高管薪酬、交互效应与公司绩效间的动态关系——基于动态内生性的经验研究

本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性框架下,运用动态面板System GMM估计方法,在考虑了高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的交互作用情况下,研究了高管薪酬与公司绩效间的动态关系。研究结果表明：（1）前期高管持股比例与公司绩效呈负相关,前期高管货币薪酬与公司绩效呈正相关;（2）前期公司绩效对高管薪酬产生了显著的反馈效应;（3）高管薪酬与其他公司治理机制间存在＂交互效应＂,即高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的相互作用对公司绩效产生了显著的影响;（4）高管薪酬与公司绩效间存在动态内生性。     

管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系--基于动态内生性的经验研究

本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,以动态性视角研究了管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系。研究发现：管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间存在动态内生性问题,不仅当期管理层薪酬激励对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,而且前期管理层薪酬激励也对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,并且两种薪酬激励方式对公司风险承担的影响方向相反。此外,前期公司风险承担对当期管理层薪酬有反馈效应。     

管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系——基于动态内生性的经验研究

本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,以动态性视角研究了管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系。研究发现:管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间存在动态内生性问题,不仅当期管理层薪酬激励对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,而且前期管理层薪酬激励也对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,并且两种薪酬激励方式对公司风险承担的影响方向相反。此外,前期公司风险承担对当期管理层薪酬有反馈效应。     

公司治理机制、替代效应与公司非效率投资——基于动态内生性的经验研究

以上交所和深交所2002--2009年上市公司为样本,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,同时考虑三种内生性,以动态性的视角研究公司治理机制与公司非效率投资跨时期的相互作用,得到以下结论：不仅当期公司治理机制对当期公司非效率投资有显著的影响,而且前期公司治理机制对当期公司非效率投资也有显著的影响,并且前期公司非效率投资对当期公司治理机制有显著的反馈效应,公司治理机制与公司非效率投资间存在动态内生性。此外,公司的监督机制与激励机制在抑制公司的非效率投资方面存在替代关系。     

股权结构、动态内生性与公司代理成本

本文以716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的系统GMM估计方法,同时考虑了三种内生性,以动态性的视角,不仅研究了当期股权结构对当期代理成本的影响,还研究了股权结构与代理成本间的跨时期相互作用。通过研究,我们发现：（1）不仅当期股权结构对当期代理成本有影响,而且前期股权结构也对当期代理成本有影响,股权结构对代理成本的影响有持续期;（2）前期代理成本对当期股权结构有反馈效应;（3）股权结构与代理成本间存在动态内生性。     

创业板上市公司董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效关系研究

董事会作为现在公司法人治理的核心,其专有特征会影响到其职能的发挥,进而影响公司的绩效。文章根据创业板上市公司的特点,利用创业板上市公司2009-2012年的最新数据,研究其董事会规模与稳定性对公司绩效的影响。研究发现,当以每股收益来衡量公司绩效时,董事会规模与公司绩效之间并不存在显著的相关关系;当以净资产收益率来衡量公司绩效时,董事会规模与公司绩效存在着显著的倒“U”型关系,并证实了董事会稳定性与公司以前年度的绩效具有显著的正相关关系,以及以前年度董事会稳定性低的公司在后续年度内其绩效会越来越差。为此建议公司在选择合适的董事会规模的同时要尽量保持董事会的稳定性。     

我国上市公司董事会效率与公司绩效的实证研究

该文以2008年在深圳交易所上市的公司为样本,采用定性定量结合的方法,将董事会效率特征量化为5个指标,提出合理假设,建立多元线性回归模型,对董事会效率与公司经营绩效的关系进行了实证分析.实证检验结果发现董事会规模与公司经营绩效存在显著的负相关关系;外部董事比例与公司经营绩效存在显著的正相关关系;董事会领导结构、董事会会议次数和董事会持股比例与公司经营绩效不相关.     

创业板公司董事会特征与公司绩效的实证研究

董事会作为代表公司行使其法人财产权的会议机关,是公司内部治理结构的核心。规范和经验分析共同表明,董事会特征会对其职能的行使发挥作用,进而对公司绩效产生影响。本文基于创业板上市公司两年的面板数据,采用多元回归方法,对创业板上市公司董事会特征与公司绩效的关系进行了实证研究,找出专属于我国创业板公司的规律。实证结果显示,董事会两职合一有利于提高公司绩效,独立董事比例与公司绩效呈倒U型关系,第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效呈显著负相关关系,最优董事会规模未得到验证。     

管理者权力、投资机会与公司非投资效率间的动态关系——基于动态面板System GMM模型的实证研究

本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,同时考虑了三种内生性,以动态的视角研究了管理者权力、投资机会与公司非效率投资间的关系。研究发现：管理者权力和投资机会不仅对当期公司非效率投资有显著的影响,而且对下一期的公司非效率投资也有显著的影响。管理者权力和投资机会对公司非效率投资有长期影响,而且其交互效应也对公司非效率投资有显著的影响。     

