Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity

We examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and synchronicity in bank equity returns over the years 2000–2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis. As expected, investments in opaque assets are more profitable than investments in transparent assets, and taking profitability into account, have larger valuation discounts relative to transparent assets. The valuation discounts on opaque asset investments decline over the 2000–2006 period only to be followed by a sharp reversal in 2007. The decline is coincident with a rise in bank equity share prices, decrease in transparent asset holdings by banks, and greater return synchronicity – evidence consistent with a feedback effect.     

Did the financial crisis affect the market valuation of large systemic U.S. banks?

We examine the impact of the financial crisis on the stock market valuation of large and systemic U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). Using the Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016) model of fundamental valuation of bank equity, we provide evidence that the financial crisis has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank characteristics. In particular, before, during, and after the crisis, investors in large and systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, albeit temporarily. Both before and after the crisis, they reward size in the short run. This pattern is appearing only briefly during the crisis. We also show that bank opacity plays no role in market valuation either in the short run or in the long run. Last but not least, we find evidence that stress testing has been informative to the market and that those BHCs that failed at the post-crisis stress tests were not subsequently valued differently by the market.     

Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions: Small Business Loan Supply before and during the Financial Crisis

We estimate a structural model of bank portfolio lending and find that the typical U.S. community bank reduced its business lending during the global financial crisis. The decline in business credit was driven by increased risk overhang effects (consistent with a reduction in the liquidity of assets held on bank balance sheets) and by reduced loan supply elasticities suggestive of credit rationing (consistent with an increase in lender risk aversion). Nevertheless, we identify a group of strategically focused relationship banks that made and maintained higher levels of business loans during the crisis.     

Two Different Ways of Treating Corporate Cash in FCF Valuations—and the Importance of Getting the Cost of Capital Right

The methods for calculating free cash flow presented in texts on financial statement analysis and valuation appear to be very different from those in corporate finance texts, causing some confusion among academics as well as practitioners. Financial statement analysis and valuation texts generally begin by valuing just the enterprise operations—that is, the entity that engages in the firm's primary revenue‐generating activities—and then adding back the value of its cash holdings and other financial assets. The corporate finance approach is typically to value all the assets together, including financial assets that are not used in the production of the goods and services provided by the firm. Using a simple example, the authors show that the valuation of the equity ownership of the firm should be the same for both methods of calculating free cash flow, provided the analyst makes the appropriate adjustments to the method for calculating the cost of capital (WACC) used to discount forecasted free cash flows to a present value.     

Policy uncertainty and bank’s funding costs: The effects of the financial crisis,Covid-19 pandemic,and market discipline

This paper examines the impacts of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on bank funding costs using the 2001–2021 data of US banks. We document consistent evidence of a negative relationship between EPU and bank funding costs, implying lower bank funding costs during a time of high EPU, consistent with the hypothesis that economic agents tend to reallocate their assets into safer investments, such as bank deposits during high uncertainty. Large banks are likely to benefit most during high EPU when experiencing lower costs of funds compared with other banks, suggesting the “too-big-to-fail” perception of depositors. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that depositors require safer banks to pay lower rates, indicating the existence of market discipline. The cost-decreasing effects of policy uncertainty are less pronounced during the global financial crisis than the Covid-19 crisis.     

Financial crisis,shareholder protection and cash holdings

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between shareholder protection and corporate cash holdings under the impact of the global financial crisis. With a sample of 192,807 observations across 40 countries during the period 2002–2015, I find that the global financial crisis mitigates the controlling effect of shareholder protection on corporate cash holdings. In addition, this mitigating role is stronger in financially constrained firms. Overall, the results suggest that managers are more likely to expropriate shareholders through corporate liquidity policy during a financial crisis.     

Collateralization,leverage, and stressed expected loss

We describe a general equilibrium model with a banking system in which the deposit bank collects deposits from households and the merchant bank provides funds to firms. The merchant bank borrows collateralized short-term funds from the deposit bank. In an economic downturn, as the value of collateral decreases, the merchant bank must sell assets on short notice, reinforcing the crisis, and defaults if its cash buffer is insufficient. The deposit bank suffers from losses because of the depreciated assets. If the value of the deposit bank's assets is insufficient to cover deposits, it also defaults. Deposits are insured by the government, with a premium paid by the deposit bank equal to its expected loss on the deposits. We define the bank's capital shortfall in the crisis as the expected loss on deposits under stress. We calibrate the model on the U.S. economy and show how this measure of stressed expected loss behaves for different calibrations of the model. A 40% decline of the securities market would induce a loss of 12.5% in the ex-ante value of deposits.     

