Do central banks respond to exchange rate movements? A structural investigation

We estimate a small-scale, structural general equilibrium model of a small open economy using Bayesian methods. Our main focus is the conduct of monetary policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. We consider generic Taylor-type rules, where the monetary authority reacts in response to output, inflation, and exchange-rate movements. We perform posterior odds tests to investigate the hypothesis whether central banks do target exchange rates. The main result of this paper is that the central banks of Australia and New Zealand do not, whereas the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England do include the nominal exchange rate in its policy rule. This result is robust for various specification of the policy rule. We also find that terms-of-trade movements do not contribute significantly to domestic business cycles.     

Taxation and the Taylor principle

A nominal tax system is added to a sticky-price monetary business cycle model. When nominal interest income is taxed, the coefficient on inflation in a Taylor-type monetary policy rule must be significantly larger than one in order for the model economy to have a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium. When effective tax rates are raised by inflation, the stability of the economy's equilibrium can be adversely affected. Finally, when depreciation is treated as a charge against taxable income, an even larger weight on inflation is required in the Taylor rule in order to obtain a determinate and stable equilibrium.     

A General Theory (and Some Evidence) of Expectation Traps in Monetary Policy

I show that multiple equilibria are a general property of economies under full monetary policy discretion. Three simple conditions are sufficient to rule out, generically, a unique equilibrium in a static economy. The key departure from Barro and Gordon (1983) is to consider bounded welfare costs of inflation. I also show that in a two Markov equilibrium economy the inflation response to certain perturbations is, generically, qualitatively different in each equilibrium. Finally, I discuss some evidence on inflation dynamics that supports the hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy was caught in an expectation trap during the high inflation episode of the 1970s.     

Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy

Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic, stochastic sticky-price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable. When fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period, the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation. Monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal.     

Determinacy and Learnability of Monetary Policy Rules in Small Open Economies

This paper evaluates under which conditions different Taylor-type rules lead to determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium in a simple "New Keynesian" small open economy model, developed by Gali and Monacelli (2005) . In particular, we extend Bullard and Mitra (2002) results of determinacy and E-stability in a closed economy to this small open economy framework. Our results highlight an important link between the Taylor principle and both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium in small open economies. More importantly, the degree of openness coupled with the nature of the policy rule adopted by the monetary authorities might change this link in important ways. A key finding is that, contrary to Bullard and Mitra, expectations-based rules that involve the consumer price inflation and/or the nominal exchange rate limit the region of E-stability and the Taylor Principle does not guarantee E-stability. We also show that some forms of managed exchange rate rules can help to alleviate problems of both indeterminacy and expectational instability, yet these rules might not be desirable since they can promote greater volatility in the economy.     

Monetary Policy Rules in an Open Economy with Heuristics: Which Model Is Best?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agents’ expectation have been critical issues for reconsidering monetary policy management since 2008. The purpose of this article is to evaluate macroeconomic stability in a New Keynesian open economy in which agents experience cognitive limitations. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and then create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Therefore, relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis has potential consequences for policy designs. Our simulations confirm that the business cycles induced by animal spirits are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a Taylor-type (CPI or domestic inflation) rule or a credible exchange rate pegging system can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy.     

Inflation Targeting,Recursive Inattentiveness,and Heterogeneous Beliefs

We consider a monetary authority that provides an explicit inflation target in order to align expectations with the policy objective. However, biased perceptions of the target may arise due to imperfect information flows. We allow agents to revise expectations over time and we model their recursive choice among prediction strategies as an optimization problem under rational inattention. We then investigate whether a simple policy rule can steer the economy toward the targeted equilibrium. Our findings suggest that determinacy under rational expectations may not be sufficient to reach the target. Instead, monetary policy should be fine‐tuned to correct agents' biased beliefs.     

