Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.     

Fiscal Externalities and Efficient Transfers in a Federation

This paper investigates properties of the second best allocation in a fiscal federal system in which both federal tax and intergovernmental grants are involved and the taxation is distortionary. Also, optimal federal grants and tax policies in a decentralized fiscal system are examined. Our major findings are: (i) the second best does not require the equalization of marginal cost of public funds across regions in a conventional form; (ii) matching grants based on either the local tax rates or tax revenues should be introduced to internalize the tax externality; and (iii) once lump-sum and matching grants are optimized, federal tax policy becomes redundant so the optimal fiscal gap is indeterminate.     

Why not fully spend a conditional block grant?

This paper studies a conditional block grant that Dutch municipalities receive for welfare-to-work programs. Many municipalities do not fully use this grant, although programs are beneficial for them. We argue that municipalities incur expenses to use the grant. If these costs are substantial, then it is optimal not to fully use the grant. Based on municipality-specific data on grants and actual expenditures, we estimate that municipalities have to add about 90 cents from their own resources to spend 1 euro of the grant. As a result, the conditional block grant is de facto a closed-ended matching grant.     

Flypaper Effect and Sluggishness: Evidence from Regional Health Expenditure in Italy

In Italy, public expenditure reduction is achieved through a revision of social security and health care programs. In particular, public health expenditure control has been implemented through a reform that imposes more stringent budget rules to local governments and a considerable reduction in grants-in-aid from the central government. This paper investigates empirically whether the response to this decrease in categorical lump-sum grants from the central to local governments results in an asymmetric response to intergovernmental grants. Hard budget and soft budget constraint hypotheses are estimated by using a sample of cross-sectional and time observations covering the 20 Italian regions over the period 1989–1993. The main finding is the existence of a standard and a super flypaper effect in both models. The introduction of the soft-budget constraint hypothesis results in a stronger effect of grants and a lower response of own resources which shows that local governments prefer to incur some deficit instead of reducing health care expenditure.     

Do Interregional Transfers Improve the Economic Performance of Poor Regions? The Case of Spain

The 17 regional governments of Spain receive grants from both the central government and the European Union. The grants are generally redistributive and are intended to stimulate economic activity in the poorer regions. We evaluate the effectiveness of the grants by comparing the economic performance of the regions before and after the implementation of the grant programs using a differences-in-differences approach. We find that these policies have not been effective at stimulating private investment or improving the overall economies of the poorer regions.     

Allocating Grant to the UK's Devolved Territories by Needs Assessment: Lessons from School Funding Formulae in England and Scotland

The UK's devolved governments (DGs) receive block grants to finance almost all their expenditure. The Barnett formula used to calculate these grants is often criticised because it does not consider the DGs’ spending needs. However, the feasibility of allocating block grants by needs assessment is often questioned, given the contestability of spending needs. This paper compares the formula used within England to assess the education spending needs of local authorities there with the equivalent Scottish formula, by using each formula in turn to calculate the relative spending needs of the UK territories. The rationale is to consider how similar the two formulae are in how they estimate the territories’ relative spending needs for education, a major responsibility of the DGs. The results show that the English and Scottish education allocation formulae produce similar estimates of the territories’ relative education spending needs. This suggests that it may be more feasible to allocate education resources to the UK's devolved territories based on needs assessment than some have suggested. The results also suggest some inequity in current patterns of education spending across the UK.     

Overlapping tax revenue,soft budget,and rent seeking

This paper investigates how the soft-budget constraint with grants from the central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical externality of local public investment by stimulating local expenditure when both the central and local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities financed by public investment. The model incorporates the local governments’ rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting. The soft-budget constraint is welfare deteriorating because it stimulates rent-seeking activities, although a soft-budget game may attain the first-best level of public investment.     

Accounting for government grants: Standard-setting and accounting choice

This paper provides evidence on several matters relating to accounting for government grants under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Focusing on grants related to assets, we trace the development of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 20, outline some of the problems of current accounting practice, and suggest why these have not been addressed by the standard-setter. Then, by hand-collecting data relating to 559 firms from 15 countries, we empirically analyze several issues. We show that asset grants are economically important for some firms and that the frequency of grants is significantly different across the countries. For the non-financial firms in our sample, we identify the grant-related accounting policy choice: a firm can either show the grant as deferred income or net it against the asset. The options are roughly equally popular overall but the firm’s country of domicile is strongly associated with the choice. Further, as a key element of disclosure quality for this topic, we investigate whether or not the balance sheet-related numbers relating to grants are disclosed, finding that many firms do not disclose them. Disclosure quality is better for firms which use the ‘deferred income’ option, and it is also better in countries where a higher proportion of firms has received government grants. International differences and poor disclosure are detrimental to international comparisons, so we conclude that the policy choice should be removed from the accounting standard.     

