Leverage and Taxes: Evidence from the Real Estate Industry

Finance theory has long viewed corporate income taxes as a potentially important determinant of corporate financing decisions and capital structures. But finance academics have been unable to provide convincing empirical evidence of a material effect of taxes on corporate leverage, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for marginal corporate tax rates, and hence for the tax benefits of debt, for large samples of individual companies. The authors address this by analyzing leverage decisions in an industry whose publicly traded entities are organized either as taxable corporations, or as real estate investment trusts (REITs) that effectively avoid entity level taxation. This enables them to measure the relative tax benefits of debt with greater precision while controlling for important nontax characteristics that affect debt usage. The tax hypothesis predicts that for real estate firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Both the nontaxable and the taxable real estate firms in our sample routinely have more than twice the leverage of industrial firms, which suggests that factors other than taxes are contributing to their use of debt. But among real estate firms, tax status appears to play a much weaker role. Taxable firms have significantly more leverage only after 2000, when restrictions on REITs were removed through new regulations that made their operations much more like those of taxable real estate firms. Our findings also depend on real estate characteristics—most notably, only residential real estate firms demonstrated differences that are consistent with the tax hypothesis. Taken together, the authors’ findings suggest that although taxes do seem to matter, their role is clearly secondary relative to factors such as the nature of the firm’s assets. A generous interpretation of our evidence puts the effect of taxes between one‐third and one‐half of that implied by prior research.     

How Entrenchment, Incentives and Governance Influence REIT Capital Structure

Although recent literature has confirmed the importance of viewing a firm??s capital structure choices of leverage and debt maturity as jointly determined, to date there has been little analysis of the importance of traditional governance variables on a firm??s capital structure decisions using a simultaneous equations approach. We examine the influence of managerial incentives, traditional managerial monitoring mechanisms and managerial entrenchment on the capital structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Using panel data, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for leverage and maturity and find that firms with entrenched CEOs use less leverage and shorter maturity debt. This is consistent with the expectation that managers acting in their own self interest will choose lower leverage to reduce liquidity risk and use short maturity debt to preserve their ability to enhance their compensation and reputations by empire building. We also find evidence that traditional alignment mechanisms such as equity and option ownership have an offsetting effect; and that firms where the founder serves as CEO choose higher leverage and longer maturity debt. The results also provide evidence that leverage and maturity are substitutes, firms with high profitability and growth opportunities use less leverage and firms with liquid assets use more leverage and longer maturity debt.     

Decomposing industry leverage: The special cases of real estate investment trusts and technology & hardware companies

Different industries exhibit significantly different leverage; companies in the real estate investment trust (REIT) and technology/hardware sectors are extreme examples. In the United States, the leverage ratio is twice as high for REITs (50%) as compared to non-real-estate firms (around 25%), and the technology/hardware sector has the lowest ratio (around 17%). We theoretically and empirically analyze their differences. By decomposing the difference into three channels, we find that the industry-specific channel explains around 67% for REITs and 68% for technology/hardware firms; the value-based channel is mostly responsible for the remaining portion. Taking the nonlinear influences of extreme values into account, the relevance of the industry-specific channel is considerably reduced.     

Liquidity dynamics across public and private markets

In this paper we investigate cross-asset liquidity between equity markets and REITs and between REITs and private real estate markets. While many studies have investigated REIT liquidity, and there is an emerging interest in liquidity in the private real estate markets, there appears to be little knowledge of the dynamics of cross-market liquidity. We find lower levels of liquidity for REITs compared to a set of control firms matched on size and book-to-market ratios. Commonality in liquidity is also lower for REITs than the controls and the overall market. However, we do find an important difference in share turnover for REITs, which appears to have a higher level of commonality than found in other studies. We suggest that this may be due to the financial crisis. Additionally we find evidence of similar time-series variation in liquidity for public and private real estate markets. We also find significant directional causality for most liquidity proxies from the public to private real estate markets. Finally our results show that there is strong contemporaneous correlation between both public and private real estate market liquidity and the term spread and real investment and consumption spending. REIT liquidity measures based on intraday data also appear to contain important information not found in measures constructed from daily returns.     

Capital Structure and Political Risk in Asia-Pacific Real Estate Markets

This study investigates the determinants of capital structure decisions by real estate firms, with a specific focus on the impact of political risk on leverage. Using a sample of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property trusts, we find those firms with properties located in countries characterized by relatively high degrees of political risk, such as political instability, and/or greater uncertainty in the ability to repatriate and monetize profits from international investment activities, employ less debt than their counterparts operating in more politically stable environments. This core finding remains robust to alternative sample selection criteria including the division of the sample into high versus low market-to-book value firms, and also holds within the subset of organizations that are active in raising additional capital in the secondary markets.     

