Financial Gatekeepers and Investor Protection: Evidence from Criminal Background Checks

We examine whether financial advisors with pre‐advisor criminal records pose a greater risk to investors than those without. We find that financial advisors with pre‐advisor criminal records are more likely to receive future customer complaints. Their complaints are more likely to receive arbitration awards or settlements and are more likely to involve large settlements exceeding $100,000. Finally, clients are more likely to suffer service disruptions from engaging advisors with pre‐advisor criminal records, even incremental to the brokerage firm being high‐risk. Although we do not have performance data of individual advisors, mutual funds of those firms that employ advisors with criminal records do not provide their clients with superior returns nor charge lower fees, suggesting that there are not compensating benefits to offset the investor harm. Overall, pre‐advisor criminal record serves as an important ex ante characteristic available to regulators, investors, and employers for risk‐assessment purposes.     

Institutional Investors and Firm Efficiency of Real Estate Investment Trusts

This study investigates the effect of institutional ownership on improving firm efficiency of equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), using a stochastic frontier approach. Firm inefficiency is estimated by comparing a benchmark Tobin??s Q of a hypothetical value-maximizing firm to the firm??s actual Q. We find that the average inefficiency of equity REITs is around 45.5%, and that institutional ownership can improve the firm??s corporate governance, and hence reduce firm inefficiency. Moreover, we highlight the importance of heterogeneity in institutional investors??certain types of institutional investors such as long-term, active, and top-five institutional investors, and investment advisors are more effective institutional investors in reducing firm inefficiency; whereas hedge funds and pension funds seem to aggravate the problem. In sub-sample analysis, we find that these effective institutional investors can reduce inefficiency more effectively for distressed REITs, and for REITs with high information asymmetry, and with longer term lease contracts. Lastly, we find that the negative impact of institutional ownership (except for long-term institutional investors) on firm inefficiency reduces over time, possibly due to strengthened corporate governance and regulatory environment in the REIT industry.     

Financial literacy and the demand for financial advice

The low level of financial literacy across households suggests that they are at risk of making suboptimal financial decisions. In this paper, we analyze the effect of investors’ financial literacy on their decision to demand professional, non-independent advice. We find that non-independent advisors are not sufficient to alleviate the problem of low financial literacy. The investors with a low level of financial literacy are less likely to consult an advisor, but they delegate their portfolio choice more often or do not invest in risky assets at all. We explain this evidence with a highly stylized model of strategic interaction between investors and better informed advisors with conflicts of interests. The advisors provide more information to knowledgeable investors, who anticipating this are more likely to consult them.     

Financial advisor participation rates and low net worth investors

This study presents a simple analytical framework to identify the key determinants underlying the incentives for households to engage financial advisors. Using the US 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, we employ a logistic regression approach to understand the characteristics of households who engage financial advisors for investment or comprehensive financial advice. We find that age, education, employment category, income and net worth are highly significant variables related to the propensity to engage a financial advisor. The results also indicate significantly reduced active engagement between advisors and low net worth investors than claimed by the low net worth investors in the survey. We construct a model to derive the expected fee profile of financial advisors as a function of wealth and compare the fee structure against a financial advisor client portfolio. We find that a combination of lower aggregate costs per investor and higher expected fee income motivates advisors to target higher net worth investors. Advisors therefore prefer higher net worth investors due to the lower aggregate costs of engagement, which drives low investment participation rates by less wealthy households.     

Are mutual fund fees excessive?

There is a long running debate over whether competition in the mutual fund industry limits the ability of investment advisors to charge fees that are disproportionate to the services they provide. We posit that disproportionately high fees are prevalent in funds with multiple share classes and those with weak governance structures. Using a comprehensive sample of index mutual funds for the from 1998 to 2007, we find that internal governance mechanisms matter primarily for funds with relatively small share classes where investors often face increased search costs and/or restricted access to competitive mutual funds. Additionally, we find that funds managed by publicly held sponsors are associated with disproportionately higher fee spreads (about 28 basis points). The results are robust to the inclusion of board characteristics, share class structure, and investment objectives. Overall, our findings suggest that competition and agency considerations are important determinants in the pricing of mutual funds.     

Financial Globalization,Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias

We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (1) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the “direct effect” of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the “indirect effect”) in response to the governance and (2) foreign direct investors from “good governance” countries have a comparative advantage as insider monitors in “poor governance” countries, so that the relative importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. Using both country‐level data on U.S. investors' foreign investment allocations and Korean firm‐level data, we find empirical evidence supporting our optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias.     

