公司治理结构特征与困境公司恢复——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

目前学者们对公司财务困境的研究主要集中在事前的困境预测上,而对公司陷入财务困境后如何恢复研究较少。本文选取2005—2009年国内被ST的上市公司为研究样本,将研究样本分为逐渐走出财务困境的公司（一类公司）和一直处于财务困境中的公司（二类公司）,从董事会特征、股权结构以及管理层持股这三个方面来比较分析这两类公司在陷入财务困境之后的公司治理结构差异对困境恢复的影响。研究结果表明,公司处于不同的财务情况下,大股东们对公司绩效的影响是不一样的。当公司逐渐陷入财务困境的过程中,大股东们对公司绩效没有显著性的影响;而在公司逐渐摆脱财务的过程中,大股东们对公司绩效有显著的正面影响,此时的公司治理关键在于股权集中度,大股东在公司摆脱财务困境中起到了重要作用。     

国有产权、政府干预与财务困境成本

本文以2000～2006年发生财务困境的480个观测数据为样本,检验国有产权与政府干预如何影响财务困境成本。我们以经行业中位数调整后的正常期间资产报酬率与困境期间资产报酬率的差额度量财务困境成本,检验发现:地区政府干预程度越高,公司财务困境成本越低;在政府干预程度较高的地区,国有公司的财务困境成本显著更低;但在政府干预程度较低的地区,国有产权对财务困境成本无显著影响。     

我国上市公司财务困境与公司治理的相关性分析

从1988年Morck,Shleifer和Vishny发现公司治理能够对公司绩效产生深远的影响之后,很多学者便致力于该领域的研究,并且大量的研究发现公司治理会对财务困境的出现产生影响。为了探寻财务困境与公司治理之关系,本文试图通过对比判断财务困境公司与非困境公司在公司治理方面是否存在明显差异,进而分析公司治理对财务困境的影响,最终有针对性地提出避免公司陷入财务困境的治理建议。     

ST上市公司与非ST上市公司财务困境问题比较研究——基于公司治理视角

公司财务困境是当前学术界和实务界极为关注的重大课题,本文通过对国内外研究学者对财务困境成本影响因素问题的概述,将上市公司被ST作为上市公司陷入财务困境的标志,同时将上市公司财务困境成本定义为权益市场价值的下降。针对ST样本公司选取了45家未被ST的公司作为配对样本,通过配对样本T检验和回归分析,得出以下结论:ST公司与配对样本之间的股权结构指标和董事会特征指标之间存在差异。股权集中度与财务困境成本呈负相关;董事会会议频率与财务困境成本呈负相关;独立董事所占比例与财务困境成本呈正相关。最后根据所得实证结果就上市公司陷入财务困境前如何积极防范、陷入财务困境后如何合理应对提出相关的政策建议。     

ST上市公司与非ST上市公司财务困境问题比较研究——基于公司治理视角

公司财务困境是当前学术界和实务界极为关注的重大课题,本文通过对国内外研究学者对财务困境成本影响因素问题的概述。将上市公司被ST作为上市公司陷入财务困境的标志,同时将上市公司财务困境成本定义为权益市场价值的下降。针对ST样本公司选取了45家未被ST的公司作为配对样本,通过配对样本T检验和回归分析,得出以下结论：ST公司与配对样本之间的股权结构指标和董事会特征指标之间存在差异。股权集中度与财务困境成本呈负相关;董事会会议频率与财务困境成本呈负相关;独立董事所占比例与财务困境成本呈正相关。最后根据所得实证结果就上市公司陷入财务困境前如何积极防范、陷入财务困境后如何合理应对提出相关的政策建议。     

青海省上市公司公司治理结构与财务绩效

上市公司的公司治理结构与财务绩效一直是证券市场的热点讨论话题。许多国内学者的相关理论研究,对公司治理结构,财务绩效评价,及公司治理结构与财务绩效相关关系分别进行研究。对很多学者研究的股权结构、董事会规模、董事长与总经理兼任、董事持股比例、独立董事比例、机构投资者比例、高管持股比例、高管薪酬因素等公司治理变量对企业绩效的影响进行分析研究,以及将公司治理的诸多影响因素整合成一个综合指数来代表公司治理水平进行的研究进行分析等。本文围绕青海省上市公司的公司治理结构对财务绩效的影响的实证结果,从制度和理论的视角解释,提出优化上市公司治理结构,提高上市公司财务绩效的建议措施。     

