对中央银行独立性问题的探讨

中央银行独立性是指中央银行在履行自身职责时对法律赋予或实际拥有的权利、决策与行动的自由程度。中央银行的独立性的争论比较集中地反映在中央银行是应该保持目标独立还是工具独立,或者是二者都进行独立。中央银行独立性有其客观必然性和深远的建设意义,由于货币政策的时间不一致等原因,建立独立的央行体系已成为必然。本文通过研究从中找到对我国央行独立性建设的政策建议,进而推动社会经济的进一步发展。     

关于中央银行独立性的法律探讨

本文通过对国外中央银行独立性立法的介绍 ,指出我国在立法上加强中央银行独立性的必要性 ,并提出了完善我国中央银行独立性的构想。     

发达国家中央银行职能的理论与实践探讨

金融危机以来,主要发达国家的中央银行持续实施量化宽松政策,这在一定程度上模糊了货币政策与财政政策的界限,引起经济学界关于中央银行独立性问题的讨论。文章分析了中央银行独立性的概念和理论,回顾了主要发达国家量化宽松政策的实施过程,指出随着世界经济的逐步恢复与量化宽松政策的逐步退出,理顺政府与中央银行关系、强化中央银行的独立性对于保持经济长期稳定增长具有重要意义。     

激励理论在央行实施效应及有效运用研究

本文运用激励理论分析了中央银行日常工作中存在的一些消极效应,提出了发挥中央银行激励机制有效性的制度设计思考。     

论中央银行的独立性

中央银行是国家的货币当局,其独立程度与该国币值稳定有密切联系。我国经济进一步融入国际金融体系,迫切需要从法律上确立中央银行的独立地位,使其更好地实现货币职能。本文在对中央银行对立性的含义进行概括的基础上,对影响中央银行独立性的因素进行了分析,进而对我国中央银行独立性的现状进行了分析,最终提出了增强我国中央银行独立性的措施。     

论中央银行的独立性

中央银行是国家的货币当局,其独立程度与该国币值稳定有密切联系。我国经济进一步融入国际金融体系,迫切需要从法律上确立中央银行的独立地位,使其更好地实现货币职能。本文在对中央银行对立性的含义进行概括的基础上,对影响中央银行独立性的因素进行了分析,进而对我国中央银行独立性的现状进行了分析,最终提出了增强我国中央银行独立性的措施。     

关于中央银行独立性问题的思考

中央银行独立性是指中央银行履行自身职责时法律赋予或实际拥有的权力、决策与行动的自主程度。本文对中央银行独立性的发展演变进行概述,详细的叙述了我国中央银行独立性现状,并结合我国实际情况提出了如何加强中央银行独立性的建议。     

多重视角下的我国中央银行独立性测度

中央银行独立性是市场经济国家宏观经济理论和政策领域的重要问题，我国处于经济转型时期，也是一个发展中国家，中央银行独立性的衡量具有一定的特殊性，本文采用三种不同测度方法，依据1995年《中国人民银行法》的有关规定，对我国中央银行的独立性程度进行初步的衡量。     

对我国中央银行独立性问题的探讨

本文在分析国际上中央银行独立性发展历程的基础上,结合我国中央银行独立性现状,提出了增强我国中央银行独立性的政策建议.     

中央银行问责制的各国实践

随着中央银行独立性增强，各国也更加注重对其独立性的制衡，即强化中央银行的问责制。中央银行问责制的强化主要表现在对货币政策目标的量化、问责对象的多元化以及透明度的不断提高。但较之中央银行享受的越来越大的独立自主权，它们的问责义务却没有得到同等的重视。目前正致力于增强中央银行独立性的国家在增强中央银行独立性的同时，也在不断强化中央银行的问责制。     

Dynamic central bank independence indices and inflation rate: A new empirical exploration

It has been argued that economies with more independent central banks experience lower inflation over time. In this paper we show that this relationship is sensitive to the methodology through which central bank independence indices are constructed. We stress the importance of employing dynamic central bank independence indices in two ways. First, we perform unit root tests with structural breaks to verify if the implementation of central bank reforms represents a structural break for the inflation rate dynamics. Second, we implement a panel data analysis.We find evidence that legislative reforms that modify the degree of independence of a central bank have a strong impact on the inflation rate dynamics. Moreover, underlying the importance of employing dynamic central bank independence indices, we confirm the negative relationship between the latter and inflation for a sample of 10 OECD countries.     