Corporate Governance and Firm Survival

We explore how various aspects of corporate governance influence the likelihood of a public corporation surviving as a separate public entity, after addressing potential endogeneity that arises from competing corporate exit outcomes: acquisitions, going‐private transactions, and bankruptcies. We find that some corporate governance features are more important determinants of the form of a firm's exit than many economic factors that have figured prominently in prior research. We also find evidence that outsider‐dominated boards and lower restrictions on internal governance play major roles in the way firms exit public markets, particularly when a firm's industry suffers a negative shock. Overall, our results suggest that failure to recognize competing risks produces biased estimates, resulting in faulty inferences.     

地方政府干预、境外战略投资者引入与城市商业银行治理

本文以8家城市商业银行的42份年报作为研究样本,利用主元分析法实证研究了地方政府和境外战略投资者对城市商业银行公司治理的影响,及其作用于城市商业银行的具体机制。研究结果表明,地方政府对城市商业银行治理产生了负面影响,境外战略投资者在一定程度上抑制了地方政府对城市商业银行的干预,促进了城市商业银行治理的改善。为了提升城市商业银行公司治理水平,本文建议地方政府进一步退出城市商业银行,取消城市商业银行中境外战略投资者持股比例监管限制,鼓励外资派驻更多的董事和高管实质性参与城市商业银行的经营管理。     

When it comes to the crunch: Retail investor decision-making during periods of market volatility

Attitude to risk questionnaires are widely used by financial advisors to recommend investments of appropriate risk levels to their clients. Yet the usefulness of this instrument to gauge how investors will react when faced with extreme volatility in the values of their assets remains untested. Using realistic scenarios and based on a large-scale survey in the UK, in this study we examine how the investing public reacts to actual portfolio losses. We find that conventional risk tolerance measures are inadequate for determining whether investors would ‘sell out’ or hold their portfolios in such circumstances. On the other hand, we find that past experience, emotions and personality characteristics, including measures of financial self-efficacy and extraversion, are significant predictors of investor reactions to market crashes.     

The index fund rationality paradox

Mutual funds that track the S&P 500 are popular because they have significantly lower costs than the average, actively managed equity fund. However, a measurable number of investors select index funds with excessive fees and uncompetitive returns. We call this observation the Index Fund Rationality Paradox because it conflicts with the belief that index fund investors are making a rational, low-cost choice in their ‘type of fund’ decision. In our analysis of this paradox, we find that both retail and institutional index investors tended to make better choices in recent years, but the cost of poor choices among both groups continues to be significant. In fact, we are able to identify an arguably naïve group of retail investors that seem to be unduly influenced by brokers and financial advisors. These investors are largely responsible for the remaining paradox.     

Foreign Under‐Investment in US Securities and the Role of Relational Capital

Over 70 academic papers attempt to explain why foreigners invest in US securities. All ignore the vital role of the US broker‐dealer. Macroeconomic factors like a trade balance or corporate governance may guide foreign investors toward certain markets. But US broker‐dealers provide information to foreign investors and execute the actual trades. We hypothesize that particular foreign investors under‐invest in US securities because of a lack of relational capital with US broker‐dealers. We find that broker‐dealer marketing intensity in foreign markets partly explains foreigners’ decisions to invest in US securities. We also estimate “pent‐up” demand for US securities in developing countries – like China, Argentina, Turkey and Russia –equals roughly half‐a‐trillion dollars. Such pent‐up demand – represented as a convergence gap with investment‐to‐GDP ratios in highly developed capital markets – helps predict which markets these broker‐dealers are likely to invest marketing effort in the future. As such, broker‐dealers interested in assisting foreign investors find the right securities for their portfolios should not focus on big, rich economies. They should focus on economies with the largest convergence gaps. We also find that broker‐dealers must take in account the effect their marketing effort has on the typical variables (like relative returns, risks, asymmetric shocks and communication with the US) when they use these screening variables in deciding where to build their relational capital (and place their sales effort) in any year.     

Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and Equity Prices

This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value‐destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries. We also find that weak governance firms in noncompetitive industries are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that investors take actions to mitigate the inefficiency.     

Blockholder exit threats in the presence of private benefits of control

Exit theory predicts a governance role for outside blockholders’ exit threats, but this role could be ineffective if managers’ potential private benefits exceed their loss in stock-price declines caused by the blockholders’ exits. We test this prediction using the Split-Share Structure Reform (SSSR) in China, which provided a large exogenous and permanent shock to the cost for outside blockholders to exit. We find that firms whose outside blockholders experience an increase in exit threats improve performance more than those whose outside blockholders experience no increase. The governance effect of exit threats also is ineffective in the group of firms with the highest concern for private benefits of control. Finally, a battery of theory-motivated tests shows that the documented effects are unlikely explained by outside blockholder intervention or some well-known intended effects of SSSR.     