我国董事会结构及其治理绩效的实证研究——基于公司规模的对比

本文选取A股沪深主板的400家上市公司作为研究样本,以净资产回报率作为公司经营绩效的衡量指标,使用多元回归分析方法对董事会结构与公司经营绩效之间的关系进行实证研究,结果表明:规模小的公司董事会规模与公司经营绩效正相关,规模大的公司董事会规模与公司经营绩效负相关;规模小的公司独立董事占比与公司经营绩效正相关,规模大的公司独立董事占比与公司经营绩效负相关;两职分离有利于规模小的公司经营绩效的提升,两职分离对规模大的公司经营绩效存在负面影响;董事会持股对规模小的公司经营绩效有着较为显著的正面影响,对于规模大的公司而言董事会持股与公司经营绩效之间不存在显著的相关性。     

Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance

We use a well-developed dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to alleviate endogeneity concerns in two aspects of corporate governance research: the effect of board structure on firm performance and the determinants of board structure. The estimator incorporates the dynamic nature of internal governance choices to provide valid and powerful instruments that address unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. We re-examine the relation between board structure and performance using the GMM estimator in a panel of 6,000 firms over a period from 1991 to 2003, and find no causal relation between board structure and current firm performance. We illustrate why other commonly used estimators that ignore the dynamic relationship between current governance and past firm performance may be biased. We discuss where it may be appropriate to consider the dynamic panel GMM estimator in corporate governance research, as well as caveats to its use.     

Corporate governance and the probability of default

We employ Merton's probability of default as a continuous ex‐ante measure of the likelihood of firm failure and dynamic panel generalised method of moments to better characterise the relationship between corporate governance and the chance of default. In doing so, we overcome limitations of discrete proxies widely used in previous studies and more completely account for endogeneity issues permeating this area of research. While initial testing designed to facilitate comparison with previous studies suggests a significant relationship between the probability of default and executive pay, board structure and ownership structure, once endogeneity concerns are accounted for, no such relationship remains.     

民营企业研发投资影响公司绩效的实证研究——基于深市中小板上市公司的面板数据分析

本文以101家在董事会报告中连续五年披露研发支出的中小板民营上市公司为研究样本,分析研发投资与企业绩效的关系.研究发现,民营企业当期研发投资与企业绩效不具有显著的相关关系,研发投资对企业绩效的影响存在滞后,具体体现在滞后一期和滞后二期的研发强度与企业绩效显著正相关.     

Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector

This paper examines the relationship between board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector. We show how the board size, board independence and combining the role of CEO and chairperson in boards may affect corporate risk taking in financial firms. Our sample is based on a panel dataset of all publicly listed firms in the UK financial sector, which includes banks, insurance, real estate and financial services companies over a ten year period (2003 − 2012). After controlling for the effects of endogeneity through the application of the dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimator, the findings of this study suggest that the presence of non-executive directors and powerful CEOs in corporate boards reduces corporate risk taking practices in financial firms. The negative relationship can be explained within the agency theory context, where managers are regarded as more risk averse because of the reputational and employment risk. An increased power concentration is therefore expected to enhance the risk aversion behaviour of directors. The findings however, do not show any significant effect of board size on corporate risk taking in financial firms. As this study covers recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code on the role of corporate boards in managing firms' risk, the empirical evidence could be useful for corporate governance regulation and policy making.     

Corporate governance and firm performance

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature:First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107–155.] and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., and Ferrell, A., 2004, What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance.Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance.Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.     

The effect of earnings management on firm performance: The moderating role of corporate governance quality

This paper investigates the relationship between earnings management and financial performance of firms in Anglophone sub-Saharan African Countries in a dynamic framework. The study shows how this relationship is moderated by aggregate disclosure and best-practice corporate governance quality metrics. The findings indicate that earnings management's performance effects persist even after controlling for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity inherent in the earnings management and performance relationship. Again, the results support the prediction of agency theory regarding the efficient monitoring effect of adherence to best-practice internal governance systems in constraining firms' earnings management practices and subsequently enhancing firms' performance. Moreover, the study's findings regarding the positive effect of earnings management on performance, which suggests efficiency motives behind earnings management practices in Africa, demonstrate that the African context is uniquely different from other emerging markets that report opportunistic motives. Concerning the moderating role, our study reveals that the positive effect of earnings management on the financial performance of firms tends to be stronger in the presence of corporate governance quality.     

Board diversity and corporate propensity to R&D spending

Drawing on collective contributions and group performance perspectives, this paper examines the role of board diversity in firms' R&D investment decisions. Building on a fault-line argument about a team's demographic attributes, this study also decomposes the impact of demographic and cognitive diversity on R&D spending. The study sample contains UK data of non-financial companies covering the period between 2005 and 2018. We employ panel data analysis techniques and control for potential endogeneity issues through the application of the two-step system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimations. The findings demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between board diversity and level of corporate R&D spending. The findings also show cognitive diversity as significantly positively associated with corporate R&D investments. Demographic diversity, however, has an insignificant relationship with corporate spending on R&D. The results further show that demographic diversity negatively moderates the relationship between cognitive diversity and spending on R&D. Our main findings document that the board's attributes as a group significantly influence decisions of strategic importance such as, investment in R&D projects. The findings on sub-dimensions of board diversity imply that as compared to demographic diversity, functional/cognitive diversity is more relevant to strategic decisions and related outcomes. The study has practical implications for shareholders in documenting the importance of board diversity, and policy implications for regulators in highlighting the separate roles of behavioural and cognitive diversity in shaping firms' strategic investment decisions.