Are IPOs really overpriced?

Purnanandam and Swaminathan [Purnanandam, A., Swaminathan, B. 2004. Are IPOs really underpriced? Review of Financial Studies, 17, 811–848.] find that IPOs are overvalued at the offer price relative to value metrics based on industry peer price multiples. I discuss some possible problems in their valuation methodology and find that IPOs are not overvalued after steps are taken to address the problems. More importantly, when I examine the long-run performance of IPO firms and their industry peers, I find that IPOs do not underperform their industry peers in the 5 years after IPO. This casts doubt to the argument that IPOs are overvalued.     

How Do Underwriters Select Peers When Valuing IPOs?

Valuing initial public offerings (IPOs) using multiples allows underwriters discretion when selecting comparable firms. We find that they systematically exclude candidate comparable firms that make a given IPO appear overvalued. On average, comparable firms published in official prospectuses have 13%‐38% higher valuation multiples than those obtained from matching algorithms or selected by sell‐side analysts, including the same underwriter's analyst after the IPO. Even if IPOs are priced at a discount as compared to peers selected by the underwriters, they are still at a premium with regard to alternatively selected peers. Greater bias in the underwriter's selection of peers leads to poorer long run performance.     

The Certification Role of Large Customers in the New Issues Market

This paper examines the certification role of large customers and finds that IPO firms that have product market relationships with large customers experience higher valuation and better long-term performance compared to IPOs without such relationships. This higher valuation is more pronounced when product market relationships are able to alleviate IPO uncertainties, when the businesses of large customers and their IPO suppliers are closely related in downstream markets, and when large customers have stronger certifying abilities. Finally, we find that large customers realize significant positive abnormal returns around their suppliers’ preliminary prospectus filing dates, suggesting that some of the benefits from product market relationships accrue to large customers.     

Is there useful information in the ‘use of proceeds’ disclosures in IPO prospectuses?

This study contributes evidence on the valuation relevance of the ‘use of proceeds’ disclosure in the initial public offering (IPO) prospectus. This article develops a classification of ‘use of proceeds’ disclosures that aims to capture information embedded in the disclosures relating to the purpose (growth, production, financing) and amount committed to specific assets. These measures are then related to IPO underpricing, survival prediction and expected and realised prospects of the IPOs. The results suggest the ‘use of proceeds’ disclosure categories have incremental information over other sources of information for underpricing, for predicting firm survival and in the case of some disclosure categories, for investors’ evaluation of the firms’ prospects and risks in the early years after listing.     

Earnings management and IPO anomalies in China

This paper empirically examines the impact of earnings management and investor sentiment on IPO anomalies using a sample of 506 Chinese IPOs issued over the 1998–2003 period. We develop a parsimonious pricing model in which both the offer price and the short-term aftermarket price are influenced by the use of earnings management, and show that the offer price can be below the fair price while the short-term equilibrium price in the aftermarket can be overvalued due to investor sentiment. Consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, the empirical results reveal a positive relation between the initial return and managed accruals and a negative relation between the long-term stock performance and the initial return. Earnings management appears to generate a pattern where the initial price following an IPO tends to be inflated by overreaction in the secondary market but adjusts to its fundamental level in the long run. These findings are robust across a variety of test specifications.     

Are IPOs Really Underpriced?

While IPOs have been underpriced by more than 10% during thepast two decades, we find that in a sample of more than 2,000IPOs from 1980 to 1997, the median IPO was significantly overvaluedat the offer price relative to valuations based on industrypeer price multiples. This overvaluation ranges from 14% to50% depending on the peer matching criteria. Cross-sectionalregressions show that "overvalued" IPOs provide high first-dayreturns, but low long-run risk-adjusted returns. These overvaluedIPOs have lower profitability, higher accruals, and higher analystgrowth forecasts than "undervalued" IPOs. Ex post, the projectedhigh growth of overvalued IPOs fails to materialize, while theirprofitability declines from pre-IPO levels. These results suggestIPO investors are deceived by optimistic growth forecasts andpay insufficient attention to profitability in valuing IPOs.     

Valuation of Internet Stocks—An IPO Perspective

We empirically investigate valuations of Internet firms at various stages of the initial public offering (IPO) from two perspectives. First, we examine the association between the valuation of Internet IPOs and a set of financial and nonfinancial variables, which prior anecdotal or empirical evidence suggests may serve as value drivers. Second, we document differences in IPO valuations between Internet and non-Internet firms as well as across different stages in the IPO process—i.e., initial prospectus price, final offer price, and first trading day price—within each set of firms. Our primary two conclusions are as follows. First, there are noticeable differences between valuations of Internet and non-Internet firms, especially at the prospectus and final IPO stage. Specifically, the valuation of non-Internet firms generally follows the conventional wisdom regarding valuation: positive earnings and cash flows are priced, while negative earnings and negative cash flows are not. The valuation of Internet firms, however, departs from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced, and negative cash flows being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments. This difference between the two classes of firms may be expected, given the age and unique nature of the Internet industry. Second, there are significant differences between the initial valuation of firms at the prospectus and IPO stage and their valuation by the stock market at the end of the first trading day. For non-Internet firms, the difference is largely ascribed to the relative offering size. For Internet firms, however, the differences are with respect to positive cash flows, sales growth, R&D, and high-risk warnings, in addition to the relative offering size.     

