Wealth Effects on Self-Insurance and Self-Protection against Monetary and Nonmonetary Losses

This paper considers the wealth effects on self-insurance and self-protection activities against possible losses of monetary wealth such as properties and nonmonetary wealth such as health. Increased initial income or monetary wealth decreases the demand for self-insurance against monetary wealth loss under the decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption, and has an ambiguous effect on self-protection. However, increased initial monetary wealth increases both self-insurance and self-protection against health loss, explaining empirical trends, if wealth and health are complements. When multiple self-insurance activities against both types of losses are considered, the effect of an increase in initial monetary wealth on self-insurance against health loss remains the same, but the effect on self-insurance against wealth loss depends on the preferences. JEL Classification No: D81, G22     

Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort?

Consider an agent facing a risky distribution of losses who can change this distribution by exerting some effort. Should he exert more effort when he becomes more risk-averse? For instance, should we expect more risk-averse drivers to drive more cautiously? In this article, we give sufficient conditions under which the answer is positive, using results presented in Jewitt (1989). We first extend the standard models of self-insurance and self-protection and show that the comparative statics depends only on the effect of effort on the net loss. We then present conditions for the continuous case with applications.     

Self-Insurance, Self-Protection and Market Insurance within the Dual Theory of Choice

As demonstrated by Ehrlich and Becker [1972], Expected Utility Theory predicts that market insurance and self-insurance are substitutes, whilst surprisingly, market insurance and self-protection could be complements. This article examines the robustness of this conclusion, as well as its extensions under the Dual Theory of Choice [Yaari, 1987]. In particular, the non-reliability of self-insurance activities, background risk and asymmetric information are considered.     

Comparative Ambiguity Aversion in Intertemporal Decisions

This article examines the effects of ambiguity aversion on intertemporal decisions when there is ambiguity about a future state. Compared to the existing literature, we allow for a three-way separation between intertemporal substitution, risk aversion, and ambiguity aversion. Holding risk preferences, beliefs, and time preferences fixed, we explore how a change in ambiguity aversion increases the strength of the current willingness to pay. We apply our results to saving, self-protection, and self-insurance problems.     

Non-expected utility and the robustness of the classical insurance paradigm

This paper uses the tools and techniques of generalized expected utility analysis to explore the robustness of some of the classical basic results in insurance theory to departures from the expected utility hypothesis on agents' risk preferences. The areas explored consist of individual demand for coinsurance and deductible insurance, the structure of Pareto-efficient bilateral insurance contracts, the structure of Pareto-efficient multilateral risk-sharing agreements, and self-insurance and self-protection. Most, though not all, of the basic results in this area are found to be quite robust to dropping the expected utility hypothesis.     

Wealth Effects on Self-insurance

This paper considers the wealth effects on self-insurance investment that reduces loss. Wealthier individuals can bear the risk better, and invest less in self-insurance with two states of the world. Self-insurance, like insurance, is thus an inferior good. This known result does not extend to many states. The reason is that an increase in self-insurance does not necessarily reduce final wealth in good states and increase it in bad states. Self-insurance thus may not act as insurance, and wealthier individuals may not necessarily invest less in self-insurance. The paper proposes a condition under which self-insurance is inferior, and a condition under which it is normal.     

侵权立法对责任保险市场的影响机制

责任保险赖以存在及发展的基础在于完善的法律体系,尤其是侵权责任法.一国侵权责任法的不断完善,不仅有利于公民和法人承担责任,同时也会增加公众的维权和自我保护意识,从而刺激责任保险市场的需求与供给.本文采用CHH模型,通过侵权责任扩张与责任保险危机问题,分析了侵权立法对责任保险市场的影响机制,并基于美国责任保险市场发展模式...     

The internationalisation of monetary policy

The case for formal central bank cooperation remains limited, and practical considerations make its implementation difficult. That being said, central banks need to be engaged in a constant dialogue so as to remain ready for rapid coordinated action in exceptional circumstances. Also, they should strive to strengthen the global financial safety nets within their monetary policy mandates so that they can better address global or regional liquidity crises, thereby limiting the case for self-insurance.     

Tradeoffs for Downside Risk-Averse Decision-Makers and the Self-Protection Decision

In addition to risk aversion, decision-makers tend to be also downside risk averse. Besides the usual size for risk trade-off, this allows several other trade-offs to be considered. The decision to increase the level of self-protection generates five trade-offs each involving an unfavourable downside risk increase and an accompanying beneficial change. Five stochastic orders that correspond to these trade-offs are defined, characterised and used to prove comparative static theorems that provide information concerning the self-protection decision. The five stochastic orders are general in nature and can be applied in any decision model where downside risk aversion is assumed.     

Reimbursing Preventive Care

The paper focuses on secondary prevention, such as diagnostic screening, medical examinations and checks-up, which refers to the early detection of disease. Secondary prevention is analyzed as a self-insurance activity reducing the negative shock of illness and can be either complement or substitute to illness treatment. This paper analyses the optimal reimbursement scheme for both prevention and treatment when each activity receives either a linear subsidy (i.e. cost sharing) or tax. Although optimal reimbursement systematically encourages treatment, it positively affects prevention if and only if prevention reduces the cost of treatment, that is in the case the two activities are substitutes.     

Reimbursing Preventive Care

The paper focuses on secondary prevention, such as diagnostic screening, medical examinations and checks-up, which refers to the early detection of disease. Secondary prevention is analyzed as a self-insurance activity reducing the negative shock of illness and can be either complement or substitute to illness treatment. This paper analyses the optimal reimbursement scheme for both prevention and treatment when each activity receives either a linear subsidy (i.e. cost sharing) or tax. Although optimal reimbursement systematically encourages treatment, it positively affects prevention if and only if prevention reduces the cost of treatment, that is in the case the two activities are substitutes.     

