The effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development

A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents (with respect to wealth and ability) shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and income inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries, with empirical estimates of each country's financial frictions and United States values for all other parameters. The results isolate the quantitative effect of these financial frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the United States, and depend critically on whether a general equilibrium factor price effect is operative.     

Asymmetric information and price competition in small business lending

This paper examines the relationship between bank lending rates and their cost of funds in New Zealand. Our results show that on average mortgage rates respond more quickly to changes in the cost of funds than base business lending rates. We also find an asymmetry in the initial (short-run) response of banks to changes in funding costs; in particular, our results show banks adjust mortgage rates downwards faster than upwards. The speed to which lending rates revert back to their equilibrium relationship with funding costs varies across the lending markets. We find the adjustment speed is faster when mortgage rates are below equilibrium, whereas it is slower when business lending rates are above long-run levels in relation to funding costs. Our analysis suggests that banks prefer the plain-vanilla type of lending such as mortgages in comparison to small business lending consistent with asymmetric information associated with business loans.     

Capital controls in Brazil – Stemming a tide with a signal?

Controls on capital inflows have been experiencing a renaissance since 2008, with several prominent emerging markets implementing them in recent years. We focus on Brazil, which instituted five changes in its capital account regime in 2008–2011. Using the synthetic control method, we construct counterfactuals (i.e., Brazil with no policy change) for each of these changes. We find no evidence that any tightening of controls was effective in reducing the magnitudes of capital inflows, but we observe some modest and short-lived success in preventing further declines in inflows when the capital controls were relaxed. We hypothesize that price-based capital controls’ only perceptible effect is to be found in the content of the signal they broadcast regarding the government’s larger intentions and sensibilities. In the case of Brazil, its left-of-center government’s willingness to remove controls was perceived as a noteworthy indication that the government was not as hostile to the international financial markets as many expected it to be.     

Financing and takeovers

This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a dynamic model of takeovers in which the financing strategies of bidding firms and the timing and terms of takeovers are jointly determined. In the paper, capital structure plays the role of a commitment device, and determines the outcome of the acquisition contest. We demonstrate that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in financing policies with endogenous leverage, bankruptcy, and takeover terms, in which the bidder with the lowest leverage wins the takeover contest. Based on the resulting equilibrium, the model generates a number of new predictions. In particular, the model predicts that the leverage of the winning bidder is below the industry average and that acquirers should lever up after the takeover consummation. The model also relates the dispersion in leverage ratios to various industry characteristics, such as cash flow volatility or bankruptcy costs.     

US presidential elections and implied volatility: The role of political uncertainty

This paper focuses on the effects of political uncertainty and the political process on implied stock market volatility during US presidential election cycles. Using monthly Iowa Electronic Markets data over five elections, we document that stock market uncertainty, as measured by the VIX volatility index, increases along with positive changes in the probability of success of the eventual winner. The association between implied volatility and the election probability of the eventual winner is positive even after controlling for changes in overall election uncertainty. These findings indicate that the presidential election process engenders market anxiety as investors form and revise their expectations regarding future macroeconomic policy.     

The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing

This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetric information in the interbank market and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfections induce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two major implications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy ( magnitude effect ), and second, it shows that banks' liquidity positions condition their reaction to monetary policy ( Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect ).     

Do industries lead stock markets?

We investigate whether the returns of industry portfolios predict stock market movements. In the US, a significant number of industry returns, including retail, services, commercial real estate, metal, and petroleum, forecast the stock market by up to two months. Moreover, the propensity of an industry to predict the market is correlated with its propensity to forecast various indicators of economic activity. The eight largest non-US stock markets show remarkably similar patterns. These findings suggest that stock markets react with a delay to information contained in industry returns about their fundamentals and that information diffuses only gradually across markets.     

Investment shocks and the commodity basis spread

I identify a “slope” factor in the cross section of commodity futures returns: high-basis commodity futures have higher loadings on this factor than low-basis commodity futures. Combined with a level factor (an index of commodity futures), this slope factor explains most of the average excess returns of commodity futures portfolios sorted by basis. More importantly, I find that this factor is significantly correlated with investment shocks, which represent the technological progress in producing new capital. I investigate a competitive dynamic equilibrium model of commodity production to endogenize this correlation. The model reproduces the cross-sectional futures returns and many asset pricing tests.     

