Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so‐called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non‐bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article.     

An empirical test of Birkett’s competency model for management accountants: Survey evidence from Dutch practitioners

In 2002, the Accountants-in-Business section of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) issued the Competency Profiles for Management Accounting Practice and Practitioners report. This “Birkett Report” presents a framework for competency development during the careers of management accountants (MAs). On the basis of this theoretical report, a hypothesis has been formulated about the sequence in which each of 38 competencies is expected to become important to the MA during his/her career. Results presented here show that practicing MAs see the same sequence of competencies during their careers as is presented in the theoretical framework, supporting Birkett’s competency model. The results indicate that there may be three groups of competencies: basic, advanced, and highly advanced. It may be said that the basic competencies need to be present at graduation. The advanced competencies may need to be present some years after the start of the MAs career. The highly advanced skills may be needed for Chief Financial Officer (CFO) candidates. These results suggest that advanced and highly advanced competencies are those that could be taught in continuing professional education (CPE) programs, while university education programs should focus on developing basic competencies.     

Revitalising local democracy: A social capital analysis in the context of a New Zealand local authority

Using an exploratory case study, we assess whether markets and strategic performance management systems (SPMS) enhanced social capital of a local authority in New Zealand and its capacity to foster democracy. We found that SPMS enhanced the interaction among managers and between managers and residents and provided residents with opportunities to participate in local authority decision-making. Market forms of management however, promoted individualism and the pursuit of narrow departmental goals. There was increased control by managers and greater reliance on experts which diminished local people's participation (and the role of councillors) in local affairs. The pairing of contradictory discourses based on efficiency, markets and participatory democracy promoted an overly rational form of democracy inimical to a deliberative democracy. The relations between staff were in a state of continuous tension. The paper contributes to an understanding on how the interaction between the state and local authorities affects local authority social capital and the potential effects on community social capital and local democracy. This paper demonstrates a need for greater attention to the contest between different discourses in the construction and sustenance of social capital and the pursuit of democracy.     

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.     

Serial Correlation in Management Earnings Forecast Errors

We examine whether management earnings forecast errors exhibit serial correlation and how analysts understand the serial correlation property of management forecast errors (MFEs). MFEs should not exhibit serial correlation if managers efficiently process information in prior forecast errors and truthfully convey their earnings expectations through management forecasts. However, for long‐horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, we find significantly positive serial correlation in MFEs, and sample self‐selection does not seem to drive this phenomenon. Further analyses suggest that managers’ unintentional information processing bias contributes to this positive serial correlation. Analysts anticipate the intertemporal persistence of MFEs but underestimate the persistence level when reacting to management forecasts. Our findings have implications for market participants who rely on management forecasts to form earnings expectations, and also shed light on the efficiency of managerial decision making.     

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS ROUNDTABLE ON ENERGY DERIVATIVES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE ENERGY SECTOR

In this roundtable, a successful oil entrepreneur and a group of ex‐bankers whose careers have taken them into the energy business discuss the deregulation of energy markets and the emergence of energy derivatives, and how these two developments have affected both the way companies do business with each other, and how the companies themselves are organized internally. The first part of this two‐part discussion explores how derivatives and corporate risk management have produced a strikingly new business model for a number of once traditional energy companies, including Enron Corp. and Mirant Corporation (until recently, Southern Energy). In addition to its ability to change corporate strategy, the panelists also consider how the hedging of price risks can affect a company's financing strategy and cost of capital. A notable feature of the new business model is a corporate structure that differs greatly from that of conventional large energy companies. And in the second half of the discussion, the focus shifts from risk management and strategy to issues of corporate structure, such as: How do companies divide themselves into business centers for reporting and accountability; how much decision‐making authority is entrusted to the managers of those divisions; and how many layers of corporate management are necessary to coordinate and control the activities of the business units? Also discussed at great length are questions of performance evaluation and incentive compensation: How do companies evaluate their own performance on a year‐to‐year basis? And what basis do they use for rewarding their managers?     

Shareholder Rights,Insider Ownership and Earnings Management

This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.     

A Theory of Takeovers and Disinvestment

We present a real‐options model of takeovers and disinvestment in declining industries. As product demand declines, a first‐best closure level is reached, where overall value is maximized by closing the firm and releasing its capital to investors. Absent takeovers, managers of underleveraged firms always close too late, although golden parachutes may accelerate closure. We analyze the effects of takeovers of under‐leveraged firms. Takeovers by raiders enforce first‐best closure. Hostile takeovers by other firms occur either at the first‐best closure point or too early. Closure in management buyouts and mergers of equals happens inefficiently late.     