保险企业社会责任与财务绩效——基于寿险与产险公司的差异性分析

本文以我国2009~2014年54家保险公司的动态面板数据为依据,利用系统GMM估计方法,分析保险企业社会责任与财务绩效之间的相互关系。研究结果表明:保险企业履行社会责任和提高财务绩效之间存在正相关关系,二者相互促进、互相影响,但是寿险公司和产险公司存在明显差异。产险公司滞后一期的社会责任对当期财务绩效有显著正向影响,滞后一期的财务绩效对当期社会责任有显著正向影响;而寿险公司社会责任与财务绩效之间的正相关关系不存在滞后性。分析表明,这种差异是由寿险和产险行业销售模式以及产品性质的不同所致。建议保险企业重视并积极履行社会责任,监管部门规范保险企业社会责任的信息披露。     

财务独立董事的公司绩效研究

本文系统回顾了国外关于财务专家与公司绩效之间关系的研究成果，并以我国上市公司2004～2006年的经验数据为样本，在对财务独立董事分类评分的基础上，分析了不同类型的财务独立董事与公司绩效之间的关系。结果表明：会计专家型财务独立董事和金融型财务独立董事能够显著地促进公司绩效，而会计型财务独立董事和监管型财务独立董事与公司绩效并无相关性。     

社会责任、公司治理与财务绩效关系研究--以制造业上市公司为例北大核心

文章以2011-2013年沪深A股制造业上市公司为例,对社会责任、公司治理与财务绩效的关系进行实证研究。结果表明:公司财务绩效对社会责任的反应具有时滞性;股权集中度与短期财务绩效不相关,但与长期财务绩效负相关;独立董事比例与短期财务绩效负相关但与长期财务绩效正相关;高管激励与财务绩效正相关;同时,公司治理会调节增强社会责任与财务绩效的相关性,但社会责任对调节公司治理与财务绩效之间关系的作用较弱。     

提高公司绩效管理水平的思考

市场竞争加剧,企业面临更大的挑战。在激烈的市场竞争下,通过有效的绩效管理提升公司的经济效益成为值得研究的话题。本文阐述了财务对于公司绩效管理的重要意义;分析了提高公司绩效管理水平的建议措施,以求通过合理的建议措施为公司的绩效管理提供参考借鉴,促进企业的健康发展与运营。     

Agency Problems,Equity Ownership,and Corporate Diversification

We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.     

Corporate Governance,Political Connections,and Intra‐Industry Effects: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China

This paper investigates intra‐industry spillover effects of corporate scandals in China. We demonstrate how a contagion effect spreads to peer firms depending upon the quality of corporate governance and their political connections. Good corporate governance in peer firms reduces the contagion effect of scandals. External governance has a stronger influence on reducing the contagion effect of both financial and non‐financial scandals, while ownership concentration and the quality of auditors play a more pronounced role in mitigating the contagion effect of financial scandals. State ownership helps to mitigate the negative influence of non‐financial scandals in individual‐owned firms, but not in state‐owned enterprises.     

Corporate governance quality and financial leverage: Evidence from China

This study explores the ways of how corporate governance quality affects firms' financial leverage using a panel sample of non-financial listed firms in China during 2000–2018. Empirical results indicate that improved corporate governance quality has a robust and negative effect on financial leverage for the full sample and subsample by ownership, industry, scale, etc. This negative effect is mediated by corporate internal and equity financing. Furthermore, in terms of the corporate performance, we show that financial leverage significantly reduces financial performance, especially during the economic downturn, and it could be offset by the improved corporate governance quality.     

How Theories of Financial Intermediation and Corporate Risk-Management Influence Bank Risk-Taking Behavior

This paper examines the rationales for risk-taking and risk-management behavior from both a corporate finance and a banking perspective. After combining the theoretical insights from the corporate finance and banking literatures related to hedging and risk-taking, the paper reviews empirical tests based on these theories to determine which of these theories are best supported by the data. Managerial incentives are the most consistently supported rationale for describing how banks manage risk. In particular, moderate/high levels of equity ownership reduce bank risk while positive amounts of stock option grants increase bank risk-taking behavior. The review of empirical tests in the banking literature also suggests that financial intermediaries coordinate different aspects of risk (e.g., credit and interest rate risk) in order to maintain a certain level of total risk. The empirical results indicate hedgeable risks such as interest rate risk represent only one dimension of the risk-management problem. This implies empirical tests of the theories of corporate risk-management need to consider individual sub-components of total risk and the bank's ability to trade these risks in a competitive financial market. This finding is consistent with the reality that banks have non-zero expected financial distress costs and bank managers cannot fully diversify their bank-related personal investments.     