Optimal monetary policy with international trade in intermediate inputs

This paper examines optimal monetary policy in a two-country New Keynesian model with international trade in intermediate inputs. We derive the loss function of a cooperative monetary policymaker and find that the optimal monetary policy must target intermediate-goods price inflation rates, final-goods price inflation rates, final-goods output gaps, and relative-price gaps. We use the welfare loss under the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark to evaluate the welfare implications of three Taylor-type monetary policy rules. A main finding is that the degree of price stickiness at the stage of intermediate-goods production is a key factor to determine which policy rule should be followed. Specifically, when the degree of price stickiness at the stage of intermediate-goods production is high, the policymaker should follow intermediate-goods PPI-based Taylor rule, whereas CPI-based Taylor rule should be followed when the degree of price stickiness at the stage of intermediate-goods production is intermediate or low.     

Using a long-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument

Using a short-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument can be problematic near its zero bound constraint. An alternative strategy is to use a long-term interest rate as the policy instrument. We find when Taylor-type policy rules are used by the central bank to set the long rate in a standard New Keynesian model, indeterminacy—that is, multiple rational expectations equilibria—may often result. However, a policy rule with a long-rate policy instrument that responds in a “forward-looking” fashion to inflation expectations can avoid the problem of indeterminacy.     

Trend Inflation, Taylor Principle, and Indeterminacy

Positive trend inflation shrinks the determinacy region of a basic New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model when monetary policy is conducted by a contemporaneous interest rate rule. Neither the Taylor principle, which requires the inflation coefficient to be greater than one, nor the generalized Taylor principle, which requires that the nominal interest rate to be raised by more than the increase in inflation in the long run, is a sufficient condition for local determinacy of equilibrium. This finding holds for different types of Taylor rules, inertial policy rules, and price indexation schemes. Therefore, regardless of the theoretical setup, the monetary literature on interest rate rules cannot disregard average inflation in both theoretical and empirical analyses.     

Monetary Policy, Determinacy, and Learnability in a Two-Block World Economy

We study how determinacy and learnability of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium may be affected by monetary policy in a simple, two-country, New Keynesian framework under both fixed and flexible exchange rates. We find that open economy considerations may alter conditions for determinacy and learnability relative to closed economy analyses and that new concerns can arise in the analysis of classic topics such as the desirability of exchange rate targeting and monetary policy cooperation.     

Normalizing the Central Bank's Balance Sheet: Implications for Inflation and Debt Dynamics

We explore the effects of reducing the overall size of the central bank's balance sheet and lowering its maturity structure. To do so, we consider an environment where fiscal policy is traditionally passive and the central bank follows the Taylor principle. In addition, the monetary authority has also explicit size and compositional rules regarding its balance sheet. Agents in this economy face limited commitment in some markets and government bonds can be used as collateral. When short- and long-term public debt exhibit premia, changes in the central bank's balance sheet have implications for long-run inflation and real allocations. To ensure a unique locally stable steady state, the central bank should target a low enough maturity composition of its balance sheet. In our numerical exercise, calibrated to the United States, we find that long-term debt holdings by the central bank should be less than 0.5 times of their short-term positions. Moreover, the process of balance sheet normalization should aggressively respond to the total debt issued in the economy relative to its target. These findings depend on the degree of liquidity of long-term bonds. The more liquid long-term bonds are, the lower is the value of the composition threshold and the parameter space consistent with unique and stable equilibria is smaller. In addition, we consider a modified Taylor rule that takes into account the premium. Such a rule increases the prevalence of multiplicity of steady states and delivers lower welfare. Thus, we argue that the traditional Taylor rule is appropriate for managing interest rates in the presence of premia.     

The Advantage of Flexible Targeting Rules

This paper investigates the consequences of debt stabilization for inflation targeting. If the fiscal authority holds constant the real value of debt at maturity under strict inflation targeting, the equilibrium dynamics are indeterminate for a wide range of parameters and steady‐state fiscal stances. “Flexible” targeting rules that include a concern for stabilization of the output gap can restore determinacy of the equilibrium. Flexible inflation targeting appears to be more robust than flexible debt targeting to alternative parameterizations. The fiscal authority can prevent indeterminacy under strict targeting rules by committing to hold constant debt net of interest rate spending.     

Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target?

In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI inflation rates, a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation, a final output gap and, unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI inflation and PPI inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules that ignore PPI inflation or PPI sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses.     

Countercyclical Bank Capital Requirement and Optimized Monetary Policy Rules

Using BoC-GEM-Fin, a large-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with real, nominal, and financial frictions featuring a banking sector, we explore the macroeconomic implications of various types of countercyclical bank capital regulations. Results suggest that countercyclical capital requirements have a significant stabilizing effect on key macroeconomic variables, but mostly after financial shocks. Moreover, the bank capital regulatory policy and monetary policy interact, and this interaction is contingent on the type of shocks that drive the economic cycle. Finally, we analyze loss functions based on macroeconomic and financial variables to arrive at an optimal countercyclical regulatory policy in a class of simple implementable Taylor-type rules. Compared to bank capital regulatory policy, monetary policy is able to stabilize the economy more efficiently after real shocks. On the other hand, financial shocks require the regulator to be more aggressive in loosening/tightening capital requirements for banks, even as monetary policy works to counter the deviations of inflation from the target.     

The Value of Interest Rate Stabilization Policies When Agents Are Learning

We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium in the "New Keynesian" model where monetary policy is optimally derived and interest rate stabilization is added to the central bank's traditional objectives of inflation and output stabilization. We consider both the case where the central bank lacks a commitment technology and the case of full commitment. We show that for both cases, optimal policy rules yield rational expectations equilibria that are E-stable for a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values. These findings stand in contrast to Evans and Honkapohja's findings for optimal monetary policy rules in environments where interest rate stabilization is not a central bank objective.     

Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules

Welfare-maximizing monetary- and fiscal-policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices, money, and distortionary taxation. The Ramsey-optimal policy is used as a point of comparison. The main findings are: the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest-rate rule plays a minor role for welfare. It matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium. Optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output. Interest-rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses. The welfare gains from interest-rate smoothing are negligible. Optimal fiscal policy is passive. The optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the Ramsey-optimal policy.     

Why Money Growth Determines Inflation in the Long Run: Answering the Woodford Critique

Woodford argues that it is not appropriate to regard inflation in the steady state of New Keynesian models as determined by steady‐state money growth. Woodford instead argues that the intercept term in the monetary authority's interest rate policy rule determines steady‐state inflation. In this paper, I offer an alternative interpretation of steady‐state behavior, according to which it is appropriate to regard steady‐state inflation as determined by steady‐state money growth. The argument relies on traditional interpretations of the central bank's power in the long run and appeals to model properties that are common to textbook and New Keynesian analysis. According to this argument, the only way the central bank can control interest rates in the long run is via affecting inflation, and its only means available for determining inflation is by determining the money growth rate.     

Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia

We show how monetary policy inertia can help alleviate problems of indeterminacy and non-existence of stationary equilibrium observed for some commonly studied monetary policy rules. We also find that inertia promotes learnability of equilibrium. The context is a simple, forward-looking model of the macroeconomy widely used in the rapidly expanding literature in this area. We conclude that this might be an important reason why central banks in the industrialized economies display considerable inertia when adjusting monetary policy in response to changing economic conditions.     

Investment and Monetary Policy: Learning and Determinacy of Equilibrium

We explore determinacy and expectational stability (learnability) of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in New Keynesian (NK) models that include capital. Using a consistent calibration across three different models—labor‐only, firm‐specific capital, or an economy‐wide rental market for capital, we provide a clear picture of when REE is determinate and learnable and when it is not under a variety of monetary policy rules. Our findings make a case for greater optimism concerning the use of such rules in NK models with capital. While Bullard and Mitra’s (2002, 2007) findings for the labor‐only NK model do not always extend to models with capital, we show that determinate and learnable REE can be achieved in NK models with capital if there is (i) plausible capital adjustment costs, (ii) some weight given to output in the policy rule, and/or (iii) a policy of interest rate smoothing.