How Big is the Tax Advantage to Debt?

This paper uses an option valuation model of the firm to answer the question, “What magnitude tax advantage to debt is consistent with the range of observed corporate debt ratios?” We incorporate into the model differential personal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income. We conclude that variations in the magnitude of bankruptcy costs across firms can not by itself account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. When it is possible for the value of the underlying assets to jump discretely to zero, differences across firms in the probability of this jump can account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. Moreover, if the tax advantage to debt is small, the annual rate of return advantage offered by optimal leverage may be so small as to make the firm indifferent about debt policy over a wide range of debt-to-firm value ratios.     

Taxation and the optimal constraint on corporate debt finance: why a comprehensive business income tax is suboptimal

The tax bias in favour of debt finance under the corporate income tax means that corporate debt ratios exceed the socially optimal level. This creates a rationale for a general thin capitalization rule limiting the amount of debt that qualifies for interest deductibility. This paper sets up a model of corporate finance and investment in a small open economy to identify the optimal constraint on tax-favoured debt finance, assuming that a given amount of revenue has to be raised from the corporate income tax. For plausible parameter values, the socially optimal debt-asset ratio is 2–3% points below the average corporate debt level currently observed. Driving the actual debt ratio down to this level through limitations on interest deductibility would generate a total welfare gain of about 5% of corporate tax revenue. The welfare gain would arise mainly from a fall in the social risks associated with corporate investment, but also from the cut in the corporate tax rate made possible by a broader corporate tax base.     

Tax shelters and corporate debt policy

We gather a unique sample of 44 tax shelter cases to investigate the magnitude of tax shelter activity and whether participating in a shelter is related to corporate debt policy. The average annual deduction produced by the shelters in our sample is very large, equaling approximately nine percent of asset value. These deductions are more than three times as large as interest deductions for comparable companies. The firms in our sample use less debt when they engage in tax sheltering. Compared to companies with similar pre-shelter debt ratios, the debt ratios of firms engaged in tax shelters fall by about 8%. The tax shelter firms in our sample appear underlevered if shelters are ignored but do not appear underlevered once shelters are considered.     

Corporate Leverage and Nondebt Tax Shields: Evidence on Crowding-Out

A negative relationship between corporate leverage and tax shields has been predicted because a large nondebt tax shield reduces the expected value of interest tax savings and lessens the advantage of debt financing. Previous studies, however, have provided inconclusive and contradictory evidence on whether nondebt tax shields crowd-out debt financing. The analysis herein relies on unique constructs of discounted depreciation tax shields and presents evidence that crowding-out does not occur. Furthermore, it is shown that contradictory inferences may result from analysis of annual tax depreciation deductions instead of discounted tax shields. The findings suggest that firms with substantial cash flow from depreciation exploit their higher debt capacity by maintaining a capital structure with significantly more debt than otherwise.     

BETAS AND DEBT MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE UK TAX ENVIRONMENT

Tax complexities relating to corporate tax losses, induced by debt finance, and to the differential tax treatment of equity and sterling debt, are introduced into corporate valuation. The after personal tax value of the geared firm can be less than that of the equivalent ungeared firm. Also, debt-induced tax losses can create negative betas. These fiscal effects are incorporated into degearing formulae under active and passive debt management policies.     

On the value and determinants of the interest tax shields

We use a dynamic model of the firm to ascertain both the value and the determinants of the debt tax shields. For a representative U.S. firm, we find that the value of the interest tax shields represents less than 5 % of firm value, and it varies considerably across U.S. industries. Our results also show that this component of firm value behaves counter-cyclically over the business cycle. Finally, besides the interest rate on debt and the corporate income tax rate, we find that the curvature of the production function is one of the main determinants of the tax advantage of debt.     

