利益输送、信息不对称与定向增发折价

定向增发作为资本市场权益再融资的重要方式之一，已日益受到监管层、上市公司和投资者的重视。本文研究了定向增发折价的形成原因。研究结果显示，大股东的机会主义行为和上市公司与投资者之问的信息不对称是定向增发折价的重要决定因素。我们发现，当大股东购买定向增发股票的比例与其在增发前持有的上市公司股权比例差额越大时，增发折价也越高，并且增发价格相对于基准价格的溢价越低。这一结果表明，大股东通过定向增发实现了以较低的对价稀释中小股东权益的目的，从而在一定程度上侵害了后者的利益。此外，与国外的研究一致，定向增发的折价还与信息不对称的程度成正比，即当不对称的程度越高时，增发的折价也越高。     

定向增发、资金占用与利益输送——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文基于2006年5月8日-2010年12月31日的沪深两市286家实施定向增发的上市公司为样本,研究了大股东参与定向增发与增发后公司资金占用的问题。研究结果发现,相对于大股东未参与定向增发的公司而言,大股东参与定向增发的公司在增发后资金占用更加严重。同时本文还发现,"大股东参与定向增发之后的每年",大股东参与定向增发后公司资金占用的增长率每一年都显著增加。研究结果表明,我国上市公司的大股东在定向增发后通过占用上市公司的资金,实施有利于自身利益的行为。     

我国上市公司定向增发后的财务表现:理论分析与实证研究

股权分置改革以来,定向增发逐渐成为上市公司股权再融资的首选方式,部分投资者甚至将定向增发后的财务表现过分"神话",认为其本质上具有低风险、高回报的投资特征。本文旨在通过理论与实证研究,深入探讨这种追捧行为是否理性。一方面,本文简要梳理国内外学者关于定向增发对经营绩效、对股东财富与业绩表现、股价表现与资金配置、对大股东与小股东利益协同等方面影响的研究。另一方面,本文采用因子分析模型开展实证分析,发现上市公司在定向增发前后短期内的经营绩效并无显著变化,但对于有大股东参与的定向增发,其绩效改善程度强于没有大股东参与的情况。     

投资者关注与投资者权益保护：定向增发视角研究评述

上市公司股票定价是定向增发的核心，对中小投资者权益影响较大。在定向增发过程中存在着上市公司大股东锁定较低发行价格的自利行为以及投资者非理性情绪推动股票价格的大幅涨跌，使其权益遭受损失的现象。如何保护投资者权益？本文基于投资者关注这一视角，分别围绕投资者关注的分类与度量、投资者关注与资产定价、定向增发一级市场定价效率与权益保护、定向增发折价问题成因与权益保护四个方面对国内外文献进行梳理与分析，并针对现有不足提出未来研究方向与重要议题。     

大股东控制与定向增发折价——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文系统研究了上市公司在定向增发前后股权结构的变化,以及大股东的认购比例和认购方式等因素对定向增发折价率的影响,研究发现：大股东通过定向增发进行隐性增持,进一步巩固了控制权地位,为将来的“掏空”行为创造了条件;定向增发普遍具有低价发行的偏好;定向增发折价率与大股东参与认购程度显著正相关,与大股东和小股东的利益分离程度显著正相关;大股东以资产认购时的折价率显著高于现金认购;大股东的低价增发和隐性增持侵害了小股东的权益.     

定向增发与上市公司长期业绩下滑

本文以2006-2009年我国A股市场上市公司定向增发事件为研究样本,从经营业绩的角度考察了上市公司定向增发后的长期业绩状况。本文的研究发现我国上市公司定向增发前的长期业绩呈上升趋势,在定向增发实施当年达到峰值,随后在增发后出现下滑趋势,特别是定向增发后一年内的下降幅度在统计上显著为负。本文从盈余管理假说、自由现金流假说和发行对象类别等角度检验了上市公司定向增发后长期经营业绩下滑的影响因素,发现上市公司定向增发前的盈余管理行为和自由现金流水平、定向增发后的过度投资以及大股东及其关联方的认购是造成定向增发后长期经营业绩下滑的重要原因。     

上市公司定向增发融资——一个文献综述

随着资本市场的不断发展,上市公司的融资方式日趋多样化.近年来,定向增发已发展成为我国上市公司进行融资的重要手段和主流模式,引起了学界的广泛关注.本文拟通过整理国内外有关定向增发的文献,从上市公司选择定向增发融资的动因、定向增发折价、定向增发的公告效应等三个方面进行分类综述,并对此进行简单评述,以期为我国上市公司定向增发融资研究提供新的视角.     

定向增发中的控制权变动:运用模式及其市场效应

作为一种重要的股权再融资方式,定向增发不仅可以用于上市公司的资金募集,而且可以用于控制权的重新配置、竞争和转移。在股权高度集中、一股独大现象突出的我国资本市场,当定向增发运用于整体上市、引进战略投资者、买壳上市等控制权变动时意义重大,因为此时的定向增发能直接实现上市公司原大股东控制权的显著变动或变更。利用事件研究法分析发现,我国上市公司定向增发都能带来市场的积极响应,而买壳上市、整体上市的累积超常收益更大。因此,我国上市公司定向增发不仅具有一般资本市场中的信号传递效应,而且还传递了大股东控制及其变动的信息。     

上市公司定向增发方式选择:基于投资者异质信念视角

本文以2006-2011年在沪深两市通过定向增发实现再融资的A股上市公司为研究对象,首次在全流通背景下理论分析和实证检验了投资者异质信念对上市公司定向增发方式选择的影响。研究结果表明:对于实施定向增发的上市公司来说,投资者异质信念越大,越倾向于选择向机构投资者增发新股;投资者异质信念与定向增发规模负相关;当大股东参与定向增发时,投资者异质信念越大,大股东越有动机利用资产认购新增股份。本文的研究拓展了行为金融理论在企业融资特别是增发融资方面的研究视野。     

