股利政策、第一大股东和公司成长性:自由现金流理论还是掏空理论

本文以763家上市公司2003年的横截面数据为样本,检查了股利政策和第一大股东持股以及企业成长性机会之间的统计关系,考察了股利政策的股权效应,并比较分析了企业成长性机会对股利政策股权效应的影响程度。作者发现,第一大股东具有发放现金股利的显著动机,而且这种动机不受股东性质的显著影响。文章进一步观察到,企业成长性机会能够弱化第一大股东分配现金股利的激励,并促使公司保留更多的现金用于有价值的投资机会。本文的经验结果并不支持“掏空”理论,而更支持自由现金流理论:第一大股东能够迫使公司吐出多余的自由现金流,并能根据企业的成长性机会调整股利政策(在成长性高的公司增加投资,在成长性低的公司增加股利)。     

创业板上市公司股利分配研究

本文以截止2010年4月30日79家创业板上市公司为对象,以实证分析的方法研究创业板上市公司股利分配。结论显示,创业板上市公司股利分配与第一大股东持股比例之间没有显著关系;公司成长性对现金股利发放水平有抑制作用;公司盈利能力、货币资金充足率及盈余积累水平对公司现金股利分配水平有显著影响。本文的研究表明,创业板公司股利分配行为不支持股利迎合假说及利益输送假说,公司股利分配在一定程度上反映了公司的组织结构特征。     

盈余管理与现金股利政策——来自中小板上市公司的经验证据

本文以2005~2012年间2049个中小板上市公司为样本,实证检验中小板上市公司盈余管理与现金股利政策之间的关系。研究发现,中小板上市公司的盈余管理行为与现金股利政策之间存在显著地负相关关系,即中小板上市公司的盈余管理程度越低,相应的现金股利分配力度与现金股利分配倾向都会越高。     

后股权分置时代上市公司大股东资金利益侵占与现金股利政策之关系的研究

股权分置改革,有利于上市公司规范市场行为和完善公司治理,但如果缺乏有效的制度和法律规范,大股东仍有可能由原来对上市公司的控制变成对公司和二级市场双重控制。研究第一大股东利益侵占与现金股利政策的关系,有利于上市公司规范市场行为和完善公司治理,减少大股东通过"隧道挖掘"对中小投资者的利益侵蚀,加强中小投资者保护,对我国资产市场的发展有重要的意义。本文分析了我国目前上市公司的资金侵占和现金股利分配的背景,提出了3个假设。通过建立相关模型,运用描述性统计、单因素分析和回归分析对所有的假设进行检验,验证了第一大股东资金侵占与上市公司的现金股利政策存在显著关系,以及股权分置改革后现金股利与资金侵占具有负相关关系。针对本文的研究结果,提出了若干建议。     

股权分置、公司治理与股利分配决策：现金股利还是股票股利？

以2004~2007中国上市公司为样本,应用LOGISTIC回归对-股权分置改革前后我国上市公司股利分配决策进行理论与实证分析。结果表明,股权分置改革后,我国上市公司发放股票股利呈现增多的趋势,第一大股东、第二大股东持股比例越高,以及董事会人数越多,公司越倾向于现金股利分配,但机构投资者持股比例越高,越倾向于发放股票股利。同时,企业成长性强的公司倾向于发放股票股利,而现金流量好的公司往往不发放股票股利,企业规模与股票分配决策无关。     

关于股改前后现金股利影响因素的实证研究

对股改前后影响现金股利水平的公司治理变量研究表明,虽然股改矫正了现金股利与增长机会之间的关系,使股改后当存在增长机会时,公司会减少现金股利的发放,但是我国上市公司的现金股利尚未呈现出全流通资本市场上作为降低控股股东与中小股东代理成本工具的现金股利政策应有的特征,突出表现在股改前后影响上市公司现金股利支付水平的股权结构变量并未发生变化,股改前后都存在股权集中度、第一大股东持股比例及第二到第十大股东持股比例与每股现金股利呈显著正相关、而流通(非限售)股比例与每股现金股利呈显著负相关的关系。     

盈余管理与现金股利政策——来自中小板上市公司的经验证据

本文以2005²012年间2049个中小板上市公司为样本,实证检验中小板上市公司盈余管理与现金股利政策之间的关系。研究发现,中小板上市公司的盈余管理行为与现金股利政策之间存在显著地负相关关系,即中小板上市公司的盈余管理程度越低,相应的现金股利分配力度与现金股利分配倾向都会越高。     

超募资金、成长性与创业板上市公司现金股利

长期以来,股利政策作为公司理财活动的重要内容之一,一直是中外理论界和实务界研究和探讨的热点。本文结合国内外相关文献及股利理论,以2009年至2012年创业板上市公司为样本,对创业板上市公司的现金股利政策进行了分析。研究发现,创业板上市公司发放现金股利与超募水平正相关,与公司成长性负相关。     

