A lost century in economics: Three theories of banking and the conclusive evidence

How do banks operate and where does the money supply come from? The financial crisis has heightened awareness that these questions have been unduly neglected by many researchers. During the past century, three different theories of banking were dominant at different times: (1) The currently prevalent financial intermediation theory of banking says that banks collect deposits and then lend these out, just like other non-bank financial intermediaries. (2) The older fractional reserve theory of banking says that each individual bank is a financial intermediary without the power to create money, but the banking system collectively is able to create money through the process of ‘multiple deposit expansion’ (the ‘money multiplier’). (3) The credit creation theory of banking, predominant a century ago, does not consider banks as financial intermediaries that gather deposits to lend out, but instead argues that each individual bank creates credit and money newly when granting a bank loan. The theories differ in their accounting treatment of bank lending as well as in their policy implications. Since according to the dominant financial intermediation theory banks are virtually identical with other non-bank financial intermediaries, they are not usually included in the economic models used in economics or by central bankers. Moreover, the theory of banks as intermediaries provides the rationale for capital adequacy-based bank regulation. Should this theory not be correct, currently prevailing economics modelling and policy-making would be without empirical foundation. Despite the importance of this question, so far only one empirical test of the three theories has been reported in learned journals. This paper presents a second empirical test, using an alternative methodology, which allows control for all other factors. The financial intermediation and the fractional reserve theories of banking are rejected by the evidence. This finding throws doubt on the rationale for regulating bank capital adequacy to avoid banking crises, as the case study of Credit Suisse during the crisis illustrates. The finding indicates that advice to encourage developing countries to borrow from abroad is misguided. The question is considered why the economics profession has failed over most of the past century to make any progress concerning knowledge of the monetary system, and why it instead moved ever further away from the truth as already recognised by the credit creation theory well over a century ago. The role of conflicts of interest and interested parties in shaping the current bank-free academic consensus is discussed. A number of avenues for needed further research are indicated.     

The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital

We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, whereas strict supervision reduces the scope of intermediation and is costly for taxpayers. We show that a mix of both instruments minimises the costs of preventing the collapse of financial intermediation. Once we allow for cross-border banking, the optimal policy is not feasible. If domestic supervisory effort is not observable, our model predicts a race to the bottom in capital requirement regulation. Therefore, countries are better off by harmonising regulation on an international standard.     

Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking

Central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the lender-of-last-resort function. This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems. Depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets, so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic. The likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system. Banking systems with well-diversified big banks are less prone to inefficient bank runs because diversification alleviates the information asymmetry. In addition, big banks can self-monitor through publicly observable branch closure. Systems of many small banks form incentive-compatible bank coalitions to emulate the big banks during times of crisis. Such coalitions improve efficiency by monitoring member banks and issuing money that is a kind of deposit insurance—a precursor of central banking.     

代理行业务反洗钱管理研究

代理行业务作为商业银行国际业务的重要组成,对于促进跨境金融活动、支撑国际贸易、推动包容性增长等方面具有重要意义。但由于该业务的内生特点,往往隐藏着较大的洗钱风险。近年来代理行业务洗钱案件频现,凸显了代理行业务在风险治理、尽职调查、风险评估、交易监控等方面的问题。商业银行要稳健发展好代理行业务,需要从事前、事中、事后等环节加强反洗钱管理。     

长三角地区银行中介发展：特征与态势

银行中介在长三角地区金融体系中居主导地位,其发展规模总的来看领先于全国其他地区,但在区域内也呈现出较严重的非平衡性。长三角地区银行业市场结构与全国其他地区相比并不存在明显差异,但其信贷配置市场化程度居于全国前列。部分得益于区域良好的法治水平,长三角地区银行中介具有较高的效率。     

Cryptocurrency,Security, and Financial Intermediation

In recent years, the use of cryptocurrencies has increased. As these currencies continue to play a larger role, they eventually will be an important component of banking system activity. Moreover, in addition to the standard role of financial intermediaries to facilitate lending, intermediaries can be valuable firms that help provide safekeeping of tokens. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate these important functions in a microfounded model of monetary exchange. Furthermore, we also consider the possibility that central banks issue their own digital currencies that may affect the level of intermediation in the private banking system.     

One or two monies?

The set of incentive-feasible allocations is examined in a dynamic quasi-linear environment where agents lack commitment and have private information over their idiosyncratic characteristics. When record-keeping is available, the first-best allocation is implementable in a set of sufficiently patient economies. When record-keeping is limited to one money, this set is strictly smaller—except when private information is absent. When record-keeping is expanded, but limited to two monies, the set of economies for which the first-best is implementable corresponds to that of record-keeping, even when private information is present. We further demonstrate that two monies are a perfect substitute for record-keeping.     

