Asymmetric Volume‐Return Relation and Concentrated Trading in LIFFE Futures

This study demonstrates that intraday volume and return on LIFFE interest rate and currency futures exhibit an asymmetric volume‐return relationship characterised by significantly larger volume associated with negative returns than with non‐negative returns. This finding is unlike the stylised asymmetric relation often observed in equity markets, where the volume on price rise is larger than the volume on price decline. The asymmetric relationship in LIFFE futures is also found to be dynamic as the direction of asymmetry can reverse during the day. It has been argued in the past that a costly short sale restriction that requires a higher transaction cost on a short position than on a long position is responsible for the asymmetric effect in equity markets. Since such a restriction is absent in futures markets, they should not exhibit any asymmetric volume behaviour. Based on the results of this research, the costly short sale hypothesis is rejected. An alternative explanation of the asymmetric relation observed in futures is presented based on recent information models that take into consideration asymmetrically‐informed traders, their dispersion of beliefs, quality and quantity of the information signal, and how the traders process it. The paper also confirms a strong U‐shape trading pattern in 15‐minute volume, but no such pattern is identified in intraday returns.     

Competition among Trading Venues: Information and Trading on Electronic Communications Networks

This paper explores the competition between two trading venues, Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) and Nasdaq market makers. ECNs offer the advantages of anonymity and speed of execution, which attract informed traders. Thus, trades are more likely to occur on ECNs when information asymmetry is greater and when trading volume and stock‐return volatility are high. ECN trades have greater permanent price impacts and more private information is revealed through ECN trades than though market‐maker trades. However, ECN trades have higher ex ante trading costs because market makers can preference or internalize the less informed trades and offer them better executions.     

Are the Insider Trades of a Large Institutional Investor Informed?

We use a unique data set to consider whether a large institution's (Fidelity funds) insider trades are informed. Theoretical studies of large informed traders suggest that their information advantage could be greater for buy trades than sell trades, be short‐ or long‐lived, and be exploited by varying the pace of trade execution. Although there is evidence of each of these, Fidelity seems to be informed only for quickly executed buy trades. Other trades outperform a stock market index but not a four‐factor return model. This performance profile is consistent with Fidelity's fees, which depend on performance compared to an index.     

Trade Size Preference of Informed Traders in Indian Equity Markets

This study utilized high frequency transactions data to analyze the trade size preference of informed traders in Indian equity markets. It is observed that informed traders at an aggregate level adopt stealth trading strategy, wherein they prefer medium sized trades over large sized trades in order to camouflage their private information. However, the stealth trading behavior varies across stocks, wherein informed traders prefer more large sized trades on firms that are part of an index compared to non-index firms. Trading behavior also varies across other market conditions. It has been noted that informed traders prefer large sized trades during periods of high market thickness, negative returns, and low volatility. This study also provides a rationale for such varied behavior of informed traders.     

Price Movers on the Stock Exchange of Thailand: Evidence from a Fully Automated Order‐Driven Market

This study examines which trade sizes move stock prices on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), a pure limit order market, over two distinct market conditions of bull and bear. Using intraday data, the study finds that large‐sized trades (i.e., those larger than the 75th percentile) account for a disproportionately large impact on changes in traded and quoted prices. The finding remains even after it has been subjected to a battery of robustness checks. In contrast, the results of studies conducted in the United States show that informed traders employ trade sizes falling between the 40th and 95th percentiles ( Barclay and Warner, 1993 ; Chakravarty, 2001 ). Our results support the hypothesis that informed traders in a pure limit order market, such as the SET, where there are no market makers, also use larger‐size trades than those employed by informed traders in the United States.     

