Market share and price rigidity

Survey evidence shows that the main reason why firms keep prices stable is that they are concerned about losing customers or market share. We construct a general equilibrium model in which firms care about the size of their customer base. Firms and customers form long-term relationships because consumers incur costs to switch sellers. In an environment with sectoral productivity shocks, we show that cost pass-through is a non-monotonic function of the size of switching costs. Specifically, prices tend to become more stable as the fraction of repeat customers increases and the elasticity of the customer base falls.     

Do switching costs make markets more or less competitive? The case of 800‐number portability

Do switching costs reduce or intensify price competition if firms charge the same price to existing and new consumers? I study 800‐number portability to determine how switching costs affect price competition under a single price regime. AT&T and MCI reduced their toll‐free services prices in response to portability, implying that reduced switching costs increased competition. Despite rapid market growth, gains from higher prices to “locked‐in” consumers exceeded the incentives to capture new consumers. Prices on larger contracts dropped more, consistent with greater lock‐in for larger users. Price changes between portability's announcement and implementation are consistent with rational expectations.     

Agency costs and product market competition: The case of audit pricing in Greece

Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs are not dependent on product market competition. However, elsewhere in the economics literature, theoretical analysis and empirical research have indicated that product market competition reduces agency costs by reducing the marginal cost of eliciting effort from agents. We investigate the relationship between product market competition and audit fee, as an example of agency cost. Taking advantage of a proprietary data set for Greek audit firms, we find that the audit fee and audit hours are inversely associated with client firm product market competition. We conclude that audit effort, as an agency cost, is reduced where competitive forces reduce the need for shareholders to bear the costs of monitoring agents.     

Banking Products: You <Emphasis Type="Italic">Can</Emphasis> Take Them with You,So Why Don’t You?

Policymakers around the world call for more competition in the banking sector. One prerequisite to achieving this is customer mobility. Despite its policy relevance, surprisingly little is known about consumers’ bank switching behaviour. We show that the principal reasons to stay at one’s bank are a good bank-customer relationship, practical barriers, and the perception that there is not much benefit in switching. Moreover, we find that the reported propensity to switch varies across banking products. For the main current and savings accounts, this propensity is most strongly related to the bank-customer relationship, while for mortgage loans it is especially linked to switching experience. These findings have important implications for antitrust policy; they provide an argument against using a cluster-based legal standard for the analysis of competition and in favour of a disaggregated approach. Regarding the effectiveness of hypothetical policy initiatives to lower switching barriers, we find that the reported switching propensity with current accounts is higher in the case of account number portability, while more knowledge of the existing switching service has no significant effect. Lastly, scenario analysis shows that a policy of allowing new foreign banks to enter the savings market is less promising for enhancing mobility than a policy that increases the number of domestic players.     

Bank relationships and underwriter competition: Evidence from Japan

I examine the effects of bank relationships on underwriter choice in the Japanese corporate bond market following the 1993 deregulation. Bank relationships have significant positive effects on a firm's underwriter choice. Relationship firms receive a small but significant fee discount and, consistent with the mitigating effect of competition on hold-up costs, multiple-relationship firms receive a significantly deeper discount than single-relationship firms. Bank shareholding alone negatively affects underwriter choice, whereas shareholding together with loans has significantly more positive effects than loans alone. Finally, existing relationships reduce a Japanese firm's switching probability by 32%, in contrast to only 6% for U.S. firms.     

Quantifying search and switching costs in the US auto insurance industry

I estimate demand for auto insurance in the presence of two types of market frictions: search and switching costs. I develop an integrated utility‐maximizing model in which consumers decide over which and how many companies to search and from which company to purchase. My modelling approach rationalizes observed consideration sets as being the outcomes of consumers' search processes. I find search costs to range from $35 to $170 and average switching costs of $40. Search costs are the most important driver of customer retention and their elimination is the main lever to increase consumer welfare in the auto insurance industry.     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.     

Customer concentration,leverage adjustments,and firm value

We examine the relationship between customer concentration and capital structure adjustment speed using a sample of US listed firms from 1977 to 2020. We found that the customer-concentrated firms have a lower speed of leverage adjustment. Customer concentration affects leverage adjustment speed mainly through increased cash flow volatility and asset specificity. The negative association is more pronounced in firms with high relationship-specific investments and low switching costs for their customers. Stock market reacts to leverage deviation strongly for firms with concentrated customers. Our findings highlight the vital role of customers as key stakeholders in capital structure decisions.     

