关于表见代理制度之私法理论分析

依照大陆法系民法,代理制度为私法自治之扩张或补充,本应当尊重本人(被代理人)的意思,考虑本人的利益。但随着社会发展,交易安全越来越受到重视,本文通过对现行表见代理制度的简介和评析论证表见代理制度在面对本人利益和相对人信赖利益所作的优先保护相对信赖利益的价值选择的正确性。并通过表见代理成立后,本人、代理人、相对人三方利益关系的分析,提出应责代理人承担惩罚性赔偿责任的观点来弥补本人在为保护交易安全中所做的牺牲,以平衡本人、代理人、相对人三方的利益,维护表见代理制度。     

论缔约过失责任损害赔偿范围

缔约过失责任损害赔偿既包括信赖利益的损失,也包括固有利益的损失.损害赔偿范围因受害方的损害类型不同而不同:固有利益的损害应当全额赔偿;其他损害仅限于信赖利益,且信赖利益不得超过履行利益,并限定在当事人可预见的范围之内.     

缔约过失责任的赔偿范围的文献综述

从刚开始的信赖利益的损失到之后的既包括信赖利益损失也包括固有利益的损失，缔约过失责任的损害赔偿范围经过了一个不断的发展变化过程。为了清晰了解这一变化过程以及缔约过失责任的具体赔偿范围，本文对学者们的有关观点和德国、我国台湾的立法例进行归纳、综述和总结。     

论缔约过失责任中信赖利益赔偿范围

信赖利益，是指在缔约的过程中，缔约一方因合理信赖合同成立或生效而受到损害的固有财产利益和机会利益。现学界一般将信赖利益的赔偿范围分为财产上损害以及非财产上损害两种。但笔者认为只包括前者，赔偿范围不宜过于扩大；对于后者，通过侵权责任来实现对受害人的救济更为充分、合理。     

独立审计责任规则探析

通过对信息不对称、外部性、有效预防与有效信赖的研究,从效率的角度提出独立审计责任规则的矛盾之处在于安排审计代理人对投资者损失承担责任会削弱对投资者的激励,而安排审计代理人逃避责任则会削弱对审计代理人的激励,并认为法律界以及公众与会计界分歧的焦点是如何区分与安排会计、审计和投资者的责任.     

浅论缔约过失责任与违约责任的区分

缔约过失责任不属于合同责任,它与违约责任是两种性质不同的民事责任。在我国没有统一民法典的情况下,为了保护缔约当事人从开始接触、磋商到合同签订及履行完毕的全过程中的信赖利益、履行利益,在立法技术上将这两种责任制度统一规制在合同法中。在我国,由于民事经济案件常常要涉及缔约过失责任和违约责任的问题,因此,准确区分缔约过失责任与违约责任对于充分保护当事人的合法权益、正确处理民事纠纷,具有重要意义。     

缔约过失责任探析

缔约过失责任是指缔约人在缔约过程中故意或过失地违反先合同义务，而致另一方的信赖利益遭受损失，依法应承担的民事责任。先合同义务始于要约生效，终于合同生效。缔约过失责任是以诚实信用原则为基础的民事责任。有过错的缔约一方应当赔偿另一方由于信赖合同成立而造成的利益损失。     

浅析合同法缔约过失责任

缔约过失责任是在订立合同过程中缔约一方当事人因违反诚实信用原则所应承担的先合同义务造成另一方当事人信赖利益的损失时所应承担的民事赔偿责任。从缔约过失责任的理论基础入手，对缔约过失责任的适用条件及缔约过失的后果作简要分析。     

企业社会责任理论述评

企业社会责任研究一直是理论界的难点和热点.本文试图从利益相关者理论、股东价值最大化理论和可持续发展理论三方面对主要其社会责任理论进行梳理.三种理论从不同角度解释企业社会责任,各有缺陷和特点.总体上需要融合理论来企业社会责任,企业目标是股东利益最大化,必须对利益相关者承担相应的责任,最终才能实现可持续发展.     

构建社会责任基础的企业财务目标

如何构建社会责任基础的社会目标一直是财务管理领域一个重要的议题,文章首先回顾了有关社会责任和企业财务目标的相关文献并对其主要观点进行评述,然后对两者关系和中国企业社会责任履行现状进行分析,最后得出构建相关者利益最大化的社会责任目标是促进企业自身发展的最好选择.     

论未经授权电子支付损失分配规则——兼论《电子商务法》第57条的完善

《电子商务法》第57条首次构建了未经授权电子支付损失分配规则,但从2018—2021年的司法实践考察,第57条鲜有援引。对相关裁判文书的进一步分析发现,在未授权电子支付损失分配中,用户承担的风险并未因《电子商务法》的颁布而降低,反而有所增高。立法规定不足以激励电子支付服务提供者与用户谨慎交易,无法有效降低电子支付业务的社会成本。只有确立用户责任限制规则并明确责任限制事由,方能激励服务提供商与用户合力防范未授权支付风险。     

Auditor liability: A comparison of judge and juror verdicts

This research examines differences between judges and jurors in rendering liability judgments in auditor litigation cases. While any number of case contexts would allow us to contrast and compare judges and jurors, we chose one that we believed would also address a second timely issue, auditor reliance or non-reliance upon the work of others. Within the general context of litigation of an alleged audit failure, we manipulated, between-participants, external auditor reliance on the work of others (relied on outsourced work, relied on in-house internal auditors’ work or did not rely). Our results show differences in the liability assessments of judges and jurors. Judges assign more liability to auditors that rely on the work of in-house internal auditors, less liability to auditors that rely on outsourced internal auditors and the least liability to auditors that choose not to rely on the work of internal auditors (but re-perform the work themselves) while jurors assess higher liability regardless of the work done by the auditors. Mediation analyses suggests the differences found in the overall liability assessments of jurors and judges are partially driven by their divergent attitudes towards the public accounting profession with jurors’ unfavorable attitudes leading to them assign liability regardless of the work performed. Further analysis suggests juror insensitivity to our reliance manipulations may reflect a strict liability perspective (consistent with prior work by Charron and Lowe (2008)); while judges consider other factors when making liability assessments.     

