商业银行高管薪酬改革适应新常态特征的路径研究

薪酬体系是否科学合理影响到经营管理者的积极性。我国商业银行薪酬体系建立在外部经济环境和内部经营规律的基础上。以往高经济增长的环境下,商业银行经营效益大幅度提升,高管薪酬也十分高企。但自金融危机发生以来,中国经济出现了增幅下降、结构急需调整等“新常态”特征,这对商业银行经营管理特别是薪酬体系设计也提出了新的要求。与此同时,国有企业整体改革的推进,又为商业银行高管薪酬改革提供了方向指引。目前,商业银行的薪酬体系改革必须充分考虑经济新常态的特征、国有企业改革对商业银行薪酬改革的影响,结合金融企业发展规律,坚持遵循价值规律原则,加速推进限制性股权制、股票期权制、绩效回收制、加大延期支付力度、构建社会比价指导与活跃职业经理人市场、完善商业银行治理机制等是新常态背景下商业银行高管薪酬改革的基本策略。     

The impact of bank merger growth on CEO compensation

We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links.     

Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry

We investigate the relation between option-based executive compensation and market measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks during the period of 1992–2000. We show that following deregulation, banks have increasingly employed stock option-based compensation. As a result, the structure of executive compensation induces risk-taking, and the stock of option-based wealth also induces risk-taking. The results are robust across alternative risk measures, statistical methodologies, and model specifications. Overall, our results support a management risk-taking hypothesis over a managerial risk aversion hypothesis. Our results have important implications for regulators in monitoring the risk levels of banks.     

商业银行高管薪酬业绩敏感度的实证研究

本文基于调查数据,实证分析了银行绩效对高管薪酬的影响,并对银行高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响因素进行了分析。结果发现,样本银行高管薪酬与银行绩效之间显著负相关,股权集中、银行风险和银行规模也影响了银行高管薪酬的决定;股权集中和银行风险强化了银行高管薪酬与绩效之间的敏感度,而股权制衡则弱化了薪酬绩效敏感度。     

Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.     

Non‐compliance in Executive Compensation Disclosure: the Brazilian Experience

We examine the determinants and consequences of firms’ choice not to comply with a new executive compensation disclosure regulation. We exploit a unique feature of Brazilian markets, where a change in the regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security‐related costs for executives. This major reform in executive compensation disclosure in Brazil became effective in December 2009. While some firms complied with the change in regulation, other firms explicitly refused to comply fully with the regulation by using a court injunction. After controlling for firm‐specific characteristics and both social and economic inequality measures, we find that the degree of criminality in the state in which the firm is headquartered (a proxy for security‐related costs) and the level of CEO compensation are important determinants of a firm's decision not to fully disclose executive compensation information. We also show that firms which do not fully comply with the regulation face costs in the form of higher bid‐ask spreads, suggesting investors are leery of the decision not to comply with the regulation. We discuss the potential implications of our results in the context of executive compensation disclosure reform.     

国有商业银行薪酬体系改革:理论与实践

国有商业银行在上市之前借助外部咨询机构初步建立了市场化的薪酬体制。但是,随着近几年国有商业银行战略的调整、组织结构的变革、业务流程的再造,原来建立薪酬体系的基础已经发生了一定程度的改变。本文将首先探讨薪酬体系设计的基本理论,并以此为基础分析国有商业银行薪酬管理的现状和问题,进而提出相应的改进措施。     

The external effects of bank executive pay: Liquidity creation and systemic risk

We develop a conceptual framework that links the compensation incentives of bank executives to the risk and return externalities generated by banks but borne by society. Using 1994 to 2016 data from large U.S. commercial banks, we find that CEO pay-performance incentives reduce both negative systemic risk externalities and positive liquidity creation externalities, while pay-risk incentives increase both externalities. Our findings offer support for Federal Reserve guidelines that encourage greater reliance on long-term equity-based compensation, and they infer a regulatory tradeoff: Bank executive pay rules aimed at reducing systemic risk will result in reduced system-wide liquidity creation as well.     

Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform

Beginning in 2018, U.S. public firms were required to report the ratio of the chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation to their median employee's compensation in the annual proxy statement. Exploiting the staggered reporting of pay ratios, we find little evidence that total CEO compensation changes in response to pay ratio disclosure reform. However, we do find that boards significantly adjust the mix of compensation awarded by reducing the sensitivity of CEO pay to equity price changes, particularly when the CEO is likely to garner media scrutiny, and by reducing reliance on stock-based and other compensation components that are most susceptible to media coverage surrounding the pay ratio disclosure. Firms ultimately disclosing higher pay ratios garner more media coverage around the filing of their proxy statement, and more negative-toned coverage in the subsequent month. Finally, we find evidence that greater pay disparity is associated with greater selling activity by retail investors and more negative say-on-pay votes following pay ratio reform, consistent with a broad set of investors responding to public scrutiny resulting from pay ratio disclosures.     

商业银行组织结构变革中的经营管理机制创新

不同的银行组织结构各不相同,组织结构的设置体现着自己的经营方针和原则.由于历史的、经济制度方面的原因,我国商业银行特别是国有商业银行的组织结构带有明显的行政色彩,缺乏有效的自我发展与自我约束机制,风险意识淡薄,经营管理粗放.这种组织管理体制和运行机制阻碍了我国商业银行的发展.本文通过对西方商业银行组织结构和经营管理机制特征的阐述,分析了我国商业银行的差距与不足,指出了我国商业银行经营管理机制的创新方向,包括完善组织架构,优化管理层次,推行扁平化管理;构建科学的组织管理体制;建立现代商业银行的资源配置机制及先进的人力资源管理机制.     

我国商业银行经营转型的动因、目标与实施途径

商业银行经营转型是指商业银行面对外部变化的经营环境,主动或被动地调整自己的经营模式和增长方式。资本约束、金融脱媒、流动性过剩、同业竞争加剧、居民阶层的结构性调整等社会、经济和外部环境的变化是商业银行转型的外在压力。目前,我国商业银行经营理念和管理模式还比较传统,经营结构和效率还有待改善,风险内控水平还有待提升,改革创新意识还不足等,这一切构成了我国商业银行经营转型的内在要求。商业银行经营转型不应局限于解决短期内面临的各种问题,而要立足长远,主动适应市场变化,调整经营战略,构建现代商业银行体系,步入协调发展的良性循环轨道。     

我国商业银行经营转型的动因、目标与实施途径

商业银行经营转型是指商业银行面对外部变化的经营环境，主动或被动地调整自己的经营模式和增长方式。资本约束、金融脱媒、流动性过剩、同业竞争加剧、居民阶层的结构性调整等社会、经济和外部环境的变化是商业银行转型的外在压力。目前，我国商业银行经营理念和管理模式还比较传统，经营结构和效率还有待改善，风险内控水平还有待提升，改革创新意识还不足等，这一切构成了我国商业银行经营转型的内在要求。商业银行经营转型不应局限于解决短期内面临的各种问题，而要立足长远，主动适应市场变化，调整经营战略，构建现代商业银行体系，步入协调发展的良性循环轨道。     

Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation

We study the executive compensation structure in 14 of the largest U.S. financial institutions during 2000–2008. We focus on the CEO's purchases and sales of their bank's stock, their salary and bonus, and the capital losses these CEOs incur due to the dramatic share price declines in 2008. We consider three measures of risk-taking by these banks. Our results are mostly consistent with and supportive of the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010), that is, managerial incentives matter — incentives generated by executive compensation programs are correlated with excessive risk-taking by banks. Also, our results are generally not supportive of the conclusions of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) that the poor performance of banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk. We recommend that bank executive incentive compensation should only consist of restricted stock and restricted stock options — restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for two to four years after their last day in office. The above incentive compensation proposal logically leads to a complementary proposal regarding a bank's capital structure, namely, banks should be financed with considerably more equity than they are being financed currently.     

Regulator Scrutiny and Bank CEO Incentives

This study analyzes the effects of monitoring intensity on compensation and turnover for CEOs of publicly-traded banks. Using a sample of banks from 1992 to 2004, I find that monitoring intensity plays a significant role in compensation levels, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and CEO turnover. The results show that CEOs from highly-rated institutions receive smaller pay than CEOs from competing institutions, and that monitoring intensity, as proxied by CEO age, influences the relationship between market performance and executive incentives. These findings suggest that regulatory ratings and CEO age impact optimal bank governance structure by varying incentive sensitivity to market performance.

