Financial liberalization,insurance market,and the likelihood of financial crises

This paper provides empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and examines the roles of insurance market, country risk, and economic conditional variables on the relationship between financial liberalization and financial crises in 39 countries. Our empirical results support that financial liberalization does have a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and that the indirect effects of insurance development and lower country risk decrease the probability of crises, but the indirect effect of economic conditional proxies is enhanced with the likelihood of a financial crisis. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of the insurance sector in order to combat financial crises.     

Foreign currency borrowing surrounding the global financial crisis: Evidence from Korea

We present a complete profile of firms’ foreign currency borrowing surrounding the 2007 global financial crisis. Employing extensive data from Korean firms during 2002–2012, we find that foreign currency borrowing is significantly related to firm attributes of export revenues, firm size, tangible assets and asset growth, as well as to macro-level factors. These results offer two important implications. First, macroeconomic factors alone cannot fully explain firms’ foreign currency borrowing. Second and more importantly, these firm attributes are indicative of a lower default probability and larger collateral value, which would not only facilitate borrowers’ access to foreign currency debt markets but also offer lenders a better protective cushion from possible loan defaults in the face of exchange rate changes and information asymmetry on borrowers’ credits. Period wise, asset-related firm attributes have more pronounced effects in the post- than pre-crisis period. We further show that banking regulations following the crisis effectively limit the access to foreign currency borrowing by Korean firms, most significantly by those belonging to large business groups.     

Costs of financial instability, household-sector balance sheets and consumption

Extant work on costs of financial instability focuses on fiscal costs and declines in aggregate GDP following banking crises. We estimate effects of banking and currency crises on consumption in 19 OECD countries, showing consumption plays an important role in the adjustment following a crisis, and effects are not captured solely by the impact of crises on standard consumption determinants, income and wealth. Additional effects, attributable to factors such as time-varying confidence, uncertainty and credit rationing, are aggravated by high and rising leverage, despite financial liberalisation easing liquidity constraints. High leverage implies that banking crises taking place now could have greater incidence than in the past.     

The Interplay among Financial Regulations,Resilience, and Growth

Interconnectedness has been an important source of market failures, leading to the recent financial crisis. Large financial institutions tend to have similar exposures and thus exert externalities on each other through various mechanisms. Regulators have responded by putting in place more regulations with many layers of regulatory complexity, leading to ambiguity and market manipulation. Mispricing risk in complex models and the arbitrage opportunities through the regulatory loopholes have provided incentives for certain activities to be more concentrated in the regulated entities and for other activities to leave the banking into new shadow banking areas. How can we design an effective regulatory framework that would perfectly rule out bank runs and TBTF and to do so without introducing incentives for financial firms to take excessive risk? It is important for financial regulations to be coordinated across regulatory entities and jurisdictions and for financial regulations to be forward looking, rather than aiming to address problems of the past.     

Bank recapitalization and economic recovery after financial crises

Does support to distressed banks early on during financial crises mitigate the macroeconomic consequences of financial distress, and if so does it matter what form the intervention takes? We analyze the effects of government and central bank interventions in 69 systemic banking crises since 1980, of which 29 are part of the recent global financial crisis. Our estimation approach controls for the correlation between intervention measures and the time-invariant component of unobservable crisis severity. We find that timely bank recapitalizations substantially reduce the duration of recessions, underscoring the distortions caused by zombie banks and the costs of regulatory forbearance.     

Understanding the financial crisis in Asia

The financial crisis of East Asia in 1997 was largely unanticipated and was characterized by sharp falls in asset prices and currency values in several countries simultaneously. Many empirical models have been developed to predict the occurrence of such crisis. However, the out-of-sample performance of these models is disappointing. Most theoretical explanations of the crisis emphasize the role of banking sector and revolve around models of moral hazard or self-fulfilling runs on liquidity. Empirical tests of the models are, however, rare. Much work remains to be done to explain the contagion, and the effects of equity capital flows.     

欧洲金融一体化波折与单一银行监管机制的构建

文章以翔实的数据比较分析了金融危机前后（包括欧债危机以来）欧元区金融运行格局的变化,探讨欧盟推动建立单一监管机制的原因及前景。文章指出2008年以前,欧洲的金融一体化进程快速推进,银行业市场和金融市场不断融合。金融危机爆发后,监管制度缺位的问题暴露出来,欧洲银行业面临巨大的信心危机,金融一体化进程停滞,货币政策传导遇阻。欧盟反思危机教训,推动建立单一监管机制,重塑银行业信心,重启一体化进程,但实现这一目标任重而道远。     

The role of foreign currency debt in financial crises: 1880–1913 versus 1972–1997

We show that exposure to foreign currency debt does not necessarily increase the risk of having a financial crisis. Some countries do not suffer from financial fragility despite original sin. Before 1913 British offshoots and Scandinavia afflicted with it avoided financial meltdowns. Today many advanced countries have original sin, but few have had crises. In both periods, aggregate balance sheet mismatches are associated with a greater likelihood of a crisis. The evidence suggests that foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-managed. This is part of the difference between developed countries and emerging markets both of which borrow in foreign currency.     

