Exposure,hedging, and value: New evidence from the U.S. airline industry

For a variety of reasons, the U.S. airline industry is a natural sample to analyze the relation between corporate risk exposure, hedging policy, and firm value. First, we find that airline exposures to fuel prices are higher when fuel prices are high or when they are rising. Second, we analyze the relation between exposure coefficients and the percentage of next year's fuel requirement hedged by airlines. In response to higher fuel price levels, rising fuel prices, and higher levels of exposure to fuel prices, airlines tend to increase their hedging activity. Finally, we explore the previously documented jet fuel hedging premium illustrated in Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006). We find a positive hedging premium in our analysis; however, the interaction of hedging and exposure does not affect firm value. We conclude that airlines increasing hedging activity because of higher fuel price exposure are not valued higher compared to those airlines employing more stable hedging policies.     

Does Hedging Affect Firm Value? Evidence from the US Airline Industry

Does hedging add value to the firm, and if so, is the source of the added value consistent with hedging theory? We investigate jet fuel hedging behavior of firms in the US airline industry during 1992–2003 to examine whether such hedging is a source of value for these companies. We illustrate that the investment and financing climate in the airline industry conforms well to the theoretical framework of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). In general, airline industry investment opportunities correlate positively with jet fuel costs, while higher fuel costs are consistent with lower cash flow. Given that jet fuel costs are hedgeable, airlines with a desire for expansion may find value in hedging future purchases of jet fuel. Our results show that jet fuel hedging is positively related to airline firm value. The coefficients on the hedging variables in our regression analysis suggest that the “hedging premium” is greater than the 5% documented in Allayannis and Weston (2001), and might be as large as 10%. We find that the positive relation between hedging and value increases in capital investment, and that most of the hedging premium is attributable to the interaction of hedging with investment. This result is consistent with the assertion that the principal benefit of jet fuel hedging by airlines comes from reduction of underinvestment costs.     

On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging

Finance theory indicates that hedging increases firm value by reducing expected taxes, expected costs of financial distress, or other agency costs. This paper provides evidence on these hypotheses using survey data on firm's use of forwards, futures, swaps, and options combined with COMPUTSTAT data on firm characteristics. Of 169 firms in the sample, 104 firms use hedging instruments in 1986. The data suggest that firms which hedge face more convex tax functions, have less coverage of fixed claims, are larger, have more growth options in their investment opportunity set, and employ fewer hedging substitutes.     

Convex costs and the hedging paradox

Financial theory suggests that hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections, including direct and indirect costs of financial distress, costly external financing, and convex tax exposure. The influence of these costs, which are high when profits are low and low or negligible when profits are large, on the extent of firm hedging has not been consistently addressed in the finance literature. In Brown and Toft's (2002) model, more convex costs imply that a firm will decrease the extent of hedging. At the same time, one version of Smith and Stulz's (1985) tax hypothesis implies that a given firm is expected to increase the extent of hedging under a more convex tax exposure. I address this ambiguity in the literature by showing that, in incomplete markets, value-maximizing firms that stand to gain the most from hedging may in fact hedge less than otherwise identical firms with less to gain from hedging. This hedging paradox can partly account for the lack of conclusive evidence to suggest that convex costs can influence both a firm's decision to hedge and the extent of the firm's hedging. Finally, I introduce a new interpretation of empirical relations between potential hedging gains and the extent of hedging.     

Does Operational and Financial Hedging Reduce Exposure? Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry

We examine the effects of both financial and operational hedging on jet fuel exposure in the U.S. airline industry. Specifically, we investigate two operational hedging strategies: the extent to which airlines operate different aircraft types and the degree to which airlines operate fuel‐efficient fleets. We find that both financial and operational hedging are important tools in reducing airline exposure to jet fuel price risk. However, operational hedging strategies appear to be more economically important, which suggests that hedging with derivatives is more likely to be used to “fine‐tune” risk exposure, whereas operational choices have a higher order effect on risk exposure.     