The Long Run Share Price Performance of Malaysian Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)

Abstract:  This paper investigates the long run share price performance of 454 Malaysian IPOs during the period 1990 to 2000. In contrast with developed markets, significant over performance is found for equally-weighted event time CARs and buy-and-hold returns using two market benchmarks, though not for value-weighted returns or using a matched company benchmark. The significant abnormal performance also disappears under the calendar-time approach using the Fama-French (1993) three factor model. While the long run performance of Main and Second Board IPOs does not differ, the year of listing, issue proceeds and initial returns are found to be performance-related.     

Non‐GAAP Earnings Disclosure in Loss Firms

This study examines the incremental information in loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures relative to GAAP earnings. Using a large sample obtained through textual analysis and hand‐collection, we posit and find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings exclusions offset the low informativeness of GAAP losses for forecasting and valuation. Loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings are highly predictive of future performance and are valued by investors, while the expenses excluded from GAAP earnings are not. Additional tests suggest that loss firms disclosing non‐GAAP profits have significantly better future performance than GAAP‐only loss firms and are not overvalued by investors. Comparing non‐GAAP earnings of profitable firms to those of loss firms, we find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP metrics are significantly more predictive and less strategic. We conclude that non‐GAAP earnings disclosures are particularly informative about loss firms and help investors disaggregate losses into components that have differential implications for forecasting and valuation.     

The underpricing of gold mining initial public offerings

This study is motivated by How [How, J., 2000. The initial and long run performances of mining IPOs in Australia. Aust. J. Manage. 25, 95-118] who examined 100 Australian gold mining initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1979 to 1990 to report an average 119.51% underpricing return by those IPOs. This study updates that analysis by investigating 114 Australian gold mining IPOs from 1994 to 2004 and finds a significantly lower 13.3% average first day return. Options offered to underwriters can in part explain these returns as can the change in either the Gold Index or the All Ordinaries Index from the date of the prospectus to the date of listing.     

Lockup and Voluntary Earnings Forecast Disclosure in IPOs

We examine the relation between lockup length and voluntary earnings forecast disclosures for IPOs in Singapore. Unlike firms in the United States, companies in Singapore are allowed to provide earnings forecasts in their IPO prospectuses. We find that forecasters are more likely to accept longer lockup periods, so that the lockup expires after the first post-IPO earnings announcement. Our study also shows that because the lockup agreement removes personal incentives to issue aggressive forecasts, IPO firms tend to issue conservative forecasts. Overall, our results suggest that the lockup mechanism adds credibility to the earnings forecast given in the IPO prospectus.     

IPO pricing: growth rates implied in offer prices

This paper studies the valuation of companies going public and defines a methodology to infer the growth expectations implicit in the prices of their Initial Public Offering (IPO). The proposed reverse-engineered DCF model is operable by individual investors, as it does not require access to private information or sell-side analysts’ forecasts. Applying the procedure to a sample of IPOs in three European countries (France, Italy, and Germany), we estimate the cash flow growth implied by offer prices and examine the bias of implied growth in comparison to the realized. We find that the estimated growth in cash flow is much higher than its actual realization, with the median IPO firm overvalued at the offering by 74%. Estimation errors increase with IPO firms’ leverage and underpricing, and decrease with age, size, and book-to-market ratios. Further tests find that post-IPO stock returns are lower for issues whose implied growth is more upward biased.     

Offer pricing of Australian industrial initial public offers

In the present paper we examine the setting of offer prices for Australian industrial initial public offers (IPOs) by fixed price offers. Our investigation focuses on the associations between offer prices and both market prices and accounting based measures of intrinsic value. Fixed‐price offers are less likely to be influenced by the canvassing of market demand when compared to the US setting, where book‐builds are typically used. We conclude that while Australian industrial IPOs are underpriced, they are not systematically undervalued. Contrary to research undertaken by Purnanandam and Swaminathan in the US book‐build setting, we do not conclude that Australian IPOs are systematically overvalued. As part of our analysis, we develop an empirical model of offer prices based on interviews with several leading Australian stockbrokers involved in setting them. Finally, using the ratio of offer price to intrinsic value measure, we find some evidence that undervaluation is positively related to underpricing.     

