网络强度、组织冗余与创新模式——对200家样本企业问卷调研数据的实证检验

通过社会网络带来资源冗余进而对创新选择产生影响，这一机制已成为当今企业可持续发展的重要路径。运用200份企业样本调研数据，对网络强度、不同类型组织冗余及两种创新模式进行实证检验，结果发现，网络强度显著正向直接影响利用式创新和探索式创新;网络强度还通过正向影响未吸收冗余对两种创新产生正向间接影响作用;未吸收冗余与创新模式间具有显著正向影响关系,而吸收冗余在三者影响路径关系中检验结果不显著，可能是受企业自身因素或条件影响所致。最后，根据研究结论提出3点重要管理启示。     

高技术企业多元化战略对创新持续性的影响——动态能力的调节作用

基于资源基础理论和持续创新内生机制，利用435家高技术企业2010—2018年面板数据，对多元化战略对高技术企业创新持续性的影响进行探究。结果表明，产品多元化与创新持续性呈正U型关系，技术多元化对创新持续性具有正向促进作用，产品多元化与技术多元化协同效应对创新持续性具有负向影响；动态能力强化了产品多元化与创新持续性之间的正U型关系，并正向调节技术多元化与创新持续性之间的关系。在动态能力调节作用下，高技术企业产品多元化与技术多元化协同效应对创新持续性具有正向影响。     

川西北高原藏区农村贫困化分异机制探测

[目的]客观揭示农村贫困化地域分异机制,为科学推进川西北高原藏区精准扶贫创新途径、综合战略和认真贯彻落实中央治藏方略提供参考依据。[方法]应用地理探测器模型、GIS空间分析与地统计方法等方法,探测川西北高原藏区贫困村单位面积GDP分异的主导因素,揭示农村贫困化分异机制,提出不同贫困化地域类型的扶贫政策措施。[结果]影响川西北高原藏区农村贫困化分异的主导因素包括到主要交通道路距离、归一化植被指数(NDVI)、土地利用、年均温度和海拔高程等,各因素对贫困村经济发展分异的解释力分别为80. 76%、12. 82%、8. 82%、5. 45%和3. 96%;贫困村经济发展贫困化的分异机制存在明显差异,可归纳为交通区位约束型、自然环境约束型和经济区位约束型等三大类型;农村贫困化驱动机制下的贫困村精准扶贫政策措施亟需因地制宜、科学推进、讲求实效,有序推进精准扶贫战略。[结论]精准扶贫应分类指导、重点突破,尤其加强贫困村交通、水利、公共基础设施建设和特色农牧业产业培植,注重多种扶贫模式的综合集成。     

粤港澳大湾区创新生态系统内部耦合时空演化及空间收敛分析

在构建以国内大循环为主体、国内国际双循环相互促进的新发展格局下，高效协同的区域创新体系有助于将粤港澳大湾区三地建设成为具有全球影响力的科技创新中心。通过构建创新生态系统综合评价指标体系，采用耦合协调模型和空间计量模型，实证检验大湾区10个城市2007-2019年创新生态系统内部耦合协调水平、时空跃迁特征以及收敛性。研究发现，大湾区整体及各城市耦合协调度呈上升趋势，基本实现从失调衰退区到协调过渡区的转化，具体可划分为4个等级层次；大湾区创新生态系统协调耦合度存在显著的绝对β与条件β收敛趋势，即最终收敛于同一稳态水平，且城市间差距逐渐缩小。其中，经济发展水平、对外交流水平、人力资本水平对创新生态系统协调耦合度起显著正向作用。     

Online marketing: When to offer a refund for advanced sales

Advance selling is a marketing strategy commonly used by online retailers to increase sales by exploiting consumer valuation uncertainty. Recently, some online retailers have started to allow refunds on products sold in advance. On the one hand this reduces the net advance sales, but on the other hand it allows a higher advance sales price. This research is the first to explore the overall effect of allowing a refund on profits from advance sales, identifying conditions where advance selling with or without refunds (or no advance selling at all) is best. We analytically compare the profits of three advance selling strategies: none, without refund, and with refund. We show that selling in advance and allowing a refund is optimal for products with a relatively small profit margin and small strategic market size, and that the added profit can be considerable. Our results guide managers in selecting the right advance selling strategy. To facilitate this, we graphically display, based on the two dimensions of regular profit margin and strategic market size, under what conditions the different strategies are optimal.     

How do successful scholars get their best research ideas? An exploration

We interview 24 marketing professors to ask how they got the ideas for 64 of their papers. More than three-quarters of the papers were inspired by holes in the literature, by a “stylized fact” that the current literature cannot explain, or by an interaction with a manager. The rest fall into several smaller categories that to a large extent can be seen as special cases of the three big ones. We describe how papers from each of the three big categories help move the literature forward. We also illustrate the range of situations contained in each category by way of several examples. Among the authors we interview, most do not use a single source. As these authors become more senior, managerial contacts play an increasing role, while the balance between literature and stylized facts appears to be unchanged.

     

The effect of shared auditors in the supply chain on cost stickiness

Do supply chain audits have real effects?We focus on the effect of shared auditors in the supply chain on corporate cost stickiness.When a supplier shares audit...     

The impact of innovation on companies’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions: evidence from China

Quality & Quantity - This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of companies’ current innovation capability on cross-border M&A initiation decisions by providing...     

The evolution of competition in innovation resource: a theoretical study based on Lotka–Volterra model

This research uses the Lotka–Volterra model to analyse the competition of innovation resource between two enterprises and studies the dynamic effects of environmental changes through the change of model parameters. The research finds that there are three possible results of the competition in innovation resource. That comprises ‘crowding out effect’, ‘unstable equilibrium’ and ‘stable equilibrium’. The results of competitive evolution are determined by enterprises’ interaction parameters. However, the natural growth rates, the initial resource possessions of both enterprises and the amount of regional innovation resource have a significant impact on the evolution of competition.     

How Has Takeover Competition Changed Over Time?

Since the boom in takeovers in the 1980s, research in both law and financial economics has debated the role of takeover impediments such as poison pills, staggered boards, and state antitakeover laws. Have these impediments entrenched target management to the detriment of shareholders? Or have they increased the bargaining power of target boards of directors and left shareholders, if not better off, then at least unharmed? In their study published recently in the Journal of Corporate Finance, the authors provide new answers to these questions with a detailed analysis of takeover competition during the period 1981 through 2014. Using a random sample of 388 completed and withdrawn deals from this 34‐year period, the authors begin by confirming the already well‐documented increase in the use of takeover impediments over time. They then report evidence that takeover competition has not declined during this period. First of all, takeover premiums—the average percentage over market paid by acquirers to consummate transactions—have remained steady over time. Second, and the most striking of the authors' findings, is that the corporate auction process has “gone underground” since the 1980s. Although we now see fewer hostile attempts and publicly reported takeover bidding contests, the amount of competition for targets has remained largely unchanged when one takes account of “private” as well as public auctions—that is, contests that, as the authors discovered, included unidentified bidders. The authors view such a fundamental change in the takeover auction process as a response to the widespread growth of takeover impediments. In this sense, as Bill Schwert commented years ago, “hostile takeovers are less about shirking target management than about the bargaining tactics of targets and bidders.” Or as the authors put it, “the greater bargaining power provided by state laws and other takeover impediments has changed the manner in which takeover auctions are conducted,” but without greatly affecting the goal of economic efficiency that such transactions are designed to help bring about.