Market concentration and the likelihood of financial crises

According to theory, market concentration affects the likelihood of a financial crisis in different ways. The “concentration-stability” and the “concentration-fragility” hypotheses suggest opposing effects operating through specific channels. Using data of 160 countries for the period 1970–2009, this paper empirically tests these indirect effects of financial market structure. We set up a simultaneous system in order to jointly estimate financial stability and the relevant channel variables as endogenous variables. Our findings provide support for the assumption of channel effects in general and both the concentration-stability and the concentration-fragility hypothesis in particular. The effects are found to vary between high and low income countries.     

Using a long-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument

Using a short-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument can be problematic near its zero bound constraint. An alternative strategy is to use a long-term interest rate as the policy instrument. We find when Taylor-type policy rules are used by the central bank to set the long rate in a standard New Keynesian model, indeterminacy—that is, multiple rational expectations equilibria—may often result. However, a policy rule with a long-rate policy instrument that responds in a “forward-looking” fashion to inflation expectations can avoid the problem of indeterminacy.     

A model in which monetary policy is about money

Optimal monetary policy is studied in a model with (i) heterogeneity in the degree to which different people are monitored (have publicly known histories); (ii) idiosyncratic shocks that give rise to heterogeneity in earning and spending realizations; and (iii) central-bank intervention in a “market” in claims or credit in which the participants are those who are heavily monitored. A special case of the model has everyone perfectly monitored. In that case, there is no role for money and no role for central-bank intervention. In the example displayed with imperfect monitoring, optimal intervention is not simple.     

A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation

Under a conventional policy rule, a central bank adjusts its policy rate linearly according to the gap between inflation and its target, and the gap between output and its potential. Under “the opportunistic approach to disinflation” a central bank controls inflation aggressively when inflation is far from its target, but concentrates more on output stabilization when inflation is close to its target, allowing supply shocks and unforeseen fluctuations in aggregate demand to move inflation within a certain band. We use stochastic simulations of a small-scale rational expectations model to contrast the behavior of output and inflation under opportunistic and linear rules.     

Regime switching and monetary policy measurement

This paper applies regime-switching methods to the problem of measuring monetary policy. Policy preferences and structural factors are specified parametrically as independent Markov processes. Interaction between the structural and preference parameters in the policy rule serves to identify the two processes. The estimates uncover policy episodes that are initiated by switches to “dove regimes,” shown to Granger-cause both NBER recessions and the Romer dates. These episodes imply real effects of monetary policy that are smaller than those found in previous studies.     

Time-to-build, monetary shocks, and aggregate fluctuations

The idea that the investment process takes time to produce finished capital goods was an integral part of Kydland and Prescott's early work on real business cycles, but this feature has been dropped in much recent work, mainly because it seemed to have little effect on macroeconomic dynamics. With a generalization of the “time-to-build” feature that incorporates multiple types of capital, however, a New Keynesian model can produce “u-shaped” responses in output, investment, and inflation to a monetary policy shock. Such responses are not found in many studies that assume no time-to-build friction. In addition, different specifications of the time-to-build structure result in substantially different response patterns for these aggregate variables.     

Dynamic risksharing in the United States and Europe

We use a panel VAR model to improve upon the existing methodologies to analyze interregional risksharing and consumption smoothing channels. First, we endogenize the output process within a more general multi-equation framework, capturing the dynamic feedback between output and various smoothing channels. Second, in line with dynamic general equilibrium open economy models of risksharing, we exploit impulse response functions to trace the role of each smoothing channel over time, in the presence of different structural shocks (temporary vs. permanent and output vs. smoothing channels). In the application to the US and OECD countries, we find different dynamic properties of different smoothing channels. We compare our results with the predictions of standard risksharing and consumption theories, and tackle some of the puzzles in the literature, such as the “international risksharing puzzle” and the “consumption-output correlation puzzle.” We are also able to address such policy issues as whether fiscal stabilizers have been substitutes or complements for financial market diversification activities and whether further financial market integration is likely to provide countries with more shock-absorption tools. A key result is the strong substitutability between capital and credit smoothing in the US, and between fiscal and credit smoothing in the OECD.     