Corporate social responsibility performance,financial distress and firm life cycle: evidence from Australia

This study examines the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and financial distress and additionally the moderating impact of firm life cycle stages on that association. Based on a sample of 651 publicly listed Australian firm‐years’ data covering the 2007–2013 period, our regression results show that positive CSR activity significantly reduces financial distress of the firm. In addition, the negative association between positive CSR performance and financial distress is more pronounced for firms in mature life cycle stages. Our results are robust to alternative proxy measures of financial distress, CSR performance and life cycle stages.     

Corporate bond pricing and ownership heterogeneity

We examine how heterogeneity in institutional equity ownership affects bondholders. Firms with larger short-term (long-term) institutional ownership are associated with higher (lower) future bond yield spreads. The adverse effect of short-term ownership on bond pricing is driven by issuing firms that have larger financial distress risk and larger equity volatility. The favorable effect of long-term ownership appears to be more systematic. Further, this bond pricing effect is stronger in cases where shareholder rights are relatively weak. Finally, the effect of short (long) horizons is driven by concentrated (diffused) institutional holdings.     

Corporate Insurance and Debt: The Case of China*

Finance theorists have long argued that corporate purchases of property insurance can reduce the probability and hence the expected costs of financial distress. And by so doing, the corporate use of insurance can reduce borrowing costs and/ or increase debt capacity, reduce the overall cost of capital, and increase firm value. This article attempts to apply this argument to the case of publicly traded companies in China, which provides a particularly interesting environment given the significant presence of both foreign direct investment and state shareholdings in its corporate sector. From their study of several hundred Chinese companies during the period 1997‐2003, the authors report the following conclusions: Companies with higher borrower costs tend to purchase more property insurance, which in turn has the effect of increasing their debt capacity. Smaller companies are more likely than larger firms both to insure their assets and to purchase more property insurance (as a percentage of assets), reflecting their greater vulnerability to financial shocks and larger potential benefit from insurers' real advisory services (such as loss prevention advice). Companies with more and larger growth opportunities are more likely to purchase insurance, reflecting their higher expected costs of financial distress (from possible underinvestment) than firms with limited growth opportunities. Companies with higher levels of state ownership tend to insure their assets to a greater extent, suggesting that the managers of such companies insure to protect their job security, particularly as the availability of state subsidies to the Chinese corporate sector has declined since market reforms were initiated in 1978.     

Financial distress,corporate control,and management turnover

We empirically investigate the effect of financial distress on corporate ownership and control. Our analysis is based on a panel of 267 German firms that suffered from repeated interest coverage shortfalls between 1996 and 2004. We track each firm’s development over the distress cycle with particular attention to corporate ownership, restructuring, and management turnover. We find a significant decrease in ownership concentration. Private investors gradually give up their dominating role and thereby cease to be an effective source of managerial control. By contrast, ownership representation by banks and outside investors almost doubles. Shareholdings by executive and non-executive directors also substantially increase but have no effect on managerial tenure. Forced management turnover is mostly initiated by outside investors and banks and often occurs subsequent to debt restructurings, block investments, and takeovers.     

Corporate Pyramids,Conservatism and Cost of Debt: Evidence From Taiwan

This study investigates the extent to which the span of corporate pyramids (as measured by the number of ownership layers) is associated with higher agency costs of debt, and whether conservatism can moderate the agency cost. Consistent with corporate pyramids generating higher agency costs and information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside creditors, we find a positive association between the number of investment layers and cost of debt. However, we also find that multi-layered firms mitigate organizational opaqueness through increased financial reporting conservatism, which results in lower cost of debt capital. These findings provide new insights into the relationship between organizational structure and financial reporting quality.     

卖空与创新:A股公司融券试点的证据

本文依托中国A股市场2010年开始实施的融券试点,在通过多时点双重差分和倾向得分匹配等计量方法控制内生性的基础上,实证检验了卖空对上市公司创新行为的促进作用.结果 表明:(1)加入融券标的后,卖空公司的创新数量和创新质量都有显著提高;(2)对于金融市场欠发达、治理水平较差的公司,这种作用更明显;(3)在使用融券余额作为卖空势力的测度并用ETF基金持股比例作为工具变量进一步控制内生性以后,以上结论仍然成立.卖空有助于降低创新企业的信息不对称性和加强对经理人的薪酬激励,进而促进了企业的创新.因此,取消卖空限制将有助于中国企业的创新和资本市场的健康稳定发展.