纳税人遵从的演化博弈分析

对纳税人遵从行为进行动态分析是税收征管研究的理论前沿问题。现实生活中由于信息的不对称和行为主体的非完全理性,征纳双方的一次性决策选择是难以实现特定的均衡,征纳之间的博弈是一个相互作用、动态变化的过程。经过长期的博弈,在税收监管水平较高,并且纳税人群体中占大多数的是诚信纳税人的状态下,如果放松监管,将不会导致纳税人在不遵从上的显著增长。但如果监管水平降到临界点之下,遵从行为的一个较大的偏移将产生,不遵从行为急剧增多,偷逃税盛行,此时再通过提高监管水平、加大惩戒力度来扭转不遵从泛滥的趋势将变得十分困难,需要比以往付出高得多的代价。     

国外税收遵从的实践

西方国家普遍认为税务管理的目标是规范纳税人行为,提高纳税人自觉遵从税法的程度。本文介绍了税务遵从实践中美国和澳大利亚的经验,并针对我国税务管理提出了几点建议:科学认识我国目前的征管现状,构建以提高税收遵从为导向的税务管理体系;以提高税收遵从为目标指导下一步信息化建设;提倡"合作遵从",构建和谐的征纳关系;以税收遵从为指导解决征管资源有限和经济高速发展的矛盾。     

税收博弈论

税收博弈是税收征纳双方基于税收这一经济利益而发生的相互作用过程中的一系列决策与决策均衡问题.税收博弈关系可以从不同的利益取向、策略选择和共同的博弈均衡追求三方面加以认识.税收博弈是零和博弈、动态博弈、重复博弈及终极意义上的合作博弈.在具体的税收博弈模型的架构与分析中可以得出,税务机关的工作质量与税收制度的完备程度是左右税收博弈纳什均衡成立与否的决定因素,税收博弈的过程体现了对纳税人权利保护和对税制完善的不断追求.     

提高我省中小企业税收遵从度的征管策略研究 ——以榆林市为例

税收遵从理论为税务行政提供了崭新的视角来审视现代税收管理中征管与服务的税企关系.当前,针对中小企业的税收遵从现状,我省各级税务部门也进行了一些理论研究与实践探索,但仍处于初级阶段.本文通过借鉴国内外税收遵从理论和征管经验,以促进中小企业纳税人自愿遵从为目标,对我市税收征管模式以及税收遵从程度的基本情况进行分析,提出了以专业平台、专业人员对中小企业实行差别化管理等征管改革策略,以期提高征管效率,对我省税收征管体制创新起到促进作用.     

税收风险管理路径选择与实践探索

税收风险管理是税务机关运用风险管理理论和方法,在全面分析纳税人税法遵从状况的基础上,针对纳税人不同类型不同等级的税收风险,合理配置税收管理资源,通过风险提醒、纳税评估、税务审计、反避税调查、税务稽查等风险应对手段,防控税收风险,提高纳税人的税法遵从度和税务机关管理水平的税收管理活动。税务总局高度重视税收风险管理工作,在2012年7月召开的全国税务系统深化税收征管改革工作会议中提出,要建立以     

税收遵从影响因素的实验分析

税收不遵从问题是各国政府面临的一大难题,各国政府都力图从那些影响纳税人遵从决策的因素中找到有效的方法来提高税收遵从水平.运用实验的方法对纳税人税收遵从的主要影响因素进行分析表明:较高的税收检查概率、罚款率,纳税人从政府获得较多的公共物品以及较低的"不存在第三方报告的收入"的比重,会导致纳税人税收遵从率较高;纳税人感到自已是不公平的受害者,税收遵从率较低;税率、纳税人收入水平及性别对税收遵从的影响是不确定的.应从树立现代税收意识、加强税收检查、提高税收执法质量等方面提高我国纳税人税收遵从水平.     

国家治理、税收遵从与小微企业课税——基于税务部门与小微企业演化博弈分析

通过构建税务部门和小微企业的演化博弈模型,揭示了小微企业税收遵从与税收的国家治理相互作用机制,并采用仿真模拟进一步探究影响两者均衡的重要因素。研究发现：将小微企业引入税收网络,对小微企业课税,促进其税收遵从度的提高是税收国家治理效应的重要体现;税务部门对小微企业的优惠政策和处罚是促使小微企业税收遵从的关键因素,税务部门应持续地对小微企业实施减税降费的优惠政策,同时加强税收监管;提高小微企业对政策的参与度及政府的信任程度可以促进税收发挥国家治理作用。     

社会认同与税收遵从意愿北大核心CSSCI

基于各种特征,个体会被归类于不同的社会群体,并进而产生不同的社会认同。社会认同主要通过两条途径影响个体意愿:一是引发群体间偏见;二是加剧个体对群体利益冲突的感知。在涉税领域可能被激活的主要社会认同包括“纳税人群体”认同、特征不同的纳税人子群体认同、国家认同。其中,国家认同有利于促进纳税人的税收遵从,而其他社会认同则可能对税收遵从具有不利影响。为了提高纳税人的税收遵从意愿,应努力激活有利于税收遵从的社会认同,尽量消减群体间对立,提高税收宣传的有效性。     

