上市公司定向增发融资——一个文献综述

随着资本市场的不断发展,上市公司的融资方式日趋多样化.近年来,定向增发已发展成为我国上市公司进行融资的重要手段和主流模式,引起了学界的广泛关注.本文拟通过整理国内外有关定向增发的文献,从上市公司选择定向增发融资的动因、定向增发折价、定向增发的公告效应等三个方面进行分类综述,并对此进行简单评述,以期为我国上市公司定向增发融资研究提供新的视角.     

关于定向增发时机选择的探究

通过对我国上市公司股权再融资方式的比较发现,当前我国上市公司最主要的股权再融资方式是定向增发,我国上市公司的融资行为容易受到外部环境的影响,而很少考虑企业自身的资本成本和资本结构。上市公司会根据市场行情的变化决定定向增发的终止和实施,具有显著的时机选择倾向。本文从政府监管和企业两个方面提出有利于规范我国上市公司定向增发行为的建议。     

经济转型期证券理财新主题:掘金定向增发

定向增发融资是在股权分置改革的背景下,在借鉴成熟市场经验基础上引入的新型发行融资制度。其法律依据是2006年中国证监会颁布的《上市公司证券发行管理办法》。近年来,定向增发已成为上市公司再融资的首选方式。即使在2008年证券市场熊市期间,仍有107家上市公司通过定向增发再融资。2011年以来,定向增发方式的融资规模更是超过了IPO。     

上市公司定向增发方式选择:基于投资者异质信念视角

本文以2006-2011年在沪深两市通过定向增发实现再融资的A股上市公司为研究对象,首次在全流通背景下理论分析和实证检验了投资者异质信念对上市公司定向增发方式选择的影响。研究结果表明:对于实施定向增发的上市公司来说,投资者异质信念越大,越倾向于选择向机构投资者增发新股;投资者异质信念与定向增发规模负相关;当大股东参与定向增发时,投资者异质信念越大,大股东越有动机利用资产认购新增股份。本文的研究拓展了行为金融理论在企业融资特别是增发融资方面的研究视野。     

我国上市公司定向增发融资效应研究——基于中小投资者视角北大核心

定向增发是我国上市公司重要的融资手段。在当前我国资本市场相关制度尚不完善以及中小投资者自我保护意识不足的情况下,规模日益扩大的定向增发融资给上市公司侵害中小投资者利益提供了操作空间,这不利于资本市场持续稳定发展。以我国沪深A股作为研究样本,以上市公司定向增发公告前后的股票价格、财务绩效变化为研究对象,运用事件研究法和财务指标分析法测算定向增发的短期股价效应、长期股价效应、长期业绩效应,以此评估定向增发对中小投资者利益的影响。实证研究结果表明:样本期内,定向增发预案公告对短期股价有提升作用且可能存在信息泄露现象,对长期股价虽有正向推动作用,但定向增发后样本公司业绩并没有得到改善,尤其是定向增发过程中如果有关联股东参与,其股价上涨而业绩无实质性改善的现象更为突出。为防范上市公司通过定向增发侵害中小投资者利益,一方面需要完善定向增发融资的相关制度,加强对定向增发事项的监管;另一方面要加强中小投资者风险教育,引导中小投资者理性认识定向增发、提高信息甄别能力、减少盲目跟随投资。     

股权分置改革对股权再融资方式的影响分析——以小天鹅A为例

一、引言定向增发是指上市公司采用非公开方式向特定对象发行股票的行为。图1分析了2006～2010年我国上市公司实施的不同股权再融资方式,图1显示,从2006年股权分置改革开始到2010年,上市公司利用定向增发融资的次数远远大于其他两种股权再融资方式。表1对比了2006年和2010年实施不同股权再融资方式的上市公司数量和募集资金总额。表1显示,实施定向增发的企业从2006年的52家扩张到2010年的290家,增长近5倍,     

我国上市公司定向增发研究文献综述

定向增发是我国上市公司进行融资的主流模式,受到学者们的极大关注。本文通过整理有关定向增发的文献,从定向增发的市场效应、增发后业绩表现、增发折价、增发前后的盈余管理等方面对我国学者的研究进行了归纳,并做出简单评述。     

我国上市公司定向增发研究文献综述

定向增发是我国上市公司进行融资的主流模式,受到学者们的极大关注。本文通过整理有关定向增发的文献,从定向增发的市场效应、增发后业绩表现、增发折价、增发前后的盈余管理等方面对我国学者的研究进行了归纳,并做出简单评述。     

结构化信托参与定向增发的业务模式分析

2006年以来,随着我国股权分置改革的成功实施,市场融资功能的恢复,定向增发再融资逐渐成为上市公司和投资者所追逐的焦点。近两年,定向增发热情空前高涨,已成为上市公司再融资的主要方式和手段。从市场参与主体的角度出发,介绍了定向增发的概念及特点,对结构化信托参与定向增发的业务模式进行了着重分析,在分析该业务模式的基础上总结了结构化信托参与定向增发的业务流程,以期对市场参与主体的投资实践起到一定的借鉴和指导作用。     

