Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation

This paper addresses vertical fiscal externalities in a model where the state governments provide health care and the federal government provides a sickness benefit. Both levels of government tax labor income and policy decisions affect labor income as well as participation in the labor market. The results show that the vertical externality affecting the state governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved that the vertical fiscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to the states.      

Federal tax competition and the efficiency consequences for local taxation of revenue equalization

Recent work has shown that a system of equalization grants can neutralize the efficiency loss caused by tax competition among lower-level governments. These models, however, ignore the vertical tax externalities that occur when the federal and lower-level governments levy taxes on the same base. This paper incorporates equalization grants into a standard capital tax competition model in which there are horizontal tax externalities between jurisdictions and vertical tax externalities between the levels of government. It is shown that, even in the presence of vertical tax externalities, an efficient level of lower-level government taxation can be achieved with a modifying version of a standard equalization grant formula.     

Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada

In a decentralised tax system, the effects of tax policies enacted by one government are not confined to its own jurisdiction. First, if both the regional and the federal levels of government co-occupy the same fields of taxation, tax rate increases by one layer of government will reduce taxes collected by the other. Second, if the tax base is mobile, tax rate increases by one regional government will raise the amount of taxes collected by other regional governments. These sources of fiscal interdependence are called in the literature vertical and horizontal tax externalities, respectively. Third, as Smart (1998) shows, if equalisation transfers are present, an increase in the standard equalisation tax rate provides incentives to raise taxes to the receiving provinces. A way to check the empirical relevance of these hypotheses is to test for the existence of interactions between the regional tax rate, on the one hand, and the federal tax rate, the tax rate set by competing regions, and the standard equalisation tax rate, on the other hand. Following this approach, this paper estimates provincial tax setting functions with data on Canadian personal income taxation for the period 1982–1996. We find a significant positive response of provincial tax rates to changes in the federal income tax rate, the tax rates of competing provinces, and the standard equalisation rate (only for receiving provinces). We also find that the reaction to horizontal competition is stronger in the provinces that do not receive equalisation transfers.     

Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping Revenue Maximizing Governments

Academic literature in public finance has focused on interjurisdictional tax competition—namely among similar types of local governments—but has leaved vertical externalities arising from interactions between two overlapping governments sharing the same tax base aside. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model within which interjurisdictional tax competition and vertical interactions between two overlapping governments that share the same tax base can be analyzed simultaneously. We find that interjurisdictional tax competition reduces the global tax rate set by both overlapping governments (federal and local) but is unable to solve completely the distortion arising from vertical externalities. The model is also extended to allow for government subsidies to industrial capital. We give sufficient conditions for capital subsidies to be more efficient to attract capital when they are granted at a federal level rather than at a local level.     

Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers

It seems to be widely believed that the case for centralizing revenue-raising is stronger than that for centralizing expenditure decisions, so that federal governments should typically make transfers to lower-level (state) governments. This paper argues, however, that pure efficiency considerations may plausibly point in exactly the opposite direction. This arises because of a vertical fiscal externality: the typical state may neglect the impact that its tax decisions have on the federal tax base. The optimal federal response is to internalize this distortion of state decisions by means of offsetting subsidy on the common tax base, the financing of which may plausibly require transfers from the states.     

分税与地方财政支出结构

本文研究了税收分成对地方财政支出结构的影响。理论分析发现,在地方政府的财政支出结构竞争中,税收分成比例的提高将直接导致地方政府增加生产性公共支出,发挥生产性支出的产出外部性,提高产出水平和自身税收收入水平,实现福利最大化。一系列经验分析显著地验证了上述结论,即当地级市政府的税收分成率提高10%,该地区生产性支出占比将提高1.39%。本文的分析和结论有助于解释中国地方财政支出结构变动的原因,从而为政府间税收分配改革提供有效的政策建议。     

中国公共预算约束软化的体制成因：理论分析与实证检验

科学和民主的预算管理制度建立前,税制和分税制对政府预算约束有重要作用。中国税制和分税制缺乏内生约束机制,地方政府有空间和激励突破预算框架参与过度财政竞争,使公共预算约束软化。根据公共预算软约束的估计和面板 probit模型,1994年的税制和分税制改革整体硬化了全国预算收入约束,但导致东部的预算收入约束软化,且未改善预算支出约束。现行税制和分税制下,不规范的税收优惠政策、投资扩张冲动和专项转移支出依赖是导致公共预算约束软化的重要机制。     

Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures

This paper deals with a specific vertical assignment of public functions in a federation: Two levels of government share both the same tax source and expenditure on a productivity increasing public service. We consider surplus maximizing Leviathan governments which provide public services in order to increase their potential tax base. The Nash equilibrium is characterized by overtaxation and relative to surplus maximization—depending on whether or not the public goods are sufficiently complementary with the entire tax base—either underprovision or overprovision of the public service. The implications of these results, in terms of welfare and potential use for earmarking taxes are also considered.     

Fiscal Externalities and Efficient Transfers in a Federation

This paper investigates properties of the second best allocation in a fiscal federal system in which both federal tax and intergovernmental grants are involved and the taxation is distortionary. Also, optimal federal grants and tax policies in a decentralized fiscal system are examined. Our major findings are: (i) the second best does not require the equalization of marginal cost of public funds across regions in a conventional form; (ii) matching grants based on either the local tax rates or tax revenues should be introduced to internalize the tax externality; and (iii) once lump-sum and matching grants are optimized, federal tax policy becomes redundant so the optimal fiscal gap is indeterminate.     

Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization

This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency.     

