Real Options, (Dis)Investment Decision-Making and Accounting Measures of Performance

This paper suggests that a residual income-type measure of performance can be designed which supports optimal investment and disinvestment decision-making in a real options framework involving the options to wait before investing and to abandon. The measure has a number of advantages and disadvantages. Nonetheless, the balance of advantage versus disadvantage for the proposed measure must be set against the inadequacies of other competing measures of performance and associated organisational designs. Even if the measure of performance suggested is not regarded as practically useful, it has another general advantage – it can be used as a benchmark against which to evaluate other performance measures with regard to their support of optimal investment and disinvestment decision-making in a real options framework.     

How to measure capital investment efficiency: a literature synthesis

This article reviews and integrates the empirical literature on the measurement of investment efficiency in the areas of accounting and finance. We identify the theories behind the measures and provide a framework which organises the measures of investment efficiency into three groups: those based on neoclassical theories, agency theory and real options theory. Furthermore, the advantages and disadvantages of each type of measure are discussed, allowing researchers to compare and then ascertain the most appropriate measure for their research purpose and research context.     

SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

This paper discusses five common divisional performance measurement methods—cost centers, revenue centers, profit centers, investment centers, and expense centers—and provides the beginnings of a theory that attempts to explain when each of these five methods is likely to be the most efficient. The central insight of the theory is that each of these methods offers an alternative way of aligning decision-making authority with valuable "specific knowledge" inside the organization.
The theory suggests that cost and revenue centers work best in cases where headquarters has good information about cost and demand functions, product quality, and optimal output mix. Profit centers—defined as business units whose managers have responsibility for overall profits, but not the authority to make major capital spending decisions—tend to supplant revenue and cost centers when the line managers have a significant informational advantage over headquarters and when there are few interdependencies (or "synergies") between divisions. Investment centers—that is, profit centers in which unit managers are allowed to make major investment decisions—tend to prevail when the activity is capital-intensive and when it is difficult for headquarters to identify the value-maximizing investment strategy.
In evaluating the performance of profit centers, rate-of-return performance measures like RONA (return on net assets) are likely to be effective when unit managers have little influence over the level of new investment. But, in the case of investment centers, Economic Value Added, or EVA, is likely to be the most effective single-period measure of performance because it is best designed to encourage value-maximizing investment decisions.     

Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement

This classic by the formulators of agency cost theory discusses five common divisional performance measurement methods—cost centers, revenue centers, profit centers, investment centers, and expense centers—while providing a theory that attempts to explain when each of these methods is likely to be the most efficient. The central insight of the theory is that each method offers a different way of aligning decision-making authority with valuable "specific knowledge" inside the organization.
The theory suggests that cost and revenue centers work best in cases where headquarters has good information about cost and demand functions, product quality, and optimal output mix. Profit centers—defined as business units whose managers have responsibility for overall profits, but not the authority to make major capital spending decisions—tend to supplant revenue and cost centers when line managers have a significant informational advantage over headquarters and when there are few interdependencies (or "synergies") between divisions. Investment centers—profit centers in which unit managers are allowed to make major investment decisions—tend to prevail when the activity is capital-intensive and when it is difficult for headquarters to identify the value-maximizing investment strategy.
In evaluating the performance of profit centers, rate-of-return measures like ROA are likely to be effective when unit managers do not have major influence over the level of new investment. But, in the case of investment centers, Economic Value Added, or EVA, is likely to be the most effective single-period measure because it is designed to encourage only value-increasing investment decisions.     

基于实物期权理论的企业设计创新投资时机研究

产品的设计创新已经成为企业培养和维持核心竞争优势的关键。已有文献较少基于经济管理的视角来探讨不确定条件下企业设计创新所具有的实物期权特性,且传统的 DCF 无法对管理决策柔性做出科学的评价。为此,根据实物期权理论,构建企业设计创新的投资时机模型,并利用案例证明该模型的科学性和可行性。结果表明,企业在 DCF 分析的同时,应充分考虑企业设计创新的投资期权价值,把握最佳投资时机,实现科学决策。     

The impacts of share pledging on firm investment timing and valuation

This paper applies a model in the real options framework to analyze the impacts of controlling shareholder’s share pledging on corporate investment timing and valuation. We find that the optimal investment timing shows an inverted U-shape with the pledge ratio, indicating that share pledging exacerbates firms’ over-investment and worsens firms’ under-investment. Furthermore, share pledging hurts firms’ option value unless active measures are taken to control the pledging risks. The maintenance requirement can keep controlling shareholder from irrational early investments and protect investors from severe wealth losses. In addition, our work can provide testable empirical implications.     