定向增发是否能缓解大小股东之间的代理冲突——基于恶性增资视角的研究

基于恶性增资视角,以2001～2010年采用SEO方式融资的上市公司为样本,研究定向增发对缓解大小股东代理冲突的作用。结果发现,定向增发在一定程度上缓解了代理冲突,抑制了恶性增资发生的概率。进一步,将样本扩大到包括非SEO融资的公司,发现公开增发或配股的公司恶性增资发生概率较高,定向增发和债权融资无显著差异。对于发生恶性增资的公司,SEO融资的公司的恶性增资程度均显著高于债权融资公司,这进一步说明相比于公开增发和配股,定向增发能起到一定的治理作用。     

Financial Contracting and the Choice between Private Placement and Publicly Offered Bonds

The financial contracting in private placement bonds and publicly offered bonds are different. Our data show that private placement bonds are more likely to have restrictive covenants than public bonds. Private placement bonds are also more likely to be issued by smaller and riskier firms. For investment‐grade firms that issue bonds in both markets, our analysis shows that firms select the bond type to minimize financing costs. We find significant differences in the pricing of private placement and publicly offered bonds, and some of these differences appear to be related to the different institutional features between the two markets.     

The initial private placement of equity and changes in operating performance in Taiwan

We propose the corporate governance hypothesis which suggests that the outside blockholders arising from the private placement of equity are more likely to have a significantly positive effect on firms with poor corporate governance. Using a sample of Taiwan‐listed firms with initial private placements of equity, our study’s results indicate that an improvement in operating performance is more likely to be seen after a private placement for those firms that are without independent directors, are controlled by a family, have lower insider shareholdings or are characterized by a pyramidal ownership structure. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis.     

大股东控制下的定向增发和财富转移——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文考察了大股东控制下的上市公司定向增发折价及其价值影响,以探求定向增发是否是上市公司的控股大股东进行财富转移的一种工具。研究发现:大股东的机会主义行为动机是影响上市公司进行定向增发的重要因素,上市公司定向增发的折价水平和大股东认购比例共同决定了大股东是否从上市公司转移财富及其转移财富的多寡。本文结论对投资者投资决策,政府部门进一步完善定向增发监管政策有一定的借鉴意义。     

The Impact of Stock Transfer Restrictions on the Private Placement Discount

The literature contains four explanations for the private placement discount. I find that all four contribute to the discount: loss of option value due to transfer restrictions, equity ownership concentration, information gathering, and overvaluation and expected underperformance post‐issue. An average‐strike put option model calculates marketability discounts that are consistent with empirical private placement discounts when observed discounts are adjusted for equity ownership concentration, information, and overvaluation effects. In contrast to the positive signaling effect of traditional private placement announcements, there is a negative signaling effect for private investments in public equity when the firm commits to register the shares promptly.     

我国定向增发市场的效应及实证研究

本文详细介绍了中国定向增发市场的发展历史,定义了定向增发市场的四种效应——年关效应、牛市效应、负债效应、政策效应,认为定向增发受市场环境、时间周期、经营状况和政策倾向等因素影响。通过研究这些效应的形成原因,提出了适度放宽发行底价、加强对高折价定向增发项目的监管等建设性意见。     

The Impact of Mispricing and Asymmetric Information on the Price Discount of Private Placements of Common Stock

The price discount on privately placed stock is large and can vary substantially among firms. While earlier studies attribute price discounts on privately placed stock to illiquidity and costs of gathering information, we offer a more complete explanation. We find that firms exhibiting higher overvaluation have significantly larger price discounts in private stock sales. We also find that higher levels of asymmetric information about the issuing firm and about the stock market environment at the time of the private placement cause more pronounced discounts in the offer price. Our analysis also shows that post-issue abnormal returns following private placements are higher when discounts are less pronounced.     

THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANK REPUTATION AND RELATIONSHIPS IN EQUITY PRIVATE PLACEMENTS

We explore the role of placement agents in equity private placements. Reputable agents are more likely to place shares of firms that have performed better and that have had frequent prior relationships with the agent. Controlling for self‐selection and endogeneity, firms using reputable agents offer smaller price discounts. However, issuers having frequent prior relationships with placement agents incur higher gross spreads. Although the results support the certification role of investment banks in private placements, they also shed light on the costs incurred by issuers that frequently rely on the same investment bank.     

Relationships,corporate governance,and performance: Evidence from private placements of common stock

Using data from private placement contracts, we analyze relationships between investors and issuers, and their impact on corporate governance and performance. Most investors have a relationship with the issuer pre-placement and many new relationships are formed through the placement agreement. New relationships are largely governance-related (board seats and/or 5% or greater blocks), but also include key business partnerships and/or employment arrangements. We have three main findings. First, new relationships drive the positive stock price response at announcement; placements lacking new relationships are non-events. Second, investors with relationship ties to the issuer are more likely to gain directorships as part of the placement. Third, new relationships are associated with stronger post-placement profitability and stock price performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with private placements creating value when they are associated with increased monitoring and strong governance.     

我国需要什么样的证券非公开发行制度

2005年修订后的《公司法》、《证券法》为我国证券非公开发行与转让打开了制度空间，我国将面临证券非公开发行与转让市场大扩容和大发展的形势。本文在介绍分析证券私募制度的由来、要素及优势的基础上，结合我国市场及法规制度实际情况，从有利于发挥证券非公开发行制度优势、有利于促进企业利用该制度融资与发展的角度，提出了完善我国证券非公开考行制度的建议。     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.