The fading stock market response to announcements of bank bailouts

We analyze the effects on bank valuation of government policies aimed at shoring up banks’ financial conditions during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Governments injected into troubled institutions massive amounts of fresh capital and/or guaranteed bank assets and liabilities. We employ event study methodology to estimate the impact of government-intervention announcements on bank valuation. Using traditional approaches, announcements directed at the banking system as a whole were associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns, whereas announcements directed at specific banks with negative ones. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that individual institutions were reluctant to seek public assistance. However, when we correct standard errors for bank-and-time effects, virtually all announcement impacts vanish in Europe, whereas they weaken in the United States. The policy implication is that the large public commitments were either not credible or deemed inadequate relative to the underlying financial difficulties of banks.     

Bank connections,corporate investment and crisis

Against the backdrop of a severe financial crisis and extensive restructuring of the financial sector, we investigate the evolution and determinants of connections between firms and banks, and the impact of bank connections on corporate investment. Our study examines Thai non-financial companies during 1995–2000, a period straddling the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. Before the crisis, bank-connections are common and associated with significantly lower sensitivity of corporate investment to internal cash flow. After the crisis, and following substantial changes in bank ownership and governance due to financial-sector reforms and restructuring, far fewer firms are bank-connected and connections no longer affect investment–cash flow sensitivity.     

Deposit insurance around the world: A comprehensive analysis and database

This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.     

Loan loss provisions and return predictability: A dynamic perspective

This paper examines the impact of loan loss provisions (LLPs) on return predictability during 1994–2017. We find that on average, LLPs are negatively associated with one year ahead stock returns. This effect is particularly significant during the global financial crisis but much weaker during the Basel II and III periods. Consistent with these findings, a long–short trading strategy based on LLPs generates positive abnormal returns during the Basel II and III periods but negative abnormal returns during the financial crisis. Cross-sectional tests show that this effect is more pronounced among banks with greater information asymmetry. Decomposition of LLPs suggests that these findings are driven mainly by nondiscretionary LLPs. Overall, our results suggest that the relationship between LLPs and future stock returns is not linear but contingent on bank regulations and macroeconomic conditions.     

影子银行与金融危机

本文认为,此次全球金融危机的根源在于回购市场挤提引起的银行恐慌。机构投资者是回购市场的需求者,他们向影子银行"存款",影子银行则以资产抵押支持证券保证"存款"的安全。当证券化资产的折价率大幅提高时,就出现了回购市场挤提,引起银行恐慌,从而导致了此次全球金融危机。     

Liquidity crisis,relationship lending and corporate finance

This paper investigates the consequences of the liquidity shocks in wholesale funding markets during the 2007–2009 financial crisis on bank lending and corporate financing. We show that banks that relied more heavily on wholesale funding contracted lending more severely than banks that relied more on insured deposits. We then examine the effects of loan contraction on the financial positions of publicly traded firms. We find that both during and after the crisis, the change in leverage of bank-dependent firms is less than that of firms with access to public debt markets. In addition, bank-dependent firms rely more on cash than net equity issuance to finance operations. We also find that firms with established bank lending relationships weather the crisis better. Such firms are able to attain higher levels of leverage during the crisis, add to their cash holdings, secure new bank credit, and achieve higher profitability as a result.     

Bank exposure to market fear

We find that increases in implied market volatility (a proxy for market fear) have a significant impact on returns of bank stocks, above and beyond systematic risk proxied by the expected excess market return during a bad economic regime. Large bank returns are favorably affected by increases in implied market volatility during the crisis, while small banks are adversely affected by increases in implied market volatility. We attribute the different effects among the size-categorized bank portfolios to the perception that large banks are protected by too-big-to-fail policies. Within the sample of small banks, the adverse share price response to increased implied market volatility is more pronounced for banks that rely more heavily on non-traditional sources of funds, use a high proportion of loans in their assets, have a higher level of non-performing assets, and have a relatively low provision for loan losses. The adverse effect of negative innovations in implied market volatility on small bank returns during the crisis is primarily driven by exposure of their loan portfolio to weak economic conditions.     

Stronger Risk Controls,Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies

We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). The U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.     