VPIN,liquidity, and return volatility in the U.S. equity markets

We examine the volume-synchronized probability of informed trading metric (the VPIN flow toxicity metric, developed by Easley, Lopez de Prado, & O'Hara, 2012) as a real-time risk management tool for liquidity deteriorations in the U.S. equity markets. We find that VPIN provides information about market liquidity and stock return volatility on ex-ante basis. These results indicate that VPIN can be a useful risk-management tool for market makers, regulators and traders in the U.S. equity markets. We also document that VPIN is negatively associated with volume and number of trades, but positively associated with trade size and volume fragmentation. These findings suggest that VPIN indicates the adverse selection problem of liquidity providers by capturing the information in volume.     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

Anonymity,Stealth Trading,and the Information Content of Broker Identity

This paper examines whether the identity of a broker involved in transactions contains information. Using a sample of transactions from the Australian Stock Exchange—where broker identity is transparent—we provide evidence that consecutive buyer‐/seller‐initiated transactions by the same broker have a relatively high permanent price impact. This implies that broker identity conveys information to market participants, and that markets in which broker identity is disclosed are likely to be more efficient. We also find that medium‐sized trades by the same broker convey greater information than large and small trades, which is consistent with stealth trading by informed investors.     

Information flow between the stock and option markets: Where do informed traders trade?

This paper investigates the flow of information between the equity and options markets. We argue that informed traders, in deciding where to place their trades, are not entirely indifferent to option moneyness, degree of information asymmetry, and option liquidity. Unlike some previous studies that find information to flow unilaterally from equity to options markets, we control for the above factors and discover feedback relations between trades in out-of-the-money (OTM) options and the underlying equities. The finding is consistent with the pooling equilibrium hypothesis, which asserts that informed traders trade in both the equity and options markets. Some informed traders are probably attracted to the out-of-the money options because of their higher liquidity, lower premiums, and higher delta-to-premium ratios, hence, lending support to the liquidity and leverage hypothesis.     

Strategic trading in the wrong direction by a large institutional insider

Many theoretical papers suggest that large informed traders should make misleading or random trades to disguise their trading. Alternatively, informed traders may trade purely on their estimate of stock value. This paper examines the trading behavior of a large institutional insider that periodically trades in the wrong direction, i.e., makes occasional sell (buy) trades within packages of buy (sell) trades. Using a hand-collected data set, we find that three quarters of the trade packages include wrong-direction trades. Wrong trades appear to be used mostly to disguise right-direction trades. We find that the wrong-trade stocks are larger and have less noisy returns, hence, they lack natural disguise. Wrong trades are relatively small, used to accentuate return volatility, distributed evenly during a package of trades, and are not consistently profitable.     

INTRADAY STEALTH TRADING: WHICH TRADES MOVE PRICES DURING PERIODS OF HIGH VOLUME?

Research documents a U-shaped intraday pattern of returns. We examine which trade sizes drive the U-shaped pattern and find that intraday price changes from larger trades exhibit a U-shaped pattern whereas price changes from smaller trades show a reverse U-shaped pattern. We argue that price changes from smaller trades are higher during the middle of the day because informed investors break up their trades to disguise their information when intraday volume is low. Price changes from larger trades are likely higher at the beginning and end of the day because high volume allows informed investors to increase their trade size without revealing their information to the market.     

On the sources of private information in FX markets

We investigate the source of information advantage in inter-dealer FX trading using data on trades and counter-party identities. In liquid dollar exchange rates, information is concentrated among dealers that trade most frequently and specialize their activity in a particular rate. In cross-rates, traders that engage in triangular arbitrage are best informed. Better-informed traders are also located on larger trading floors. In cross-rates, the ability to forecast flows explains all of the advantage of the triangular arbitrageurs. In liquid dollar rates, specialist traders can forecast both order-flow and the component of exchange rate changes that is uncorrelated with flow.     

The Dynamics of Security Trades,Quote Revisions,and Market Depths for Actively Traded Stocks

We examine the dynamics of return volatility, trading volume, and depth—in an intraday setting for a sample of actively traded NYSE and NASDAQ stocks. We show that depth is a useful intervening variable and mitigates the impact of trading activity on price volatility. Furthermore, depth is affected by the perception of prevailing information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders. We demonstrate empirically that the NYSE supplies greater depth under conditions of high, perceived information asymmetry as compared to NASDAQ. NASDAQ makes up for this deficiency by its capability of managing large volume shocks without a major decline in depth.JEL Classification: C32, D82, G10     

Decimals And Liquidity: A Study Of The Nyse

Using a carefully constructed matched sample of control (nondecimal) stocks, we isolate the effects of decimalization for a sample of NYSE‐listed common stocks trading in decimals. We find that the quoted depth as well as the quoted and effective bid‐ask spreads declined significantly following decimalization. Additionally, both the number of trades and trading volume declined significantly. Stock return volatilities display an initial increase but a decline over the longer term, probably as traders become more comfortable in their new milieu.     