Fuel hedging,operational hedging and risk exposure — Evidence from the global airline industry

The aviation industry is characterized by low profit margins and a constant struggle with skyrocketing fuel costs. Financial and operational hedging strategies serve aviation managers as a tool to counteract high and volatile fuel prices. While most research on fuel hedging has concentrated on the U.S. airline market, this paper is the first study to include airlines from Asia and Europe. We analyze 64 airlines over 11 years and find that Asian carriers are more negatively exposed than European airlines but less exposed than North American airlines. In contrast to Treanor, Simkins, Rogers and Carter (2012), this study finds less significant negative exposure coefficients among U.S. carriers. Using a fixed effects model we reject the hypothesis that financial hedging decreases risk exposure. One possibility is that the decreased volatility in jet fuel prices over the past few years has perhaps made airlines less exposed to fuel prices and hence, financial hedging is less effective. Operational hedging, defined by two proxies for fleet diversity, does not reduce exposure significantly, either. In contrast, a one percentage point increase in fleet diversity, calculated with a dispersion index using different aircraft types, increases the risk exposure coefficient by 1.83%. On the other hand, fleet diversity, calculated with different aircraft families, increases exposure by only 0.63%. These results are supported by the global trend of airline managers to reduce fleet diversity. Airlines have reduced their fleet diversity by 7.70% or 10.77% (depending on the proxy) between 2002 and 2012. The greatest reduction can be found among European airlines with 23.12% (28.04%).     

Fine‐Tuning a Corporate Hedging Portfolio: The Case of an Airline

Industrial companies typically face a multitude of risks that could cause significant fluctuations in their cash flow. This is a case study of the hedging strategy adopted by an international air carrier to manage its jet‐fuel price exposure. The airline's hedging approach uses “strips” of monthly collars constructed with Asian options whose payoffs are based on average of “within‐prompt‐month” oil prices. Using the carrier's own implicit objective function based on an annual granularity, the authors show how the air carrier could fine‐tune its current hedge portfolio by adding tailored exotic options. The article describes annual average‐price options, provides an explicit valuation of them, and considers how such instruments may affect corporate liquidity. Consistent with its annual objective function, the airline made this exotic derivative the central tool to hedge across all potential realized values of annual jet‐fuel spot prices. The authors believe this modified portfolio is better suited to address the firm's hedging cost and its overall exposure to jet‐fuel price fluctuations.     

Financial Constraints, Competition, and Hedging in Industry Equilibrium

We analyze the hedging decisions of firms, within an equilibrium setting that allows us to examine how a firm's hedging choice depends on the hedging choices of its competitors. Within this equilibrium some firms hedge while others do not, even though all firms are ex ante identical. The fraction of firms that hedge depends on industry characteristics, such as the number of firms in the industry, the elasticity of demand, and the convexity of production costs. Consistent with prior empirical findings, the model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the decision to hedge in the most competitive industries.     

Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas Producers

This paper studies the hedging activities of 119 U.S. oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001 and evaluates their effect on firm value. Theories of hedging based on market imperfections imply that hedging should increase the firm's market value (MV). To test this hypothesis, we collect detailed information on the extent of hedging and on the valuation of oil and gas reserves. We verify that hedging reduces the firm's stock price sensitivity to oil and gas prices. Contrary to previous studies, however, we find that hedging does not seem to affect MVs for this industry.     

The Real and Financial Implications of Corporate Hedging

We study the implications of hedging for corporate financing and investment. We do so using an extensive, hand‐collected data set on corporate hedging activities. Hedging can lower the odds of negative realizations, thereby reducing the expected costs of financial distress. In theory, this should ease a firm's access to credit. Using a tax‐based instrumental variable approach, we show that hedgers pay lower interest spreads and are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in their loan agreements. These favorable financing terms, in turn, allow hedgers to invest more. Our tests characterize two exact channels—cost of borrowing and investment restrictions—through which hedging affects corporate outcomes. The analysis shows that hedging has a first‐order effect on firm financing and investment, and provides new insights into how hedging affects corporate value. More broadly, our study contributes novel evidence on the real consequences of financial contracting.     

The effects of management compensation on firm hedging: Does SFAS 133 matter?

