财务治理：陷阱与出路

财务治理作为公司治理的重要组成部分,其作用日显突出.近年来甚至有把财务治理在公司治理中的作用夸大的现象,同时对财务治理模式的选择也有值得商榷的地方.为此,我们有必要将财务治理的作用回归本位,并选择恰当的财务治理模式.     

MBO与公司治理

所有权的配制可以产生不同的公司治理模式,而不同的公司治理模式又会对企业的组织运转和经营效率产生重要的影响.当所有权的配制影响了公司的效率时,产权就有必要发生转移,让那些真正的企业家走上前台.MBO正是为这种产权的转移提供了可能,并由此产生了新的公司治理模式.     

公司治理与我国会计模式的选择

公司治理成为近几年企业改革的一个重要问题,而公司治理结构与会计有着必然的联系.公司治理结构不同,会计模式的选择应当不同,会计模式在不同公司治理结构中选择的好坏,直接影响着会计信息的质量.本文在分析公司治理结构与会计模式选择关系的基础上,对我国公司会计模式的选择提出几点看法.     

公司治理模式与公司层次业绩评价体系

业绩评价是公司治理模式的有效组成部分,不同的公司治理模式下有不同的业绩评价体系,不同的业绩评价体系反过来又影响公司治理的实现,从总体上看业绩评价为公司相机治理服务在英美模式下它是有效资本市场的组成部分:在德日模式下它是与公司有密切关系的"内部人集团"对企业进行治理的组成部分它们本身没有优劣之分,我们应该利用不同的评价体系为公司治理服务.     

浅析以公司社会责任为导向的公司治理模式

公司要实现长期发展,仅考虑对股东负责是远远不够的,还必须考虑对其他各方利益相关群体负责,承担起相应的社会责任.本文阐述了公司社会责任的内涵,并从公司社会责任的视角出发,提出了公司治理模式重塑的建议,对完善目前的治理模式具有重要意义.     

会计模式在公司治理中的作用

由于公司治理结构的不同,会计模式也会不相同,本文分析了公司治理的类型与会计模式的选择,同时也指出了会计模式在公司治理中的作用,希望能对公司治理起到一定的指导作用.     

公司治理模式与国家文化的关联性研究

人们已经越来越多地认识到,文化因素是建立或完善公司治理模式中不可或缺考虑因素.文化的因素到底在多大的程度上影响了各国公司治理模式的选择?各国文化模式与公司治理模式之间存在着怎样的关联?本文以霍夫斯特德文化模式模型为出发点,分析了文化因素与公司治理模式选择之间的关系,并试图探讨前者对于后者的影响,从而对我国公司治理模式的选择提供有益的路径.     

基于层次分析法的国有券商公司治理分析

国有券商对一国的金融安全与经济的发展具有深远与广泛的影响.良好的公司治理是国有控股券商持续、健康发展的保障,文章运用层次分析法建立了国有券商公司治理的评价指标体系,讨论了国有券商在公司治理上存在的问题,对于探索更加有效的国有券商公司治理模式具有重要意义.     

上市公司治理特征与绩效关系的实证研究

一、引言 公司治理是国外学者持续研究的热点课题,国外有关公司治理与绩效的文献可谓汗牛充栋,相关研究也取得了一些丰硕的成果,但由于我国市场经济体制的特殊性,我国的公司治理模式既不同于由非独立董事、独立董事加经理层构成的英美模式,也不同于由董事会、监事会加经理层构成的日德模式.此外,我国国有股的一股独大,经理人市场及资本市场的不发达、不完善以及公司治理中存在的行政色彩使得我国公司治理特征具有明显的独特性.因此.我国现行公司治理的效果与西方发达国家相比会有较大的差异,西方学者关于公司治理研究的结论和经验不能用来解释我国的公司治理行为和结果.     

公司治理模式和股利模式政策的国际比较

筹资决策、投资决策和股利政策是现代股份公司三个最重要的财务决策。随着证券市场的日益规范,投资者的日益成熟,股利政策的研究显得愈来愈重要。因此,本章基于对英美公司治理模式和德日公司治理模式两种不同公司治理模式的对比,比较研究了两种不同公司治理模式下的现金股利政策,以及不同治理模式现金股利政策治理效应的区别,最后得出对我国上市公司的启示。     

The Internal Governance of Firms

We develop a model of internal governance where the self‐serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, in which dividends are paid by self‐interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control.     

Corporate fraud culture: Re‐examining the corporate governance and performance relation

We analyse the corporate governance and performance relation, when conditioning on corporate fraud, for fraud firms during 2000 – 2007. Fraud firms are identified as either self‐ reported fraud events, or subject to regulatory investigation. We use the inverse Mills ratio procedure to account for firms' (unobservable) fraud culture in the dynamic system GMM model of the performance‐ governance relation. We find that corporate governance is an endogenously determined characteristic that has no causal impact on firm performance when conditioning on fraud. Fraud is a significant regulatory event but its overall economic impact at the firm level is highly variable.     