The determinants of debt maturity in Australian firms

We examine the determinants of debt maturity in the Australian capital market with the Top 400 firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 1989–2006. We find that Australian firms not only exhibit a positive leverage–maturity relationship but also use short‐term debt to signal their high quality to the market. Our results are robust to different estimation methods that control for endogeneity and error‐dependence. We also find that ignoring the interaction between leverage and maturity can lead to erroneous conclusions about the support for the matching principle, the agency costs hypothesis and the transaction costs hypothesis.     

The value of control: Evidence from full and partial acquisitions in the real estate industry

We investigate the differential wealth effects of (1) full and partial control acquisitions, (2) nonreal estate, real estate and REIT participants, and (3) single- and multiple-bidder events. We find that target firms earn positive excess returns at the announcement of partial and full acquisitions, but acquisitions that result in control earn larger excess returns than noncontrol acquisitions. An examination of industry differences shows that real estate firms or REITs do not earn higher returns relative to nonreal estate firms. Our analysis of market structure finds that bidders that are not involved in an acquisition program earn greater announcement period returns than prior acquirers. For target firms, we find that those with a single offer earn higher returns than those with subsequent offers. A cross-sectional regression analysis shows that while market structure is important in explaining returns, the main determining factor for target firms is the degree of control sought.     

The joint determinants of cash holdings and debt maturity: the case for financial constraints

We examine the joint choices of cash holdings and debt maturity for a large sample of firms for the 1985–2013 period. We find that there is a positive relation between debt maturity and cash holdings. Our results hold after taking into account endogeneity among leverage, debt maturity, and cash holding. We posit that this positive relationship will be found among firms facing financial constraints and we find support for this hypothesis. Our results are robust after we control for agency problems, international taxation, bank loan liquidity covenants and default risk.     

Return Relationships between Listed Banks and Real Estate Firms: Evidence from Seven Asian Economies

This paper studies the return relationships between listed banks and real estate firms in seven Asian economies before and after the Asian financial crisis. We find that listed banks were exposed to real estate risk both before and after the crisis, but that the exposure increased in the post-crisis period. After the crisis, the hidden risk of real estate collateral in the bank lending process was explicit, as was evidenced by the increased sensitivity and the structure break. In terms of causality, the returns of listed real estate firms are found to Granger-cause the returns of listed banks. However, there is mixed evidence as to whether listed bank returns Granger-cause the returns of listed real estate firms. The study is significant because it indicates the importance of lending policies in relation to the real estate market in establishing a healthy financial system.     

Size effects and economies of scale in European real estate companies

This study investigates scale economies in European real estate companies. We examine the effects of size on revenue, expense, profitability ratios and capital costs using panel data regression. We find that larger real estate companies in Europe are able to generate higher revenue per unit of company size, incur lower costs and produce higher returns. Net Operating Income ratios and return ratios increase while Selling, General and Administrative expense ratios decrease with the size of a company. However, we do not find evidence that larger companies have lower cost of debt or lower weighted average cost of capital. From our analysis, it is evident that particularly small firms can reap substantial economies of scale as they grow. However, the benefits of further growth tend to be much more modest for larger companies. Given REITs are on average larger than comparable non-REITs this may explain why REITs have lower economies of scale in expenses and revenues than Non-REIT real estate companies.     

On the Hybrid Nature of REITs

The consensus that emerges from the current research on the linkage between securitized and direct investment in real estate is that direct (private) real estate returns play a relatively minor role in the real estate investment trust (REIT) return generating process. However, this result may at least partially be due to the coarseness of the measures of direct real estate returns or the relatively short return horizons used in previous studies. This study takes a different and unique perspective. Unlike earlier studies we do not use aggregated, average appraisal based returns on direct real estate investment. Instead, we use the MIT TBI indexes, which are transaction based price indexes, available both on the aggregate and sub-index levels. We find that the relation between REIT and direct real estate returns appears to be stronger at longer horizons. More specifically, using a cointegration framework, we find robust evidence that REITs and the underlying real estate are related and that they share a long run equilibrium. Interestingly, we find that both REITs and direct real estate returns adjust towards this long run relationship. When we examine property type level data we find similar results.     

Advisor Choice in Asia-Pacific Property Markets

This paper examines advisor choice decisions by publicly traded REITs and listed property companies in Asia-Pacific real estate markets. Using a sample of 168 firms, we find robust evidence that firms strategically evaluate and compare the increased agency costs associated with external advisement against the potential benefits associated with collocating decision rights with location specific soft information. Our empirical results reveal real estate companies tend to hire external advisors when they invest in countries: 1) that are more economically and politically unstable, 2) whose legal system is based on civil law, 3) where the level of corruption is perceived to be high, and 4) when disclosure is relatively poor. Additionally, we find the probability of retaining an external advisor is directly related to the expected agency costs. Lastly, we find evidence of return premiums in excess of 13 % for firms whose organizational structure matches their investment profile. As such, we conclude that the decision to hire an external advisor represents a value relevant trade-off between the costs and benefits of this organizational arrangement.     

