Bank concentration,competition, and crises: First results

Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between bank concentration, bank competition and banking system fragility, this paper studies the impact of national bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems even after controlling for differences in commercial bank regulatory policies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic conditions, and shocks to the economy. Furthermore, the data indicate that regulatory policies and institutions that thwart competition are associated with greater banking system fragility.     

Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific

Analysis of the tradeoff between competition and financial stability has been at the center of academic and policy debate for over two decades and especially since the 2007–2008 global financial crises. Here we use information on 14 Asia Pacific economies from 2003 to 2010 to investigate the influence of bank competition, concentration, regulation and national institutions on individual bank fragility as measured by the probability of bankruptcy and the bank’s Z-score. The results suggest that greater concentration fosters financial fragility and that lower pricing power also induces bank risk exposure after controlling for a variety of macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory and institutional factors. In terms of regulations and institutions, the results show that tougher entry restrictions may benefit bank stability, whereas stronger deposit insurance schemes are associated with greater bank fragility.     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

Monetary policy,bank competition and regional credit cycles: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

This paper examines how competition in the banking sector affects the transmission of monetary policy and the variation of credit expansion across regions in the United States. Using the U.S. branching deregulation between 1994 to 2008 as an exogenous change in banks’ competition, we analyze how bank competition affects monetary policy transmission through the bank lending channel. The results show that competition strengthens the impact of monetary policy on bank loan supply. We then show that states with a more deregulated banking sector were more affected by monetary conditions in the years leading to the Great Recession. Specifically, the effect of loose monetary conditions on the expansion of households’ debt was stronger in states that had fewer bank branching restrictions. The results suggest that variations in the level of bank competition may have amplified regional asymmetries in the years leading to the Great Recession.     

How do banks adjust their capital ratios?

We analyze the dynamics of banks’ regulatory capital ratios. Using monthly regulatory data of large German banks, we estimate the target level and the adjustment speed of the capital ratio for each bank separately. There exists a target level for a substantial percentage of banks. Unlike with panel regressions, we can estimate individual adjustment speeds and find large variation across banks. Adjustments on the liability side are most effective, although adjustment rates on the asset side are higher. Private commercial banks (neither state-owned nor cooperative) and banks with a high level of proprietary trading are more likely to adjust their capital ratio tightly. Banks with a target capital ratio compensate for low target ratios with low asset volatilities and high adjustment speeds. They seem to care mainly about the resulting probability to comply with the regulatory minimum. Assuming low variation of this probability explains most of the large cross-sectional variation of bank capital.     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

Does the Basle Capital Accord reduce bank fragility? An assessment of the value-at-risk approach

We examine the economic implications arising from a bank using a VaR-constrained mean-variance model for the selection of its trading portfolio as a consequence of the Basle Capital Accord. Surprisingly, we show that when a VaR constraint is imposed, it is plausible that certain banks will end up selecting ‘riskier’ portfolios than they would have chosen in the absence of the constraint. Accordingly, regulators such as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision should be aware that allowing a bank to use VaR to determine its minimum regulatory capital may increase its fragility. Alternatives to VaR-based bank capital regulation that mitigate or even preclude its perverse implications are presented.     

Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans

We examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. The information asymmetries in the OTD market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders. We find, using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization, that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation: more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality. We interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators’ capital structure can mitigate moral hazard. In addition, we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have ‘skin in the game’ and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting. Finally, having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans, suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent. Overall, our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the OTD market. The findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders’ incentives with the investors of mortgage-backed securities.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.     

Multiple bank regulators and risk taking

The potential for banks to arbitrage between regulators exists both in the US, with its multiple federal banking regulators, and in Europe, due to multinational banking. This paper models multiple regulators that have an agency bias, which can give rise to a “race to the bottom”. The model is used to analyze the interaction between the regulatory equilibrium and several salient pre-crisis features: rising bank leverage; wholesale funding with asymmetric information; and increasing supervisional costs to disentangling bank asset exposures. Each of these raises bank risk taking on its own, but regulatory competition is shown to be an amplification mechanism.     

Does competition influence the bank lending channel in the euro area?

This paper examines how competition influences the bank lending channel in the euro area countries. Using a large panel of banks from 12 euro area countries for the period 2002–2010 we analyze the reaction of loan supply to monetary policy actions depending on the degree of bank competition. We find that the effect of monetary policy on bank lending is dependent on bank competition: the transmission of monetary policy via the bank lending channel is less pronounced for banks with extensive market power. Further investigation shows that banks with less market power were more sensitive to monetary policy only before the financial crisis. These results suggest that bank market power has a significant impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy. Therefore, wide variations in the level of bank market power may lead to asymmetric effects of the single monetary policy.     

Banking competition and welfare

We develop a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, higher social welfare, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium, they are empirically relevant, and carry significant implications for policy guidance.     

Towards a measure of financial fragility

The paper proposes a measure of financial fragility that is based on economic welfare in a general equilibrium model calibrated against UK data. The model comprises a household sector, three active heterogeneous banks, a central bank/regulator, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors and how the response of the economy to shocks relates to our measure of financial fragility. Finally we use panel VAR techniques to investigate the relationships between the factors that characterise financial fragility in our model, i.e. banks’ probabilities of default and banks’ profits – to a proxy of welfare.      

