失业保险金申领时限

案例回放《社会保险法》第四十五条规定,失业人员同时符合“失业前用人单位和本人已经缴纳失业保险费满一年的”“非因本人意愿中断就业的…已经进行失业登记,并有求职要求的”三个条件的,从失业保险基金中领取失业保险金。并未规定失业保险金申领期限。《失业保险金申领发放办法》（劳动保障部令第8号）第六条规定：“失业人员应在终止或者解除劳动合同之日起60日内到受理其单位失业保险业务的经办机构申领失业保险金。”终止或者解除劳动合同之日起60日以后,失业人员可否申领失业保险金？     

失业保障制度在反失业中的双重效应及其构建方略

本文首先论述了失业保障制度在治理失业中的积极作用， 认为它虽然不能从根本上解决周期性失业问题， 但却是反失业政策体系中不可或缺的组成部分， 是反失业的“稳定器”和“安全网”； 接着通过一个社会福利博弈模型阐述了过高的失业保障水平对解决失业问题的负面影响； 最后对如何构建和完善失业保障制度提出了一些初步设想。     

关注“新失业群体”

孙立平指出，近些年来，失业下岗问题成为整个社会关注的焦点。但人们一般所说的失业下岗指的是国有企业的失业下岗人员，顶多将原来集体企业的失业下岗人员包括进去。但事实上，在我们的社会中，还存在另外一个失业群体，这个群体至今很少受到人们的关注，这就是原来所说的待业青年，我们这里将其称之为“新失业群体”，以便与由国有。     

对我国现行失业统计的探讨

我国现行的失业统计已有很大改进,但在失业人口、农村失业和隐性失业统计等还存在一些问题,通过分析这些问题与不足,对我国现行失业统计的改进提出了一些措施,包括:建立健全失业统计指标体系,完善失业统计调查方法;对失业人员的年龄应取消上限;加强下岗职工失业统计;加强隐性失业统计;加强农业失业人口统计.     

对转型期我国经济高增长与高失业并存的原因探析

中国经济在高速增长的同时,失业率却居高不下,出现了高增长与高失业并存的现象。本文回顾了我国失业问题的相关研究,分析了我国经济高增长与高失业并存的现状,认为我国经济政策的逆就业倾向、转型期失业显性化、产业结构失衡和贸易产品升级换代是导致我国经济高增长与高失业并存的原因,最后提出了确立以就业优先为中心的经济发展战略、扩大内需刺激经济增长、加快产业结构调整、积极发展中小企业、加快农业结构调整步伐、鼓励灵活就业等缓解高失业问题的对策。     

关于失业保障监测预警系统的研究

建立失业保障监测预警系统,对于政府从宏观上把握失业状况、制定相应的宏观调控政策、保证社会保障体系的良性运行以及社会经济的可持续发展具有重要的理论和实际意义。我国失业保障制度还处在改革和完善之中,对失业保障的统计研究正处于起步阶段,更没有建立失业保障预警系统。因此,在我国构建一种对失业保障状况进行监测并通过信号灯向人们发出警报的监测预警系统十分必要。     

重新就业后再次失业如何计算失业保险金

案例回放 吴某1986年5月参加工作,单位依法为其缴纳了失业保险费。2003年9月,因企业改制吴某失业,失业保险经办机构核定其应领取24个月失业保险金。2003年10月他开始失业登记领取失业保险金。2004年9月,吴某被某单位招聘,失业保险经办机构停发了其剩余12个月的失业保险金。新的用工单位继续为其缴纳失业保险费2年多后,本人因故辞职,再次失业并要求享受失业保险金。吴某应如何继续享受失业保险待遇？     

湖南城镇失业与再就业问题研究

城镇人口失业和再就业矛盾日趋突出，从数学模型分析，至２０１０年，湖南仍属于失业问题严重型省份，缓解这一矛盾的根本途径是发展经济，即要从加快产业结构调整、保持适度通货膨胀、加大固定资产投资力度、大力发展私营经济努力。     

研究中国失业高峰问题的力作——介评《失业高峰问题研究》

就业是民生之本、安邦之策、和谐之基,而失业问题则是每个国家的政府都要面临的重要的经济社会问题。理论界对失业问题的研究大多是从理论和政策相结合的角度出发,对于大规模失业所形成的失业高峰问题的系统研究并不常见于已有研究文献中,失业高峰问题被理论界所忽视。实际上,只有当失业问题变得     

失业理论及对我国大学生就业形势浅析

本文从概念、分类、影响及措施等多方面对现行的宏观经济失业理论进行了简要地阐述；然后具体分析了目前我国社会较为严重的也是最引人关注的毕业大学生群体的失业现象，并依据失业理论根据不同的失业类型提出了一些可行的举措及方案。     

东北老工业基地经济转型中的失业特征分析

在经济转型过程中东北老工业基地出现了严重的失业问题,目前下岗职工再就业问题仍未从根本上解决,失业人数仍然在不断增加,新失业群体也不断出现,甚至在某些地区或行业还出现了群集现象,重点发展第三产业、民营企业、中小企业是破解就业问题的根本出路。     

Taxation, Public Policy, and Dynamics of Unemployment

This paper provides an overview of the key issues relating to taxation, public policy and the dynamics of unemployment.It takes issue with the widely held view that generous social insurance schemes and the associated highpayroll taxes have been the major cause of the high unemployment rates which have persisted in Europe over thepast 15 years. It puts forward a framework for a theory of adjustment, based on the portfolio theory of the riskaverse firm and the efficiency wage theory of labor markets. This is used to explain why in the onset of a downturn,the hiring rate may lag the layoff rate, thus giving rise to rising unemployment rates. It is also shown to provideguidance as to policies which enhance the ability of firms to bear risks and which reduce costs of hiring and firing.The paper argues that while policies which increase severance or layoff costs may be well intended they mayactually serve to exacerbate the magnitude of employment fluctuations. Similarly, unemployment compensation,which is designed to ease the burden on those who are unemployed, may lead to higher levels of equilibriumunemployment. These programs can be restructured in ways which simultaneously ease the short-run burden ofthose thrown into unemployment, while reducing the adverse impact of these programs on the unemployment rate.     