The influence of governance on investment: Evidence from a hazard model

Does corporate governance affect the timing of large investment projects? Hazard model estimates suggest strong shareholder governance may deter managers from pursuing large investments. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with good governance experience longer spells between large investments. However, in the presence of financial constraints or strong CEO incentives (high delta (δ)), we find no such timing differences. Finally, these higher investment hazard firms exhibit significantly negative long-run operating and stock performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that poor governance associates with overinvestment.     

A Regional Future for the UK Civil Service? The Government Offices for the English Regions and the Civil Service in Scotland

The civil service role in the Westminster model is to inform and implement central government policy. The authors argue that extensive public sector reforms and changes in UK governance mean that the Westminster model no longer provides an adequate explanation of how government works. Thus the United Kingdom is now a 'Disunited Kingdom'.     

Executive incentive compatibility and selection of governance mechanisms

Executive incentive compatibility plays a crucial role in firm's selection of corporate governance mechanisms. We provide a simple model to explain why firms with enough executive incentive compatibility still prefer having external governance mechanisms, and firms with poor executive incentive compatibility have to rely on a combination of large investors monitoring and external governance. This model facilitates a better understanding of the co-existence of the two governance mechanisms and also reconciles conflicting findings with respect to a substitutive and complementary relationship between the two governance mechanisms. Empirical evidence supports there is a substitutive relation between large investors monitoring and executive compensation.     

An Early Warning System of Financial Distress Using Multinomial Logit Models and a Bootstrapping Approach

This study adopts multinomial logit models to separately measure the extent to which financial ratios and corporate governance signal the likelihood of "slight distress events" and "reorganization and bankruptcy." The results show that corporate governance variables are closely related to the occurrence of "slight distress events." The estimated misclassification costs of the 1,000 resamples generated through bootstrapping procedures are statistically lower for a model that makes use of corporate governance (CG model) than one without corporate governance (non-CG model) at all cutoff points in 2009, and cutoff points from 0.11 to 0.27 in 2008. Since corporate governance is incrementally useful in predicting financial distress, the CG model's predictive ability improves as two corporate governance factors are considered: ownership ratio of insiders and pledge-ownership ratio of insiders.     

治理机制、特殊治理水平与财务报告的稳健性

与以往的研究不同,我们将公司治理因素分成管理者可控的和不可控的两个部分,然后研究管理者可控部分即公司特殊治理水平对财务报告稳健性产生的影响。在整合了各种无条件公司治理机制的基础上,控制了其中管理者不可控的部分后得到了公司特殊治理变量。通过对我国A股上市公司2002—2006年的数据的分组检验和坏消息增量反应系数的显著性检验,发现特殊治理水平越高的公司其财务报告的稳健性水平也越高。     

基于共同治理模式下的银行公司治理结构

从公司治理结构的理论和实践发展经验看,企业公司治理模式的选择受到股权结构、市场发育程度和制度环境等多种因素的制约。单纯强调股东至上主义思想的单边治理模式与银行的稳健经营原则是相矛盾的,它必然削弱债权人对管理层监控的动力和能力。考虑到我国商业银行股权比较集中,国有股权比例较大,金融市场发育程度远低于西方发达国家以及金融业实行分业监管等基本现实,我国的银行业更适合选择利益相关者理论所倡导的多边共同治理模式。在充分考虑利益相关者的基础上,保持各方利益的均衡,构建一个反映我国银行业发展特点、各利益相关方共同参与、相互制衡的多边共同治理模式。     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Relationship Between Fundamental Information Analysis and Stock Returns

This study investigates whether corporate governance affects the impact of the relationship between fundamental signals and stock returns using Taiwanese data. The study employs the endogenous switching model (ESM) of Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), which combines the response equation and governance index equation simultaneously. We divide the sample into strong and weak governance regimes. Our results suggest that stock returns respond differently in different governance regimes. The beneficial response is greater in the strong governance regime than in the weak one, suggesting that it is worth improving governance for firms.     

Corporate governance and incidences of listing suspension by the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa: An empirical analysis

We examine the association between corporate governance structures and incidences of listing suspension from the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa. Using a matched-pairs research design, we compare 81 firms suspended between 1999 and 2005 to an equal number of control firms matched in terms of time, size and industry. Employing a conditional logistic model, we find that the likelihood of suspension is higher in firms with a smaller proportion of non-executive directors, without an audit committee, and with greater block-share ownership and higher gearing (i.e. leverage). Further analysis splitting block-share ownership into institutional and non-institutional investors provides mixed results. While we find a positive association between suspension and non-institutional investors, we observe no association with institutional investors. No association is detected for board size, role duality, directors' share ownership, auditor quality and return on assets. Given the paucity of studies examining listing suspension from stock exchanges and corporate governance mechanisms, these findings contribute to the literature. Additionally, the dearth of research on corporate governance in developing countries suggests that our findings have important implications for policy makers in these countries as they endeavor to improve corporate governance.