The Effects of Ambiguous Information on Initial and Subsequent IPO Returns

Newly public companies must disclose significant risk factors in the offering prospectus. These disclosures are examples of “soft” or ambiguous information. Ambiguity models predict that investors will alter their portfolio weights and react to subsequent signals about such information. We test for these effects in a sample of 1,398 initial public offerings (IPOs) using word count ratios between soft and hard information as measures of ambiguity. We find a significant relationship between the soft information on risk and both initial and ex post measures of returns. These results support the view that soft information embeds ambiguity and that it influences investors’ portfolio choices.     

Issuer Operating Performance and IPO Price Formation

We study the relation between issuer operating performance and initial public offering (IPO) price formation from the initial price range to the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day. For a post‐bubble sample of 2001–2013 IPOs, we find that pre‐IPO net income and, in particular, operating cash flow are strongly, positively associated with the revision from the mid‐point of the initial price range to the offer price and that the “partial adjustment phenomenon” concentrates among issuers with the strongest operating performance. As for why publicly observable information helps predict changes in valuation from when the initial price range is set to when the offer price is set, our findings suggest that strong‐performing issuers, especially those offering small slices of ownership, have lower bargaining incentives and are susceptible to the underwriter(s) low‐balling the price range. Overall, our results suggest an important role for accounting information in understanding the pricing of book‐built IPOs and are consistent with the presence of agency problems between issuers and underwriters.        

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Measuring the market response to going concern modifications: the importance of disclosure timing</Emphasis>

Auditor going concern modifications (GCMs) are intended to provide market participants with information related to financial distress, and prior research suggests that the disclosure of a GCM elicits a substantial negative market reaction from investors. In this study, we investigate the market reaction to GCMs in a contemporary disclosure regime and consider whether the observed market reaction is confounded by other material disclosures. We find that the majority of GCMs are issued concurrently with earnings announcements (EAs) and that EAs in the year of new GCMs elicit large negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). We also find that CARs surrounding GCMs are significantly more negative when GCMs are disclosed with EAs versus following EAs. We then evaluate whether GCMs convey distress that is incremental to EA disclosures by measuring i) the market reaction to GCMs disclosed following EAs, and ii) whether EA CARs are substantially more negative for companies disclosing GCMs with EAs as opposed to after EAs. In both cases, we find that the incremental market response to GCMs is statistically weak and much smaller in economic magnitude than is suggested by prior research. Finally, we find that management disclosures in EAs, rather than the presence of a GCM, appear to convey information that investors use to anticipate bankruptcy. Taken together, these findings suggest that GCMs are confounded by other significant disclosures and that the informational benefits of GCM reporting are significantly smaller than previously thought.     

Determinants of corporate tone in an initial public offering: Powerful CEOs versus well-functioning boards

Recent literature on initial public offerings (IPOs) suggests a significant effect of tone in IPO underpricing but ignores its determinants. This study concentrates on the factors that shape the tone of the information disclosed in IPOs. Sampling 211 Latin American IPOs during the period 2000–2019, we find empirical evidence that a powerful CEO can influence tone, avoiding unfavorable tone and fostering the use of positive words in the information disclosed to the market. We also show that more independent boards tend to use more unfavorable tones. Additionally, we find a non-monotonic relationship between board size and the tone in the prospectus, which suggests that an optimal board size mitigates the excessive use of positive tone and leads to more unfavorable tones in the IPO prospectus. Overall, well-functioning boards counterbalance powerful CEOs and generate more realistic disclosure to the market. Finally, we find that market-dominant auditors, age of the issuing firm, proposed use of proceeds, and the number of risk factors significantly affect the tone in the information disclosed.     

Performance of Malaysian IPOs: Underwriters reputation and management earnings forecasts

This paper examines the financial performance of Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs) during the period 1980–1995. The major focus of the study is on the role of management earnings forecasts and underwriters in the valuation of IPOs. The results suggest extremely high and statistically significant initial premiums and positive and statistically significant long-term returns up to 3 years after listing. The findings for long-term returns contradict the consensus of the IPO literature that documents a significant negative long-term performance. Our results indicate a negative association of upward bias in management earnings forecasts with IPOs' performance during the first 12 months after the IPOs.     

The Really Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The Pre-Nasdaq Evidence

Financial economists have intensely debated the performance of IPOs using data after the formation of Nasdaq. This paper sheds light on this controversy by undertaking a large, out‐of‐sample study: We examine the performance for five years after listing of 3,661 U.S. IPOs from 1935 to 1972. The sample displays some underperformance when event‐time buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns are used. The underperformance disappears, however, when cumulative abnormal returns are utilized. A calendar‐time analysis shows that over the entire period, IPOs return as much as the market. The intercepts in CAPM and Fama–French regressions are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting no abnormal performance.