Revenue Volatility and Fiscal Risks: An Application of Value-at-Risk Techniques to Hong Kong's Fiscal Policy

Revenue volatility poses challenges for fiscal policy makers. It can create risks to service provision, require borrowing, or entail sudden tax changes. This paper investigates the use of value-at-risk techniques to measure the fiscal risks caused by volatility as well as the sensitivity of measured risks to policies that may limit volatility. The revenue of Hong Kong's Special Administrative Region (SAR) is among the most volatile in Asia, and thus is a natural case for applying these techniques. Reflecting its revenue volatility, Hong Kong's SAR has traditionally held high fiscal savings (reserves), and the value of the self-insurance these savings provide is also discussed.     

Captives zur Absicherung von Extremrisiken? Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der OIL Insurance Limited

The use of captive insurance companies (captives) is quite common among big and international companies. Generally, captives are used to insure against high frequency/low severity risks. However, we can find captives which have been founded to deal with extreme risks as well. An example is the OIL Insurance Limited (OIL Insurance). In this context, we examine from a theoretical perspective whether captives are suitable for insurance against catastrophe risks. We show that regarding actuarial aspects captives have advantages in comparison to internal self-insurance and disadvantages in comparison to external insurance. The foundation of industry captives through the association of several companies can solve some of the problems, but further criteria especially costs have to be considered. Based on the developed arguments, we analyse whether our case example OIL Insurance is an appropriate instrument to transfer extreme risks.     

Anreizwirkungen von Haftungsregeln bei nicht nachgewiesener Kausalität

This article analyses the incentives generated by liability rules for non-causal damages on the basis of a cause assumption, which can be found in the German environmental liability law. In contrast to the basic model of the economic analysis of liability rules, where strict liability and the negligence rule induce the same precaution activities for risk neutral people, both rules differ in their incentives in the case of a cause assumption. It is shown that without a possibility of exculpation for intended business there will be inefficient incentives which result in an sub-optimal social income. If there exists (like in the German law) a possibility of exculpation for intended business, a tendency for reaching the optimal precaution level can be observed. Therefore from an economic point of view the use of strict liability in combination with the German version of a cause assumption leads to an efficient result.     

论我国会计师事务所有限责任合伙制改造

通过对我国会计师事务所体制的基本状况及会计师事务所问卷调查,分析了国际上主要国家有限责任合伙制会计师事务所的改制历程,认为有限责任合伙制会计师事务所具有比较优势。为此,我国应创造条件尽快实行会计师事务所有限责任合伙制改造。     

The Production of Goods in Excess of Demand: A Generalization of Self-Protection

We consider a risk-averse firm producing a limited number of goods that can be defective. The firm must determine its level of production before knowing which goods will be defective. Such is the case, for example, for a producer of telecommunications satellites. The problem under scrutiny can be interpreted as a generalization of self-protection for more than two states of nature. In our model, the firm determines jointly its level of production and its demand for insurance. It is shown that, under reasonable assumptions, the two strategies are complements.     

环境治理的经济学思维与环境责任保险

本文分析了环境保护的经济学思想——外部成本内在化;总结了环境保护领域的经济手段;比较了环境责任保险相对于其他经济手段在环境保护中的优势;探讨了我国环境责任保险的实施模式;并对我国企业在环境责任保险问题上存在的认识误区予以澄清。     

Die ökonomische Funktion von Haftungsregeln bei Risikoaversion und Haftpflichtversicherungsmöglichkeiten

Most of the literature on the economic analysis of liability law reduces the economic importance of liability regulations to their prevention or incentive function. This is due to the premise of risk neutral decision behavior or to the assumption of ?costless“ insurance that is very often used in this context. In this paper the case of risk neutrality is discussed briefly. Then the relevance of risk aversion is explained, and results are presented from an analysis which integrates risk averse behavior and employs a more adequate modeling of the insurance supply, such that the risk allocation function of liability rules is given emphasis in addition to the aspect of loss prevention. An important result is that for large numbers of potential victims an ideal solution can be approximated by a negligence rule. This insight is particularly interesting in light of the fact that liability risks which are characterized by large numbers of victims usually are regulated by strict liability.     

Self-Protection, Information and the Precautionary Principle

In this paper we examine the effect of information on investment in self-protection. We show that the relationship between more information and investment in self-protection is ambiguous in general. If absolute risk aversion is constant, then investment in self-protection always decreases with a better information structure. We show that if we interpret the Precautionary Principle as requiring more self-protection today, it is difficult to accept it on the grounds of efficiency, except for a particular subset of information structures.     

Risk Aversion,Downside Risk Aversion and Paying for Stochastic Improvements

This paper considers the relationship between risk preferences and the willingness to pay for stochastic improvements. We show that if the stochastic improvement satisfies a double-crossing condition, then a decision maker with utility v is willing to pay more than a decision maker with utility u, if v is both more risk averse and less downside risk averse than u. As the condition always holds in the case of self-protection, the result implies novel characterizations of individuals’ willingness to pay to reduce the probability of loss. By establishing a general result on the correspondence between an individual's willingness to pay, and his optimal purchase of stochastic improvement when there is a given relationship between stochastic improvements and the amount paid for them, we further show that all results on the willingness to pay can be applied directly to characterize the conditions under which a more risk averse individual will optimally choose to buy more stochastic improvement. Generalizations of existing results on optimal choice of self-protection can be obtained as corollaries.