Houses as ATMs: Mortgage Refinancing and Macroeconomic Uncertainty

Mortgage refinancing activity associated with extraction of home equity contains a strongly countercyclical component consistent with household demand for liquidity. We estimate a structural model of liquidity management featuring countercyclical idiosyncratic labor income uncertainty, long- and short-term mortgages, and realistic borrowing constraints. We empirically evaluate its predictions for households' choices of leverage, liquid assets, and mortgage refinancing using microlevel data. Taking the observed historical paths of house prices, aggregate income, and interest rates as given, the model accounts for many salient features in the evolution of balance sheets and consumption in the cross-section of households over 2001 to 2012.     

Mortgage Brokers and the Refinancing Transaction: Evidence from CRA Borrowers

This study adds to an emerging literature on the lending practices of mortgage brokers during the run-up in home prices prior to 2006. Following a sample of low— and moderate-income borrowers through the first years following home purchase, the analysis identifies differences in the refinancing transaction associated with the use of mortgage brokers vs. retail lenders. Specifically, the analysis includes measures of the refinancing process, including whether the lender initiated contact with the borrower, whether the terms of the mortgage changed at closing, and the level of borrower satisfaction in hindsight. Care must be taken in extrapolating from this sample to the broader mortgage market, as all borrowers refinanced out of 30-year fixed-rate purchase mortgages in the Community Advantage Program (CAP). Nevertheless, analysis of this sample offers unique insight into borrowers’ interactions with mortgage brokers during the refinancing transaction. Origination with a mortgage broker, compared with origination through a retail lender, is associated with both a less satisfactory refinancing process and a higher likelihood of refinancing into an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM).     

Correlated leverage and its ramifications

This paper develops a theory in which housing prices, the capital structures of banks (mortgage lenders) and the capital structures of mortgage borrowers are all endogenously determined in equilibrium. There are four main results. First, leverage is a “positively correlated” phenomenon in that high leverage among borrowers is positively correlated with high leverage among banks, and higher house prices lead to higher leverage for both. The intuition is that first-time homebuyers with fixed wealth endowments must borrow more to buy more expensive homes, whereas higher current house prices rationally imply higher expected future house prices and therefore higher collateral values on bank loans, inducing banks to be more highly levered. Second, higher bank leverage leads to greater house price volatility in response to shocks to fundamental house values. Third, a bank’s exposure to credit risk depends not only on its own leverage but also on the leverage decisions of other banks. Fourth, positive fundamental shocks to house prices dilute financial intermediation by reducing banks’ pre-lending screening, and this reduction in bank screening further increases house prices. Empirical and policy implications of the analysis are drawn out, and empirical evidence is provided for the first two main results. The key policy implications are that greater geographic diversification by banks, tying mortgage tax exemptions to the duration of home ownership, and increasing bank capital requirements when borrower leverage is high can help reduce house price volatility.     

经济周期、金融周期动态演变下企业杠杆率探析 ——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

：将经济周期和金融周期的变化同时纳入杠杆率模型,分别建立中国上市公司的衰退模型和扩张模型,结合企业融资约束,研究经济周期、金融周期的周期异步性对企业杠杆率的直接效应和间接效应。研究发现：周期异步性对企业杠杆率的直接效应呈逆周期性特征,间接效应呈顺周期性;衰退期时,再融资企业杠杆率对周期性变动比融资受限企业更为敏感。研究对于监管当局综合经济周期、金融周期,制定、调整、完善企业债务融资政策,帮助企业深入理解债务融资环境,提升债务融资能力具有参考和借鉴意义。     

The Net Benefits to Leverage

I estimate the market's valuation of the net benefits to leverage using panel data from 1994 to 2004, identified from market values and betas of a company's debt and equity. The median firm captures net benefits of up to 5.5% of firm value. Small and profitable firms have high optimal leverage ratios, as predicted by theory, but in contrast to existing empirical evidence. Companies are on average slightly underlevered relative to the optimal leverage ratio at refinancing. This result is mainly due to zero leverage firms. I also look at implications for financial policy.     

Credit refinancing and corporate tax avoidance

This study examines the disciplining effects of credit markets on firms’ corporate tax avoidance strategies. We show that, during adverse credit market conditions, firms with refinancing needs prefer to limit the after-tax cash flow benefits of tax avoidance to regain access to traditionally risk-averse credit markets. Our results show that firms increase their cash effective tax rate by two percentage points when facing refinancing constraints, and this effect is more pronounced for firms with lower asset redeployability and higher default probability. However, corporate governance mechanisms mitigate the relationship between tax avoidance and credit refinancing. Moreover, we show that firms decrease their tax avoidance strategies while leaving their leverage and debt shield unchanged. Overall, our findings are consistent with the observation that credit markets put pressure on tax-avoiding firms and contribute to the policy debate on disciplining tax avoiders.     

The leverage effect and the basket-index put spread

Benchmark models that exogenously specify equity dynamics cannot explain the large spread in prices between put options written on individual banks and options written on the bank index during the financial crisis. However, theory requires that asset dynamics be specified exogenously and that endogenously determined equity dynamics exhibit a “leverage effect” that increases put prices by fattening the left tail of the distribution. The leverage effect is larger for puts on individual stocks than for puts on the index, thus increasing the basket-index spread. Time-series and cross-sectional variation in the leverage effect explains option prices well.     

Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager–shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. In the model, firms face taxation, refinancing costs, and liquidation costs. Managers own a fraction of the firms’ equity, capture part of the free cash flow to equity as private benefits, and have control over financing decisions. Using data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we find that agency costs of 1.5% of equity value on average are sufficient to resolve the low‐leverage puzzle and to explain the dynamics of leverage ratios. Our estimates also reveal that agency costs vary significantly across firms and correlate with commonly used proxies for corporate governance.     

Sales Concessions in the US Housing Market

This article examines the use of concessions in the US housing market, specifically payments for closing costs, home warranties, and structural repairs. This is the first study to examine the motivations and characteristics of homeowners that utilize concessions. It also examines the impact concessions have on transaction prices and marketing durations. While the literature has attempted to determine if concessions can reduce marketing durations or increase transaction prices, the evidence is tainted by endogeneity and sample issues. Additionally, we find that relative bargaining power between buyers and sellers has a fundamental effect on how concessions alter prices and marketing durations. This aspect has been considered only narrowly in the extant literature. Our results demonstrate that when sellers have bargaining power, transactions including concessions exhibit higher prices and shorter marketing durations. Conversely, when buyers have greater negotiation leverage, transactions including concessions experience lower prices and longer marketing periods.     

The differential impact of leverage on the default risk of small and large firms

We analyse a sample of 6 million firm-year observations of large corporations and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) spanning 6 European countries from 2005 to 2015, to determine the impact of leverage and different sources of funding on default risk. We find that financial leverage has a greater impact on the probability of default of SMEs than of large corporations. The difference in default probability between the top and bottom leverage quartiles is 1.24% for large firms and 2.87% for SMEs. This difference may be explained by the greater exposure of SMEs to short-term debt and their consequently higher refinancing risk. Indeed, we find that SMEs that recover from the state of insolvency may have similar leverage to defaulted SMEs; however their liability structure is significantly altered towards long-term debt and away from short-term debt. Our findings have important implications not only for bank regulators and policy-makers but also for credit risk modelling.