外延型定向增发股票好处多

根据定向增发股票的类型,定向增发可以分为"定向增发非流通股"和"定向增发流通股"两类,其中,定向增发流通股是一种实现资产证券化的金融工具.定向增发流通股又可分为"外延型定向增发"和"内涵型定向增发",其中,外延型定向增发是指法人或自然人以上市公司之外的合格资产来认购上市公司所发行的流通股的增发方式.     

上市公司股权分置改革之中小非流通股股东会计处理探讨

股权分置的基本含义是上市公司的全部股份由于政策限制被分为两类性质不同的股份，一类是可以在证券交易所挂牌交易的流通股，一类是只能在场外协议转让的非流通股。目前，非流通股约占上市公司总股份的三分之二。股权分置破坏了上市公司利益机制一致性的基础，导致流通股股东和非流通股股东的利益发生冲突。股权分置改革的实质是通过非流通股股东向流通股股东支付对价取得相应的流通权，从而实现所有股东股份的同质化，并以此希求股东价值取向的一体化、决策基础的一致性，在此基础上完善资本市场的功能发挥和促进上市公司的健康发展。     

关于股权分置改革之控股非流通股股东会计处理探讨

股权分置的基本含义是：上市公司的全部股份由于政策限制被分为两类性质不同的股份，一类是可以在证券交易所挂牌交易的流通股，一类是只能在场外协议转让的非流通股。目前，非流通股约占上市公司总股本的三分之二。股权分置破坏了上市公司利益机制一致性的基础，导致流通股股东和非流通股股东的利益发生冲突。     

股权分置改革试点评价:基于博弈论的分析

股权分置改革试点使上市公司非流通股股东和流通股股东围绕改革中的利益分割展开激烈的博弈。基于各自利益最大化的选择，非流通股股东将倾向提供素质一般或较差、发展前最不明朗或暗淡、股票价格对公司内在价值存在显著高估的公司进行试点；流通股股东期望同非流通股股东裁上述公司的试点博穿中获得最大的利益补偿。稳妥推进股权分置试点，需要改变市场不合理预期．积极鼓励蓝筹类上市公司先行试点。     

上市公司股权结构与再融资方式的选择

通过对2000-2003年实施再融资的上市公司的股权结构的实证分析,发现不同类别股东的再融资方式选择倾向不同,非流通股中国家股与流通A股、内部职工股、高管股倾向配股方式,而其他非流通股和流通B股、H股、基金、战略投资者均倾向增发、转债的方式.流通股集中度高倾向配股,非流通股集中度高倾向增发.原因在于各类别股东在不同再融资方式下的利益格局不同,同时各类别股东对再融资决策的影响力不同,决定最终选择结果不同.     

上市公司股权结构对融资行为的影响

我国上市公司股份分为流通股和非流通股，两者价格的巨大差异，加上非流通股股东的控股地位，导致上市公司热衷于增发和配股等再融资方式。本文认为上市公司股权结构对其融资方式的选择会产生很大影响，从非流通股东和经营者角度考虑，股权融资是必然选择。如果股权结构不进行调整，所有股东不能做到同股同价，上市公司倾向于股权融资的状况将难以改变。     

股权分置改革后财务管理的变化

股权分置严重歪曲上市公司理财行为 股权分置的情况下,一部分股票流通而另一部分股票不流通,流通股股东以股票市值衡量投资价值并以市值的变动确认损益.尽管股价会影响非流通股股东的融资成本,但作为控股股东的非流通股股东更关心的是净资产以及能否通过配股增发获取更多的资金.     

定向增发中的散户利益保护问题研究

上市公司在实施定向增发过程中,由于现行的相关政策对其监管难度较大,极易出现关联交易、利益输送等侵害小股东利益的行为,因此监管部门必须更加细化定向增发的操作规范以保护小股东利益。     

定向增发新股折扣率的影响因素及其与公司短期股价关系的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文分析了影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素,并研究了中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率对公司短期股价表现的影响。本文认为,影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素与外国不同,中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的高低与股东的身份有关,向控股股东及关联投资者定向增发新股的折扣率要低于向非关联投资者定向增发新股的折扣率。并且,中国上市公司定向增发新股的折扣率越低,投资者获得的超额累积收益率越高。本文运用中国证券市场定向增发新股的数据,对影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素及中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率对公司短期股价表现的影响分别进行了实证研究,实证研究结果证明了本文理论分析的结论。     

股权分置与大股东权力寻租的治理

我国股市的股权分置制度和公司治理制度的不完善,导致了上市公司的非流通股股东利用本身绝对控股的权力,进行权力寻租,侵蚀上市公司利益,损害其他股东权益,导致我国资本市场的低效率.本文提出了建立起针对投融资人的资信评价体系;以新带老,缩小流通股与非流通股价差;加强公司内部治理制度和证券市场监管等措施,规范非流通股股东行为,防止大股东权力寻租的一些方法.     

