Bubble in the Indian stock market: myth or reality

The paper investigates the existence of speculative bubbles in the Indian stock market using both monthly and weekly returns for the period 1990–2007. Further, a year-by-year analysis using weekly returns was also carried out to test for the existence of bubbles in each individual year. The results suggest that no speculative bubbles were present in the Indian stock market for the sample period considered for this study.     

首日涨停板制度与IPO解禁效应——基于投机泡沫视角的分析

本文以2006—2016年上市的1397家公司为研究样本,实证检验了首日涨停板制度对新股解禁效应的影响。结果发现:首日涨停板制度实施期间发行的新股,解禁时有显著更差的市场表现,[-30,30]窗口期间的超额回报低至-8.43%,同时有更小的异常交易量和异常波动率;新股上市时股价高估程度越大、投资者情绪越高,首日涨停板制度对解禁效应的影响越强。上述结果支持了Hong et al.(2006)提出的“解禁与资产泡沫破灭”的理论,即首日涨停板制度导致新股发行后投机泡沫累积,投机泡沫破灭导致解禁时更大幅度的股价下跌。本文的研究结论补充了首日涨停板制度后果的文献,并对防范金融风险和完善新股市场化改革具有一定的政策参考价值。     

Speculative bubbles in emerging stock markets and macroeconomic factors: A new empirical evidence for Asia and Latin America

The purpose of this study is firstly to test for the existence of periodically collapsing stock price bubbles in Asian and Latin American emerging stock markets for the period 1990–2009. We use the new non-cointegration test developed by Taylor and Peel (1998) with the Residuals-Augmented Least Squares (RALS) method of Im (1996) and Im and Schmidt (2008) for monthly data of price indexes and dividends. The results show that the hypothesis of formation of bubbles cannot be rejected for all of the studied emerging stock markets. This evidence implies that the co-integration relation between the prices and the dividends is not always supported, indicating that the stock prices do not reflect their fundamental values in the emerging stock markets. We then link speculative bubbles with macroeconomic and financial factors, which is an interesting contribution of this study. The degree of equity market openness is found to be the key factor, positively related to the formation of speculative bubbles in these markets.     

Optimal learning and new technology bubbles

It is widely believed that there is a fundamental linkage between major technological innovations, speculative fever, and wasteful overinvestment. This paper presents an equilibrium model of investment in a new industry, whose return-to-scale is not known in advance. Overinvestment relative to the full-information case is then optimal as the most efficient way to learn about the new technology. Moreover, the initial overinvestment is accompanied by apparently inflated stock prices and apparently negative expected excess returns in the new industry, which are also fully rational. This suggests a new interpretation of what seems to be stock market driven real bubbles.     

Average correlation and stock market returns

If the Roll critique is important, changes in the variance of the stock market may be only weakly related to changes in aggregate risk and subsequent stock market excess returns. However, since individual stock returns share a common sensitivity to true market return shocks, higher aggregate risk can be revealed by higher correlation between stocks. In addition, a change in stock market variance that leaves aggregate risk unchanged can have a zero or even negative effect on the stock market risk premium. We show that the average correlation between daily stock returns predicts subsequent quarterly stock market excess returns. We also show that changes in stock market risk holding average correlation constant can be interpreted as changes in the average variance of individual stocks. Such changes have a negative relation with future stock market excess returns.     

Returns and volatilities of energy futures markets: Roles of speculative and hedging sentiments

