The effect of financial market development on bank risk: evidence from Southeast Asian countries

This paper examines how bank risk varies with changes in financial markets development in a broad data set of 52 publicly listed commercial banks in five Southeast Asian countries over a 23-year period between 1990 and 2012. A consequence of two financial crises (i.e. the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009) provides a natural experiment in which linkages between financial markets development and bank risk are measured. Empirical results show that higher degrees of financial markets development are associated with weaker bank capital positions and are positively related to higher degrees of bank revenue diversification. There is also evidence for a U-shaped relationship between the degree of financial markets development and bank capital.     

Dividends and financial health: Evidence from U.S. bank holding companies

Using a large sample of U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2020, we show that there is a positive relationship between banks' dividends lagged by one quarter and their financial health in the current quarter. We also find that this positive relationship is more pronounced for banks with lower capital adequacy and during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, indicating that it is more necessary for banks with these characteristics to use dividends to convey information regarding their financial health. Our additional analyses suggest that total payout is also positively associated with bank financial health, and that the positive relationship between dividends and financial health applies to private banks as well, but that the magnitude is weaker for them than for public banks. Our overall findings primarily complement a risk reduction hypothesis in corporate finance and bank payout policies.     

Bank Diversification and Overall Financial Strength: International Evidence

There are many studies in the finance and management literature that examine the impact of diversification on performance. Yet, the literature remains inconclusive as for the potential benefits in terms of risk and return. The present study aims to re‐examine this issue, while proposing a methodological framework that integrates various bank performance and risk indicators into a single measure of financial strength. Using an international sample of commercial banks, we find that diversification in terms of income, earning assets, and on‐ and off‐balance sheet activities influences positively their financial strength. We also find that income diversification can be more beneficial for banks operating in less developed countries compared to banks in advanced and major advanced economies. However, we observe the opposite in the case of diversification between off‐balance sheet and on‐balance sheet activities. Furthermore, the results reveal that income and earning assets diversification can mitigate the adverse effect of the financial crisis on bank financial strength. We continue to find a positive relationship between diversification and financial strength when we account for nesting effects, endogeneity, as well as when using an alternative approach for the construction of the financial strength indicator.     

Geographic diversification in banking

In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 crisis, banks claiming positive diversification benefits are being met with skepticism. Nevertheless, diversification might be important and sizable for some large internationally active banking groups. We use a universally applicable correlation matrix approach to calculate international diversification effects, in which bank subsidiaries are treated as individual assets of the banking group portfolio. We apply the framework to 49 of the world's largest banking groups with significant foreign business units over the 1992–2009 period. Focusing on the most important risk in banking, credit risk, we find that allowing for geographical diversification could reduce banks’ credit risk by 1.1% on average, with risk reduction ranging from negligible up to 8%.     

Credit Ratings and Bank Affiliation to Financial Holding Companies: Effects of Government Ownership and Financial Crisis

This study compares credit ratings between FHC affiliated banks and independent banks using Taiwan bank and FHC data. The results show banks that join Insurance- or Security-FHCs obtain better ratings than those that join Bank-FHCs. Second, banks that join FHCs with higher activity diversification can obtain better credit ratings. Third, joining government-owned FHCs enhances bank credit ratings and mitigates bank default risk compared to joining non-government-owned FHCs. Fourth, prior to the financial crisis, banks joining FHCs can obtain better credit ratings and reduce the cost of debt. However, during the financial crisis, rating agencies stopped regarding banks joining privately owned bank-based FHCs as risk diversification and assigning better credit ratings on this basis.     

In Banking,Is Small Beautiful?

The state‐led resolution of the 2007‐2009 financial crisis has proven to be costly. Calls are being heard in Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland to cap the size of domestic banks. Is small beautiful? In this policy paper, we first match bailing out cost data to the relative size of banks for a sample of 14 countries and 29 banks. An important observation is that some countries with relatively small banks faced large bailout cost when correlated systemic risk affected many banks. Secondly, we call to the attention that capping the size of banks can have an unintended effect: a lack of credit risk diversification. Risk diversification is needed to reduce the costs of financial distress, which are quite significant in the banking industry. If reducing public bail out costs is the right objective, capping the size of banks is not the best tool. So as to keep large banks that provide highly skilled employment opportunities in a services economy, we discuss four policy options that help to ensure financial stability: independence and accountability of bank supervisors, prompt corrective action mechanisms, burden sharing across countries, and an end to the too‐big‐to‐fail doctrine.     

