Comparative advantages of regional versus national banks in alleviating SME's financial constraints

This paper provides new evidence on the impact of local banking market structure on SME's access to credit and emphasize the comparative advantages of regional versus national banks in alleviating SME's financial constraints. Matching a unique dataset on bank branch-level and firm-level information for a sample of 33,165 French manufacturing firms over the 2005–2013 period, we rely on two alternative indicators to capture different dimensions of SMEs financial constraints and find significant differences in the drivers of these constraints. While higher market share of regional banks or stronger presence of geographically-focused banks helps to alleviate SMEs' short-term credit constraint, higher market share of national banks or stronger presence of geographically-diversified banks is beneficial to reduce SMEs investment cash-flow sensitivity. Moreover, in both cases, SMEs' financial constraints are strengthened in functionally-distant markets. In addition, during crisis times, the benefits of relationship banking on short-term credit constraint remain and, in some cases, are reinforced. We also find that these benefits differ according to SMEs pre-crisis financial health. Regional banks facilitate access to short term credit for firms which were more profitable before the global financial crisis and particularly those who experienced a sharp decline in profitability in troubled times, supporting the hypothesis of continuation lending by relationship banks during economic downturns.     

The Relation Between Bank Resolutions and Information Environment: Evidence from the Auctions for Failed Banks

This study examines the impact of disclosure requirements on the resolution costs of failed banks. Consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure requirements mitigate information asymmetries in the auctions for failed banks, I find that, when failed banks are subject to more comprehensive disclosure requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing a bank and retain a lower portion of the failed bank's assets, while bidders that are geographically more distant are more likely to participate in the bidding for the failed bank. The paper provides new insights into the relation between disclosure and the reorganization of a banking system when the regulators' preferred plan of action is to promote the acquisition of undercapitalized banks by healthy ones. The results suggest that disclosure regulation policy influences the cost of resolution of a bank and, as a result, could be an important factor in the definition of the optimal resolution strategy during a banking crisis event.     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Bank affiliation and discounts on closed-end funds

This study investigates whether investors value the bank affiliation of closed-end funds and analyzes whether investors treat funds differently because of their affiliated bank type, commercial or investment, and the size of their affiliated commercial bank, small or big. The analysis of the discounts on closed-end funds traded on Borsa Istanbul reveals that bank-affiliated funds trade at a lower discount than other funds, controlling for fund characteristics and market conditions. It is found that investors are willing to pay a higher price on funds affiliated with commercial banks, especially big ones, than bank-unaffiliated funds. However, discounts on all bank-affiliated funds increased more than discounts on unaffiliated funds during the banking crisis of 2000–2001 in Turkey suggesting that investors are willing to pay a trust premium to invest in funds that are affiliated with banks regardless of their type or size.     

Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it.     

Public bank lending in times of crisis

This paper studies the role of government-owned banks in the event of financial crises. The study takes an empirical perspective focusing on bank lending. We compare the lending responses across government-owned and private banks to financial crises using the balance sheet information of 764 major banks headquartered in 50 countries over the period of 1994–2009. Using a nested panel regression framework that allows for parameter shifts in the bank lending equation, we find robust evidence that government-owned banks increase their lending during crises relative to normal times, while private banks’ lending decreases. Government-owned banks thus counteract the lending slowdown of private banks. The findings suggest that governments can play an active counter-cyclical role in their banking systems directly through government-owned banks.     

Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry

This study examines the relation between earnings management through discretionary loan loss provisions (LLPs) and systemic risk in the U. S. banking sector using a large sample of commercial banks from 1996 to 2009. We find that earnings management increases a bank's contribution to systemic crash risk and systemic distress risk, consistent with the notion that earnings management increases information opacity, facilitates bad news hoarding, co‐moves with macroeconomic conditions, and exhibits cross‐sectional correlation and herding in earnings management. However, the effect of earnings management through discretionary LLPs on systemic risk disappears during the crisis period, consistent with weakened earnings management in crisis times. We also find that the same effect strengthens with bank uncertainty and homogenous loans, and weakens in the post‐SOX period, and when banks are audited by Big 4 auditors.     