HOW TO USE EVA IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY

The use of EVA in the oil industry has lagged behind that in most other industries because the accounting information reported by oil and gas concerns does such a poor job of representing management's effectiveness in adding value for shareholders. The essence of the problem is that the exploration activities of oil companies create assets whose changes in value are recognized by the stock market long before they are reflected on income statements or balance sheets. As a result, all accountingbased performance measures, including generic measures of EVA (which are derived from accounting information), fail to provide meaningful goals, decision tools, or compensation benchmarks.
This article provides a new, EVAbased framework for performance measurement and incentive compensation for oil and gas firms—and for companies in extractive industries in general. The authors show that, when adjusted by a publicly available measure of hydrocarbon reserve value known as "SEC-10," EVA's ability to explain annual stock returns rises from under 10% to almost 50%. Moreover, because SEC-10 has several important limitations as a measure of reserve value, there is considerable additional room for improving EVA's explanatory power. And the actual implementation of an EVA financial management system for an individual oil company can and should be based on more precise estimates of reserve value than those provided by SEC-10.
To this end, the authors provide an approach to hydrocarbon reserve valuation that captures the "real option" value of undeveloped reserves. By incorporating real option values, this new EVA financial management system for oil companies aligns management's incentives with the goal of creating shareholder wealth by rewarding managers for creating real option value as well as current cash flow—and by forcing managers to consider the optimal "exercise" of such strategic options.     

OPTION EXERCISE GAMES: THE INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY

While the real options approach has proven useful in providing an analytical framework for analyzing the timing of investment decisions, a notable failure of the approach has been an almost complete lack of strategic considerations. In standard real options models, invest-ment (and exercise) strategies are for-mulated in isolation, without considering the potential impact of other firms' exercise strategies. This paper illustrates how the intersection of real options and game theory provides powerful new insights into the behavior of economic agents under uncertainty.
Introducing strategic considerations into the real options framework can lead to a rethinking of standard real option analysis. For example, one of-ten cited conclusion of the real options literature is the overturning of the standard capital budgeting rule of in-vesting immediately in any project with a positive NPV. Because the fu-ture value of the asset is uncertain, there may be significant benefits to deferring the investment until condi-tions prove even more favorable. But this result clearly depends on the lack of competitive access to the project. If firms fear preemption, then the option to wait becomes less valuable. For example, while the standard real op-tions models suggest that a real estate developer should wait until the devel-opment option is considerably "in the money," competition and the fear of preemption will likely force develop-ers to build much earlier.     

Macroeconomic conditions and a firm’s investment decisions

We propose a model of a firm’s reversible investment decision with macroeconomic conditions based on optimal switching of a diffusion regime. The switching costs and the cash flow generated from the firm depend on a business cycle alternating via a Markov chain, and the triggers of investment and disinvestment in each state are determined endogenously. Provided the investment costs are cyclical due to high wages and rents in a boom, the investment tends to be delayed in boom, while the disinvestment is likely to be made earlier in terms of the level of switching triggers. This result shows us that the ‘hysteresis’ of investment is a rigorous phenomenon that does not change dramatically depending on business cycle. Yet, the business cycle may still amplify and propagate the exogenous shocks from macroeconomic conditions as far as the persistence of business cycle is concerned. In particular, the investment is deferred and the disinvestment occurs earlier when recession lasts longer and boom ends soon.     