Disability Risk, Disability Benefits, and Equilibrium Unemployment

This paper analyses the labour market and efficiency effects of various kinds of disability policies. It therefore extends Pissarides (1990) model of equilibrium unemployment with disability risk and disability benefits and allows for the improper use of disability schemes by the unemployed. The paper finds that recognition of this improper use can reverse the ranking of policies. In addition, it concludes that disability policies that reduce the participation in disability schemes tend to increase the rate of official unemployment. Only policies that lower the rate of disability shocks succeed to reduce both the participation in disability and unemployment schemes.     

Household Level Economic Incentives, Unemployment Trap and Job Finding Probability

This paper considers the sensitivity of the household's disposable income with respect to the labour market states and the labour market transitions of unemployed workers. The paper analyses the following questions: (i) which are the determinants of starting wages? (ii) how many unemployed are in the unemployment trap? (iii) how do household level economic incentives affect the conditional probability of finding a job? The empirical analysis is based on individual panel data covering the years 1987–1993 in Finland, when the unemployment rate rose from about 4% to 18%. We have estimated the starting wage equation to calculate the effects of hypothetical re-employment on the household's disposable income and to evaluate the frequency of the unemployment trap. To analyse factors affecting the transition out of unemployment to employment in open labour market, we estimate unemployment duration using a semi-parametric proportional risk model. The paper shows that the impact of the economic incentives, measured by the hypothetical change in household disposable income, on employment is more important in the recession than in the boom.     

东北老工业基地改造中的下岗失业问题

在改造和振兴东北老工业基地过程中，解决下岗失业问题是一个绕不开的难题，并且还和其他的问题交织在一起，相互影响，成为改造东北老工业基地的一个关键点。因此，把东北老工业基地的下岗失业问题作为一个重要课题加以研究，具有很强的现实性。     

中国失业保险制度改革方向:纳入社会救助——基于历史背景与功能定位的分析

失业保险在建立和长期发展过程中,具有缓和劳资矛盾、天然双向平滑经济波动、提供失业保障和平滑个人收入的基本功能。但随着各国劳动保护及福利制度的发展,失业保险在政治和经济方面的功能减弱,且其失业收入损失补偿功能常常引发失业陷阱,于是各国进行了以促进积极就业为导向的改革。中国失业保险制度曾经为经济体制转型起到了“减震器”的作用。随着劳动保护和社会保障制度的发展和政府就业政策的完善,在二元就业结构、户籍制度、公共部门人力资源管理制度及政府承担就业促进任务的影响下,我国失业保险的政治、经济、失业人口收入补偿、就业促进功能未能有效发挥。在比较了若干改革方案后,本文认为,取消失业保险并将其功能并入社会救助体系是新时代背景下我国失业保险制度的最优改革路径。     

Unemployment Risk, the Housing Market and the Effects of Decentralised Redistribution

The paper examines the general equilibrium effects of benefits to the unemployed and the taxes to pay for them in a two country model in which people move to maximise expected utility. Wages are set by unions, and unemployment emerges as an equilibrium phenomenon. Wage setting institutions are found to be important for assessing the welfare effects of redistribution from the employed to the unemployed. The analysis finds that, with monopoly unions, more redistribution tends to repel population from the country increasing redistribution and to reduce welfare in both countries, but the opposite is the case in a model in which wage setting does not depend on unemployment benefits and taxes. These effects are dampened by the combination of risk averse consumers and inelastic housing supply.     

美国失业保险税对我国的启示

美国的失业保险是联邦和州政府的合作项目,它通过失业保险税来融资。其失业保险税立法及执行保障层次高,税制设计科学合理。建议我国在借鉴美国失业保险税制的基础上,尽快颁布《社会保险法》,建立中央和地方两种失业保险税,在具体规定上给予地方一定的自主权,采用失业保险税率的经验评估方法,以进一步改革和完善我国的失业保险缴贲制度。     

失业保险制度的就业促进效果评估——以内蒙古自治区为例

由于经济发展水平的限制和市场经济体制改革的层次性要求,我国的失业保险制度从建立之初就一直把充分发挥制度的"生活保障"功能作为追求的主要目标,而忽视了失业保险制度的预防失业和就业促进功能。本文以内蒙古自治区为例,运用层次分析法选取了一套较为科学的失业保险制度就业促进效果评估指标,旨在从制度层面分析内蒙古失业保险的就业促进效果。实证研究结果表明,应当建立城镇调查失业率制度、提高失业金替代率、增强就业培训与就业援助的效率、改变参保人群与失业人群错位现象、构建失业保险制度"自动调节机制"、积极探索权力下放和基金投资方式。     

Time inconsistency as a rationale for public unemployment insurance

A role for public unemployment insurance is developed based on the inability of the government to commit to a future rate of unemployment. This is illustrated using a model in which a minimum wage policy combined with unemployment insurance is welfare-improving. Unemployment insurance could be decentralized to the private sector if the government could commit to a minimum wage. However, if not, a government that acts in the interest of the workers will have an incentive to increase the minimum wage to exploit private insurers. In the absence of commitment, an equilibrium with private unemployment insurance will not exist.