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.     

危机后影子银行的国际监管改革及对我国的启示

本轮金融危机的爆发表明,影子银行天生具有的表外性、高杠杆性和证券化运行机理,一旦疏于监管就极易引发系统性风险和法律风险。危机后国际金融监管组织和美英欧等各大经济体纷纷出台强化影子银行监管的金融监管改革法案。我国应结合自身情况,探索和构建适合我国金融业发展实际的影子银行监管制度。     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis

Prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, banking sector profits were very high but the profitability of financial intermediation was poor. Using a novel model of banking, this article argues that the high profits were achieved through balance sheet expansion and growing default, liquidity, and term risk mismatches between assets and liabilities. As a result, large banks’ financial leverage rose as they became less liquid, setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. This article argues that the increase in financial leverage was possible due to misguided changes in the regulatory framework, specifically, the Basel I capital accord and reductions in reserve requirements. Finally, this article overviews and assesses the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis.     

The pricing of foreign exchange risk around the Asian financial crisis: evidence from Taiwan's stock market

The volatile exchange rate movement during the Asian financial crisis has led global investors to re-evaluate the importance of currency exposures in Asian stock markets. In this paper, we examine industry-level currency risk of Taiwan's stock market around the Asian financial crisis. The results show that most export-oriented industries, except for the electronics industry, are positively affected by the depreciation of the New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) against the US Dollars (USD). We also find that the magnitude of currency risk is less for banking and electronics industries in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) than for those in the over-the-counter (OTC) security exchange. Our results are consistent with the findings of Chow et al. (J. Financial Res. 2 (1997b) 191) and have important implications for international investors with exposures in Taiwan's stock market.     

Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence

Using aggregate balance sheet data from banks across the EU-25 over the period from 1997 to 2005 we provide empirical evidence that national banking market concentration has a negative impact on European banks’ financial soundness as measured by the Z-score technique while controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory, and institutional factors. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that Eastern European banking markets exhibiting a lower level of competitive pressure, fewer diversification opportunities and a higher fraction of government-owned banks are more prone to financial fragility whereas capital regulations have supported financial stability across the entire European Union.     

银行危机的蝴蝶效应、负外部性及其防治

对于银行突发事件,若处理不当则会演变成银行危机,乃至会对社会金融和经济产生严重影响。本文从内生性突发事件和外生性突发事件出发,探讨了“蝴蝶效应”导致发生局部银行危机的可能性;运用外部性经济学原理,对银行突发事件的负外部效应和风险溢出进行了探讨。对于突发事件与银行危机的解决,可以从监管机构与商业银行两个方面加强治理:对于监管机构而言,央行要发挥金融稳定职能实施外部援助,银行监管部门加强对商业银行的外部监督;对于商业银行而言,应加强内控机制建设,增强管理层对突发事件的预防和处置能力,防止工作人员道德风险的产生。     

Regulation,financial crises,and liberalization traps

This paper examines how financial regulation and institutional quality affect the probability of a banking crisis using a panel of 138 countries over the period 1996–2017. Our key inference is that the probability of a financial crisis fits an inverted U-shaped curve: it rises as regulation stringency moves from low to medium levels and falls from medium to high levels. Countries located in the intermediate level of regulatory stringency face more financial instability than either loosely or severely regulated countries, which are caught in a “liberalization trap” and a “regulation trap,” respectively. Institutional quality interacts significantly with the regulatory environment, implying a trade-off with regulatory stringency.     

WTO financial services commitments: Determinants and impact on financial stability

The paper investigates the factors that have influenced WTO members to take on their chosen level of liberalization commitments in the framework of liberalization of trade in financial services and the impact of such commitments on financial sector stability. The most important factors are economic growth, current account, trends in banking sector development, policy restrictiveness, and peer-group effects. The econometric evidence suggests that more liberal commitments may be associated with greater vulnerability to currency and banking crises—most likely a short-term effect, which should be mitigated with time through increased market efficiency and better resource allocation.     

Bank concentration,competition, and crises: First results

Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between bank concentration, bank competition and banking system fragility, this paper studies the impact of national bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems even after controlling for differences in commercial bank regulatory policies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic conditions, and shocks to the economy. Furthermore, the data indicate that regulatory policies and institutions that thwart competition are associated with greater banking system fragility.     

Shadow banking,insurance and financial sector stability

Motivated by the recent financial crisis and the near collapse of the insurance giant American International Group (AIG), we empirically study the link between the insurance sector, the size of the shadow system and financial stability across countries. Using the Z-score as a measure of financial stability and the ratio of insurance assets to GDP for 26 countries during the period 1998–2011, this paper shows that: (i) the insurance sector is negatively and significantly related to financial stability, and that (ii) using the shadow banking system as a channel, the insurance sector is detrimental to financial stability for countries with a high level of shadow banking assets.     

国际影子银行体系的风险监管改革与启示

影子银行体系的超常规发展和信用扩张,是全球金融危机爆发的重要原因之一。本文从影子银行体系的内涵、运作机制展开研究,分析危机后西方主要国家有关的金融监管改革举措,并结合中国影子银行体系的现状提出有关建议。