This study examines how speculative and hedging sentiments influence the returns and volatilities of energy futures markets. We construct speculative and hedging sentiment indices based on the weekly data of fund and commercial positions of four energy futures: crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, and natural gas, traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) from 15 January 2013 to 5 February 2019. Our study demonstrates that speculative sentiment generates greater market fluctuations in the energy futures markets than hedging sentiment; and, further, speculative sentiment stimulates a reversal effect on the returns of crude oil futures. Moreover, speculative sentiment exerts positive systemic risk compensation on the four futures' returns, whereas hedging sentiment alleviates volatilities in the energy futures markets. Most notably, distinguishing it from the leverage effect in stock markets, the speculative sentiment in the energy futures markets is influenced more by good than by bad news; while hedging sentiment exhibits emotional neutrality, as opposed to its impact on stock markets as reported in the literature. Additionally, the positive hedging sentiment in crude oil futures demonstrates significant systemic risk compensation, whereas the three other futures do not have an influence, confirming the prevalence of speculation in hedging transactions in crude oil futures. Our further analysis shows cross-market volatility spillover effects, among which speculative sentiment inherent in crude oil futures causes volatility spillovers to the three other futures, while hedging sentiment has no such effect. Our study has implications for overseeing international energy futures markets, providing regulators with evidence that will facilitate the development of effective strategies to strengthen market supervision.     

Are There Rational Speculative Bubbles in REITs?

This study tests for the presence of rational speculative bubbles in the Equity REIT industry. We analyze REIT prices using a vector of macroeconomic fundamentals. Using the unit root test and cointegration procedures, we find no evidence of rational bubbles in the REIT market. Tests for duration dependence in the returns series show no evidence of negative duration dependence, suggesting that REIT markets are not affected by rational bubbles. Applying the same tests, we find no evidence of rational speculative bubbles in the Russell 2000 index, a proxy for small-cap stocks.     

Empirical evidence of the existence of speculative bubbles in the prices of stocks traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange

Speculative price bubbles are defined as a significant deviation between an asset's intrinsic value and its market value and in this paper it refers to stock values. Literature about the theme has noted the existence of bubbles in various types of markets and their respective assets. A great deal of effort has been directed toward identifying bubbles in stock price indices. However, few research endeavors focus on assets as the unit of analysis. Studies about stocks in Brazil have identified the presence of bubbles in IBOVESPA (São Paulo Stock Exchange Index). Given this context and assuming that the speculative bubbles are present in the Brazilian stock market, this research is focused on the following question: Is there evidence of the existence of speculative bubbles in stock prices traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange? Econometric tests were performed on twenty-seven stocks, based upon their positions each semester, for the period between the first semesters of 1990 until the first semester of 2010. The nominal values of the selected stocks were adjusted for inflation by the IPCA (Brazilian Consumer Price Index). In order to identify the presence of bubbles, we applied the Johansen non-cointegration test and/or the Granger non-causality test between the intrinsic value, dividends and interest on equity capital, and the market value (semester closing price) of the stocks. The primary findings reveal a presence of bubbles in twenty of the twenty-seven stocks, at a 5% significance level. Of the seven stocks not showing evidence of bubbles, six are financial institutions. In five stocks the tests reveal Granger causality stemming from the market value toward the intrinsic value. The study findings are consistent and contribute with previous research in the literature and, are useful for investors, financial institutions, academics, government agents, and traders.     

Intrinsic bubbles and Granger causality in the S&P 500: Evidence from long-term data

Results of research on whether changes in earnings can predict future stock returns are inconclusive. We add to this debate by using long-term data from 1871 to 2004 to examine the predictive power of changes in earnings in periods of intrinsic bubbles and in periods absent intrinsic bubbles. Our results show that accounting for bubbles is important in whether changes in earnings can predict future stock returns. In periods of no bubble, we find that changes in earnings Granger-cause future returns, whereas in periods of bubble, this Granger causality from changes in earnings to future returns cannot be found. We conclude that changes in earnings can predict future stock returns, but only in periods absent bubbles.     

Speculative bubbles in the S&P 500: Was the tech bubble confined to the tech sector?

This study tests for the presence of periodically, partially collapsing speculative bubbles in the sector indices of the S&P 500 using a regime-switching approach. We also employ an augmented model that includes trading volume as a technical indicator to improve the ability of the model to time bubble collapses and to better capture the temporal variations in returns. We find that well over half of the S&P 500 index by market capitalization and seven of its ten sector component indices exhibited at least some bubble-like behavior over our sample period. Thus the speculative bubble that grew in the 1990s and subsequently collapsed was surprisingly pervasive in the US equity market and it affected numerous sectors including financials and general industrials, rather than being confined to information technology, telecommunications and the media. In addition, we develop a joint model for cross-sectional contagion of bubbles across the sectors and we examine whether there is evidence for bubble spillovers.     

