护银行债权安全

文章简述了不正当关联交易给银行债权带来的危害，提出了健全统一授信制度，确立公司人格否认原则，完善信息披露制度、规范担保等保护银行债权的对策。     

对银行贷款企业关联方及关联交易问题的思考

当前贷款企业借助关联交易调节利润，达废银行债务的做法，给银行信贷管理带来了潜在的风险。本文介绍了我国相关会计制度对关联方及关联方交易的规定和判断标准，对贷款企业可能利用的关联交易进行了归类，分析了关联交易给银行信贷管理带来的制度风险、财务报告风险、法律风险和道德风险，并对如何防范风险提出了建议。     

商业银行关联交易风险及其防范

随着我国国有银行股份制改造及现代商业银行公司治理结构的推行，一些银行在增资扩股时吸收了大量的企业资本加入，形成了银企关联的关系，其中个别地方发生了控股企业操纵银行高级管理层并进行恶意关联交易的事件。可以说，商业银行关联交易的发展给商业银行的风险管理和监管当局的风险监管带来了巨大的挑战。防范关联交易风险，无论对银行本身     

对防范关联企业信贷风险的研究

当前,以企业集团为主的关联企业间的关联关系日趋错综复杂,一些集团公司盲目扩张、管理混乱、缺乏诚信,利用关联企业多头套取银行资金,或通过关联交易转移资产,甚至逃废银行债务,给商业银行贷款带来严重风险。本文在深入剖析关联企业的表现、关联企业的信贷风险特点的基础上,提出了商业银行如何防范关联企业信贷风险的设想和建议。     

关于贷款企业关联方及关联交易的思考

伴随着市场经济发展,企业规模化、多元化经营的趋势明显,关联方关系及其交易变得越来越普遍。对银行而言,由于贷款企业可能利用关联方关系或关联交易,达到调节利润、粉饰报表,逃废银行债务的目的,这给银行的信贷资金带来了潜在风险。因此,如何对关联方交易进行有效的识别、分析,正确地评价贷款企业经营状况和资金情况,防范潜在风险,成为银行信贷管理的重要工作。     

商业银行在集团客户信贷风险案例中应汲取的教训及其对策

集团企业关联交易是一个普遍存在的经济现象,它的产生和发展,有降低经营成本、发挥规模效益、优化资产结构、实现集团利润最大化和提高整体市场竞争能力等客观的需求,但不公平关联交易所引发的集团风险案例。对银行等债权人权益的损害也十分突出,严重威胁了银行信贷资产的安全。暴露出我国现行关联企业制度的缺陷以及我国商业银行关联风险控制机制的漏洞。本文剖析了关联交易的4种主要特征,旨在揭开集团企业关联交易复杂、神秘的面纱,结合商业银行信贷操作实际,提出了防范集团关联交易风险的六个环节。     

如何防范关联企业信贷风险

随着市场经济的发展，业务范围跨行业、跨地区的集团企业越来越多，企业间的关联关系日趋错综复杂，某些关联企业钻银行信贷管理制度不健全的空子，大量占用银行贷款，通过关联交易转移资产，甚至逃废银行债务，给商业银行贷款带来严重风险。同时，由于一些集团公司盲目扩张，管理混乱，缺乏诚信，利用关联企业多头套取银行资金，往往某一环节出现资金链条断裂，就会引起连锁反应，并导致商业银行出现贷款集中度风险和关联交易风险。     

非正当关联交易行为的法律问题研究

由于我国对关联交易行为的法律规制不够完善,出现了许多侵吞公司财产、损害中小股东利益的非正当关联交易,影响着我国市场经济秩序的稳定。本文将对非正当关联交易的概念进行界定,并分析非正当关联交易的具体表现形式,并在此基础上提出一些对策,以期防范非正当关联交易行为,维护市场经济秩序。     

浅谈如何防范关联企业信贷风险

随着我国社会主义市场经济体制的日趋完善，特别是随着民营经济的快速发展，以企业集团为主的关联企业如雨后春笋般崛起。关联企业融资的主要来源是商业银行贷款。但值得注意的是，在市场经济条件下，投资主体多元化、业务范围跨行业、跨地区的集团企业越来越多，企业间的关联关系日趋错综复杂，某些关联企业钻银行信贷管理制度不健全的空子，通过关联交易转移资产，甚至逃废银行债务，给商业银行贷款带来严重风险。同时，由于一些集团公司盲目扩张．管理混乱．缺乏诚信，利用关联企业多头套取银行资金，往往某一环节出现资金链条断裂，就会引起连锁反应，导致商业银行出现贷款集中度风险和关联交易风险，如众所周知的“德隆事件”、“农凯事件”．“铁本项目”等。鉴此，商业银行应高度重视，采取有效措施加强对关联企业的信贷风险防范。[编者按]     

Institutional failure or market failure?

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.     