Exchange rate dynamics under alternative optimal interest rate rules

We explore the role of interest rate policy in the exchange rate determination process. Specifically, we derive exchange rate equations from interest rate rules that are theoretically optimal under a few alternative settings. The exchange rate equation depends on its underlying interest rule and its performance could vary across evaluation criteria and sample periods. The exchange rate equation implied by the interest rate rule that allows for interest rate and inflation inertia under commitment offers some encouraging results — exchange rate changes “calibrated” from the equation have a positive and significant correlation with actual data, and offer good direction of change prediction. Our exercise also demonstrates the role of the foreign exchange risk premium in determining exchange rates and the difficulty of explaining exchange rate variability using only policy based fundamentals.     

One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation

This paper employs a multi-country delegation monetary policy model and argues that a decision-making mechanism based on the median voter theorem where intensity of preferences cannot play a role does not capture important aspects of policy setting in the European Monetary Union. Replacing the median voter mechanism with a less restrictive “weighted mean mechanism”, it is shown that strategic delegation can lead to a surprising degree of central bank inflation aversion. This finding supports the “The Twin Sister Hypothesis” and the perception of the European Central Bank implementing the policy of the Bundesbank rather than a more inflationary monetary policy.     

Optimal monetary policy with the cost channel

In the standard new Keynesian framework, an optimizing policy maker does not face a trade-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and stabilizing the gap between actual output and output under flexible prices. An ad hoc, exogenous cost-push shock is typically added to the inflation equation to generate a meaningful policy problem. In this paper, we show that a cost-push shock arises endogenously when a cost channel for monetary policy is introduced into the new Keynesian model. A cost channel is present when firms’ marginal cost depends directly on the nominal rate of interest. Besides providing empirical evidence for a cost channel, we explore its implications for optimal monetary policy. We show that its presence alters the optimal policy problem in important ways. For example, both the output gap and inflation are allowed to fluctuate in response to productivity and demand shocks under optimal monetary policy.     

A theory of socialistic internal capital markets

We develop a model of a two-division firm in which the “strong” division has, on average, higher quality investment opportunities than the “weak” division. We show that, in the presence of agency and information problems, optimal effort incentives are less powerful and thus managerial effort is lower in the strong division. This leads the firm to bias its project selection policy against the strong division. The selection bias is more severe when there is a larger spread in the average quality of investment opportunities between the two divisions.     

A happy “half way-house”? Medium term inflation targeting in New Zealand

The 2002 Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) between the government and central bank of New Zealand asks the central bank to target inflation “over the medium term” rather than over an annual target. Delegating such a medium term objective to the central bank shifts inflation targeting towards a “halfway-house” between inflation targeting and price level targeting. We show empirically that this helps time consistent policy approximate the first-best commitment policy even when the government asks the central bank to weight output stabilisation differently to society. We estimate the New Zealand economy with a small open economy DSGE model and show that the happiest halfway house is located around a two year averaging horizon at most, which leads to mild improvements in monetary policy efficiency.     

How much inflation is necessary to grease the wheels?

Tobin's proposition that inflation “greases” the wheels of the labor market is studied using a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric wage adjustment costs. The simulated method of moments is used to estimate the nonlinear model based on its second-order approximation. Optimal inflation is determined by a benevolent government that maximizes the households’ welfare. Econometric results indicate that nominal wages are downwardly rigid and that the optimal level of grease inflation for the U.S. economy is about 0.35% per year, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.04% to 0.87%.     