Another Example of a Credit System that Co-Exists with Money

We study an economy in which exchange occurs pairwise, there is no commitment, and anonymous agents choose between random monetary trade or deterministic credit trade. To accomplish the latter, agents can exploit a costly technology that allows limited record-keeping, and enforcement. An equilibrium with money and credit is shown to exist if the cost of using the technology is sufficiently small. Anonymity, record-keeping, and enforcement limitations also permit some incidence of default, in equilibrium.     

New or used? Investment with credit constraints

Used capital is cheap up front but requires higher maintenance payments later on. We argue that the timing of these investment cash outflows makes used capital attractive to financially constrained firms, since it is cheap when evaluated using their discount factor. In contrast, it may be expensive from the vantage point of an unconstrained agent. We provide an overlapping generations model and determine the price of used capital in equilibrium. Agents with less internal funds are more credit constrained, invest in used capital, and start smaller firms. Empirically, we find that the fraction of investment in used capital is substantially higher for small firms and varies significantly with measures of financial constraints.     

Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries

Using data on defaulted firms in the United States over the period 1982–1999, we show that creditors of defaulted firms recover significantly lower amounts in present-value terms when the industry of defaulted firms is in distress. We investigate whether this is purely an economic-downturn effect or also a fire-sales effect along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny [1992. Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance 47, 1343–1366]. We find the fire-sales effect to be also at work: Creditors recover less if the industry is in distress and non-defaulted firms in the industry are illiquid, particularly if the industry is characterized by assets that are specific, that is, not easily redeployable by other industries, and if the debt is collateralized by such specific assets. The interaction effect of industry-level distress and asset-specificity is strongest for senior unsecured creditors, is economically significant, and robust to contract-specific, firm-specific, macroeconomic, and bond-market supply effects. We also document that defaulted firms in distressed industries are more likely to emerge as restructured firms than to be acquired or liquidated, and spend longer time in bankruptcy.     

CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework

There is widespread concern about whether Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are appropriately punished for poor performance. While CEOs are more likely to be forced out if their performance is poor relative to the industry average, overall industry performance also matters. This seems puzzling if termination is disciplinary, however, we show that both absolute and relative performance-driven turnover can be natural and efficient outcomes in a competitive assignment model in which CEOs and firms form matches based on multiple characteristics. The model also has new predictions about replacement managers' equilibrium pay and performance. We document CEO turnover events during 1992–2006 and provide empirical support for our model.     

Capital over the Business Cycle: Renting versus Ownership

We find that capital renting makes up one‐fifth of U.S. capital expenditures, and it increases during downturns. Further, we present cross‐country evidence that output losses after financial crises are smaller where renting is more prevalent. To understand these findings, we build a general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints and with the option to rent or buy capital. The countercyclicality of rentals occurs because their supply increases, as renting serves as an additional means of savings when credit markets malfunction. Moreover, demand also shifts toward rentals as they become relatively cheaper. By absorbing excess savings, renting mitigates financial crises.     

Weighted norm inequalities and hedging in incomplete markets

Let be an -valued special semimartingale on a probability space with canonical decomposition . Denote by the space of all random variables , where is a predictable -integrable process such that the stochastic integral is in the space of semimartingales. We investigate under which conditions on the semimartingale the space is closed in , a question which arises naturally in the applications to financial mathematics. Our main results give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the closedness of in . Most of these conditions deal with BMO-martingales and reverse H?lder inequalities which are equivalent to weighted norm inequalities. By means of these last inequalities, we also extend previous results on the F?llmer-Schweizer decomposition.     

A practical approach to validating a PD model

The capital adequacy framework Basel II aims to promote the adoption of stronger risk management practices by the banking industry. The implementation makes validation of credit risk models more important. Lenders therefore need a validation methodology to convince their supervisors that their credit scoring models are performing well. In this paper we take up the challenge to propose and implement a simple validation methodology that can be used by banks to validate their credit risk modelling exercise. We will contextualise the proposed methodology by applying it to a default model of mortgage loans of a commercial bank in the Netherlands.     