超募资金、成长性与创业板上市公司现金股利

长期以来,股利政策作为公司理财活动的重要内容之一,一直是中外理论界和实务界研究和探讨的热点。本文结合国内外相关文献及股利理论,以2009年至2012年创业板上市公司为样本,对创业板上市公司的现金股利政策进行了分析。研究发现,创业板上市公司发放现金股利与超募水平正相关,与公司成长性负相关。     

创业板上市公司现金股利政策影响因素研究

创业板市场的特征决定了其上市公司股利分配政策的独特性。本文从大股东控制、公司成长性、公司自身的结构性特征等三方面研究创业板公司股利分配水平的公司内部决定因素,得出我国创业板上市公司股利分配与盈利能力、资金充足率、公司成长性等因素显著相关,而与公司股权集中程度无显著关系。     

Does strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights reduce their expropriation motivation? Evidence from China’s dividend tax reforms

According to classic corporate governance theory, strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders. However, due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China, large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends. They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights. An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase. However, when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder, expropriation activities ease significantly.     

Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms

Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.     

Does geography matter? Firm location and corporate payout policy

We investigate the impact of geography on agency costs and firm dividend policies. We argue that remote firm location increases the cost of shareholder oversight of managerial investment decisions. We hypothesize that remotely located firms facing free cash flow problems precommit to higher dividends to mitigate agency conflicts. We find that remotely located firms pay higher dividends. As expected, the effect of geography on dividends is most pronounced for firms with severe free cash flow problems. Further, remotely located firms rely more on regular dividends instead of special dividends or share repurchases and decrease dividends less often.     

Trading restrictions and firm dividends: The share lockup expiration experience in China

Chinese firms experienced a substantial reduction in nontradable shares following the Split-Share Structure Reform that began in 2005. The decrease in nontradable shares, or increase in share tradability, is associated with a decline in the firms’ cash dividend payouts. The positive association is attenuated in firms with fewer financial constraints, only weakly affected by firm governance, and not affected by investment opportunities or controlling shareholder type. The results highlight the fact that firms disgorge cash to compensate shareholders for trading restrictions and conclude that dividends persist when firms have easier access to external financing. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of nontradable shares, after controlling for firm fixed effects and omitted changing firm characteristics.     

Nonnegotiable shares, controlling shareholders, and dividend payments in China

China has some unique institutional features. For example, the shares of listed firms are segmented into negotiable and nonnegotiable ones. The controlling shareholders, usually connected to the government, hold nonnegotiable shares. We examine how these institutional features affected cash dividend payments in China during the period 1994-2006. We find that dividend payments are positively associated with the proportion of nonnegotiable shares in a firm and the proportion of nonnegotiable shares held by the controlling shareholder; moreover, the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulation requiring cash dividend payments does not benefit negotiable shareholders. However, we also find that dividend payments are downside flexible, and controlling shareholders cannot force firms to pay or to pay more dividends when firms' earnings decline significantly. The conventional factors, especially profitability or the capability to pay, still play an important role in determining the dividend policy. The propensity to pay and the payout ratio in China are not high compared to those of other countries.     

Family control,institutional environment and cash dividend policy: Evidence from China

Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004–2008, this study empirically tests the impact of family control, institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. Our results indicate that (1) family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms; (2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies; and (3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem I (the owner–manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem II (the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder conflict), and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy. In contrast, a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem I and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.     

The Association Between Operating Cash Flows and Dividend Changes: An Empirical Investigation

The Association between earnings and dividend changes has been established since Lintner's (1956) pioneering work. Subsequent research attempted to establish an association between operating cash flows and dividend changes, given earnings, without success (Simons, 1994). Recently, there has been increased attention in cash flow reporting. Regulatory bodies worldwide have stressed the significance of cash flow information in capital markets. Research on the association between cash flows and dividends has been limited, yielding inconclusive results. The purpose of this study is to re-evaluate and extend prior studies by examining the incremental ability of cash flows to explain dividend changes, given earnings. We argue that a positive relationship between cash flows and dividend changes should exist due to liquidity and accruals management considerations. The empirical evidence of this study supports that the dividend changes-cash flow relationship is significantly positive (a) when operating cash flows are low compared to earnings, and (b) when firm growth is moderate.     

Dividend taxation and the ownership structure of private firms

This paper examines the effect of dividend taxation on the ownership structure of private firms. I exploit a German dividend tax increase that only affects corporate shareholders owning a minority stake. Using data on private German firms and their shareholders, I find that corporate shareholders reduce their minority stakes in firms after the dividend tax reform. This result is in line with the notion that, because minority shareholders do not have sufficient decision-making power to influence the payout policy, they can only react to a dividend tax increase by selling their shares. This effect is larger when the affected minority shareholders face high dividend tax costs. However, I find a smaller effect when the benefits of the minority stakes are highly relevant for the firm and the affected shareholders, suggesting that non-tax factors mute the response to dividend taxes. In addition, I find that the largest shareholder of the firm buys the minority stake, resulting in greater ownership concentration. These findings extend the prior literature that finds no effect of dividend taxes on the ownership structure of private firms.