上市公司自愿性信息披露中信息偏差研究

自愿性信息披露是上市公司管理层的一种信息权力,这些权力形成了管理层的信息租金,他们经常会对自愿性信息披露进行选择,产生一定的信息偏差,利用这种非对称信息达到寻租目的,有必要对上市公司的自愿性信息披露行为进行有效的管制,提高自愿性信息披露的质量。     

中美自愿性信息披露规制比较

随着我国资本市场的发展,自愿性信息披露越来越受到人们关注,自愿性信息披露有助于解决会计信息披露供给不足的问题,提高会计信息的相关性.本文通过中美自愿性信息披露规制的比较,探讨了中国自愿性信息披露规制不足之处,并提出了相关政策措施.     

上市公司自愿性信息披露的博弈分析

本文运用博弈论分析方法,对自愿性信息披露的主体、行为策略及支付函数等进行分析,以促使会计信息资源优化配置的效用达到"帕累托最优",实现自愿性信息披露的纳什均衡.并借助于博弈分析的结论,指出改善我国自愿性信息披露有关问题的对策建议.     

上市公司自愿性信息披露研究综述

<正>上市公司的信息披露分为强制性信息披露和自愿性信息披露,据有关资料对投资者对强制性信息披露和自愿性信息披露的重视度调查所得,投资者认为强制性信息披露和自愿性信息披露的重要程度各占50%,由此可以看出,投资者越来越重视     

上市公司自愿性信息披露问题探究

随着中国证券市场的发展和经济环境的不断变化,信息使用者对会计信息披露提出了更有效、更高、更严的要求,单一强制性信息披露机制已不能充分满足资本市场发展的要求。自愿性信息披露是在原有强制性信息披露的基础上为了增加市场有效性而进行补充披露。研究中国上市公司自愿性信息披露对整个资本市场的发展与完善,有着极其重要的理论和现实意义。本文通过分析各行业自愿性信息披露存在的问题,并提出如何增强上市公司自愿披露信息的积极性和可靠性的建议与方法。     

我国上市公司自愿性信息披露行为研究

随着我国资本市场处于正在发展的阶段,信息的非对称性是资本市场中存在的一种固有现象,为了减少资本市场的信息不对称,采取信息披露措施来解决,但不能完全消除这种现象。加强自愿性披露信息的研究有助于我国上市公司自愿性披露信息的主要因素。文章的主体表现在对我过上市公司自愿性信息披露行为进行研究,包括对其的一个概括,影响因素,以及了解自愿性信息披露行为特征。     

信息披露的经济后果研究综述

公司披露的信息包括自愿性信息和强制性信息。强制性信息披露是监管部门管制的结果,而自愿性信息披露是公司自愿性向资本市场传递信息的结果,比如公司披露的社会责任报告、环境信息报告、产品信息、重大合同信息、盈余预测报告等。实际中,公司在强制性信息披露中也面临一些选择空间。     

公司治理结构对我国上市公司自愿性信息披露影响的实证研究——以信息技术行业为例

上市公司自愿性信息披露是对强制性信息披露的补充和扩展。近年来我国上市公司的自愿性信息披露已经起步,但仍存在着披露项目较少、披露质量不高等一系列问题。而公司治理各因素与自愿性信息披露之间存在着密切的联系,要从根本上推进上市公司自愿性信息披露工作,改善公司治理环境是一条有效路径,尤其是要尽快建立和完善审计委员会制度,监督上市公司按承诺时间完成有限售条件股份的上市,并不遗余力地进一步完善独立董事制度。     

房地产上市公司自愿性信息披露现状研究

本文对2012年-2013年沪市和深市的房地产行业上市公司的自愿性信息披露情况进行全样本的统计分析,对其披露现状进行详细分析和解释,进一步阐述了房地产行业上市公司自愿性信息披露中存在的问题并提出相应的对策。     