关于开展纳税遵从工作的思考

纳税遵从是指纳税人（扣缴义务人）遵照税收法律法规向国家正确缴纳应纳（应扣缴）的各项税收、并服从税务部门及税务执法人员符合法律规范管理的行为。纳税遵从度是指纳税义务人纳税遵从的程度。     

税收征管目标及征纳双方的博弈分析

目前,国内关于税收征管目标有两种代表性观点:一是促使纳税人依法纳税;二是提高税收征管的质量和效率。应该同时吸收两种观点的合理要素,将税收征管目标重新界定为税收成本与税收流失总和最小化。在税收征纳关系中,税务机关追求的是税收成本与税收流失总和最小化,而纳税人追求的是自身利益最大化,两者根据对方的策略,做出符合各自目标的策略选择,从而形成税收征纳博弈关系。     

Thinking and Learning in the Tax Evasion Game

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent‐based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well‐defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of ‘predictive analytics’ by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking.     

Compliance costs for personal income tax in a transition country: the case of Slovenia

The evaluation of taxpayers' compliance costs has grown in significance within tax system research over the last 15 years. In 2001, two surveys of VAT and personal income taxpayers were conducted in Slovenia to evaluate compliance costs for the 2000 fiscal year. This paper presents the results of research into compliance costs for personal income tax in Slovenia. The results show that compliance costs for personal income tax are relatively low, primarily because most taxpayers consider filing their tax declaration to be a simple procedure, which means that consultancy costs are low.     

新个人所得税法对扣纳双方的影响及应对——基于扣缴人义务及纳税人行为视角

新个人所得税法在实践中的运行效果取决于征纳双方在税收征管过程中的耦合作用。一方面,作为联系税务机关与纳税人的中介与桥梁,扣缴人在个税预扣预缴及汇算清缴方面发挥着重要作用;另一方面,税制结构变化与缴税申报模式转变对纳税人影响深远。在新个人所得税下,扣缴人的扣缴清缴合规、沟通保密及判定审查等义务均有不同程度的增加、拓展或提升。而纳税人的缴税申报、现金管理及税收规避等行为更易于引致税务管控及稽查。落实应对建议有助于促使扣纳双方在税务合规的框架内发挥正向合力作用,凭借税收法治助力个税财政收入的实现。     

加拿大税收信用体系中的"自我遵从"和"失信惩戒"

加拿大是个高税负的国家,同时,它又是一个税法遵从度非常高的国家。加拿大的税收征管体制是建立在纳税人"自我遵从"的基础之上,这得益于其完善的税收信用管理体制。本文介绍了加拿大税收信用体系的基本情况,并探讨了其对我国税收信用体系建设的借鉴意义。     

Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India

This paper evaluates effects on tax compliance of simple reforms in personnel policy in the Indian income tax administration. Taxpayers voluntarily disclosing higher incomes are currently assigned to special assessment units. To avoid this, high income taxpayers have an added incentive to understate their incomes. Empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis is found. It explains spillover effects of enforcement efforts across assessment units. We incorporate these spillovers in estimating revenue effects of increased support staff. The results imply significant compliance gains would accrue from expanded staff employment and changes in assignment procedures for staff and taxpayers.     

信息不对称、激励与税收征管

税务机关与纳税人之间的信息不对称造成的影响:其一,造成了纳税人的逆向选择;其二,造成了税制的扭曲;其三,加大了税收的征收成本。应采取有力的政策措施减少纳税人与税务机关之间的信息不对称。在信息不对称条件下关联博弈和重复博弈可以有效地激励纳税人诚实纳税。     

影响纳税人税收遵从决策的因素

税收遵从决策是纳税人行为选择的一个复杂过程,其中起作用的因素很多,除了经济因素,还包括非经济因素。按照经典的逃税模型——A-S模型①所揭示的主要因素是稽查概率和罚款率,除此之外影响纳税人遵从决策的因素还包括:税收遵从成本、税制、纳税人个体特征、对政府的满意程度以及税收文化等。     

完善消费税的思考

消费税计税价格核定与增值税的相关规定不衔接，不利于税款及时入库，难以防范纳税人偷漏税款；单一环节征税消弱了消费税的调节功能，难以形成完整的税收征管链条；价内税不能解决重复征税问题。为此，建议比照增值税的相关规定调整消费税计税价格，调整部分消费品征税环节，改价内税为价外税。     

Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance

The existence of a private cost borne by audited taxpayers affects the tax enforcement policy. This is so because tax auditors will face now two sources of uncertainty, namely, the typical one associated with taxpayers’ income and that associated with the taxpayers’ idiosyncratic attitude towards tax compliance. Moreover, the inspection policy can be exposed to some randomness from the taxpayers’ viewpoint due to the uncertainty about the audit cost borne by the tax authority. In this paper we provide an unified framework to analyze the effects of all these sources of uncertainty in a model of tax compliance with strategic interaction between auditors and taxpayers. We show that more variance in the distribution of the taxpayers’ private cost of evading raises both tax compliance and the ex-ante welfare of taxpayers. The effects of the uncertainty about the audit cost faced by the tax authority are generally ambiguous. We also discuss the implications of our model for the regressive (or progressive) bias of the effective tax system.