Institutional Investors and Shareholder Litigation

We examine whether institutional investors are able to avoid future litigation. Our results show that institutions provide a fiduciary role by decreasing or eliminating their positions in sued firms well before litigation begins. We also find that institutional groups with high monitoring ability (independent investment advisors and mutual funds) are more proactive in their trading behavior than are institutions with low monitoring ability (banks, insurance companies, and unclassified institutions such as endowments, foundations, and self-managed pension funds). We find that percentage changes in institutional ownership are correlated with public information available more than two quarters before litigation.     

Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

We find that companies with directors from academia are associated with higher performance. This relation is driven by professors without administrative positions. We also find that academic directors play an important governance role through their advising and monitoring functions. Specifically, our results show that the presence of academic directors is associated with greater acquisition performance, a higher number of patents and citations, higher stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, and higher CEO forced turnover‐performance sensitivity. Overall, our results indicate that academic directors are valuable advisors and effective monitors and firms benefit from having academic directors.     

Corporate governance,life cycle,and payout precommitment: An emerging market study

We analyze the role of firm‐level corporate governance in determining the precommitment payout policy of emerging market firms and investigate whether there is a precommitment life‐cycle effect. Unlike previous studies of U.S. firms, we find evidence of precommitment only among relatively well‐governed firms, which combine good governance with large dividend payouts to shareholders and large debt‐related repayments to creditors. We also document a strong precommitment life‐cycle effect. Firms in the growth and mature stages of their life cycle tend to use both debt and dividends to precommit to investors, with an increasing proportion of dividends in total payout measures. Our results are robust to an array of control variables, alternate payout proxies, market setting, and firm‐level corporate governance, and it addresses potential endogeneity concerns in the sample.     

Financial advisors: A case of babysitters?

We use two data sets, one from a large brokerage and another from a major bank, to ask: (i) whether financial advisors are more likely to be matched with poorer, uninformed investors or with richer and experienced investors; (ii) how advised accounts actually perform relative to self-managed accounts; (iii) whether the contribution of independent and bank advisors is similar. We find that advised accounts offer on average lower net returns and inferior risk-return tradeoffs (Sharpe ratios). Trading costs contribute to outcomes, as advised accounts feature higher turnover, consistent with commissions being the main source of advisor income. Results are robust to controlling for investor and local area characteristics. The results apply with stronger force to bank advisors than to independent financial advisors, consistent with greater limitations on bank advisory services.     

Factors Influencing Corporate Environmental Disclosures

We investigate the effectiveness of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a not‐for‐profit organization that facilitates environmental disclosures of firms with institutional investors, thereby serving as a corporate governance mechanism for shareholders to influence the firm's environmental disclosures. We examine firm characteristics associated with firms' decisions to disclose carbon‐related information via the CDP for a sample of 319 Canadian firms over a four‐year period. In particular, we examine how firms' decisions to disclose via CDP are associated with shareholder activism, litigation risk, and the opportunity for low‐cost positive publicity once requested by the firms' “signatory” investors. Our results also show that management's decision to release climate change data is associated with domestic, but not foreign, signatory investors. We also find that disclosing firms tend to be those from lower polluting industries with less exposure to litigation risk. This suggests that this new form of coordinated shareholder activism may not be successful at altering the behavior of firms that are heavier polluters.     

Institutional Ownership and the Dynamics of Trading Volume around FFO Announcements

We examine the effect of institutional ownership on abnormal trading volume around the announcement of funds from operations (FFO) by real estate investment trusts (REITs). Our central thesis is that abnormal trading volume is lower for the more informed institutions vis a vis non-sophisticated retail investors/institutions. We find a negative relationship between ownership by pension funds and abnormal trading volume around quarterly FFO announcements. However, ownership by the other types of institutions is unrelated to abnormal trading volume. Consistent with the view that some institutional investors are more informed than individual investors and therefore respond less to end of year announcements, we find that higher ownership by investment advisors is associated with lower levels of trading volume around end of year FFO announcements. Lastly, we find no evidence of institutional sell-offs associated with announcements of less than expected FFO.     

Friends can help: The effects of relationship in the Chinese book-building process

Using detailed bidding information in Chinese IPO book-building process, we find that institutional investors who have a close relationship with the underwriter are more likely to participate in bidding and their bidding prices are higher, compared to other institutional investors. We also find that related institutional investors bid higher when the underwriter is more likely to need or receive their support. Further analysis suggests that related institutional investors gain some benefits for their support to the underwriter, including receiving more shares in profitable IPOs, better timing their exit from the IPO in the open market, and receiving more optimistic earnings forecasts or stock recommendations from analysts of the underwriter. Regarding the economic consequence, we show that the underwriter is more likely to revise the offer price upward if related institutions bid higher. The evidence overall indicates the existence of relationship-driven bidding in the Chinese book-building process.