上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度绩效的实证检验

我国上市公司终极控股股东利用对上市公司的控制权,普遍通过非公平关联交易、违规信息披露、市场操纵等方式获取控制权私人收益,非法侵害中小投资者的合法权益。从上市公司股权结构等角度,通过逻辑回归分析,分别对股权分置改革时期、后股权分置时期中国上市公司中小投资者权益保护制度的绩效进行实证检验,这为制定保护中小投资者权益的政策提供了实证依据。     

中国“二元经济”结构下的土地银行研究

土地问题是中国社会问题的核心。从中国的＂二元经济＂结构入手,研究土地银行是非常有意义的课题。本文研究发现,二元分割的经济结构对土地产权的交易更容易产生＂败德行为＂,并加深＂二元经济＂的对立;不完整的产权制度造成了比较混乱的＂多中心主体＂的利益格局,出现＂弱化一方,增强另一方＂的经济权利的现象,造成土地资源配置的低效率;＂土地货币＂却是政府对土地定价权独占的衍生物,通过控制＂土地货币＂的发行量来增减财政收入。但它们严重地妨碍了土地资本化的深化,并且不利于土地银行业务的拓展。     

融资租赁、银行信贷与企业投资

本文从企业投资视角探讨融资租赁与银行信贷之间是否存在替代关系,以及融资约束对于两者关系的作用机理。通过手工整理中国沪深两市 2004-2016 年间全部 A 股上市公司的年度融资租赁数据,并结合公司财务数据进行实证检验,结果表明:融资租赁和银行信贷都能够显著促进公司投资效率提高,并且融资租赁对于银行信贷具有显著的替代效应。本文进一步从融资约束视角验证融资租赁替代银行信贷的影响机制,发现公司的有形性资产净值率较低、资产负债率较高或是民营企业,则公司面临的融资约束程度越严重,融资租赁对银行信贷的替代作用就会越大。这不仅为融资租赁有助于实体经济发展提供了微观证据,也对于持续深化金融供给侧结构性改革,助力“六稳”“六保”具有政策启示。     

公司为股东担保的法律效力及商业银行的对策建议

现行银行贷款担保中相当比例是公司为股东担保,其法律效力如何直接关系到银行贷款的安全.我国现行的法律规定并未绝对禁止公司为股东的债务提供担保.允许公司为其股东的债务提供担保既是现实经济生活之需要,亦有利于公司自身的发展,对促进债权实现和维护交易安全均具有积极作用,符合现代立法趋势.商业银行有条件地接受公司为股东提供的融资担保,有利于在防范风险的前提下拓展自己的业务领域.本文提出应修改<公司法>第60条第3款和相关法律法规,建立和完善股东表决权排除制度、董事回避制度、股东诉讼制度和担保信息披露制度,以构建和完善我国公司为股东担保制度.     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.     

Product market competition,ultimate controlling structure and related party transactions

Previous studies have shown that product market competition has an important effect on corporate strategies and internal governance mechanisms. Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2004 to 2009, we explore the relationship between product market competition and normal related party transactions and find a significant positive relationship. In addition, we investigate the substitutive effect of product market competition and the cash flow rights owned by ultimate controlling shareholders on the extent of normal related party transactions. In particular, our results suggest a positive relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights and normal related party transactions that is strongest in noncompetitive industries and weakens as product market competition increases.     

对企业债转股的财务评价和分析

债权转股权是金融资产管理公司作为投资主体,将商业银行原有的不良信贷资产转为金融管理公司对企业的股权,以及国家开发银行对企业的股权,由原来的债权债务关系,转变为金融资产管理公司和国家开发银行与实施债权转股权企业之间的持股与被持股或控股与被控股的关系。但是,并非所有国有企业都符合债转股条件,债转股对具体企业也不是都有利。对于符合条件,能考虑实施债转股,并对企业长期发展有利的企业,需要利用现代财务分析评价方法来分析评价债转股。     

Political Connections and Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Indonesia

This paper examines whether politically connected firms use related party transactions as a tunneling mechanism in Indonesia. We further investigate whether the presence of tunneling compels managers to manage earnings to conceal such expropriation of resources. Our study is motivated by conflicting evidence in the extant literature about the role of political connections and related party transactions. Using data from Indonesia, we document that politically connected firms use related party loans to tunnel resources, and that this effect is more pronounced for firms with government connections. We further document that politically connected firms manage earnings to conceal their tunneling activities. By documenting the role of related party transactions as a specific channel through which connected firms expropriate resources, we enrich the political connection and related party transactions literature.     

What’s the value of politically connected directors?

This study examines the stock price response to Document 18, a regulation released in China in 2013 requiring independent directors with political connections to resign from the boards of directors for publicly listed firms. We document a significant positive price response in the window surrounding the directive’s promulgation date. This response is also of important economic magnitude. Our findings suggest that on average, the market views the costs of hiring politically connected directors as outweighing the associated benefits. Consistent with this view, we document that politically connected directors often shirk their board duties, as evidenced by their poor rates of attendance at board meetings. Further investigations show that the value decreasing effect of politically connected directors is apparent mainly for firms in regulated industries and varies with earnings management practices. However, the market views politically connected directors favorably if firms have significant business transactions with the government.