An analysis of the consistency of banks’ internal ratings

Internal ratings-based models are used for a variety of important bank and regulatory decisions. Thus, model risk – the potential for different models to provide different probability-of-default (PD) estimates – is of crucial importance. Using a comprehensive German credit registry dataset from 40 banks and 17,000 corporate borrowers from 2008–2012, we assess the consistency of internal PD estimates across banks. We find three main results. First, the variability of PD estimates for the same borrower across banks is large. Second, bank fixed effects explain 5% of the variation in PD estimates across banks, while 95% of the variation is idiosyncratic. For the 10 largest banks in our sample, reported regulatory capital ratios would change by a maximum of ±10%, equivalent to approximately 1 percentage point, when using average risk weights from all banks instead of risk weights based on banks’ individual PD estimates. Third, we explore various bank characteristics that explain the size of bank fixed effects.     

A Look Back at Merton Miller's “Financial Markets and Economic Growth”

The author begins by agreeing with Miller's characterization of the fragility of U.S. banks and of the shortcomings of the Asian model of bank finance‐driven growth. The article also expresses “emphatic agreement” with Miller's arguments that the protection of banks through deposit insurance, regulatory forbearance, and other forms of “bailout” have created costly moral‐hazard problems that encourage excessive risk‐taking. And the author endorses, at least in principle, Miller's main argument that the development of capital markets that do not require the direct involvement of banks should make economies if not less prone to financial crises, then at least more resilient in recovering from them. But having acknowledged the limitations of bank‐centered systems and the value of developing non‐bank alternatives for savers and corporate borrowers, the author goes on to point to the surprising durability of some banking systems outside the U.S.—notably Canada's, which has not experienced major problems since the 1830s. And even more important, the author views banks and capital markets not as “substitutes” for one another, but as mutually dependent “complements” whose interdependencies and interactions must be recognized by market participants and regulators alike.     

Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?

This paper uses our new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. The paper examines: (i) regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce; (ii) regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry; (iii) regulations on capital adequacy; (iv) deposit insurance system design features; (v) supervisory power, independence, and resources; (vi) loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines; (vii) regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring of banks; and (viii) government ownership.The results, albeit tentative, raise a cautionary flag regarding government policies that rely excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. The findings instead suggest that policies that rely on guidelines that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, performance and stability.     

银行业竞争、创新资源配置和企业创新产出——基于中国工业企业的经验证据

本文利用城市级商业银行分支机构数据,结合中国工业企业数据和企业专利数据,实证分析银行业竞争对中国企业创新产出的影响。研究发现,竞争性的银行业市场结构显著促进了企业创新产出,对非国有企业和中小企业尤为显著。进一步地,本文基于资源配置角度,从新进入企业和在位企业双重视角探讨银行业竞争影响企业创新产出的作用途径。检验发现,银行业竞争提高条件下,更多的高效率企业进入创新部门,更多的高效率在位企业增加创新投入,且上述影响在非国有企业和中小企业中更为明显。本文检验结果显示,银行业竞争能提高银行对高效率企业的信贷支持,优化企业之间创新资源配置,并通过引导高效率非国有企业和中小企业增加创新投入而推动整体层面的创新产出。本文拓展了银行业竞争对企业创新的微观影响研究,为制定基于创新驱动的金融发展政策提供新思路。     

Bank capital and credit market competition: Will competitive pressure lead to higher capital levels?

This paper establishes a theoretical model to study the relationship between credit market competition and bank capital. In the model, bank capital can alleviate the debt overhang problem, and the extent to which banks can enjoy the gain of holding capital is decreasing in the competitive pressure in the credit market. It is shown that credit market competition reduces banks' incentive to hold capital. Deposit insurance also induces banks to hold less capital. In addition, bank capital regulation is welfare improving, and banks may voluntarily hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums.     

The role of strategic interactions in risk-taking behavior: A study from asset growth perspective

This study uses panel data on Vietnamese commercial banks from 2008 to 2018 in order to investigate the role of strategic interactions in determining bank risk-taking behavior by considering bank asset growth. The results suggest that aggressive competition is less favorable for banks striving for stability and that a high value of competitive strategy measure (as a proxy for strategic interactions) encourages risk-taking incentives. We also find that the distributional effects of strategic interaction on bank risk-taking because of asset growth reveal that the uncertainty in strategic-interaction-driven profits diminishes in banks with higher growth. This finding is consistent with the idea that when competition becomes more aggressive, bank restructuring should focus on increasing total assets by merging and acquiring small- and medium-sized banks to stabilize the banking sector. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that banks with low leverage or under regulatory pressure engage in more risk-taking. Therefore, policymakers may not implement a tighter capital requirement that contributes to a heightened level of risk. The results are robust to alternative measures of risk-taking and monetary policy stance as well as different econometric specifications.     

Do small businesses still prefer community banks?

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank type – small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking relationships. The conventional paradigm suggests that “community banks” – small, single-market, local institutions – are better able to form strong relationships with informationally opaque small businesses, while “megabanks” – large, multimarket, nonlocal institutions – tend to serve more transparent firms. Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the “main” relationship bank for small businesses with different firm and owner characteristics. Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of an exclusive relationship and main bank relationship length as functions of main bank type and financial fragility, as well as firm and owner characteristics. The results are often not consistent with the conventional paradigm, perhaps because of changes in lending technologies and deregulation of the banking industry.