Commercial Banks in the Securities Business: A Review

This paper analyses the potential effects of commercial banks' expansion into the securities business in the context of the contemporary theory of financial intermediation. The analysis focuses on the gains claimed to emerge with that expansion, particularly the gains due to information advantages and economies of scope, and on the costs also claimed to arise with it; namely, those due to conflicts of interest and safety and soundness considerations. The paper ends with a discussion on how these effects depend on the location of the securities unit within the banking conglomerate.     

Private Money and Banking Regulation

We show that a competitive banking system is inconsistent with an optimum quantity of private money. Because bankers cannot commit to their promises and the composition of their assets is not publicly observable, a positive franchise value is required to induce the full convertibility of bank liabilities. Under perfect competition, a positive franchise value can be obtained only if the return on bank liabilities is sufficiently low, which imposes a cost on those who hold these liabilities for transaction purposes. If the banking system is monopolistic, then an efficient allocation is incentive feasible. In this case, the members of the banking system obtain a higher return on assets, making it feasible to pay a sufficiently high return on bank liabilities. Finally, we argue that the regulation of the banking system is required to obtain efficiency.     

FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS IN LEVERAGED COMMERCIAL LOAN MARKETS

In the last decade, three innovations in commercial loan-based securities and derivative have enabled institutional investors to access commercial loan markets on leveraged terms : collateralized loan obligations (CLOs); loan-based total return swaps; and leveraged loan-based structured notes (LLSNs). These innovations have been driven by a combination of structural changes in the banking industry, enhanced technology for securitizations, reformed banking regulations, and the advent of credit derivatives.
Besides providing new investment opportunities for institutional investors, these recent innovations in loan markets also promise to reinforce the existing trend in banking away from financial intermediation and toward information intermediation. Such a trend, the authors argue, is helping to ensure the long-run viability of commercial banks. By transforming loan assets in the ways described in this article, banks can generate fee income instead of interest income (thus limiting their capital requirements and interest rate and credit exposures) while still exploiting their comparative advantage in credit analysis and monitoring.     

Banking,debt, and currency crises in developed countries: Stylized facts and early warning indicators

We construct and explore a new quarterly dataset covering crisis episodes in 40 developed countries over 1970–2010. First, we present stylized facts on banking, debt, and currency crises. Using panel vector autoregression we find that banking and debt crises are interrelated and both typically precede currency crises, but not vice versa. Banking crises are the most costly in terms of the overall output loss, and output takes about six years to recover. Second, on a reduced sample we try to identify early warning indicators of crises specific to developed economies, accounting for model uncertainty by means of Bayesian model averaging. The most consistent result across the various specifications and time horizons is that significant growth of domestic private credit precedes banking crises, while rising money market rates and global corporate spreads are also leading indicators worth monitoring. For currency crises, we also corroborate the role of rising domestic private credit and money market rates and detect the relevance of domestic currency overvaluation. The role of other indicators differs according to the type of crisis and the warning horizon selected, but it mostly seems easier to find reliable predictors at a horizon shorter than two years. Early warning indicators of debt crises are difficult to uncover due to the low occurrence of such episodes in our dataset. We also employ a signaling approach to derive the threshold value for the best single indicator (domestic private credit), and finally we provide a composite early warning index that further increases the usefulness of the model.     

Bank liabilities channel

The financial intermediation sector is important not only for channeling resources from agents in excess of funds to agents in need of funds (lending channel). By issuing liabilities it also creates financial assets held by other sectors of the economy for insurance or liquidity purpose. When the intermediation sector creates less liabilities or their value falls, agents are less willing to engage in activities that are individually risky but desirable in aggregate (bank liabilities channel). The paper shows how financial crises driven by self-fulfilling expectations about the liquidity of the banking sector are transmitted to the real sector of the economy. Since the government could also create financial assets by borrowing, the paper analyzes how public debt affects the issuance of liabilities by the financial intermediation sector.     

Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?

This paper briefly reviews the contemporary literature on relationship banking. We start out with a discussion of the raison d'être of banks in the context of the financial intermediation literature. From there we discuss how relationship banking fits into the core economic services provided by banks and point at its costs and benefits. This leads to an examination of the interrelationship between the competitive environment and relationship banking as well as a discussion of the empirical evidence. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G20, G21, L10.     