Financial supervision regimes and bank efficiency: International evidence

There exists a lively debate as for the appropriate architecture of the financial supervision regime, with a long list of theoretical advantages and disadvantages associated with each one of its key dimensions. The present study investigates whether and how bank profit efficiency is influenced by the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision, the unification of financial authorities, and the independence of the central bank. The results show that efficiency decreases as the number of the financial sectors that are supervised by the central bank increases. Additionally, banks operating in countries with greater unification of supervisory authorities are less profit efficient. Finally, central bank independence has a negative impact on bank profit efficiency.     

中央银行独立性与资产负债管理

金融危机后，各同中央银行的独立性和资产负债管理引起专家学者的重视。中央银行的独立性影响其调控经济的能力，不同独立性下的经济调控反映在资产负债表上就是各具特色的资产负债管理。本文分别研究了美联储、日本银行和中国人民银行的独立性和资产负债管理，以期对我国中央银行的独立性和资产负债管理提供有益借鉴。     

Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes

Making the central bank an agency with the mandate and reputationfor maintaining price stability is a means by which a governmentcan choose the strength of its commitment to price stability.This article develops four measures of central bank independenceand explores their relation with inflation outcomes. An aggregatelegal index is developed for four decades in 72 countries. Threeindicators of actual independence are developed: the rate ofturnover of central bank governors, an index based on a questionnaireanswered by specialists in 23 countries, and an aggregationof the legal index and the rate of turnover. Legal independence is inversely related to inflation in industrial,but not in developing, countries. In developing countries theactual frequency of change of the chief executive officer ofthe bank is a better proxy for central bank independence. Aninflation-based index of overall central bank independence contributessignificantly to explaining cross-country variations in therate of inflation.     

Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in OECD countries. We use quarterly data in the 1980.1–2005.4 period and exclude EMU countries. Our Taylor-rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time-variant index of central bank independence with government ideology. The results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short-term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low. In contrast, short-term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high. The effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible. Our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments, in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies, have pushed market-oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers.     

The impact of central bank independence on the performance of inflation targeting regimes

This paper examines the effects of inflation targeting on inflation in both advanced and emerging economies. We do not detect significant effects in advanced economies and only find small benefits in emerging economies, in line with previous studies. However, when we differentiate the impact of inflation targeting based on the degree of central bank independence, we find large effects in emerging economies with low central bank independence. Our results therefore suggest that central bank independence is not a prerequisite for countries to experience significant declines in inflation following the adoption of inflation targeting. Furthermore, we provide evidence that one channel through which inflation targeting lowers inflation more in countries with low central bank independence is the reduction of budget deficits following the adoption of an inflation target.     

中国能进一步提高央行独立性以改善货币政策可信度吗?

中央银行独立性是决定货币政策可信度(信誉)的一个重要体制性特征因素。在中国,央行独立性受到政治基础结构、司法独立性、经济金融基础结构和社会文化环境等制度结构方面的现实约束,即便照搬西方国家经验在立法层面确立央行独立性,这种外生的法定独立性也不能转化为真正的实践准则;在当下的中国要改善货币政策可信度,不能期望进一步提高央行独立性来实现,而应寻求其他路径。     

The interpretation of CBDC within an endogenous money framework

Central bank digital currency (CBDC) has increasingly received attention among policymakers and academics. From a theoretical perspective, the introduction of a CBDC arouses long-standing questions, foreseeing the possibility for the private (non-financial) sector to access the central bank reserves. The aim of this paper is to strengthen the understanding of the CBDC through the Endogenous Money Theory (EMT). The paper examines the balance sheets of the central bank, commercial banks, and the non-financial private system, tracking all the assets and liabilities of the macro-agents involved in the introduction of a CBDC. It explains the logical chain of relationships starting with the creation of bank loans from commercial banks, transformed into deposits, and ultimately converted into CBDC. Such a chain of relationships is also explained by amending the four quadrants model proposed by many post-Keynesian scholars.     

西方中央银行沟通视角下的预期管理研究：渠道、手段及效果

近年来,中央银行沟通成为一种新型的货币政策工具。基于中央银行沟通视角,分析西方国家在预期管理中的渠道、手段及效果,结论表明中央银行沟通有助于预期管理。借鉴西方国家沟通经验,提出中央银行的有效沟通,需要中央银行独立性及问责制作保障;重视沟通的规律性,强调沟通信息的清晰和准确;注重对宏观经济运行认识水平,提高公众的经济学素养。