An empirical investigation of the relative effect of trust and switching costs on service loyalty in the UK retail banking industry

The crisis in the UK financial services industry has led to retail banking customers treating transactions with growing scepticism. Retail banks are having to work very hard to regain customer trust. Despite recent research in marketing that acknowledges the importance of service loyalty to service firms, studies that have examined the relative effects of trust and the different types of switching costs on attitudinal and behavioural loyalty are scant. Therefore this article aims to build a model to examine the strength of the relationships between these constructs. Using survey data collected from a convenience sample of 290 retail banking customers in the United Kingdom, the article reveals that the main drivers of attitudinal loyalty are trust and relational switching costs. In contrast, the main drivers of behavioural loyalty are trust, relational switching costs and attitudinal loyalty. Interestingly, financial and procedural switching costs exert no significant effect on either attitudinal or behavioural loyalty. Trust and relational switching costs exert a stronger effect on attitudinal than behavioural loyalty.     

债券评级机构变更——基于评级选购与评级迎合视角

本文以2008年至2017年的公司债券为样本,研究了发行人变更评级机构的影响,以此来解释评级市场上发行人频繁变更评级机构的现象。本文发现发行人变更评级机构后,其信用等级得到显著提升。发行人变更评级机构的行为对信用等级的影响在以下两种情形中更显著:一是当发行人所处行业或评级机构所在的评级市场竞争激烈时;二是当发行人主体评级位于AA信用等级的临界点时。进一步研究发现,考虑到评级机构变更与信用等级之间的交互影响,变更评级机构的发行人整体上可实现发债成本的降低。但该类发行人未来的违约风险增加、经营业绩下降。最后,本文发现债券发行规模较大以及非国有发行人更倾向于变更评级机构来提高信用等级。本文通过分析发行人更换信用评级机构的动机和后果,为监管部门构建以评级质量为导向的良性竞争环境提供借鉴参考。     

Multidimensional Competition and Corporate Disclosure

In this paper, we argue that the influence product market competition exerts on disclosure is defined by the combined effect of the incentives and disincentives to disclose raised by the multiple competition dimensions. We distinguish between firm‐ and industry‐level competition measures, and we hypothesize that the former raises agency and proprietary costs, whereas the latter creates incentives to disclose either to fulfil the owners’ need for information to monitor managers or to deter the entrance of new competitors in the industry. Our research design allows for non‐monotonic relationships between competition and disclosure as well as for interactions between competition dimensions. Using a sample of US manufacturing companies, we gather evidence that is consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find an inverted U‐shape relationship between corporate disclosure and a firm's abnormal profitability, which is suggestive of firms being reluctant to disclose when they are underperforming (outperforming) their rivals because of the fear of unveiling agency conflicts (raising proprietary costs). Second, we observe a U‐shape relationship between corporate disclosure and industry profitability, although this U design evolves to approximate a rising function as the protection provided by entry barriers increases.     

The effect of major customer concentration on firm profitability: competitive or collaborative?

We test two potential hypotheses regarding the effects of major customer concentration on firm profitability. Under the collaboration hypothesis, customer power facilitates collaboration, and both the supplier firm and its major customers obtain benefits. Under the competition hypothesis, customer power results in rent extraction, and the major customers benefit at the expense of the supplier firm. We document that major customer concentration is negatively associated with the supplier firm’s profitability but positively associated with the major customers’ profitability. We demonstrate that these effects weaken as the supplier firm’s own power grows over its relationship with major customers, supporting the competition hypothesis. We carefully reconcile our results with prior studies’ findings that focus only on the supplier firm’s profitability and identify their research design and interpretation problems. We obtain similar inferences in a setting of major customers’ horizontal mergers and when we use an alternative measure of major customer power.

     

An investigation of the relationships among consumer satisfaction,loyalty, and market share in Kuwaiti loan services

This study investigates the relationships among customer satisfaction, customer loyalty, and market share in nearly 700 users of Kuwaiti bank loan services. The authors show that the expected positive relationships of satisfaction with market share and of satisfaction with loyalty are not supported in this sector of the banking industry. As expected, however, customer loyalty is shown to be related to market share. It appears that, within this product market, loyalty is not derived from customer satisfaction, but rather is based on other factors such as, for example, price, special deals, or bank–customer relationships. Therefore, market share in Kuwaiti loan services is dependent on banks creating and maintaining a large and loyal customer base.     