Auditors' Liability, Vague Due Care, and Auditing Standards

This paper expands the set of previously considered liability rules to include a negligence liability rule with a vague specification of due care. Auditors who are negligent in conducting their audit are liable for losses that result from reliance on misstated financial statements. However, what constitutes negligence for auditors is not clearly specified in the law. Consequently, courts often resort to Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) as benchmarks for determining due care. A liability regime that consists of a vague negligence rule supports and amplifies the credibility of auditing standards. While auditing standards alleviate some of the vagueness that is inherent in the legal standard, they also form a lower bound on due care, since an audit of a quality that is lower than the quality that auditing standards require would be considered negligent. Thus, the vague specification of due care enables auditors to commit to audit quality as pronounced in auditing standards. This paper explores this link between professional standards and auditors' legal liability. It establishes that the commitment to auditing standards could not have been as credible as it is, if auditors' liability was determined based on the strict liability rule, or based on a negligence rule with a clearly specified due care, since under these two liability rules courts would not need to refer to auditing standards to establish fault. The paper also demonstrates that a legal regime where audit standards are used as a benchmark to evaluate negligence is not the same as a legal regime where due care is defined clearly. Therefore, previous studies that assumed a negligence regime with clear due care may have overstated the effort level that is induced by legal liability.     

Can compulsory liability insurance reduce agency costs? Evidence from China

This paper discusses the impact mechanism of compulsory liability insurance on agency costs. Studying the companies listed in China’s food manufacturing industries in 2011–2018, we find that compulsory liability insurance significantly reduces the two types of agency costs, namely, alleviating the principal-agent problem and the principal–principal problem. Robustness tests confirm this finding. The reduction of information asymmetry and the improvement of internal control quality are the mechanisms leading to this result. Compulsory food safety liability insurance plays a significant role in reducing agency costs when company ownership is concentrated or when media coverage is high. This paper provides empirical evidence for joint regulation by the public and private sectors, also provides theoretical reference for further optimizing food safety governance mode.     

会计师事务所虚假陈述行政法律责任研究

会计师事务所被誉为证券市场的“经济警察”,其对被审单位审计报告关系到投资者的切身利益。会计师事务所在证券市场的虚假陈述行为不仅破坏了金融市场秩序同时还会引起投资者合法权益的损害,因此《证券法》规定了会计师事务所及注册会计师虚假陈述时因承担的民事责任和行政责任。然而,在现行法?律框架之下行政责任的认定往往是民事责任的前提,就我国目前实践而言,行政责任的认定存在诸多不足,注册会计师基于其专业性及公众的合理信赖而对审计业务负有合理的注意义务,法律要求注册会计师在从事审计义务时要勤勉尽责,故细化勤勉尽责义务、完善行政责任构成要件是研究会计师事务所虚假陈述法律责任的重点。     

Behavioral dynamics of tax compliance when taxpayer assistance services are available

This research utilizes a laboratory experiment involving a large and diverse set of participants to investigate the behavioral dynamics of tax reporting in a setting where tax liability is uncertain and the tax agency makes a service available to help resolve the uncertainty. Our design varies the level of liability uncertainty, as well as the cost and quality of the information service. We find that, in the absence of an information service regime, the behavioral response to past audits, whether penalizing or not, is to report a lower tax liability. However, with an information service present (regardless of whether it is accessed), behavioral responses to past audits are no longer found. Interestingly, information service acquisition decreases modestly in response to a penalizing audit, although as the experiment progressed a larger proportion of participants were compliant, offsetting this effect. Mirroring the few experimental studies that have investigated tax liability information services, we find that providing these services has a strong and positive effect on tax compliance.     

The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard,risk neutrality,and limited liability

The analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability. We introduce a “critical ratio” that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state. The form of the contract is debt (a capped bonus) when the critical ratio is increasing (decreasing) in the state. An increasing critical ratio in the state‐space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced‐form distribution of output, which we term the “decreasing hazard rate in effort property” (DHREP). The critical ratio also yields insights into agency with adverse selection.     

Medical records: information gathering and confidentiality

This article focuses on protecting the confidentiality and privacy of workplace medical records. All employers should be concerned about the potential legal liability for unauthorized and improper disclosure of confidential employee medical data. Employers should adapt and follow a corporate policy governing the use and maintenance of confidential employee hiring, benefits, personnel and medical information. If there is any question concerning the confidentiality of records, employers should consult with legal counsel or other outside advisers.     

操纵证券交易价格行为及其治理对策

操纵证券交易价格的行为是资本市场的客观现象,不必禁止此类行为,只需将其限制在资本市场能承受的限度之内。治理证券价格操纵行为必须借助刑法;彰显其及时性、严厉性、确定性;完善前置刑法制度;基于信托责任、民事责任与行政责任等层面,构筑治理证券价格操纵行为的预防体系。