Local fiscal equalisation based on fiscal capacity: the case of Austria

This paper deals with local fiscal equalisation in Austria. The system of intergovernmental relations in Austria includes different regulations in order to equalise differences in the fiscal capacity of the municipalities. This leads to so‐called ‘compensation effects’, because additional revenues from a local government's own tax are (at least partly) compensated by losses from equalisation grants. This paper carries out a detailed analysis of these compensation effects. It is shown that they create strong fiscal disincentives for the local governments: on average, 55 per cent of additional revenues from the communal tax (which is the most important of a local government's own taxes) are compensated by losses of equalisation grants. In extreme cases, local governments can lose up to 144 per cent of the additional tax yields collected. These local governments would be better off if they made no effort to increase their tax base.     

Fiscal Effects of Block Grants for the Needy: An Interpretation of the Evidence

In 1996 the United States revamped its welfare system by eliminating the entitlement to cash benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and replacing it by Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Federal financing was converted from open-ended matching grants to fixed block grants. This paper reviews the evidence on the likely impact of block grants for the needy on average benefit levels, total redistributional outlays, and on differentials across states. The econometric evidence on state responses to federal incentives for spending on the needy varies enormously. An evaluation of this evidence, together with an examination of state responses to the federalization of aid to the elderly, blind, and disabled through the Supplementary Security Income program, suggests that in the long run the federal changes will substantially decrease the amount of direct cash redistribution in the United States. A reasonable guess is that average benefits to the needy will be 15 to 30 percent smaller than under current law, while total spending on cash grants could decline by as much as 35 percent. While interstate competition will act to reduce benefit differentials across states, this tendency will be offset by differential matching rate effects. An extreme race to the bottom, with a total withering of the transfer state, is unlikely to occur.     

Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants

This paper describes the tax and expenditure externalities that can occur in a federation, focusing on the (relatively neglected) vertical tax and expenditure externalities which arise when state governments' tax and expenditure decisions affect the federal government's budget constraint and vice versa. Formulas are derived for matching grants which correct the distortions in governments' decision-making caused by fiscal externalities. With vertical tax externalities, the matching revenue grant may result in transfers from the state government to the federal government. With vertical expenditure externalities, the federal government should provide a matching expenditure grant equal to the additional federal revenue that is generated from an additional dollar spent by a state on productivityenhancing activities such as education.     

Impure public goods,matching grant rates and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility

We examine the decentralized provision of an impure public good by regional governments in a federation similar in certain respects to both the European Union and the United States. The central authority redistributes income and provides matching grants on a per rate basis after it observes the regions’ contributions to the impure public good. Imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments’ policies by establishing residence in their most preferred region. We show that the allocations of the impure public good and the population are generally efficient in a federation with decentralized leadership.     

The real impact of a one-off fiscal restriction: empirical evidence of a flypaper effect in Flemish municipalities

This paper analyses the effects of a one-off fiscal restriction on Flemish local government spending. The authors provide evidence of a ‘flypaper effect’: fiscal restriction stimulated the sensitivity of local spending to grants. This means that higher-level governments (regional/national/supranational) need to take a flypaper effect into account when considering one-off fiscal restrictions on lower-level governments.     

Managerial gaming of stock and option grants

In this paper, we examine managerial gaming of different types of equity grants, both at the initial award of the equity grants (front‐end gaming) and the unwinding of the equity holdings in the future (back‐end gaming). We find that the potential gains from stock price manipulation vary substantially across different types of equity grants. While traditional stock option grants are less vulnerable to front‐end gaming, they are more vulnerable to back‐end gaming than other types of equity grants (e.g., restricted stock grants). To prevent or discourage managerial gaming, firms should preset all terms of the equity grant in advance and link its future payoff to average stock prices (e.g., by granting Asian stock options).     

Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints

There is much evidence against the so-called “too big to fail” hypothesis in the case of bailouts to subnational governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability and willingness of a district to induce a bailout and district size are negatively correlated. Furthermore, we argue that these policies can be equilibrium strategies.     