Accounting-based downside risk and expected stock returns: Evidence from China

We document that earnings downside risk contains information on firms' future operating performance and is positively associated with expected stock returns in Chinese stock markets, and the return predictability of earning downside risk mainly comes from its accrual downside risk component. The pricing of earnings downside risk is especially evident among firms with more transparent information environment and stronger governance efficacy, such as large firms, non-high-tech firms, old firms, and firms with high analyst coverage. Lastly, we show that aggregated earnings downside risk and its components at the market level are all significantly and positively associated with subsequent stock market returns, which is consistent with the notion that the accounting-based downside risk measures contain information about future macroeconomic conditions.     

Idiosyncratic skewness and cross-section of stock returns: Evidence from Taiwan

In this study, we examine whether idiosyncratic skewness (IS) affects the returns of the Taiwan stock market. We find that speculative retail investors prefer positive skewness in stocks that leads them to overprice these stocks. As a result, the IS, that reflects gambling, has a negative relation with future returns. Gambling preferences vary with time, mainly occur during recessions and down markets. Moreover, the negative IS-return relation exists only among firms with prior capital gains. We use a difference-in-difference (DID) framework to mitigate the endogeneity concern and find that this IS effect is more significant among stocks with lower arbitrage limits. The IS effect remains significant even after controlling for the IS risk factor. Overall, the IS effect cannot be explained by either arbitrage limits or risk exposure.     

The perception of time,risk and return during periods of speculation

Abstract

What return should you expect when you take on a given amount of risk? How should that return depend upon other people's behaviour? What principles can you use to answer these questions? In this paper, I approach these topics by exploring the consequences of two simple hypotheses about risk.

The first is a common-sense invariance principle: assets with the same perceived risk must have the same expected return. It leads directly to the well known Sharpe ratio and the classic risk-return relationships of arbitrage pricing theory and the capital asset pricing model.

The second hypothesis concerns the perception of time. I conjecture that in times of speculative excitement, short-term investors may instinctively imagine stock prices to be evolving in a time measure different from that of calendar time. They may perceive and experience the risk and return of a stock in intrinsic time, a dimensionless time scale that counts the number of trading opportunities that occur, but pays no attention to the calendar time that passes between them.

Applying the first hypothesis in the intrinsic time measure suggested by the second, I derive an alternative set of relationships between risk and return. Its most noteworthy feature is that, in the short-term, a stock's trading frequency affects its expected return. I show that short-term stock speculators will expect returns proportional to the temperature of a stock, where temperature is defined as the product of the stock's traditional volatility and the square root of its trading frequency. Furthermore, I derive a modified version of the capital asset pricing model in which a stock's excess return relative to the market is proportional to its traditional beta multiplied by the square root of its trading frequency.

I also present a model for the joint interaction of long-term calendar-time investors and short-term intrinsic-time speculators that leads to market bubbles characterized by stock prices that grow super-exponentially with time.

Finally, I show that the same short-term approach to options speculation can lead to an implied volatility skew.

I hope that this model will have some relevance to the behaviour of investors expecting inordinate returns in highly speculative markets.     

Sticky prices or economically-linked economies: The case of forecasting the Chinese stock market

We explore whether economic links via trade affect aggregate Chinese stock market returns. We find that market return indices from countries that China net imports from can forecast the Chinese aggregate market return at the weekly time horizon. The stock returns of countries that China net exports to have no consistently significant OOS predictability.The economic intuition for our results follows from the fact that China has positioned itself as a low-cost provider competing on price. As a low-cost provider China has a more difficult time passing cost increases through to export customers because of sticky prices. However, import costs, e.g., raw materials, are subject to both consumption and speculative demand and thus vary. We can conclude that costs will drive short term economic gains for the overall Chinese economy. One interpretation of our results is that supply shocks are absorbed within 2 weeks.     