What happened to profitability? Shocks,challenges and perspectives for euro area banks

This paper analyses the evolution of bank profitability from 2005 to 2016, with a focus on the period covering both the global financial crisis and the euro area crisis. To accomplish this, we constructed a dataset that includes financial statement information from 310 euro area banks. Using a dual approach – a ‘bottom-up’ approach as applied by bank analysts and macroeconomists' ‘top-down’ approach, we find that the profitability of euro area banks was hit by two shocks of different nature. The Lehman Brothers collapse affected mostly big banks with diversified portfolios via losses in their securities investment. The subsequent euro area debt crisis and economic recession hit more traditional banks specialising in retail lending activities, mainly through increasing impairment costs. If the first shock had a one-off impact on bank profitability, the second shock is far more long-lasting and is still depressing the profitability of banks in peripheral Europe.     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

Financial statements based bank risk aggregation

One of the major challenges involved in risk aggregation is the lack of risk data. Recently, researchers have found that mapping financial statements into risk types is a satisfactory way to resolve the problem of data shortage and inconsistency. Nevertheless, ignoring off-balance sheet (OBS) items has so far been regarded as the usual practice in risk aggregation, which may lead to deviations in conclusions. Hence, we improve the financial statements based risk aggregation framework by mapping OBS items into risk types. Based on 487 quarterly financial statements from all 16 listed Chinese commercial banks over the period 2007–2014, we empirically study whether the overall impact of OBS activities and the individual impact of each of the OBS risk types on total risk depend on bank size. Moreover, this research divides the sample into two subsets, during and after the subprime crisis, to find out how the subprime crisis affects risks of Chinese banks. Our empirical results show that although OBS credit risk is positively linked to total risk while OBS operational risk is negatively linked to total risk for both large and small banks, the overall impact of OBS activities on total risk depends on bank size. The overall OBS activities are positively related to the large bank’s total risk while they are negatively related to the small bank’s total risk. Besides, we also found that it is the increase of liquidity risk and market risk that leads to the larger total risk of Chinese banks during the subprime crisis.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Islamic and conventional banks' soundness during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

The recent global financial crisis has induced a series of failure of many conventional banks and led to an increased interest in the Islamic banking business model. This paper attempts to answer empirically the following question: What was the effect of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on the soundness of Islamic banks and their conventional peers? Using the Z-score as an indicator of bank stability, our regression analysis (covering a matched sample of 34 Islamic Banks (IBs) and 34 conventional banks (CBs) from 16 countries) shows that there is no significant difference in terms of the effect of the financial crisis on the soundness of IBs and CBs. This finding reveals that IBs are diverging from their theoretical business model which would have allowed them to keep the same level of soundness even during the crisis.     

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

This research examines the effects of securitization on the bank's risk exposure both in terms of individual expected shortfall and marginal expected shortfall as a measure of systemic risk. The relationship between securitization activity and tail risks is especially relevant in light of the consequences for financial stability, both for the individual securitizing banks and for the market as a whole, as the financial crisis 2007–2008 reveals. By using a sample of Italian listed banks over the period 2000–2009, we find that securitizing banks have, on average, higher expected losses in case of extreme events. This adds new evidence on the main findings in the literature that focused on the evidence that risk transfer through securitization is relatively insignificant compared to the risk retained by the originating bank. We show that this risk retention is in terms of an increase of tail risk. We also find that securitization increases the probability of banks to become “systemically” riskier, but we find no difference when comparing the pre-crisis with the post-crisis period. This suggests that the systemic exposures of Italian banks are still as high as before the crisis with severe implications for financial stability.     

Valuation of diversified banks: New evidence

This paper reconsiders the effect of diversification on bank valuation. Our objective is to provide new evidence based on a unified estimation framework that places particular emphasis on separating the effects of diversification (specialised banks vs. diversified banks) from those of bank type (investment banks vs. commercial banks). Consistent with prior studies, we find a significant diversification discount at the end of the 1990s. Our main finding is that it decreases over time and practically vanishes after the financial crisis. We do not find support for the hypothesis that the diversification effect is influenced by geographical or regulatory factors. The valuation impact of bank characteristics varies over time, particularly in the financial crisis, but this structural break does not explain the observed decrease of the diversification discount. We show that the pre-crisis discount is considerably smaller in a robust regression, which in part is driven by banks with a large share of non-interest income.     

How using derivatives affects bank stability in emerging countries? Evidence from the recent financial crisis

Based on banks exclusively from emerging countries over the whole period 2003–2011, this paper aims to investigate whether the use of derivative instruments are responsible in the amplification of the recent and global financial crisis. To do that, we measure the effect of derivatives use on stability of banks from emerging countries during normal period “the pre-crisis period”, 2003–2006, and turbulent period “the crisis and post-crisis period”, 2007–2011. We use the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator technique developed by Blundell and Bond to estimate our regressions.The main findings show that contrarily to forwards and swaps – which are not disruptive factors – futures and especially options, weaken the stability of banks from emerging countries. The major conclusion is that only options and futures can be considered as risky derivatives and partly responsible in the intensification of the last financial crisis.     