Decision-making in sequential projects: expected time-to-build and probability of failure

The main purpose of this paper is to account for the two most basic options in the context of a sequential investment project, the option to adjust investment speed and the exit option. Current models of sequential investment ignore the role of a minimal investment rate that must be sustained as long as the project is not abandoned. In most real projects, a positive minimal investment rate provides an incentive for (irreversible) exit from the project. On the other hand, the minimal investment rate still leaves room for adjustment of the investment speed. Therefore, models with realistic (non-extreme) assumptions about the minimal investment should account for both, the exit option and the option to adjust investment speed. In this paper we set up the equations for this dual-option scenario in a continuous (PDE) framework. The resulting model is characterized by the presence of two thresholds describing the optimal decision-making. We provide a robust numerical procedure for the determination of both thresholds. Our analysis reveals that the minimal investment rate creates an endogenous incentive for fast completion that complements the corresponding exogenous incentives. This ??incentive-enhancement effect?? of the minimal investment rate is reflected by the fundamental statistical characteristics of the sequential project. As a direct consequence of this effect, an increase of the minimal investment rate will always lead to a reduction of the expected time-to-build. Another, striking consequence is that the minimal investment rate can also have a positive effect on the probability of failure (default-risk). This effect occurs under the condition of a low exogenous incentive for fast completion, represented e.g. by poor market expectations for the product to be developed.     

Taking Real Options Beyond the Black Box

Finance theorists have long argued that DCF undervalues investment opportunities with significant flexibility to respond to future events and that real options valuation methods provide a solution to that problem. But for most corporate managers, real options analysis continues to be a "black box" when applied to real investment decisions.
This paper begins by considering why these approaches have not yet made it to the mainstream of practical application. It then shows how a traditional DCF approach can undervalue a project that provides management with operating flexibility and illustrates a case study that demonstrates to senior management how a real options valuation method with a few clear value drivers can build upon and be made consistent with the traditional DCF framework.
Critical to this process is ensuring consistency with the company's planning assumptions such as future price forecasts and discount rates. The article shows how to separate the static ("optionless") DCF value from the additional real options value that is shown to be a direct consequence of the assumptions about price dynamics.     

Determinants of corporate borrowing: A behavioral perspective

This article integrates an earnings-based capital structure model into a simple real options framework to analyze the effects of managerial optimism and overconfidence on the interaction between financing and investment decisions. Several empirical implications follow from solving the model. Notably, my analysis reveals that managerial traits can ameliorate bondholder–shareholder conflicts, such as the debt overhang problem. While debt delays investment inefficiently, mildly biased managers can overcome this problem, even though they tend to issue more debt. Similar properties and results are discussed for other real options, such as the asset stripping or risk-shifting problems.     

High-speed rail transport valuation

In this paper, the optimal timing for investing in high-speed rail projects under uncertainty in relation to the utility provided to railway users was investigated. To accomplish this, a continuous time real options analysis framework using a stochastic demand model was developed to determine the optimal time to invest. Uncertainty upon investment expenditures was also added in an extended framework. The value of the option to defer and the investment opportunity value were also assessed.     

Debt and managerial rents in a real-options model of the firm

We present a theory of capital investment and debt and equity financing in a real-options model of a public corporation. The theory assumes that managers maximize the present value of their future compensation (managerial rents), subject to constraints imposed by outside shareholders’ property rights to the firm's assets. Absent bankruptcy costs, managers follow an optimal debt policy that generates efficient investment and disinvestment. We show how bankruptcy costs can distort both investment and disinvestment. We also show how managers’ personal wealth constraints can lead to delayed investment and increased reliance on debt financing. Changes in cash flow can cause changes in investment by tightening or loosening the wealth constraints. Firms with weaker investor protection adopt higher debt levels.     

Real options with unknown-date events

The real options literature has provided new insights on how to manage irreversible capital investments whose payoffs are uncertain. Two of the most important predictions from such theory are: (i) greater risk delays a firm’s investment timing, and (ii) greater risk increases the option value of waiting. This paper challenges such conclusions in a setting in which the relevant random variable is the arrival time of an unfavorable event. In particular, we model situations in which a firm must choose the time at which to invest in a project whose profit grows at a known rate until a random date is reached and decays thereafter, which may be representative of stochastic product or industry life cycles. This is a novel framework in which a firm can update its beliefs about the profitability of an investment opportunity by simply waiting to invest. Thus, a wait-and-see approach allows the firm to capitalize on favorable market evolutions and avoid adverse ones to some extent. Our framework is simple and does not require using stochastic calculus, which allows for an economic interpretation of optimal investment policies for the cases of one-time and sequential investments.     