Audit quality and information asymmetry between traders

In this study, we investigate the association between audit quality and information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders. We employ three proxies for information asymmetry – absolute price differences, absolute volatility differences, and absolute differences in the long/short ratio of trades – between US stock and options markets and represent audit quality through the appointment of Big n and industry specialist auditors. For a sample of 4062 firm‐years between 2002 to 2005, our results indicate that the appointment of Big n and industry specialist auditors is associated with lower information asymmetry measures. Our results are consistent with audit quality playing a role in the quality of financial reporting information and flowing through to the allocation of information among traders.     

TRADE SIZE AND INFORMED TRADING: WHICH TRADES ARE “BIG”?

We find adverse‐selection spread components increase sharply in the ratio of trade size to quoted depth, and spike when trade size equals quoted depth. We find that two previously documented and prominent indicators of informed trading, raw trade size and high‐trading volume half‐hours, offer almost no explanatory power for informed trading measures beyond trade size to quoted depth, and a third indicator, time of day, offers no explanatory power among trades with high trade size to quoted depth. Our results suggest trade size to quoted depth is perhaps the single most important indicator that a trade is informed.     

Multimarket trading and market liquidity

When a security trades at multiple locations simultaneously,an informed trader has several avenues in which to exploit hisprivate information. The greater the proportion of liquiditytrading by 'large' traders who can split their trades acrossmarkets, the larger is the correlation between volume in differentmarkets and the smaller is the informativeness of prices. Weshow that one of the markets emerges as the dominant locationfor trading in that security. When informed traders can usetheir information for more than one trading period, the timelyrelease of price information by market informed traders expectto make subsequently at other locations. Markets makers, competingto offer the lowest cost of trading at their location, consequentlydeter informal trading by voluntarily making the price informationpublic and by 'cracking down' on insider trading.     

HOURLY RETURNS,VOLUME, TRADE SIZE,AND NUMBER OF TRADES

Previous research identifies a causal relationship between returns and trading volume. But volume has two components: number of trades and number of shares per trade. In this paper the relationship between each of these volume components and returns is examined and the number of trades is found to be the dominant component. Results show that return activity in a period is associated with the level of trading frequency in a subsequent period and also with the number of shares in a subsequent period. This is consistent with small traders reacting to returns while professional traders largely ignore previous returns in their trading.     

Stealth trading: The case of the Tokyo Stock Exchange

The stealth trading hypothesis asserts that informed traders trade strategically by breaking up their orders so as to more easily hide among the liquidity traders. Using data for the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), a pure order-driven market, we find evidence that price changes are driven by small- and medium-size trades, with small trades making the greatest contribution to price change relative to their contribution to trading volume. We also find that large trades explain a greater portion of the cumulative price change on high volatility days. Hence, our results support the stealth trading hypothesis for the TSE.     

Informed Trading Around Earnings Announcements: Another Look

This study is an empirical test of the Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) multimarket sequential trade model of stock and option markets. We employ two approaches to determine the information content of signed stock and option trades executed around quarterly earnings announcements. The first approach expands the vector autoregression (VAR) technique of Hasbrouck (1991a) to include signed option trade volumes and inter‐trade durations. Estimates from the VAR models provide insight into whether both equity and option trades are viewed as informative by the equity specialist. The second approach focuses on the information content of the earnings releases to determine whether signed equity and option trades executed prior to the announcements are informed. Results indicate that although informed traders prefer to transact in both markets around earnings announcements, option market transactions contain no incremental information.