影响我国上市公司定向增发公告效应的因素分析

自2006年5月9日股权分置改革取得重要的阶段性成果、中国证监会颁布《上市公司证券发行管理办法》以来,上市公司通过定向增发进行再融资已成为当前的热点和主渠道。上市公司定向增发新股是市场实现资源优化配置的重要手段之一,同时涉及公司财富在不同股东之间的重新分配与转移。研究哪些因素影响定向增发的股     

The Impact of Stock Transfer Restrictions on the Private Placement Discount

The literature contains four explanations for the private placement discount. I find that all four contribute to the discount: loss of option value due to transfer restrictions, equity ownership concentration, information gathering, and overvaluation and expected underperformance post‐issue. An average‐strike put option model calculates marketability discounts that are consistent with empirical private placement discounts when observed discounts are adjusted for equity ownership concentration, information, and overvaluation effects. In contrast to the positive signaling effect of traditional private placement announcements, there is a negative signaling effect for private investments in public equity when the firm commits to register the shares promptly.     

我国上市公司控股股东利益侵占行为研究：一个委托代理模型

我国上市公司控股股东侵占上市公司以及中小股东利益的行为屡见不鲜。其主要途径包括：虚假招股说明书、关联交易、股利政策、定向增发以及利润操纵。上市公司中小股东与控股股东间存在着委托代理关系。控股股东的利益侵占行为不仅降低了上市公司的期望收益,还降低了控股股东自身的努力程度以及所享有的收益份额。通过推进上市公司股权分散化、完善上市公司信息披露制度、推进＂以股抵债＂等金融创新,可以纠正上市公司控股股东侵占中小股东利益行为。     

What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions

We study shareholder returns for firms that acquired five or more public, private, and/or subsidiary targets within a short time period. Since the same bidder chooses different types of targets and methods of payment, any variation in returns must be due to the characteristics of the target and the bid. Results indicate bidder shareholders gain when buying a private firm or subsidiary but lose when purchasing a public firm. Further, the return is greater the larger the target and if the bidder offers stock. These results are consistent with a liquidity discount, and tax and control effects in this market.     

定向增发公司盈余管理研究

文章按照定向增发公司发行对象分组，分析了各组公司在发行前后共计11个季度的盈余管理情况。发现公司只对大股东发行股份时，发行前没有操纵利润，但发行后存在较强盈余管理；当机构投资者参与定向增发时，企业在发行前后都进行了盈余管理，发行后盈余管理的程度有所降低。机构投资者参与定向增发的程度越大，企业在增发过程中盈余管理的持续性和程度都越大。盈余管理的动机可能是为了保证企业承诺业绩的实现。     

Managerial Placement and Entrenchment

Using data on companies that have implemented private placements in China from 2011 to 2016, we examine the discount on private placements, short-term stock returns, and long-term performance after the placements. Our goal is to determine whether the prevailing certification and entrenchment hypotheses can explain managerial placements. We find that the participation of managerial investors has a significant and negative impact on short-term stock returns. Such a negative effect can also be found on issuing companies’ long-term profitability. Moreover, managerial placements have a higher discount than nonmanagerial placements. Our findings suggest that managerial placement is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis but not the certification hypothesis.     

Corporate governance,shareholder rights and firm diversification: An empirical analysis

Grounded in agency theory, this study investigates how the strength of shareholder rights influences the extent of firm diversification and the excess value attributable to diversification. The empirical evidence reveals that the strength of shareholder rights is inversely related to the probability to diversify. Furthermore, firms where shareholder rights are more suppressed by restrictive corporate governance suffer a deeper diversification discount. Specifically, we document a 1.1–1.4% decline in firm value for each additional governance provision imposed on shareholders. An explicit distinction is made between global and industrial diversification. Our results support agency theory as an explanation for the value reduction in diversified firms. The evidence in favor of agency theory appears to be more pronounced for industrial diversification than for global diversification.     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.     

Determinants of Underwriting Fees by New Entrant Banks: Evidence from the Japanese IPO Underwriting Market

This research investigates how banks expand market share after entering the underwriting market by examining the relation between commercial bank equity investments and underwriting fees. First, we find that not only bank underwriters with private information about issuers but also those without private information discount their fees, especially for smaller and riskier firms. This result is robust when using multiple firm‐bank relationship measures or when changing the investing stage. This is consistent with the strategic discount view that predicts that bank underwriters discount fees to expand bank market shares in underwriting markets.     

Market Liquidity,Investor Participation,and Managerial Autonomy: Why Do Firms Go Private?

We focus on public-market investor participation to analyze the firm's decision to stay public or go private. The liquidity of public ownership is both a blessing and a curse: It lowers the cost of capital, but also introduces volatility in a firm's shareholder base, exposing management to uncertainty regarding shareholder intervention in management decisions, thereby affecting the manager's perceived decision-making autonomy and curtailing managerial inputs. We extract predictions about how investor participation affects stock price level and volatility and the public firm's incentives to go private, providing a link between investor participation and firm participation in public markets.     

Corporate governance and private placement issuance in Australia

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating dilution in the economic and voting interests of existing nonparticipating (retail) shareholders in private placements. Based on a sample of 2420 private placements in Australia from 2001 to 2012, we find support for this proposition through the influence of corporate governance on pricing negotiation and firms’ choice of issuing method in private placements. Specifically, firms with better corporate governance offer private placements with a smaller discount, and are more likely to include a share purchase plan, which protects nonparticipating shareholders from ownership dilution in the placement.