Macroeconomic control, political costs and earnings management: Evidence from Chinese listed real estate companies

Firms in China have faced high political costs during China’s economic transition, because they are affected by macroeconomic policies. However, research to date has offered no consistent conclusions on the relationship between political costs and earnings management in China. This study tests whether real estate firms attempt to decrease earnings during periods of macroeconomic control, using variables related to the national real estate market as proxies for political costs. We find that political costs are negatively related to earnings management in listed real estate firms. In addition, we find that non-state-owned enterprises utilized more income-decreasing accruals during this period. Our results are consistent with the political costs hypothesis.     

Investment opportunities and share repurchases

We examine the over-investment motivation for share repurchases using a sample of 139 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) between 1996 and 2010. By combining a REIT's property portfolio data with project ROAs from the underlying real estate market, we are able to create a unique measure of the firm's investment opportunity set. Controlling for other possible buyback rationales, we find that poor investment opportunities are related to higher levels of share repurchases. Conditioning on investment opportunities, we find that the level of cash is positively related to repurchases only for low investment opportunity set firms. We also find a negative relationship between share repurchase announcement returns and investment opportunities.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure and Intragroup Loans on Leverage: Evidence from Family Firms in Chile

This article examines the effects of family control and pyramidal ownership on firms’ capital structure decisions. After studying a sample of listed family and nonfamily firms in Chile, we find that families take a conservative approach to debt and financial risk exposure. We test the hypothesis that family firms restrict the use of debt in order to avoid the monitoring role of creditors, which could limit their enjoyment of the private benefits of control. In keeping with this hypothesis, we find a U-shaped relationship between leverage and the degree of pyramidal ownership that is more pronounced among family firms than nonfamily firms. We do not find any evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that family-controlled firms have low leverage ratios due to their access to internal capital markets. In fact, conversely, we find that listed family firms provide more loans to related companies than comparable nonfamily firms.     

Do REITs use cash reserves efficiently? Evidence from corporate acquisitions

We examine the combined impact of corporate governance and excess cash holdings on the propensity of firms to become bidders and engage in value destroying acquisitions. We focus on the REIT market, due to its unique characteristics caused by regulation and the nature of the industry. The lack of active real estate takeover market should lead to entrenchment and exacerbate agency costs. However, given the mandatory high cash payout for REITs, the absence of takeover market should not cause concerns to shareholders. Our analyses reveal that unlike conventional firms, cash-rich REITs are not more likely to become acquirers and acquisitions by cash-rich REITs are not value decreasing. However, similarly to industrial firms, REITs with higher excess cash and lower insider ownership are more likely to become bidders. We interpret our results to be consistent with the hypothesis that agency problems are less severe in real estate and investors are not averse to use of excess cash by REIT managers on intra-industry acquisitions.     

On the Capital Structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

Much of the literature on capital structure excludes Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) due mainly to the unique regulatory environment of these firms. As such, the issue of how REITs choose among different financing options when they raise external capital is largely unexplored. In this paper, we explore two issues on the capital structure of REITs: is there a relationship between market-to-book and leverage ratios, and, is the relationship between market-to-book and leverage ratio temporary or persistent. Our results suggest that REITs with historically high market-to-book ratio tend to have persistently high leverage ratio. In essence, REITs with high growth opportunity and high market valuation raise funds through debt issues. This finding, which is robust to various specifications and econometric tests, is contrary to the financing decisions of non-regulated firms. We attribute it to the special regulatory environment of REITs where, despite no apparent benefits to debt financing, management issues debt. Comments from Robert Edelstein and others at the Maastricht–Cambridge 2005 Symposium, and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are our own.     

The Effect of Legal Environment and Regulatory Structure on Performance: Cross-Country Evidence from REITs

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - We study the relationship between international REIT regulatory structures and real estate returns and find that the legal requirements that REITs...     

Capital Structure Determinants in Real Estate Limited Partnerships

This paper models the capital structure decision facing partnerships and tests the implications using panel-data regression analysis for a sample of real estate limited partnerships. The model shows that if an optimal capital structure exists for non-taxed firms, it is a function of personal tax effects, costs of financial distress, and substitute tax shields. The empirical tests indicate a positive relationship between leverage and the proportion of real estate assets held, and a negative relationship between leverage and both growth rates and non-debt tax shields. Furthermore, the findings suggest that changes resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are positively related to partnership leverage.     

REIT Characteristics and the Sensitivity of REIT Returns

Previous research on the returns to real estate investment trusts (REITs) has considered whether REITs are systematically exposed to general stock-market risk and interest-rate risk. This study examines how the sensitivity of REIT returns to these factors may be influenced by various REIT characteristics. Using a sample of publicly traded REITs, we estimate the sensitivity of REIT returns to stock market and interest-rate changes. We then propose and implement a model for testing whether differences in asset structure, financial leverage, management strategy, and degree of specialization in the REIT portfolios are related to their sensitivity to interest rate and market risk. Our results permit us to offer some inferences about how REITs can alter their risk exposure by managing these characteristics.