The private placement of bank equity

This paper investigates the role of private placements of common stock as a source of bank capital. Our results show that information asymmetry problems that typically attend new offers of bank equity are mitigated in the private placement process. Moreover buyers of privately placed common stock seem to provide a quality certification of capital deficient bank holding companies. Our evidence is also consistent with the notion that buyers of privately placed common stock provide a monitoring service that aligns the interest of the bank's managers and shareholders. Finally, we find no evidence that private placements are predominately motivated by incumbent management's attempts to sell equity to a friendly buyer at the expense of the bank's current shareholders.     

Does shareholder coordination matter? Evidence from private placements

We propose a new role for private investments in public equity (PIPEs) as a mechanism to reduce coordination frictions among existing equity holders. We establish a causal link between the coordination ability of incumbent shareholders and PIPE issuance. This result obtains even after controlling for alternative explanations such as information asymmetry and access to public markets. Improved equity coordination following a private placement leads to favorable debt renegotiations within one year of issuance. Mitigating coordination frictions among shareholders ultimately decreases the odds of firm default in half.     

Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision

This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross-list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.     

Corporate governance and private placement issuance in Australia

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating dilution in the economic and voting interests of existing nonparticipating (retail) shareholders in private placements. Based on a sample of 2420 private placements in Australia from 2001 to 2012, we find support for this proposition through the influence of corporate governance on pricing negotiation and firms’ choice of issuing method in private placements. Specifically, firms with better corporate governance offer private placements with a smaller discount, and are more likely to include a share purchase plan, which protects nonparticipating shareholders from ownership dilution in the placement.     

Financing constraints and share pledges: Evidence from the share pledge reform in China

Financing constraints are important to triggering controlling shareholders' share pledges. However, the related literature faces two major challenges: the endogeneity problem and the lack of direct evidence of why and how individual share pledges can ease corporate financing constraints. Based on China's Share Pledge Reform (SPR) in Q4 2012 and the phenomenon that private firms face discrimination when obtaining bank loans, this paper studies the impact of financing constraints on share pledging behavior and its mechanisms by building a difference-in-differences (DID) model. The SPR makes it more convenient for shareholders to raise money through share pledges, and shareholders of private firms facing stronger financing constraints are more vulnerable to this reform than are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). After the SPR, the probability of share pledging by controlling shareholders of private firms is approximately 23.04% higher than that of controlling shareholders of SOEs, and the pledge ratio is approximately 16.53% higher. Further tests reveal that, after the SPR, controlling shareholders of private firms are more inclined than those of SOEs to provide loans to the company to alleviate its financing constraints. Heterogeneity tests further corroborate the finding that this effect is more significant in private firms that are smaller and do not have shareholders of banking and institutional firms among their top ten shareholders.     

定向增发与上市公司长期业绩下滑

本文以2006-2009年我国A股市场上市公司定向增发事件为研究样本,从经营业绩的角度考察了上市公司定向增发后的长期业绩状况。本文的研究发现我国上市公司定向增发前的长期业绩呈上升趋势,在定向增发实施当年达到峰值,随后在增发后出现下滑趋势,特别是定向增发后一年内的下降幅度在统计上显著为负。本文从盈余管理假说、自由现金流假说和发行对象类别等角度检验了上市公司定向增发后长期经营业绩下滑的影响因素,发现上市公司定向增发前的盈余管理行为和自由现金流水平、定向增发后的过度投资以及大股东及其关联方的认购是造成定向增发后长期经营业绩下滑的重要原因。     

Dividend taxation and the ownership structure of private firms

This paper examines the effect of dividend taxation on the ownership structure of private firms. I exploit a German dividend tax increase that only affects corporate shareholders owning a minority stake. Using data on private German firms and their shareholders, I find that corporate shareholders reduce their minority stakes in firms after the dividend tax reform. This result is in line with the notion that, because minority shareholders do not have sufficient decision-making power to influence the payout policy, they can only react to a dividend tax increase by selling their shares. This effect is larger when the affected minority shareholders face high dividend tax costs. However, I find a smaller effect when the benefits of the minority stakes are highly relevant for the firm and the affected shareholders, suggesting that non-tax factors mute the response to dividend taxes. In addition, I find that the largest shareholder of the firm buys the minority stake, resulting in greater ownership concentration. These findings extend the prior literature that finds no effect of dividend taxes on the ownership structure of private firms.     

Crossing the River by Touching Stones?: The Reform of Corporate Ownership in China

The privatization of Chinese enterprises in a low-legal-protection environment raises the question as to how minority shareholders are assured that their capital will not be expropriated. This paper sheds some light on this issue by examining the influence of controlling shareholders on the corporate performance of listed firms from 1997 to 2006. The first main finding is that firms controlled by local governments are more valuable to minority shareholders, whereas firms controlled by individuals are less valuable. The second main finding is that the post-WTO-accession relinquishment of control from local governments to private shareholders appears to have reduced corporate performance.     

我国定向增发市场的效应及实证研究

本文详细介绍了中国定向增发市场的发展历史,定义了定向增发市场的四种效应——年关效应、牛市效应、负债效应、政策效应,认为定向增发受市场环境、时间周期、经营状况和政策倾向等因素影响。通过研究这些效应的形成原因,提出了适度放宽发行底价、加强对高折价定向增发项目的监管等建设性意见。