Capital Structure,Corporate Taxation and Firm Age*

This paper analyses the relationship between corporate taxation, firm age and debt. We adapt a standard model of capital structure choice under corporate taxation, focusing on the financing and investment decisions typically faced by a firm. Our model suggests that the debt ratio is associated positively with the corporate tax rate and negatively with firm age. Further, we predict that the tax-induced advantage of debt is more important for older firms than for younger ones. To test these hypotheses empirically, we use a cross-section of around 405,000 firms from 35 European countries and 127 NACE three-digit industries. In line with previous research, we find that a firm's debt ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. Further, we observe that older firms exhibit smaller debt ratios than their younger counterparts. Finally, consistent with our theoretical model, we find a positive interaction between corporate taxation and firm age, indicating that the impact of corporate taxation on debt increases over a firm's lifetime.     

Are target leverage ratios stable? Investigating the impact of corporate asset restructuring

If firms balance the benefits and costs of leverage, then we might expect corporate asset shocks to trigger a change in corporate target leverage. We investigate the impact of corporate asset restructuring and find that target leverage after restructuring is reduced for downsizing firms and increased for upsizing firms. Changes in target leverage are stabilized by the second year after the restructuring event and are monotonic relative to the degree of restructuring. Decomposition analysis shows that corporate asset restructuring directly and significantly affects target debt ratios. Compared to control firms, downsizing firms adjust claims by repurchasing debt while upsizing firms issue debt securities. As expected, debt repurchases are associated with lower tax liabilities while debt issuance decisions correspond to lower growth proxies and are consistent with a higher adverse selection cost of issuing equity, positive leverage deficit, higher tax liabilities, and lower bankruptcy risk.     

Debt and taxes: Evidence from the real estate industry

Compelling empirical evidence documenting a material effect of corporate taxes on leverage decisions is limited, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for the firm's tax benefit of debt. We examine leverage decisions across taxable and nontaxable real estate firms—firms for which we can measure the relative tax benefit of debt with little error. The tax hypothesis implies that for firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Consistent with this, leverage ratios of taxable real estate firms are higher than their nontaxable counterparts, but the magnitude of this difference is at most one-half of that implied by studies that employ simulated marginal tax rates.     

The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions: Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms

This paper provides additional evidence on the relationship between corporate taxes and debt using panel data on Italian companies. The panel covers 1054 companies for the years 1982–1994.The paper follows the Graham-Shevlin methodology for calculating company specific marginal tax rates (MTR) relying on the non-linearity of corporate tax schedules resulting from company losses and the ensuing tax provisions (carry-forward and backward rules). In the period covered by the panel there were in Italy two taxes on corporate income (IRPEG and ILOR), with different loss carry-forward rules, whose statutory tax rates and tax bases changed several times. For these reasons the simulated MTRs display both cross-sectional and time-series variation.The paper tests whether taxes encourage the use of debt by analysing incremental financing decisions. In order to cope with the endogeneity of the MTR the paper considers two different specifications. The first uses the lagged value of the simulated MTR. The second employs the estimate of before-financing MTR proposed by Graham et al. (1998). Significant cross-sectional tax effects are identified under both specifications whereas time-series variation cannot be identified if due account is taken of firm-fixed tax effects.The paper also investigates whether personal taxes affect corporate financing decisions. The MTR may either overstate or understate the fiscal benefit of debt financing according to whether, at the personal level, interest income is taxed at a rate that is higher or lower than the tax rate on returns from common stocks. Differences in the dividend-payout ratio across companies and several reforms in interest, dividend and capital gains taxation provide sufficient cross-section and time-series variations to identify the effect of personal taxes on debt usage.     

Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital

We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963] , the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage‐related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt.     

Reformulating Tax Shield Valuation: A Note

Standard financial theory (in the absence of agency costs and personal taxes) implies that each dollar of debt contributes to the value of the firm in proportion to the firm's tax rate. To derive this result, incremental debt is assumed permanent. This paper shows that when the firm acts to maintain a constant market value leverage ratio, the marginal value of debt financing is much lower than the corporate tax rate. Since Hamada's 2 unlevering procedure for observed equity betas was derived under the assumption of permanent debt, we derive an unlevering procedure consistent with the assumption of a constant leverage ratio.     