On the Contagion Effect in the US Banking Sector

By using the spatial econometrics methodology, this paper investigates the contagion of the risk taking by banks in the US banking sector during 2001 to 2012. In addition, the contagion signals up to the Subprime crisis in 2008 are analyzed and different channels of contagion are studied in order to identify fragile groups of banks. Our analysis reveals that there is no significant contagion transmitted to the whole banking system. However, we observe that the bank contagion is significantly spread locally and for the group of banks that share similar characteristics related to size and bank regulations.     

Relationship and Transaction Lending: New Evidence and Perspectives

In this article, I try to answer three questions: (1) How do relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the cycle? (2) How do economic systems that are more “bank oriented” perform compared to “market-oriented” systems? (3) What are the consequences on relationship banking of the recent structural bank regulation reforms adopted to separate specific investment and commercial banking activities? Building on some recent evidence, the main conclusions are as follows: (1) Relationship banks protect their clients in normal downturns; (2) when recessions coincide with a financial crisis, countries that rely relatively more on bank financing tend to be more severely hit; (3) the effects of structural bank regulation initiatives on relationship banking are uncertain.     

The Determinants of Bank Capital Ratios in a Developing Economy

This paper reports new findings on the determinants of bank capital ratios. The results are from an unbalanced panel data set spanning eight years around the period of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. Test results suggest a strong positive link between regulatory capital and bank management’s risk-taking behaviour. The risk-based capital standards of the regulators did not have an influence on how regulatory capital is adjusted by low-capitalized banks, perhaps due to the well-documented banking fragility during the test period. Finally, bank capital decisions seem not to be driven by bank profitability, which finding is inconsistent with developed country literature that has for long stressed the importance of banks’ earnings as driving capital ratios. Although the study focuses only on one developing economy, these findings may help to identify the correlates of bank capital ratios in both developed and developing economies since this topic has received scant attention of researchers. These findings are somewhat consistent with how banks engaging in risky lending across the world could have brought on the 2007–2008 banking liquidity and capital erosion crisis.     

What happened to profitability? Shocks,challenges and perspectives for euro area banks

This paper analyses the evolution of bank profitability from 2005 to 2016, with a focus on the period covering both the global financial crisis and the euro area crisis. To accomplish this, we constructed a dataset that includes financial statement information from 310 euro area banks. Using a dual approach – a ‘bottom-up’ approach as applied by bank analysts and macroeconomists' ‘top-down’ approach, we find that the profitability of euro area banks was hit by two shocks of different nature. The Lehman Brothers collapse affected mostly big banks with diversified portfolios via losses in their securities investment. The subsequent euro area debt crisis and economic recession hit more traditional banks specialising in retail lending activities, mainly through increasing impairment costs. If the first shock had a one-off impact on bank profitability, the second shock is far more long-lasting and is still depressing the profitability of banks in peripheral Europe.     

Foreign banks and credit stability in Central and Eastern Europe. A panel data analysis

We examine whether foreign and domestic banks in Central and Eastern Europe react differently to business cycles and banking crises. Our panel dataset comprises data of more than 250 banks for the period 1993–2000, with information on bank ownership and mode of entry. During crisis periods domestic banks contracted their credit base, whereas greenfield foreign banks did not. Also, home country conditions matter for foreign bank growth, as there is a significant negative relationship between home country economic growth and host country credit by greenfields. Finally, greenfield foreign banks’ credit growth is influenced by the health of the parent bank.     

The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness

Doubts about the accuracy with which outside investors can assess a banking firm’s value motivate many government interventions in the banking market. Although the available empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the recent financial crisis has reinforced a common assessment that banks are unusually opaque. This paper examines bank equity’s trading characteristics during “normal” periods and two “crisis” periods between 1993 and 2009. We find only limited (mixed) evidence that banks are unusually opaque during normal periods. However, consistent with theory, crises raise the adverse selection costs of trading bank shares relative to those of nonbank control firms. A bank’s balance sheet composition significantly affects its equity opacity, but we cannot detect specific balance sheet categories that have robust effects.     

Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach

This paper proposes a new method to measure and monitor the risk in a banking system. Standard tools that regulators require banks to use for their internal risk management are applied at the level of the banking system to measure the risk of a regulator’s portfolio. Using a sample of international banks from 1988 until 2002, I estimate the dynamics and correlations between bank asset portfolios. To obtain measures for the risk of a regulator’s portfolio, I model the individual liabilities that the regulator has to each bank as contingent claims on the bank’s assets. The portfolio aspect of the regulator’s liability is explicitly considered and the methodology allows a comparison of sub-samples from different countries. Correlations, bank asset volatility, and bank capitalization increase for North American and somewhat for European banks, while Japanese banks face deteriorating capital levels. In the sample period, the North American banking system gains stability while the Japanese banking sector becomes more fragile. The expected future liability of the regulator varies substantially over time and is especially high during the Asian crisis starting in 1997. Further analysis shows that the Japanese banks contribute most to the volatility of the regulator’s liability at that time. Larger and more profitable banks have lower systemic risk and additional equity capital reduces systemic risk only for banks that are constrained by regulatory capital requirements.     

The term structure of banking crisis risk in the United States: A market data based compound option approach

We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to estimate banking crisis risk for the United States based on market data on bank stocks on a daily frequency. We contribute to the literature by providing separate information on short-term, long-term and total crisis risk instead of a single-maturity risk measure usually inferred by Merton-type models or barrier models. We estimate the model by applying the Duan (1994) maximum-likelihood approach. A strongly increasing total crisis risk estimated from early July 2007 onwards is driven mainly by short-term crisis risk. Banks that defaulted or were overtaken during the crisis have a considerably higher crisis risk (especially higher long-term risk) than banks that survived the crisis.     

Multinational Banks and the Global Financial Crisis: Weathering the Perfect Storm?

We use data on the 48 largest multinational banking groups to compare the lending of their 199 foreign subsidiaries during the Great Recession with lending by a benchmark of 202 domestic banks. Contrary to earlier and more contained crises, parent banks were not a significant source of strength to their subsidiaries during 2008–09. When controlling for other bank characteristics, multinational bank subsidiaries had to slow down credit growth almost three times as fast as domestic banks. This was in particular the case for subsidiaries of banking groups that relied more on wholesale funding.     

Banking for the public good

Bank shareholders cannot be expected to provide good stewardship to banks because there is a conflict of interests between the shareholder owners and a non-mutually owned bank's depositors; who provide the bulk of the funds in traditional retail banks and are willing to accept a lower return on their savings than shareholders, in return for lower risk exposure. Regulation is required to protect depositors where deposit insurance schemes are at best partially funded and underwritten by taxpayers, who in turn need to be protected, and to deliver financial stability, a public good. Once some banks become ‘too big (to be allowed) to fail’ (TBTF), they enjoy additional implicit public (taxpayer) insurance that enables them to fund themselves more cheaply than smaller banks, which gives them a competitive advantage. The political influence of big banks in the US and the UK is such that they can be regarded as financial oligarchies that have hitherto successfully blocked far reaching structural reform in the wake of the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ and lobbied successfully for the financial sector liberalisation that preceded it. The TBTF problem and associated moral hazard have been worsened by mergers to save failing banks during the crisis and as a result competition within a number of national banking systems, notably the UK, has been significantly reduced. Solutions alternative to making the banks small enough to be allowed to fail are considered in this paper, but it is difficult to be convinced that they will deliver banks that promote the common or public good. It is argued that regulating retail banking as a utility and pooling insurance against financial instability using pre-funded deposit insurance schemes, with risk related premiums that can also serve as bank resolution funds, should be pursued; and that capital leverage ratios and/or Financial Activity Taxes might be used to ‘tax’ the size of banks.     

Differential impact of Korean banking system reforms on bank productivity

We study the impact of banking system reforms during a crisis following a period of undisciplined lending. Regulatory changes aimed at strengthening the banks’ capital structure and risk management practices do not have a uniform impact on bank productivity, but rather favor financially sound or strategically privileged banks. We present evidence documenting the differential impact of regulatory reforms on Korean commercial bank productivity over the period 1995–2005. Average technical efficiency of banks decreased during the financial crisis of 1997–1998. It improved following the subsequent bank restructuring and continued to improve through 2005. The capital adequacy ratio is positively associated with banks’ technical efficiency. The non-performing loans ratio is negatively associated with technical efficiency. Both relationships are accentuated during the crisis but attenuated after the reforms.