Customer concentration and digital transformation

Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed firms during 2009–2020, we examine how customer concentration would influence firms' digital transformation. In this study, we construct a proxy for digital transformation based on a text analysis approach. Our baseline results show that customer concentration hinders digital transformation at the firm level. Moreover, we design a series of tests including instrumental variables and 2SLS regression to mitigate the endogeneity concern. Still, we find results consistent with the baseline regression. The results hold after multiple robustness tests. Furthermore, this negative effect of customer concentration on digital transformation is more pronounced when firms are subject to 1) more market competition, 2) more financing constraints, 3) higher transaction costs, and 4) less efficient use of resources. Overall, our results demonstrate the role of customer concentration in inhibiting firms' digital transformation from the perspective of supply chain management.     

Bank competition,concentration and EU SME cost of debt

Despite the plentiful debate on the effects of bank competition on SME access to finance and growth, only few studies have explored the impacts on SME cost of debt. This study examines how bank market power affects the credit costs of SMEs by using unique matched SME-bank data from 17 EU countries. We show that bank market power reduces the cost of debt for SMEs. Such a favorable effect is stronger for SMEs that are less informationally transparent, and in the economies subject to less credit information depth and business extent of disclosure. These findings support the Information-based Hypothesis, whereby market power motivates banks to invest in soft information acquisition and to build lending relationships to reduce information costs. In addition, we show that despite the favorable effects of relationship lending brought by bank market power, SME credit conditions worsen in a more concentrated banking market.     

Trade credit and cost stickiness

Using a large sample of US data, we examine the relation between trade credit and cost behaviour and further investigate the moderating effects on this relation of agency problem, product market competition, and customer concentration. We find that firms using high levels of trade credit exhibit lower cost stickiness and this is prevalent in the high agency problem sub‐sample. In addition, in a non‐competitive market, where the agency problem arises owing to lack of competition, trade credit plays an external monitoring role by attenuating cost stickiness. However, high customer concentration curtails this monitoring ability.     

信用卡转换成本研究综述

早在上世纪80年代,经济学家开始研究存在转换成本的市场竞争问题.目前,有关转换成本的研究主要集中在电信、银行存款及信用卡等市场领域.研究信用卡转换成本对银行业发展、信用卡产业的发展等具有重要现实意义.本文基于转换成本一般研究基础之上,从转换成本的内涵与类型、对消费者的影响及研究方法等方面对学术界有关信用卡转换成本的研究进行了梳理和概括,以期为今后的信用卡转换成本的深入研究提供参考.     

Two months in the life of several gilt-edged market makers on the London Stock Exchange

We investigate the micro structure of the UK gilt market studying the behaviour of several gilt-edged market makers on the London Stock Exchange. Through a structural model of the price process we can test different microstructural hypotheses, concerning information asymmetries, transaction and inventory carrying costs, and market liquidity. Our results suggest that inventories do not alter the price process in the gilt market. Moreover, in contrast to customer orders, inter-dealer transactions possess an information content. Transaction costs in the inter-dealer market are also substantially smaller than those for external customers.     

Mystery Shopping in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung – Einsatz von Testkäufern zur Qualitätssicherung

Because of raising costs, modified legal regulations and a changed self-perception of many insurants, compulsory health insurance funds have to cope with an intensified competition on their market. Management instruments like Mystery Shopping, as a method for a hidden inspection of ex ante defined quality standards, enter the health care system. This study's aim is to assess the utilisability of this instrument for compulsory health insurance funds.Basing on a literature analysis and the conducted Mystery Shopping-study in cooperation with a German company health insurance fund, it is assessed, that there are already existing successful approaches of using Mystery Shopping in health insurances and further health care sector. Like in the present study, previous existing applications occur primarily in the evaluation of advisory services (primary in those by telephone). Via Mystery Shopping it is possible to identify relevant factors influencing customer's contentment as well as fund's strengths and weaknesses in an objective and detailed manner. Together with conventional customer satisfaction analyses, potential need for action can be revealed. Besides the evaluation of solely service aspects, prospective applications in the further health care system are introduced.     

Securitization,competition and monitoring

We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition model where borrowers face both exogenous and endogenous costs to switch between banks, we uncover a competition softening effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives, securitization mitigates winner’s curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial market share. Due to this competition softening effect, securitization can adversely affect loan market efficiency while leading to higher equilibrium profits for banks. This effect is driven by primary loan market competition, not by the exploitation of informational asymmetries in the secondary market for loans. We also argue that banks can use securitization as a strategic response to an increase in competition, as a tool to signal a reduction in monitoring intensity for the sole purpose of softening ex ante competition. Our result suggests that securitization reforms focusing exclusively on informational asymmetries in markets for securitized products may overlook competitive conditions in the primary market.