Modigliani and Miller Again Revisited: The Cost of Capital with Unequal Borrowing and Lending Rates

The financial literature asserts that financial managers must borrow at least to some degree if they are to optimise the value of their companies. This result has been described in the literature as ‘perhaps the single most important result in the theory of corporate finance obtained in the last 30 years’ (Copeland and Weston, 1988, p. 443). Based on US tax systems, the value added to a company by debt has been estimated as high as 35 to 50% of the debt's market value. More recently in this journal, Ashton (1989b) has argued that under the present UK tax system, the theoretical tax advantage afforded by debt should be estimated at no more than 13% of the debt's market value. The contribution of this paper is to draw attention to an aspect of borrowing that has largely escaped attention, but which nevertheless affects the above conclusions: namely, that the market spread between borrowing and lending constitutes a ‘cost’ for corporate borrowing. This paper demonstrates that in the context of the present UK tax system, this ‘cost’ of borrowing is sufficient to nullify entirely the formerly perceived financial tax benefits of corporate borrowing. We conclude that, at present, corporate borrowing could imply a net disadvantage for the valuation of a company's equity by about 6 or 7% of the debt's market value.     

Capital structure and international debt shifting

This paper presents a model of a multinational firm's optimal debt policy that incorporates international taxation factors. The model yields the prediction that a multinational firm's indebtedness in a country depends on a weighted average of national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested using a novel firm-level dataset for European multinationals and their subsidiaries, combined with newly collected data on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Our empirical results show that a foreign subsidiary's capital structure reflects local corporate tax rates as well as tax rate differences vis-à-vis the parent firm and other foreign subsidiaries, although the overall economic effect of taxes on leverage appears to be small. Ignoring the international debt shifting arising from differences in national tax rates would understate the impact of national taxes on debt policies by about 25%.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODEL

Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity.
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios.     

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.     

PERSONAL TAXES,INFLATION AND MARKET VALUATION

In an inflation-non-indexed progressive tax system, inflation results in a “bracket-creep” effect that reduces the demand for corporate debt while the tax-deductibility of nominal interest makes the use of debt financing cheaper. The interactive effect of inflation and differential dividend and capital gains taxes on the value of a levered firm is analyzed in this paper. Under a non-indexed progressive tax system, inflation decreases the value of the unlevered firm but the effect of inflation on the firm's debt-to-asset ratio is theoretically indeterminate. The gain from leverage is also derived and compared with other valuation models.     

对中国上市公司债务期限影响因素的实证研究——基于面板数据的因子分析和回归分析

国内外诸多学者已经开始从代理成本、税盾作用、信息不对称等角度来研究影响债务融资期限的各种因素。但综合各种因素来考察企业融资期限结构影响的研究却相对较弱。以中国546家A股的上市公司最近9年相关数据为样本,从企业规模、财务杠杆、债务税率、清算比率和资产期限等因素对企业融资期限结构的影响做因子分析和回归分析后,指出代理成本等理论对中国上市公司债务期限解释是有限的。     

Do personal taxes affect capital structure? Evidence from the 2003 tax cut

Because the personal tax treatments of interest and dividend income likely affect the relative cost of debt and equity financing, a sharp change in tax treatment could affect firms' optimal leverage. This paper examines the effect of the 2003 equity income tax cut on firms' debt usage. Because this tax cut affected only individual investors, we can use a difference-in-differences method to identify the effect of personal tax on firms' leverage. Previous research has found that the 2003 tax cut encouraged dividend payouts and reduced the cost of equity, but it provides no link to equilibrium leverage ratios. We estimate that the tax cut causes the affected firms' leverage to decrease by about 5 percentage points. Furthermore, we show that the effects of the tax cut are stronger for firms with lower marginal corporate tax rates and for firms that are not financially constrained, consistent with our theoretical predictions. Overall, we find strong evidence that personal tax is an important determinant of firms' optimal leverage.     

Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?

There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of tax function convexity, we find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. Our analysis does, however, indicate that firms hedge to increase debt capacity, with increased tax benefits averaging 1.1 percent of firm value. Our results also indicate that firms hedge because of expected financial distress costs and firm size.