How sticky are local expenditures in Italy? Assessing the relevance of the flypaper effect through municipal data

An extensive literature analysed the impact of upper tier transfers on spending behaviour of lower level governments finding evidence of a flypaper effect, an overreaction to varying grants from upper tiers. Our work seeks to supplement a dearth of evidence for the Italian case by focusing on the responsiveness of municipal expenditures to State grants. We use a panel of almost 8,000 municipalities from 1999 to 2006. Budget data are matched with several other information sources, enabling us to investigate also the role played by some important political factors like the electoral cycle or the political strength of local cabinets. Application of panel data techniques with the use of instrumental variables and a dynamic setting highlights the presence of a sizeable flypaper effect and a significant role for political variables while the asymmetric response is not confirmed in all specifications.     

Does it pay to pray? Religious nonprofits and funding

This study examines whether religious identity has an impact on two types of funding, donations and government grants, received by nonprofit organizations. We argue that religious nonprofits attract more donations because (1) donors feel an affinity or special tie to religious organizations and/or (2) donors regard religious organization as having good stewardship. Using 54,917 organization-year observations we find that 18% of the largest U.S. nonprofit organizations have some religious identity and that these organizations receive more donations than their non-religious counterparts. We further find that the association is more pronounced for nonprofits in more religious geographic areas, those with unrestricted donations, and organizations with better stewardship. Conversely, we find that government grants are negatively associated with religious identity, a result consistent with the separation between church and state established under U.S. law and tradition. This negative relationship, however, is mitigated for nonprofits with better stewardship. Our results should be of interest to donors and policymakers who seek to understand the impact of religion on nonprofit funding as well as the role of donor affiliation and stewardship in the fundraising process.     

Do executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance?

Consistent with predictions of agency theory, we find direct evidence that executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance. This inference is drawn from evaluation of various motivations for the use of such grants in executive compensation: value enhancement, risk taking, tax benefit, signaling and cash conservation. We find consistent evidence for the value enhancement motivation to reduce agency costs. As well, they signal for positive price sensitive information. Our results reject the tax benefit and cash conservation motivations. This finding is robust after controlling for the endogenous character of executive stock option grants and other equity-based grants. JEL Classification G32 • J33 • M52     

Community Asset Valuations by Non‐profit Government Entities

This paper examines an implication of applying International Financial Reporting Standards to the government sector in Australia. We posit both a self‐interest and a transparency motivation for local governments effecting revaluations of both infrastructure assets and community land. The self‐interest motivation was expected to manifest as a relationship between the amount of revaluation and CEO (or management team) remuneration. The transparency motivation was expected to result in a relationship between revaluation and the extent of spending on these assets, measured as both the quantum of materials and contracts expense, and as the quantum of contracts awarded by the entity above the disclosure threshold. We also speculated that revaluations may be used to signal to state governments a need for additional funds through capital and/or operating grants. At conventional levels of significance, we find no support for these relationships, suggesting that agency motivations at the local government level are either more subtle or non‐existent. As local government authorities in our study follow a reporting framework and standardised accounting procedures prescribed by the state government (in compliance with applicable AASB/IFRS standards), financial and public accountabilities are also likely to be a driver for the valuation of local infrastructure assets at fair value, and this is not likely to be undermined by the opportunistic incentives we have considered.     

CEO performance-based grants’ vesting provisions and debt contracts: Evidence from GAAP,Non-GAAP and KPI metrics

We examine the influence of CEOs’ equity and cash grants’ vesting provisions that are based on (i) accounting performance metrics prepared under US generally accepted principles (GAAP), (ii) non-GAAP performance metrics and (iii) key performance indicators (KPIs) on debt contracts. We find that grants with vesting provisions based on GAAP metrics and KPIs lead to a lower cost of debt, a lower likelihood of collateral requirements and less restrictive covenant terms. In contrast, performance-based grants with non-GAAP vesting provisions lead to a higher cost of debt, a higher likelihood of collateral requirements and more restrictive covenant terms. Supplementary analyses reveal that our results are incremental to other debtholder-friendly features in the CEO contracts, such as grants with debt-related performance measures and CEOs’ inside debt holdings, and robust to alternative variable definitions and specifications. Overall, our results suggest that debtholders understand the differing incentives associated with GAAP, non-GAAP and KPI-based performance measures, and incorporate these differences into debt contracts.