The influence of government intervention on the trajectory of bank performance during the global financial crisis: A comparative study among Asian economies

The global financial crisis that started from 2007 onwards spread around the world and impacted the performance of banks in major economies. Many governments have used a variety of intervention policies to recover their financial systems. By examining the dynamic changes in bank performance before and after government intervention, this study demonstrates the use of the piecewise latent trajectory model. We used the data collected from Bloomberg for banks of five major Asian economies, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, over the eleven-quarter period from the 4th quarter of 2007 to the 2nd quarter of 2010 on six financial performance indicators reflecting solvency, credit risk and profitability. The change patterns of bank performance before/after government intervention during the global financial crisis have been compared among the five economies. Our empirical results indicate that, on average, the bank performance in terms of solvency, credit risk, and profitability improves after government intervention. Moreover, the influence of government intervention on bank performance depends on the evaluative financial indicator, the economy, and whether banks are internationalized. South Korea and Hong Kong have been identified to be the economies with stronger bank performance after government intervention. Policies demonstrated useful in South Korea and Hong Kong have been summarized and discussed.     

The risk of financial intermediaries

This paper reconsiders the formal estimation of bank risk using the variability of the profit function. In our model, point estimates of the variability of profits are derived from a model where this variability is endogenous to other bank characteristics, such as capital and liquidity. We estimate the new model on the entire panel of US banks, spanning the period 1985q1–2012q4. The findings show that bank risk was fairly stable up to 2001 and accelerated quickly thereafter up to 2007. We also establish that the risk of the relatively large banks and banks that failed in the subprime crisis is higher than the industry’s average. Thus, we provide a new leading indicator, which is able to forecast future solvency problems of banks.     

A re-examination of Libor rigging: a time-varying cointegration perspective

Using a time-varying cointegration framework, this paper examines the alleged manipulation of the London interbank offered rate (Libor) during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Bank quotes are found to be poor indicators of their financing costs in the crisis period. The aberration in the estimated values of the cointegrating and error correction parameters governing the long-run equilibrium relationship between bank quotes and the final Libor suggests banks were submitting lower quotes. Further analysis which controls for an individual bank’s credit risk, market wide credit and liquidity risks, and a common market factor, demonstrate possible evidence of Libor rigging during the crisis period.     

Does bank capital reduce liquidity creation?

This paper investigates the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Analyzing an unbalanced panel of 11,617 U.S. commercial banks from 1996 to 2016, we find a negative association between regulatory capital and on-balance-sheet liquidity creation, but positive associations for small banks and after the financial crisis. Further, we observe lower liquidity creation among banks that participated in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The results are largely robust to several alternate variable proxies and model specifications. Our findings suggest that “one-size-fits-all” policy may have some unintended consequences for banks.     

Economic value,competition and financial distress in the European banking system

In this paper we examine the impact of a large number of factors at the bank level (liquidity and credit risks, asset size, income diversification and market power), at the industry level (banking concentration) and macro-level (real GDP growth) on bank financial distress using an unbalanced panel of 308 European commercial banks between 1996 and 2009. The observations falling below a given threshold of the empirical distribution of the Shareholder Value Ratio proxy bank financial distress. We employ a panel probit regression and, given the presence of overlapping data giving rise to residual autocorrelation, we use the Bertschek and Lechner (1998) robust estimator of the covariance matrix of parameters. We show that credit risk, liquidity risk and bank market power are the most influential determinants of distressed Shareholder Value Ratio. Finally we evaluate the model out-sample forecasting performance over the 2008–2009 crisis period.     

金融产品持股与银行系统性风险——兼论《商业银行股权管理暂行办法》的影响

基于金融机构通过金融产品增持上市银行股份现象日益普遍的背景,本文运用2011-2019年上市银行数据,采用系统GMM和合成控制法(SCM),分析金融产品持股¹对银行系统性风险的影响及其异质性,并探讨《商业银行股权管理暂行办法》(以下简称《股权办法》)限制金融产品超比例持有上市银行股份规定的效果。结果表明:(1)当单家金融产品股东的持股比例均低于5%²时,其会利用专业优势更好地监督银行行为,金融产品总持股比例有助于降低银行系统性风险。(2)当第一大金融产品股东的持股比例超过5%时,其会利用话语权为自身牟利,导致银行系统性风险增加,削弱金融产品总持股比例对银行系统性风险的降低作用。(3)由于保险产品持股在金融产品总持股中占主导地位,其对银行系统性风险的影响与金融产品持股的作用一致;保险产品以外的其他金融产品总持股比例会降低银行系统性风险。(4)《股权办法》的实施有助于约束持股比例超过5%的机构投资者的冒险行为,进而降低相应银行的系统性风险。