我国上市银行风险抵补能力解析及其启示

《商业银行风险监管核心指标》是目前衡量国内商业银行风险状况及其抵补能力的权威规定。本文应用新的核心监管指标框架,以实证方法比较分析了我国5家上市股份制商业银行的信用风险状况及风险抵补能力和水平,透过指标及数据表象分析了背后存在的深层问题和原因。在此基础上,作者得出了国有商业银行海外上市必须提高资产质量和强化风险管控能力、加强业务转型和提高盈利能力、提高拨备及资本充足水平、与国际惯例接轨和加大信息披露等启示;并提出了完善《核心指标》、统一贷款损失准备计提办法及衡量指标、统一信息披露格式及口径等的政策建议。     

Cost behavior and executive bonus compensation

Prior literature provides compelling evidence of an asymmetric relation between executive bonus compensation and earnings performance. In particular, this literature reports that compensation committees assign greater weight to good (positive) earnings performance than poor (negative) earnings performance. Taken together, the prior literature provides strong support for critics who claim that compensation committees blindly protect executives from earnings underperformance. We further examine this issue by investigating whether a firm's cost behavior (i.e., the relation between expenses and sales) provides an explanation for the apparent inefficiency in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that executives are rewarded more for increases in ROA that arise from normal cost behavior than other increases in ROA consistent with these increases being perceived as more persistent. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship for decreases in ROA which suggests that executives are largely shielded from decreases in ROA that follow normal cost behavior. We examine two factors suggested by the prior literature, expected future sales and the extent of capacity utilization, which may provide an explanation for why executives are shielded from normal cost behavior decreases in ROA. When these additional factors are included in our empirical models, our evidence suggests that the asymmetric relation between changes in CEO bonus compensation and increases and decreases in earnings performance documented in prior literature goes away. That is, our results suggest that compensation committees do not blindly protect executives for earnings underperformance. On the contrary, our evidence suggests that these committees take into account other non-earnings information when deciding how much weight to give to a decrease in earnings and that executive compensation may not be as inefficient as suggested by prior research.     

Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure

The interrelationship between top-management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied. The optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management, but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus. We analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are (1) equity and risky debt, and (2) equity and convertible debt. In addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests, managerial compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt. The optimal management compensation derived has low pay-performance sensitivity. With convertible debt, instead of straight debt, the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay-to-performance sensitivity. A negative relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and leverage is derived. Our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of Jensen and Murphy ( 1990 ) with agency theory. Other testable implications include (1) a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top-management compensation structures, and (2) the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices. The model yields implications for management compensation in banks and Federal Deposit Insurance reform. Our results explain the dynamics of top-management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization.     

上市商业银行高管薪酬和经营绩效研究——基于五家上市商业银行2001～2006年面板数据

上市商业银行的高管薪酬与经营绩效显著正相关,资本充足率和不良资产率分别正向和负向影响高管薪酬。高管对盈利水平的贡献是决定其薪酬的最重要因素,风险控制因素对高管薪酬的影响不大。因此,应建立综合的高管薪酬决定机制。     

Pensions as a Form of Executive Compensation

This paper investigates the role of pensions as an element of total executive compensation, and the relationship between pensions and performance‐based compensation in executive pay. Using hand‐collected data on FTSE 100 CEOs and senior executives from 2004?2011, we document that pensions function as a substitute for performance‐based compensation (primarily bonuses) in both cross‐sectional and time‐series settings. We also examine the effect of corporate governance characteristics on executive pensions. We find that corporate governance characteristics associated with stronger board monitoring play a constraining role on the magnitude of pensions. Our evidence of substitution effects between pensions and performance‐based compensation is consistent with a managerial power view of executive compensation‐setting, and the use of pensions as a ‘stealth’ element of compensation. Our findings are robust to considering different types of pensions, product market competition, and cross‐listing. Sub‐period analysis shows that pensions decrease and substitution effects weaken following the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, we find no evidence that the use of compensation consultants with potential conflicts of interest is associated with higher pensions. Overall, our study contributes to a greater understanding of the role of pensions in executive compensation, and shows the importance of including pensions in analysis of executive compensation.     

CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives and the Cost of Equity Capital

In this paper, we show that the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock prices (deltas) decrease the implied cost of equity capital while the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock volatility (vegas) increase the implied cost of equity capital. Our findings demonstrate that shareholders understand the risks of firms’ future projects as embedded in executive compensation and price these risks into the cost of equity capital accordingly. The findings have strong implications for optimal executive compensation contract design, project evaluation and cost of capital estimation.