房地产上市公司自愿性信息披露现状研究

本文对2012年-2013年沪市和深市的房地产行业上市公司的自愿性信息披露情况进行全样本的统计分析,对其披露现状进行详细分析和解释,进一步阐述了房地产行业上市公司自愿性信息披露中存在的问题并提出相应的对策。     

The Information Content of Segment Disclosures: Australian Evidence

This paper investigates whether the voluntary decomposition of consolidated earnings disclosures into industry segments has information content in the sense that such disclosures better enable investors to predict earnings. The broad rationale underlying the experimental design is that if segment disclosure does enable investors to better predict earnings then residual abnormal returns (after controlling for unexpected earnings) surrounding the earnings announcements of firms providing segment disclosures should on average be significantly lower than a matched' group of firms that do not provide this type of disclosure. Using a short event window design, our results support this view.     

Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform

In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission enacted the Securities Offering Reform (Reform), which relaxes “gun‐jumping” restrictions, thereby allowing firms to more freely disclose information before equity offerings. We examine the effect of the Reform on voluntary disclosure behavior before equity offerings and the associated economic consequences. We find that firms provide significantly more preoffering disclosures after the Reform. Further, we find that these preoffering disclosures are associated with a decrease in information asymmetry and a reduction in the cost of raising equity capital. Our findings not only inform the debate on the market effect of the Reform, but also speak to the literature on the relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry by examining the effect of quasi‐exogenous changes in voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry, and thus a firm's cost of capital.     

Managerial risk-taking incentives and non-GAAP earnings disclosures

We investigate the association between risk-taking incentives provided by stock-based compensation arrangements and non-GAAP financial disclosures. Controlling for compensation to stock price sensitivity, we find that managers with higher compensation to stock volatility sensitivity (vega) are more likely to be associated with voluntary non-GAAP earnings information disclosures. In addition, higher-vega managers are found to be associated with more frequent and less opportunistic non-GAAP earnings information disclosures. Robust to alternative specifications and estimations, our findings suggest that compensation arrangements can encourage managers to make more, higher-quality voluntary non-GAAP disclosures.     

Information dissemination on intellectual capital in mergers and acquisitions: purchase price allocations,press releases and business press

In order to reduce information asymmetries in relation to a firm's current decisions and long-term strategy, firms must consistently provide information to stakeholders. This paper investigates intellectual capital (IC) information disclosed in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) provided through three different disclosure channels (voluntary press releases, related newspaper articles and subsequent mandatory corporate disclosures in the notes to the financial statements). For a sample of 215 randomly selected US and European M&As, we analyse 215 press releases, 1025 newspaper articles and 215 purchase price allocations. Our findings suggest that IC disclosure in press releases is not perceived as informative and qualitative forward-looking IC information in voluntary corporate disclosures appears to lack credibility. Moreover, we empirically demonstrate interdependencies across the three disclosure channels. The business press seems to filter IC information provided in press releases. The amount of IC disclosure in the notes to the financial statements is positively associated with prior IC disclosure in newspaper articles, but negatively associated with IC disclosure in press releases. The managements of acquirer firms appear to pay attention to news coverage and public opinion. However, both voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosures appear to substitute rather than complement each other.     

Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary Disclosures

A standard result in the voluntary disclosure literature is that when the manager's private information is a signal correlated with the firm's liquidation value, mandatory disclosures substitute for voluntary disclosures. In this paper, we assume that the manager's private information complements the mandatory disclosure and show that the content and likelihood of a voluntary disclosure depend on whether the mandatory reports contain good or bad news. This different information asymmetry produces new, testable implications regarding the probability of and market reaction to voluntary disclosures. We also show that changes in mandatory disclosure regulations can have unintended consequences due to their effects on the manager's willingness to voluntarily provide supplemental disclosures.     

The relevance of environmental disclosures: Are such disclosures incrementally informative?