The interbank market after the financial turmoil: Squeezing liquidity in a “lemons market” or asking liquidity “on tap”

After August 2007 the plumbing system that supplied banks with wholesale funding, the interbank market, failed because toxic assets obstructed the pipes. Banks were forced to squeeze liquidity in a “lemons market” or to ask for liquidity “on tap” from central banks. This paper disentangles the two components of the 3-month Euribor–Eonia swap spread, credit and liquidity risk and then evaluates the decomposition. The main finding is that credit risk increased before the key events of the crisis, while liquidity risk was mainly responsible for the subsequent increases in the Euribor spread and then reacted to the systemic responses of the central banks, especially in October 2008. Moreover, the level of the spread between May 2009 and February 2010 was influenced mainly by credit risk, suggesting that European banks were still in a “lemons market” and relied on liquidity “on tap” even before sovereign debt crisis unfolded in Europe.     

What are the effects of monetary policy on output? Results from an agnostic identification procedure

This paper proposes to estimate the effects of monetary policy shocks by a new agnostic method, imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses of prices, nonborrowed reserves and the federal funds rate in response to a monetary policy shock. No restrictions are imposed on the response of real GDP to answer the key question in the title. I find that “contractionary” monetary policy shocks have no clear effect on real GDP, even though prices move only gradually in response to a monetary policy shock. Neutrality of monetary policy shocks is not inconsistent with the data.     

Credit and identity theft

The quintessential crime of the information age is identity theft, the malicious use of personal identifying data. In this paper we model “identity” and its use in credit transactions. Various types of identity theft occur in equilibrium, including “new account fraud,” “existing account fraud,” and “friendly fraud.” The equilibrium incidence of identity theft represents a tradeoff between a desire to avoid costly or invasive monitoring of individuals on the one hand, and the need to control transactions fraud on the other. Our results suggest that technological advances will not eliminate this tradeoff.     

Adaptive expectations, underparameterization and the Lucas critique

A striking implication of the replacement of adaptive expectations by rational expectations was the “Lucas critique,” which showed that expectation parameters, and endogenous variable dynamics, depend on policy parameters. We consider this issue from the vantage point of bounded rationality, where for transparency we model bounded rationality by means of simple adaptive expectations. We show that for a range of processes, monetary policy remains subject to the Lucas critique. However, there are also regimes in which the expectation parameter is locally invariant and the Lucas critique does not apply.     

The impact of Milton Friedman on modern monetary economics: Setting the record straight on Paul Krugman's “Who was Milton Friedman?”

Paul Krugman's essay “Who Was Milton Friedman?” seriously mischaracterizes Friedman's economics and his legacy. In this paper, we provide a rejoinder to Krugman on these issues. In the course of setting the record straight, we provide a self-contained guide to Milton Friedman's impact on modern monetary economics and on today's central banks. We also refute the conclusions that Krugman draws about monetary policy from the experiences of the United States in the 1930s and of Japan in the 1990s.     

Capital market imperfections and the theory of optimum currency areas

This paper studies how within- and cross-country capital market imperfections affect the welfare effects of forming a currency union. The analysis considers a bank-only world where intermediaries compete in Cournot fashion and monitoring and state verification are costly. The first part determines the credit market equilibrium and the optimal number of banks, prior to joining the union. The second part discusses the benefits from joining a currency union. A competition effect is identified and related to the added monitoring costs that banks may incur when operating outside their home country, through an argument akin to the Brander-Krugman “reciprocal dumping” model of bilateral trade. However, in our framework, whether joining a union raises welfare of the home country is ambiguous; it depends on the relative strength of “investment creation” and “intermediation diversion” effects.     

Welfare implications of the transition to high household debt

Aggressive deregulation of the mortgage market in the early 1980s triggered innovations that greatly reduced indebted households’ required home equity, and a borrowing surge followed. This paper uses a calibrated general equilibrium model of lending from the wealthy to the middle class to evaluate the welfare effects of this reform quantitatively. We find that the “indirect” effects of endogenous interest rate and other relative price changes dominate the “direct” effect of relaxing the constraint. The borrowing household's welfare falls even though the reform directly relaxes a constraint on its trade. The saving household's welfare rises substantially.