Shiller's CAPE: Market Efficiency and Risk

Robert Shiller shows that Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio (CAPE) is strongly associated with future long‐term stock returns. This is often interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency. We present two findings contrary to such an interpretation. First, if markets are efficient, stock returns should be higher than the risk‐free rate. We find that even when CAPE is in its ninth decile, future 10‐year stock returns, on average, are higher than future returns on 10‐year U.S. Treasurys. Thus, the results are largely consistent with market efficiency. Second, consistent with a risk–return tradeoff, we find that CAPE is negatively associated with future stock market volatility.     

Speculative Betas

The risk and return trade‐off, the cornerstone of modern asset pricing theory, is often of the wrong sign. Our explanation is that high‐beta assets are prone to speculative overpricing. When investors disagree about the stock market's prospects, high‐beta assets are more sensitive to this aggregate disagreement, experience greater divergence of opinion about their payoffs, and are overpriced due to short‐sales constraints. When aggregate disagreement is low, the Security Market Line is upward‐sloping due to risk‐sharing. When it is high, expected returns can actually decrease with beta. We confirm our theory using a measure of disagreement about stock market earnings.     

Estimating the Intertemporal Risk–Return Tradeoff Using the Implied Cost of Capital

We argue that the implied cost of capital (ICC), computed using earnings forecasts, is useful in capturing time variation in expected stock returns. First, we show theoretically that ICC is perfectly correlated with the conditional expected stock return under plausible conditions. Second, our simulations show that ICC is helpful in detecting an intertemporal risk–return relation, even when earnings forecasts are poor. Finally, in empirical analysis, we construct the time series of ICC for the G–7 countries. We find a positive relation between the conditional mean and variance of stock returns, at both the country level and the world market level.     

Bear beta

We test whether bear market risk, time variation in the probability of future bear market states, is priced. We construct an Arrow–Debreu security that pays off in bear market states (AD Bear) from traded Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index options and use its returns to measure bear market risk. We find that bear beta (exposure to bear market risk) has a strong relation with expected stock returns that is robust, persistent, and remains strong among liquid and large stocks. Historical bear beta also predicts future bear market risk exposure. We conclude that bear market risk is priced in the cross section of stock returns.     

U.S. stock prices and the dot.com-bubble: Can dividend policy rescue the efficient market hypothesis?

This paper thoroughly integrates speculative bubbles to corporate finance literature by focusing on dividend policy issues. More specifically, we examine the importance of dividend policy when testing for speculative bubbles in the S&P 500 equity index on a data set spanning 1871 to 2014. Given the phenomenon of dividend smoothing, in particular in the U.S., we question the usefulness of observed dividend payments as fundamental factor in testing for bubbles. Circumventing dividend smoothing, we construct hypothetical dividend payouts which are based on reported corporate earnings instead. The empirical evidence presented here indeed suggests that the dividend policy of firms affects testing for speculative bubbles. While the dot.com-bubble—commonly seen as the prime example for a stock price bubble not only in the NASDAQ but also in other, broader equity indices—is detected with the observed dividend series as fundamental factor, this is not necessarily the case with our adjusted dividend time series. Some of our results argue against a speculative price bubble in the broader U.S. stock market in the late 1990s.     

Time-varying risk The case of the American computer industry

A bivariate GARCH-in-mean model for individual stock returns and the market portfolio is designed to model volatility and to test the conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model versus the conditional Residual Risk Model. We find that a univariate model of volatility for individual stock returns is misspecified. A joint modelling of the market return and the individual stock return shows that a major force driving the conditional variances of individual stocks is the history contained in the market return variance. We find that a conditional residual risk model, where the variance of the individual stock return is used to explain expected returns, is preferred to a conditional CAPM. We propose a partial ordering of securities according to their market risk using first and second order dominance criteria.