Taylor rules, McCallum rules and the term structure of interest rates

Recent empirical research shows that a reasonable characterization of federal-funds-rate targeting behavior is that the change in the target rate depends on the maturity structure of interest rates and exhibits little dependence on lagged target rates. See, for example, Cochrane and Piazzesi [2002. The Fed and interest rates—a high-frequency identification. American Economic Review 92, 90-95.]. The result echoes the policy rule used by McCallum [1994a. Monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates. NBER Working Paper No. 4938.] to rationalize the empirical failure of the ‘expectations hypothesis’ applied to the term structure of interest rates. That is, rather than forward rates acting as unbiased predictors of future short rates, the historical evidence suggests that the correlation between forward rates and future short rates is surprisingly low. McCallum showed that a desire by the monetary authority to adjust short rates in response to exogenous shocks to the term premiums imbedded in long rates (i.e. “yield-curve smoothing”), along with a desire for smoothing interest rates across time, can generate term structures that account for the puzzling regression results of Fama and Bliss [1987. The information in long-maturity forward rates. The American Economic Review 77, 680-392.]. McCallum also clearly pointed out that this reduced-form approach to the policy rule, although naturally forward looking, needed to be studied further in the context of other response functions such as the now standard Taylor [1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214.] Rule. We explore both the robustness of McCallum's result to endogenous models of the term premium and also its connections to the Taylor Rule. We model the term premium endogenously using two different models in the class of affine term-structure models studied in Duffie and Kan [1996. A yield-factor model of interest rates. Mathematical Finance 57, 405-443.]: a stochastic volatility model and a stochastic price-of-risk model. We then solve for equilibrium term structures in environments in which interest rate targeting follows a rule such as the one suggested by McCallum (i.e., the “McCallum Rule”). We demonstrate that McCallum's original result generalizes in a natural way to this broader class of models. To understand the connection to the Taylor Rule, we then consider two structural macroeconomic models which have reduced forms that correspond to the two affine models and provide a macroeconomic interpretation of abstract state variables (as in Ang and Piazzessi [2003. A no-arbitrage vector autoregression of term structure dynamics with macroeconomic and latent variables. Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 745-787.]). Moreover, such structural models allow us to interpret the parameters of the term-structure model in terms of the parameters governing preferences, technologies, and policy rules. We show how a monetary policy rule will manifest itself in the equilibrium asset-pricing kernel and, hence, the equilibrium term structure. We then show how this policy can be implemented with an interest-rate targeting rule. This provides us with a set of restrictions under which the Taylor and McCallum Rules are equivalent in the sense if implementing the same monetary policy. We conclude with some numerical examples that explore the quantitative link between these two models of monetary policy.     

Optimal pricing of intraday liquidity

This paper presents a general equilibrium model where intraday liquidity is needed because the timing of payments is uncertain. A necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium to be efficient is that the nominal intraday interest rate be zero, even when the overnight rate is strictly positive. Because a market for liquidity may not achieve efficiency, this creates a role for the central bank. I allow for the possibility of moral hazard and study policies commonly used by central banks to reduce their exposure to risk. I show collateralized lending achieves the efficient allocation, while, for certain parameters, caps cannot prevent moral hazard.     

Competition,transmission and bank pricing policies: Evidence from Belgian loan and deposit markets

This paper addresses the pass-through from market interest rates to retail bank interest rates. The paper advocates a heterogeneous approach and applies it to the Belgian banking market. A substantial proportion of the heterogeneity in bank pricing policies can be explained by the bank lending channel and the relative market power hypothesis. The results also suggest that the long-term pass-through is typically less than one-for-one, rejecting the completeness hypothesis. While there is no convincing evidence for asymmetry in retail rates, large deviations from equilibrium mark-ups are faster reduced than small deviations. Overall, conditions for corporate loans are more competitive compared to consumer loans. Demand and savings deposits have, by far, the most rigid prices.     

Mean-variance hedging for continuous processes: New proofs and examples

Let be a special semimartingale of the form and denote by the mean-variance tradeoff process of . Let be the space of predictable processes for which the stochastic integral is a square-integrable semimartingale. For a given constant and a given square-integrable random variable , the mean-variance optimal hedging strategy by definition minimizes the distance in between and the space . In financial terms, provides an approximation of the contingent claim by means of a self-financing trading strategy with minimal global risk. Assuming that is bounded and continuous, we first give a simple new proof of the closedness of in and of the existence of the F?llmer-Schweizer decomposition. If moreover is continuous and satisfies an additional condition, we can describe the mean-variance optimal strategy in feedback form, and we provide several examples where it can be computed explicitly. The additional condition states that the minimal and the variance-optimal martingale measures for should coincide. We provide examples where this assumption is satisfied, but we also show that it will typically fail if is not deterministic and includes exogenous randomness which is not induced by .     

Financial Intermediaries, Markets, and Growth

We build a model in which financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Households can invest in financial markets directly if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. From a growth perspective, this can be beneficial because intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide more risk-sharing. Our model predicts that bank-oriented economies can grow more slowly than more market-oriented economies, which is consistent with some recent empirical evidence.