Banks, private money, and government regulation

We study competition between inside and outside money in economies with trading frictions and financial intermediation. Claims on banks circulate if the redemption rate is low. When the quantity of fiat money is scarce, coexistence of inside and outside money dominates equilibria with a unique medium of exchange. If outside money is ample, banks choose to redeem claims in outside money, which increases welfare. Under binding reserve requirements, tightening monetary policy leads to credit rationing. Our results support recent trends toward lower reserve requirements. However, we also identify situations where restrictions on note issue are beneficial.     

Can banks individually create money out of nothing? — The theories and the empirical evidence

This paper presents the first empirical evidence in the history of banking on the question of whether banks can create money out of nothing. The banking crisis has revived interest in this issue, but it had remained unsettled. Three hypotheses are recognised in the literature. According to the financial intermediation theory of banking, banks are merely intermediaries like other non-bank financial institutions, collecting deposits that are then lent out. According to the fractional reserve theory of banking, individual banks are mere financial intermediaries that cannot create money, but collectively they end up creating money through systemic interaction. A third theory maintains that each individual bank has the power to create money ‘out of nothing’ and does so when it extends credit (the credit creation theory of banking). The question which of the theories is correct has far-reaching implications for research and policy. Surprisingly, despite the longstanding controversy, until now no empirical study has tested the theories. This is the contribution of the present paper. An empirical test is conducted, whereby money is borrowed from a cooperating bank, while its internal records are being monitored, to establish whether in the process of making the loan available to the borrower, the bank transfers these funds from other accounts within or outside the bank, or whether they are newly created. This study establishes for the first time empirically that banks individually create money out of nothing. The money supply is created as ‘fairy dust’ produced by the banks individually, "out of thin air".     

Protectionism and international banking : Sectorial efficiency, competitive structure and National policy

This paper deals with barriers to trade in services. More specifically, the paper deals with competition and its absence in the provision of international intermediation services by banks. Section 2 of the paper examines the substitutability of international trade and FDI (foreign direct investment) in the services sector as a basis for international competition. It also considers the overlap between commercial policy measures and regulations governing the entry and operations of foreign affiliates. Section 3 describes the types of restrictions imposed on foreign banks and evaluates their effects. Existing practices in some countries are outlined in the fourth section. The countries are the U.S., the U.K., Switzerland, Australia, Brazil and Taiwan. Section 5 evaluates competitive conditions in offshore banking centers, and compares them with conditions in onshore markets. The last section evaluates the costs and the benefits of an ‘open’ (free-trade) banking system. Such a system will tend to improve world welfare as well as the welfare of those countries who have a comparative advantage in international banking. The results are not clear with regard to the countries who have a comparative disadvantage in banking.     

The Twin Crises: Determinants of Banking and Currency Crises in the Turkish Economy

Several twin crises occurred in the Turkish economy in the last three decades. In this article, we aim to analyze the link between banking and currency crises and to illustrate the essential determinants of these twin crises by developing a multivariate logit model for the period 1990–2013. The empirical findings show that Turkish currency crises are mainly due to excessive fiscal deficits, rises in short-term external debt, overvaluation of Turkish lira, and external adverse shocks; banking crises are primarily caused by excessive money supplies and bank short positions. The empirical findings also indicate that banking crises lead to currency crises, and vice versa.     

More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.     

论美国影子银行体系的发展、运作、影响及监管

第二次世界大战结束特别是20世纪70年代以来,由货币政策目标与金融监管框架之间的不一致性所引发的金融创新以及机构投资者对安全性资产的超额需求共同推动了影子银行体系在美国迅速发展。美国的影子银行体系主要由政府支持的影子银行体系、"内部"影子银行体系以及"外部"影子银行体系组成,但其各自的信贷中介程序和复杂程度不尽相同。影子银行体系的迅速发展对美国以及全球金融体系都产生了重要而复杂的影响。尽管《多德—弗兰克法》为美国乃至全球金融监管改革指明了方向,但旨在有效规范影子银行体系发展的金融监管体制改革之路依然漫长。     

Financial Flexibility,Bank Capital Flows,and Asset Prices

In our parsimonious general‐equilibrium model of banking and asset pricing, intermediaries have the expertise to monitor and reallocate capital. We study financial development, intraeconomy capital flows, the size of the banking sector, the value of intermediation, expected market returns, and the risk of bank crashes. Asset pricing implications include: a market's dividend yield is related to its financial flexibility, and capital flows should be important in explaining expected returns and the risk of bank crashes. Our predictions are broadly consistent with the aggregate behavior of U.S. capital markets since 1950.