Bank Diversification and Overall Financial Strength: International Evidence

There are many studies in the finance and management literature that examine the impact of diversification on performance. Yet, the literature remains inconclusive as for the potential benefits in terms of risk and return. The present study aims to re‐examine this issue, while proposing a methodological framework that integrates various bank performance and risk indicators into a single measure of financial strength. Using an international sample of commercial banks, we find that diversification in terms of income, earning assets, and on‐ and off‐balance sheet activities influences positively their financial strength. We also find that income diversification can be more beneficial for banks operating in less developed countries compared to banks in advanced and major advanced economies. However, we observe the opposite in the case of diversification between off‐balance sheet and on‐balance sheet activities. Furthermore, the results reveal that income and earning assets diversification can mitigate the adverse effect of the financial crisis on bank financial strength. We continue to find a positive relationship between diversification and financial strength when we account for nesting effects, endogeneity, as well as when using an alternative approach for the construction of the financial strength indicator.     

Value-at-risk and the cross section of emerging market hedge fund returns

This paper examines the cross-sectional relationship between downside risk (Value at Risk) and expected returns in a sample of 1370 emerging market hedge funds (EMHF). We find that downside risk significantly drives expected returns for these funds, particularly before the global financial crisis, commanding an annual risk premium of over 12%. While EMHF differ from their advanced market counterparts in risk/return patterns, we show that the global financial crisis of 2008 has caused a structural shift in that pattern. Finally, we show that the risk premium associated with downside risk is predictable by the global financial cycle, even after we control for emerging market systematic risk factors.     

Economic shock,owner-manager incentives,and corporate restructuring: Evidence from the financial crisis in Korea

We examine how owner-managers incentives and firm-specific measures of corporate governance affect restructuring decisions during an economy-wide shock. Using a large sample of Korean firms that had experienced a severe financial crisis during 1997–1998, we find that the likelihood of restructuring is negatively related to the divergence of cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders, and that the announcements of restructuring by chaebol firms with such divergence are greeted more negatively by investors. However, firm-specific measures of corporate governance such as total debt, bank loans, and equity ownership by unaffiliated financial institutions mitigate these negative effects, thereby influencing firms to choose value-maximizing restructuring policies. Our results suggest that the controlling shareholders' incentives to expropriate other investors are high during an economic shock. Our results also highlight the importance of corporate governance in mitigating such expropriation incentives, and provide important implications for the role of corporate governance during an economic shock, such as the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.     

How did a domestic housing slump turn into a global financial crisis?

The global financial crisis clearly started with problems in the U.S. sub-prime sector and spread across the world from there. But was the direct exposure of foreigners to the U.S. financial system a key driver of the crisis, or did other factors account for its rapid contagion across the world? To answer this question, we assessed whether countries that held large amounts of U.S. mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and were highly dependent on dollar funding experienced a greater degree of financial distress during the crisis. We found little evidence of such direct spillovers from the United States to abroad. Although CDS spreads generally rose higher and bank stocks generally fell lower in countries with more exposure to U.S. MBS and greater dollar funding needs, these correlations were not robust, and they fail to explain the lion’s share of the deterioration in asset prices that took place during the crisis. Accordingly, less tangible channels of contagion may have played a more important role in the global spread of the crisis: a generalized run on global financial institutions, given the opacity of their balance sheets; excessive dependence on short-term funding; vicious cycles of mark-to-market losses driving fire sales of MBS; the realization that financial firms around the world were pursuing similar (flawed) business models; and global swings in risk aversion. The U.S. sub-prime crisis, rather than being a fundamental driver of the global crisis, may have been merely a trigger for a global bank run and for disillusionment with a risky business model that already had spread around the world.     

Is Country Diversification better than Industry Diversification?

In this paper, we develop a framework in which one can examine the source of industry and country diversification by examining their underlying return components. We find that the global cash flow factor explains on average 39% of the variation of country cash flows and global discount rates explain 55% of the variation of country discount rates. These are much less than the explanatory power of the two factors over industry cash flow and discount rate variations, which are 72% and 78% respectively. This suggests that global factors are much less important for return components at country level than at the industry level. As a result, both better diversification of expected returns and cash flows across countries determine the larger benefits of country diversification versus industry diversification. Moreover, emerging markets tend to have much smaller co‐movements of both dividends and expected returns with those of the world, suggesting a lower degree of integration with the world goods and financial markets. Our results cast doubt on the prevailing wisdom that country diversification should be replaced by industry diversification.