Tax competition and tax base equalization in the presence of multiple tax instruments

The literature on tax competition has argued that tax base equalization, which reduces regional disparities in tax bases, can serve as a means of internalizing horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities. This argument assumes that each government relies on a single tax base (a regional tax on mobile capital and a federal tax on savings). This paper considers the case in which a distortionary labor tax is also available. Internalizing fiscal externalities requires that while the regional capital tax base is fully equalized, a region’s equalization entitlement for the labor tax is positive when its tax base is “larger” than the average tax base of all regions. This efficient tax base equalization system is incompatible with the primary objective of fiscal equalization.

     

地方政府周期性财政收支、融资依赖与地区出口结构

在财政分权与政治垂直管理的激励体制下,地方政府财政支出的逆周期性弱化。同时,地区间初始禀赋差异和风险异质性则使得地方政府财政政策的周期性特征存在明显的地区差异。本文借鉴Rajan与Zingales(1998)发展的固定效应估计模型,采用2004年我国29个省份29个行业的相关数据,考察了周期性财政政策对地区出口结构的影响。本文研究显示,财政政策逆周期性较强的地区,在外部融资依赖性高的行业出口相对更多,具有比较优势。同时,在控制了人力资本、物质资本和自然资源禀赋等传统比较优势影响因素,以及外部市场接近度、国内市场容量和基础设施等新经济地理的因素之后,本文的结论依然成立。     

物业税改革的经济影响:一个文献综述

自从2003年我国提出物业税改革的设想后,物业税改革成为了一个热点话题.分析物业税改革可能带来的经济影响是当前讨论的重点之一.物业税将逐渐成为地方政府的一个稳定的主要收入来源.为地方政府提供长期而稳定的激励,提高地方公共财政的效率;物业税改革在短期内会降低房价,不过幅度不会太大,也不会降低购房者的负担;物业税改革还可以提高土地资源的配置效率,一定程度上缓解由土地批租制度带来的地方政府"寅吃卯粮"的问题.     

我国地方税系的重构——基于税收分布视角

地方税系重构需要在考虑地方税收均衡程度的基础上进行,所以,理清税收在各地的分布状况及其差异系数非常关键.分析表明,地方税收的差异系数决定于进入地方税系的税种类别及其在地方税收中的比重.进一步,在中央与地方税收格局不变的限定下,通过模拟计算出地方税系重构八种情景下的地方税收差异系数.同时,基于模拟结果与各种因素的权衡,认为我国地方税系重构不能仅简单依赖增值税分享比例向地方政府的倾斜来实现,而是需要将车辆购置税与部分消费税划归地方政府,之后再以增值税分享比例的调整来稳定地方税收规模.     

Value-added tax options for India

The pressures of aggregate revenue, the requirement of a reduced role for customs duties for the liberalization of the economy, and the complexity and strains of the current system together point clearly toward the desirability of tax reform in India. Since domestic indirect taxes provide the major source of revenue, they deserve special attention. This paper argues that India would benefit from moving toward a system of value-added taxation (VAT) and focuses on the way in which a VAT (or VATs) can be best introduced into India given the country's federal structure. Three different options are distinguished: a central VAT, dual VAT, and states' VAT. We argue that the first is politically infeasible, that the second represents the best way forward in the short term, and that the third deserves consideration as a long-run option. Special attention is paid to the problems that would arise under either a states' or a dual VAT with regard to taxing interstate trade.     

我国最优宏观税负水平的实证分析及政策选择

以巴罗、斯库利模型为分析框架,通过相关分析和多元回归分析,进一步研究我国的宏观税负问题。实证研究结果表明：政府通过征税把资源从私人部门转移到公共部门使用的过程中,政府征税对经济产生的负面影响并没有被政府有效地使用税收对经济产生的正效应所抵消,而政府支出本身也对经济产生了负面的影响。从这个角度判断,我国宏观税负水平不是最优的。我国应该进一步完善相关的政策,调整财政体制,进行相应的税收改革。     

持久性减税对地方财政可持续性的动态效应研究

持久性减税可能对地方财政造成动态冲击,合理施策有利于保障地方财政可持续性。为此,选取我国2010—2019年251个地级市数据,使用熵值法从财源结构、支出效益、治理目标和区域协调四个方面构建地方财政可持续性指标,系统考察持久性减税对地方财政可持续性的短期与长期动态效应。研究发现：持久性减税短期内不利于地方财政可持续性,但从长期来看,将对地方财政可持续性产生显著的促进作用;异质性分析表明,短期内减税对地方财政可持续性的负向影响在经济发展水平更高、财政自给率更高以及产业结构高级化更强的地级市更明显,因此要更加注意施策力度。     

A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Effects of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany

Several recent studies suggest that equalizing transfers in a federal system may distort the tax policy decisions of states. We study this issue for the German federal fiscal system. In a simple theoretical model, we first identify a substitution effect and an income effect of equalizing transfers. Our main hypothesis is that both effects should tend to reduce tax revenue of German states. We perform various empirical tests which confirm this hypothesis.     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

Progression and revenue effects of income tax reform

Usually, only initial revenue effects of personal income tax reforms are considered. However, a tax reform characterized by base broadening in exchange for rate reduction can reduce the income elasticity of tax revenue. In that case, the increase in revenue after income growth will be relatively smaller: the tax reform has a negative effect on revenue in the second period. Using the microtax model of the Central Planning Bureau we simulated the effects of the Dutch Oort reform 1990 on revenue elasticities and, consequently, on tax revenue. The income tax revenue elasticity declined by 17 percent which caused an additional revenue loss of 0.6 percent in 1990, rising to 3.8 percent in 1993.