This paper analyzes whether executive compensation in the form of options or stocks affects a firm's decision to hedge. In particular, we investigate whether SFAS 133, a regulation designed to increase transparency of derivative reporting, alters the relationship between managerial compensation and derivative use. We demonstrate that when management is compensated with options, the firm uses less derivatives to hedge interest rate and currency risk. Whereas, compensation of management with shares increases a firm's hedging activity. Results thus highlight the importance of agency conflict in the payment of managerial options and the firm's use of hedging instruments. Passage of SFAS 133 significantly affects derivative use and agency conflict.     

Measuring Corpotate Liquidity Risk

This article presents the outline of a framework for evaluating liquidity risk (at the corporate level) with risk measures that are intuitive and economically relevant. In particular, the risk measures are designed explicitly to show the effectiveness of a company's risk management program in helping the firm to (1) avoid financial distress or default and (2) ensure its ability to undertake all strategic investments. For managers attempting to quantify liquidity risks, this paper proposes that the risk measures have two important features: One is to make the liquidity risk estimate depend on some measure of the firm's balance sheet strength, one that reflects the role of the balance sheet as a risk buffer. The second is to provide a useful estimate of the opportunity costs associated with a given liquidity shortage—one that reflects the value of the investment opportunities that liquidity problems could jeopardize. The author illustrates the application of the proposed risk measures with an example of a company evaluating a hedging strategy designed to accompany a substantial increase in its investment budget. Using the risk measures discussed in this paper, the author shows how to assess the effectiveness of a proposed hedge in terms of its expected ability to reduce costly cash shortfalls in scenarios in which the firm's debt capacity is also expected to be depleted.     

WHY HEDGE? SOME EVIDENCE FROM OIL AND GAS PRODUCERS

Despite the prevalence of corporate risk management, there are no widely accepted explanations for why companies hedge or how shareholders benefit from hedging. This article provides some evidence on these issues by reporting the results of a study of the risk management policies of 100 oil and gas producers from 1992 to 1994.
The first notable finding is the considerable variety of the hedging policies of the oil and gas producers. For example, in 1993 slightly more than half of the companies did not hedge, while a quarter of the firms in the sample hedged more than 28' of their production, and some firms hedged almost 100'. The second main finding was that the extent of hedging was related to a variety of factors, largely those related to financing costs. In particular, companies with higher leverage—and thus presumably facing greater difficulties in accessing the capital markets—tended to hedge a larger fraction of their output than firms with lower leverage ratios. This result is consistent with the idea that corporations manage risks to help ensure they have sufficient capital to finance their investment opportunities and to reduce the likelihood that low oil and gas prices will push them into financial distress. Under either of these interpretations, financial theory would suggest that corporate hedging increases shareholder value. Whether it actually does so is a matter for future research.     

Is operational hedging a substitute for or a complement to financial hedging?

This paper investigates operational hedging by firms and how operational hedging is related to financial hedging by using a sample of 424 firm observations, which consist of 212 operationally hedged firms (firms with foreign sales) and a size- and industry-matched sample of 212 non-operationally hedged firms (firms with export sales). We find that non-operationally hedged firms use more financial hedging, relative to their levels of foreign currency exposure, as measured by the amount of export sales. On the other hand, though operationally hedged firms have more currency exposure, their usage of financial derivatives becomes much smaller than that of exporting firms. These results can explain why some global firms use very limited amount of financial derivatives for hedging purpose despite much higher levels of currency risk exposure. We also show that hedging increases firm value.     

Is value creation consistent with currency hedging?

This paper analyzes value creation through currency hedging in the Spanish market. The results show that the hedging with derivatives generated an average premium of 1.53% and that foreign currency debt generated 7.52%, with respect to company value approximated by Tobin's Q, while operational hedging does not affect company value. Moreover, in half of the observations corresponding to companies that hedged with derivatives, the value premium was between 0.08% and 0.99%. In the case of foreign currency debt, the range was between 1.79% and 10.37%. It demonstrates that the contribution of currency hedging to company value fluctuates considerable according to the volume of financial hedging. Thus, an empirical study of this aspect which only analyses the decision to hedge through dummy variables to define financial hedging, as empirical previous studies, can lead to biased results in terms of estimated premium amounts, because it assumes a homogenous treatment of companies regardless of hedging volumes.     

Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge

This paper examines optimal compensation contracts when executives can hedge their personal portfolios. In a simple principal-agent framework, I predict that the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO's) pay-performance sensitivity decreases with the executive-hedging cost. Empirically, I find evidence supporting the model's prediction. Providing further support for the theory, I show that shareholders also impose a high sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility and increase financial leverage to resolve the executive-hedging problem. Moreover, executives with lower hedging costs hold more exercisable in-the-money options, have weaker incentives to cut dividends, and pursue fewer corporate diversification initiatives. Overall, the manager's ability to hedge the firm's risk affects governance mechanisms and managerial actions.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF SELECTIVE EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT–EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS

Survey studies of both corporate exchange risk management and the corporate use of derivatives in general have shown considerable variation in managerial practices. Some firms do not hedge open positions at all, and some hedge their exposures completely. Most companies, however, hedge only those positions on which they expect a currency loss, while leaving open positions on which they expect a currency gain—a practice known as “selective hedging.” Finally, there is a small minority of firms that engage in outright speculation, deliberately creating risk exposures in addition to those arising from their normal business operations. Such findings are consistent with survey studies that suggest that a majority of corporate financial managers appear to believe that they are able to “beat the market”—a belief that, of course, is inconsistent with efficient markets theory. So why do some companies follow selective risk management strategies while other firms hedge open positions without recourse to exchange rate forecasts? In an attempt to answer this question, the author surveyed 74 German non‐financial companies about their exchange risk management practices. He found that highly levered firms were less likely to take bets in the currency markets, while bank‐controlled firms were more likely to use a selective risk management strategy. There was a negative relationship between profitability and the use of selective hedging—a finding that could be interpreted as suggesting that selective hedging does not generally benefit the firm's shareholders. Finally, there was a weak tendency for larger firms to be more inclined to use forecasts in their foreign exchange risk management.     

Managerial hedging,equity ownership,and firm value

Suppose risk‐averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash‐flow risk by trading in financial markets but cannot hedge their firm‐specific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm‐specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater aggregate risk. Such forms of moral hazard give rise to excessive aggregate risk in stock markets. In this context, optimal managerial contracts induce a relationship between managerial ownership and (i) aggregate risk in the firm's cash flows, as well as (ii) firm value. We show that this can help explain the shape of the empirically documented relationship between ownership and firm performance.     

Empirical evidence concerning incentives to hedge transaction and translation exposures

We investigate Swedish firms’ use of financial hedges against foreign exchange exposure. Our survey data lets us distinguish between translation exposure and transaction exposure hedging. Survey responses indicate that over 50% of the sampled firms employ financial hedges, and that transaction exposure is more frequently hedged than is translation exposure. The likelihood of using financial hedges increases with firm size and exposure, and liquidity constraints are important in explaining transaction exposure hedging. Importantly, the existence of loan covenants accounts for translation exposure hedging, suggesting that firms hedge translation exposure to avoid violating loan covenants.     

How Companies Can Use Hedging to Create Shareholder Value

This article provides a framework for designing and evaluating corporate risk management and hedging programs. Corporate risk management has the potential to create substantial shareholder wealth by protecting companies from unexpected events that could force them to put their strategic investment plans on hold or even endanger their existence. However, assessing the performance of risk management, and how it is expected to increase the value of the enterprise, is a difficult undertaking because the costs of risk management tend to be much easier to quantify—indeed, they often appear directly on the firm's bottom line—than the benefits. The author begins by discussing how to evaluate the benefits and costs of a risk management program in general terms, and then focuses more directly on the assessment of corporate hedging programs, which are generally conducted with derivatives. In practice, there are many obstacles to designing and carrying out a successful hedging program. But one of the most common has been the tendency of top managements to insist that hedging programs be “costless.” The author argues that just as the purchase of fire insurance is not viewed as waste of funds or a bad investment if the insured house does not burn down, the use of derivatives in a well‐designed hedge should not be viewed as a mistake if the derivative position produces losses. To guard against this mistake, the people who design and implement risk management strategies must ensure that their CEOs and boards understand the possible outcomes of the strategy—including losses on derivatives position—and how the strategy itself increases the (expected) value of the firm. Further, management should attempt to communicate the principles underlying its risk management program and the value created by its hedging strategy to the investment community.