Risk assessments at the Royal Netherlands Air Force: an explorative study

In this paper, differences in the assessment of mission risks and mission benefits between operators and members of the management level in the transport helicopter branch of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) are studied. Results were obtained from a risk analysis that was conducted in accordance with RNLAF procedures. The analysis suggests that the two organizational levels have a coherent perception on risks despite their hierarchical position. Perceived measures of control – controllability – seem to induce the inclusion or the exclusion of what is appeared to be a risk. The analysis also suggests that risk management tools may obscure these perceptual differences. Risk management tools may therefore not be sufficient to attain safe operations. In discussions and future studies on risk management and on hierarchical differences in risk perception, this is something to take well notice of. Also, managers and others involved in risk management need to recognize the implications of using risk management instruments that are based on simplified models of risk. This research adds to the risk management theory because it connects multi-dimensional risk theory with actual organizational risk management practice.     

Performance measurement system use in generating psychological empowerment and individual creativity

Individual creativity is essential to an organisation's ability to innovate (Amabile, 1988, 1996), and potentially, management control systems could be used to enhance or constrain this creativity in organisations (Amabile, 1988; Davila et al., 2009). The purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of how interactive performance measurement system (IPMS) use is implicated in the generation of individual creativity. A conceptual framework linking IPMS use to creativity is developed, incorporating psychological empowerment as an intervening variable. The results of a survey of middle‐level managers confirm that IPMS use impacts on creativity through the psychological construct of psychological empowerment.     

The control dynamics of outsourcing involving an early-stage firm

Firms in the early stage of their organisational lifecycle experience challenges that shape the adoption of management controls. They are also recognised for their use of outsourcing. However, the accounting research has provided limited insight on how these control challenges and inter-organisational control concerns interact to influence the adoption of specific controls within an outsourcing relationship involving an early-stage firm. Exploration of this gap provides a key motivation for this paper. Contrary to existing management control and organisational science literature, we find a strong preference for new or enhanced action controls. Conversely, we find low levels of interest in result controls by managers within the buyer but not the supplier firm. These preferences influence inter-organisational control adoption within the frame of an incomplete outsourcing contract that emphasises flexibility in terms of relationship exit. Within the limits of a case study methodology, we argue that adoption of inter-organisational controls is shaped by tensions between the control challenges of early-stage firms, the control preferences of managers within these firms and inter-organisational control concerns. These findings have theoretical implications, expanding the Davila et al. [2009. Reasons for management control systems adoption: insights from product development systems choice by early-stage entrepreneurial companies. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34 (3–4), 322–347] framework and the Merchant [1985. Control in Business Organizations. Boston, MA: Pitman] control typology into an ESF inter-organisational control context.     

The Role of Visual Attention in the Managerial Judgment of Balanced‐Scorecard Performance Evaluation: Insights from Using an Eye‐Tracking Device

This paper investigates the role of visual attention in managerial judgments during balanced‐scorecard performance evaluations. Using the Locarna eye tracker to establish the amount of time managers spent focused on visual cues, we found that managers who look more at strategically linked performance measures are more likely to make decisions consistent with the achievement of their subordinates’ strategic objectives. When aware of strategy, managers focused more on strategically linked performance measures than on nonlinked measures. The presentation format of the strategy information did not significantly affect this focus. Our findings indicate that awareness of strategically linked performance measures, but not their presentation, appears to be important in helping managers to make better decisions. This study contributes to the management accounting literature by generating useful insights into the impact of visual attention on judgments and decision‐making processes.     

Assessing the Performance of Business Unit Managers

Using a sample of 140 managers, we investigate the use of various performance metrics in determining the periodic assessment, bonus decisions, and career paths of business unit managers. We show that the weight on accounting return measures is associated with the authority of these managers, and we document that both disaggregated measures (expenses and revenues), and nonfinancial measures play a greater role as interdependencies between business units increase. The results suggest separate and distinct roles for different types of performance measures. Accounting return measures are used to create the proper incentives for managers with greater authority, while disaggregated and nonfinancial measures are employed in response to interdependencies.     