Polynomial goal programming and the implicit higher moment preferences of US institutional investors in hedge funds

Polynomial goal programming (PGP) is a flexible method that allows investor preferences for different moments of the return distribution of financial assets to be included in the portfolio optimization. The method is intuitive and particularly suitable for incorporating investor preferences in higher moments of the return distribution. However, until now, PGP has not been able to meet its full potential because it requires quantification of “real” preference parameters towards those moments. To date, the chosen preference parameters have been selected somewhat “arbitrarily”. Our goal is to calculate implied sets of preference parameters using investors’ choices of and the importance they attribute to risk and performance measures. We use three groups of institutional investors—pension funds, insurance companies, and endowments—and derive implied sets of preference parameters in the context of a hedge fund portfolio optimization. To determine “real” preferences for the higher moments of the portfolio return distribution, we first fit implied preference parameters so that the PGP optimal portfolio is identical to the desired hedge fund portfolio. With the obtained economically justified sets of preference parameters, the well-established PGP framework can be employed more efficiently to derive allocations that satisfy institutional investor expectations for hedge fund investments. Furthermore, the implied preference parameters enable fund of hedge fund managers and other investment managers to derive optimal portfolio allocations based on specific investor expectations. Moreover, the importance of individual moments, as well as their marginal rates of substitution, can be assessed.     

Teams,repeated tasks,and implicit incentives

In a team setting, wherein only group performance is tracked, we show that muted incentive contracts may be sufficient to motivate team members. By having the team repeat a task, explicit (contractual) incentives can be substituted by implicit incentives team members provide to each other. We also study an example in which, despite uncorrelated individual performance measures being available, it is optimal to condition each manager's pay on both managers' performance. This can be viewed as creating a group performance measure. Using a group performance measure provides each manager with incentives to monitor and a means of punishing other managers.     

Assessing the Value of Growth Option Synergies from Business Combinations and Testing for Goodwill Impairment: A Real Options Perspective

Goodwill is an intangible asset, and therefore hard to measure and difficult to account for. This article argues that the two‐stage impairment test for acquired goodwill under SFAS 142 has several limitations. Most important, it measures aggregate rather than acquired goodwill, making it very difficult to separate acquisition‐related goodwill from aggregate enterprise goodwill after a business combination. As a consequence, any potential deterioration of acquired goodwill value could be concealed by increases in internally generated goodwill. As an alternative, the authors propose a real options approach to managing a business unit portfolio as a better framework for conducting the goodwill impairment test. A real options approach to testing goodwill for impairment—as opposed to the standard fair value assessment based on DCF analysis—not only accounts for deterioration in the value of goodwill, but also captures upward potential. It enables tracking of the changes in goodwill value from one period to the next, providing a less biased estimate of its real value at each point in time.     

创新支持政策下自贸试验区企业多阶段研发投资动态决策分析

基于实物期权理论,构建自贸试验区企业多阶段研发投资动态决策模型,运用数值模拟方法,考量自贸试验区相关税收、补贴以及知识产权保护等创新支持政策对企业研发投资行为的影响。结果显示：相比传统投资决策方法,多阶段研发投资动态决策模型能更好地帮助企业根据市场环境变化动态调整研发投资策略,发掘政策红利;有助于政府及时调整与完善相关政策,激励与引导企业创新。鉴于此,需完善鼓励类产业目录、优化事中事后监管规则、健全知识产权保护机制、适时调整企业发展战略。     

基金业绩如何影响风格漂移和经理离职?——理论与经验分析

本文通过一个两期模型,刻画了基金业绩如何通过影响市场信念,进而影响基金风格漂移和基金公司的解雇行为。若上期基金业绩很好,基金经理就会在乐观的自我能力预期下,完全按照自己的判断选择基金投资风格;若上期业绩一般,基金经理会因为调整成本而不太愿意切换投资风格;而若上期业绩很差导致自我能力预期悲观,基金经理就宁愿模仿上期绩优基金的投资风格。综合起来,基金风格漂移将随上期基金业绩呈现出显著的U型关系。进一步,因为业绩很差的基金经理会采取模仿策略,因此在市场风格发生切换时更有可能发生基金经理解雇事件。此外,本文基于中国开放式基金的季度数据,检验了风格漂移与滞后一期基金业绩之间的关系,经验证据稳健地支持了理论分析的各种结论。