Establishing the information content of transparent voluntary environmental disclosures and the source of this information content is of fundamental importance for corporate social responsibility (CSR) practitioners. Our results indicate that: (1) incremental to information provided by current Toxics Releases Inventory (TRI) data, voluntary environmental disclosures provide valuation relevant information; (2) the various disclosure categories are similar in value relevance, implying that each category is informative of management’s current environmental strategies; (3) current TRI is positively associated with cost of capital but there is no association between voluntary environmental disclosures and cost of capital; and (4) taken together, the above results point to a signaling role for such disclosures and financial performance prediction as the means by which voluntary environmental disclosures enhance firm value. This advances the literature by pinning down the source of firm value enhancement of such disclosures. Our results suggest that a proactive environmental strategy and the signaling of such a strategy to investors can enhance a firm’s stock price, a finding which will assist CSR practitioners in convincing top management that proactive environmental strategies combined with transparent voluntary environmental disclosures are worthwhile.     

Intertemporal Dynamics of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures

While empirical evidence alludes to the intertemporal nature of corporate voluntary disclosures, most of the existing theory analyzes firms' voluntary disclosure decisions within single‐period settings. Introducing a repeated, multiperiod, disclosure setting, we study the extent to which firms' strategic disclosure behavior in the past affects their prosperity to provide voluntary disclosures in the future. Our analysis demonstrates that by voluntarily disclosing private information firms make an implicit commitment to provide similar disclosures in the future, and therefore are less willing to voluntarily disclose information in the first place. This effect is expected to be of larger magnitude for firms (1) with a long history of absence of voluntary disclosures and an impressive past operating performance, or (2) that operate in a relatively stable and predictable business and information environment, or (3) whose managers have a long time horizon and a high degree of risk aversion.     

Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures: Dynamic Interactions

Firms sometimes obtain soft private information about growth prospects along with hard information about current or past performance. In this environment, we find that optimizing disclosures over multiple periods yields nonlinear stock price reactions following both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Further, we derive several predictions about distinct short‐run and long‐run effects of disclosures and nondisclosures on security prices. Under specified conditions, when the volatility of the firm's earnings increases, the average contemporaneous and prospective post‐mandatory‐disclosure market premia (for voluntary disclosures over nondisclosures) rise, while farther‐in‐future market discounts (for such voluntary disclosures) also become larger. Our analysis moreover predicts that both the disclosure probability and the information content of nondisclosures can increase in the persistence of earnings.     

CONSERVATIVE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, EQUITY VALUATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES

Previous theoretical research on voluntary disclosures has commonly viewed accounting information as a simple signalling device, for example indicating «good news» or «bad news». In this paper, voluntary disclosures are considered to provide complementary information in fundamental valuation analysis, as broadly outlined in Ohlson (1989), Brief & Lawson (1992) and Bernard (1993). The research questions are concerned with the importance of voluntary disclosures in a valuation framework of this kind and the expected content and context of such disclosures. The results imply that voluntary disclosures for typical operating companies are expected to be concerned with the prediction of net income for the next period, the long-run future development of the book return on owners» equity, and the accounting cost matching bias of owners» equity. The cost matching bias is caused by conservative valuation principles, and a specific linkage between the book return and the cost matching bias of owners» equity is recognized in the analysis.     

Ownership concentration, voluntary disclosures and information asymmetry in New Zealand

This paper investigates the impact of different classes of ownership concentration on information asymmetry conditional upon corporate voluntary disclosures in New Zealand. The current paper attempts to extend this stream of research by incorporating three mutually exclusive ownership structures and considering the interactive relationship between such ownership structures and corporate voluntary disclosures. Results reveal that ownership concentration in general is significantly positively associated with bid-ask spreads (proxy for information asymmetry) observed around annual report release dates. This finding supports the adverse selection hypothesis and importantly this effect is found to be most pronounced for financial institutions and management-controlled ownership categories. When voluntary disclosure is taken into account, the findings demonstrate that disclosures significantly attenuate information asymmetry risk associated with ownership concentration. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms with management-controlled ownership structures. The findings highlight the importance of corporate disclosures under concentrated ownership structures especially management-controlled ownership structures in reducing information asymmetry and enhancing market efficiency in New Zealand.