Identifying and Managing Control System Benefits and Costs

A well‐functioning management control system is essential to ensure the organization's strategy is executed as planned. While accounting students are provided many opportunities to master the design of management control systems, students are provided fewer opportunities to practice applying management control systems. This interactive role play allows students to experience the challenges managers face when applying organizational control systems. The role play fits best at the end of the unit where instructors have reviewed management control system design and application and is best suited for undergraduate and MBA students who have little or no supervisory experience. Students rated the role play as highly effective, as 97 percent (n = 38) of the students recommend that instructors at other institutions adopt this exercise.     

Performance management systems' stability: Unfolding the human factor – A case from the Italian public sector

The aim of this study is to examine the institutional context during the emergence of New Public Management (NPM), which created pressure on public sector organizations to implement performance management systems (PMSs), such as the balanced scorecard (BSC). Drawing on Granlund's framework (2001) and Giddens' (1979) structuration theory, we engage insights from a longitudinal case study of an Italian local authority to show how managers exercise agency before the mandated implementation of the BSC. This analysis suggests a re-interpretation of Granlund’s (2001) factors of inertia (human, institutional and economic) in terms of balance among the three factors, and inclusion of a historic and culturally specific perspective. The findings also encourage a broader consideration of the agency of managers in a public entity before the design and enhancement of a NPM tool.     

On-market share buybacks, exercisable share options and earnings management

Chan et al. (2006b ) suggest that managers might announce a share buyback to manipulate investors’ perceptions and capitalize on the positive price reaction usually associated with the announcement. The incentive to do so is greater when managers have exercisable options. Prior studies document that managers engage in upwards earnings management for opportunistic reasons related to option holdings (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). We examine the association between earnings management and exercisable option holdings for buyback firms to investigate if earnings management in the pre‐buyback period is greater for firms with equity incentives to increase share price. Our results, using 138 buybacks over the period 1996–2003, support our prediction. We find that buyback firms with both exercisable options that are in‐the‐money prior to the buyback announcement as well as options that are exercised in the buyback period have higher discretionary current accruals than buyback firms with no exercisable options, unexercised options or with out‐of‐the‐money options. Overall, our results are consistent with buyback firms with exercisable options using earnings management and buyback announcements to maximize option payoffs, and buyback firms without exercisable options signalling undervaluation.     

Earnings Management and Firm Performance Following Open-Market Repurchases

Both post‐repurchase abnormal returns and reported improvement in operating performance are driven, at least in part, by pre‐repurchase downward earnings management rather than genuine growth in profitability. The downward earnings management increases with both the percentage of the company that managers repurchase and CEO ownership. Pre‐repurchase abnormal accruals are also negatively associated with future performance, with the association driven mainly by those firms that report the largest income‐decreasing abnormal accruals. The study suggests that one reason firms experience post‐repurchase abnormal returns is that post‐repurchase realized earnings growth exceeds expectations formed on the basis of pre‐repurchase deflated earnings numbers.     

No reliance on guidance: counter‐signaling in management forecasts

This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high‐performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find that both high and low ability managers withhold issuing guidance, while intermediate types forecast. Hence, high ability managers counter‐signal in equilibrium, which does not result in a subsequent “punishment” by the market.     

DEVOLVED BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LESSONS FROM A SHIRE COUNTY

The changing environment of public sector organisations has, in recent years, focused attention on the management processes employed to achieve effective service delivery as economically and efficiently as possible. One approach has been the importation into the public sector ofa number ofprivate sector management strategies and practices, most notably those based on devolved bud- getary management principles. This paper analyses the approach of a large local authority to the implementation of devolved budgetary management, based, in large part, on interviews with line managers to whom budgets were devolved. It examines the process of devolution within the authority and the reactions of line managers to that process. It concludes that while the implementation of truly devolved budgetary management is an important, and perhaps essential, managerial technique in the 'new' local government environment, it should not be implemented in ways which ignore the differ- ences between public and private sector organisations and between different local authority departments.     

Bank Liquidity Creation and Risk‐Taking: Does Managerial Ability Matter?

This study investigates the impact of managerial ability on banks' liquidity creation and risk‐taking behavior. We find that higher ability managers create more liquidity and take more risk. During times of financial crisis, however, higher ability bank managers reduce liquidity creation as a way to de‐leverage their balance sheets. Our findings inform recent theoretical and empirical studies that investigate determinants of liquidity creation and risk by introducing managerial ability as a prominent antecedent of the banks' intermediation and risk‐transforming service. Moreover, this study has policy‐related implications, since managerial ability can be quantified as a key performance indicator for prudential supervision of banks and could help regulators to target intervention efforts more purposefully during times of crisis.