Logit Price Dynamics

We model retail price stickiness as the result of costly, error‐prone decision making. Under our assumed cost function for the precision of choice, the timing of price adjustments and the prices firms set are both logit random variables. Errors in the prices firms set help explain micro facts related to the size of price changes, the behavior of adjustment hazards, and the variability of prices and costs. Errors in adjustment timing increase the real effects of monetary shocks, by reducing the “selection effect.” Allowing for both types of errors also helps explain how trend inflation affects price adjustment.     

Pricing Behavior and the Response of Hours to Productivity Shocks

Recent contributions have suggested that technology shocks have a negative impact on hours, contrary to the prediction of standard flexible-price models of the business cycle. Some authors have interpreted this finding as evidence in favor of sticky-price models, while others have either extended flexible-price models or disputed the empirical finding itself. In this paper, we estimate a variety of alternative total factor productivity measures for a representative sample of Italian manufacturing firms and on average find a negative effect of productivity shocks on hours growth. More interestingly, using the reported frequency of price reviews, we show that the contractionary effect is stronger for firms with stickier prices and weaker or not significant for firms with more flexible prices. Price stickiness remains a crucial factor in shaping the response of hours after controlling for product storability or market power.     

An open-economy new Keynesian Phillips curve for the U.K.

We estimate a pricing equation or “new Keynesian Phillips curve” (NKPC) obtained from a structural dynamic model of price setting based on Rotemberg [1982. Sticky prices in the United States. Journal of Political Economy 90(6), 1187-1211] and extended to capture employment adjustment costs and the openness of the United Kingdom. This model nests the baseline Galí and Gertler [1999. Inflation dynamics: a structural econometric analysis. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 127-159) and Sbordone [2002. Prices and unit labor costs: a new test of price stickiness. Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 265-292] relationship between inflation and marginal cost in the limiting case of no employment adjustment costs, no impact of relative prices of imported inputs on real marginal cost and a constant equilibrium markup. Our findings indicate that each of our modifications to the baseline NKPC model is important for U.K. data, so that inflation in the U.K. is explained both by changes in employment and by changes in real import prices, in general, and real oil prices, in particular. External competitive pressures also seem to affect U.K. inflation via their impact on the equilibrium price markup of domestic firms.     

Resale price maintenance and collusion

The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short‐run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it.     

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two‐way access pricing: no termination‐based price discrimination†

We study access pricing rules that determine the access prices between two networks as a linear function of marginal costs and (average) retail prices set by both networks. When firms compete in linear prices, there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of underlying demand conditions. When firms compete in two‐part tariffs, there exists a class of rules under which firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, the regulator can choose among these rules to pursue additional objectives such as increasing consumer surplus or promoting socially optimal investment.     

Oligopolistic markets with sequential search and production cost uncertainty

This article analyzes a sequential search model where firms face identical but stochastic production costs, the realizations of which are unknown to consumers. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying a reservation price property and provide a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. We show that (i) firms set on average higher prices and make larger profits compared to the scenario where consumers observe production costs, (ii) expected prices and consumer welfare can be non‐monotonic in the number of firms, and (iii) the impact of production cost uncertainty vanishes as the number of firms becomes very large.     

Evidence that Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership Accelerate the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper presents evidence that prices of firms followed by sell-side analysts and favored by institutional investors incorporate future earnings earlier than prices of other firms. We conduct two sets of empirical tests: the first examines coefficients from regressions of returns on lead, contemporaneous, and lag earnings changes; the second compares the timing of monthly abnormal returns from earnings-based zero-investment portfolios. In both sets of tests, the results for analysts and institutions are incremental to each other. In addition, neither the analyst price lead nor the institutional price lead is due to price leads increasing with firm size.     

Price setting in forward-looking customer markets

If consumers form habits in individual goods, firms face a time-inconsistency problem. Low prices in the future help attract customers in the present. Firms, therefore, have an incentive to promise low prices in the future, but price gouge when the future arrives. In this setting, firms benefit from “committing to a sticky price.” If consumers have incomplete information about costs and demand, the firm-preferred equilibrium has the firm price at or below a “price cap.” The model therefore provides an explanation for the simultaneous existence of a rigid regular price and frequent “sales”.     

Shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness

We show that firm‐specific information is more likely to be incorporated into stock prices when firms have stronger shareholder coordination. The premise of our work is that geographic proximity reduces communication costs among shareholders, thereby leading to better coordination. The positive coordination‐informativeness relation is driven mainly by shareholder coordination among dedicated and independent institutions. We further show that the positive effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance mechanisms, suggesting that shareholder coordination could serve as a substitute conduit of price discovery. Lastly, we propose that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness through the channel of enhanced voluntary disclosure quality.     

A search cost model of obfuscation

This article develops models in which obfuscation is individually rational for oligopolistic firms. Firms sell a homogeneous good to rational consumers who incur search costs to learn prices. Search costs are endogenized by allowing obfuscation—firms have an unobservable action that increases the time needed to learn their price. One model involves search costs convex in shopping time. We show that slight convexity can dramatically alter the equilibrium price distribution. A second model examines an informational linkage between current and future search costs: consumers are uncertain about a component of search costs. Here, a signal‐jamming mechanism can lead to equilibrium obfuscation.     

Restaurant Prices and the Minimum Wage

In this paper, we examine the effect of the minimum wage on restaurant prices. We contribute both to the study of economic impact of the minimum wage and to the study of microeconomic patterns of price stickiness. For this purpose, we use a unique data set of individual price quotes collected to calculate the Consumer Price Index in France and we estimate a price rigidity model based on a flexible rule. We find a positive and significant impact of the minimum wage on prices. The effect of the minimum wage on prices is, however, very protracted. A change in the minimum wage takes more than a year to fully pass through to retail prices.     

Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses

We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming. However, despite allowing for showrooming in our model, we find that price parity clauses often harm consumers.     

Aggressive reporting,investor protection and stock price informativeness: Evidence from Chinese firms

This paper investigates the impact of aggressive reporting on the ability of stock prices to inform in Chinese firms. Using both stock price synchronicity and the probability of informed trading as proxies for stock price informativeness, we find that aggressive reporting damages the ability of stock prices to inform in Chinese firms. Our findings are robust to potential endogeneity and the use of alternative aggressive-reporting measures. Finally, we find that the impact of aggressive reporting in reducing stock price informativeness is stronger in firms located in regions of weaker institutional development and in private sectors firms.     

Endogenous Price Stickiness,Trend Inflation,and Macroeconomic Stability

Previous studies show that higher trend inflation is more likely to induce indeterminacy of equilibrium in sticky‐price models based on micro evidence that each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged. This paper demonstrates that when the degree of price stickiness is endogenously determined in a Calvo model, indeterminacy caused by higher trend inflation is less likely. A key factor for determinacy is the long‐run inflation elasticity of output implied by the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This elasticity declines substantially with higher trend inflation in the case of exogenously given price stickiness, whereas in the case of endogenous price stickiness the decline in the elasticity is mitigated because higher trend inflation leads to a higher probability of price adjustment.     

How Do Nominal and Real Rigidities Interact? A Tale of the Second Best

This paper analyzes the importance of real wage rigidities, in particular through their interaction with price stickiness, in a New Keynesian model. Real wage rigidities result from a combination of staggered wage setting and partial indexation of nonreset wages to past inflation. Blanchard and Galí (2007) show real rigidities to introduce a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and the welfare‐relevant output gap. The present paper complements their findings by showing that the welfare costs of real rigidities can be substantial compared to nominal frictions. In a typical “tale of the second best,” we also show that in the presence of real wage rigidities, higher price stickiness can be welfare enhancing.     

Industrial Sickness, Primary and Secondary: The Effects of Exit Constraints on Industrial Performance

In an attempt to protect workers from unemployment, governmentsin some countries subsidize firms which would otherwise fail.This article examines the effects of such subsidies on output,prices, and welfare. It also briefly reviews the effects forvarying price elasticities of supply and demand, for nontradedand fully traded goods, and for firms in which wages exceedtheir free market level. If the firm produces a nontraded good,the "sickness" of one firm that is subsidized to maintain productioncan spread to other firms that would be viable in the absenceof the subsidies. The analysis shows that the exit constraintshave the most detrimental effect when the elasticity of demandis low and supply elasticity is high, and when the governmentweighs the welfare of the firm's workers and consumers lessthan that of the general taxpayers and the firm owners. Whenlabor costs are higher than their free market levels and outputis thus less than the optimal levels, the subsidies could havean effect similar to that of an optimal production subsidy.In practice, however, this possibility is likely to be outweighedby associated rent-seeking costs and other distortions.     

FT coverage and UK target price run-ups

We focus on the market expectation hypothesis to explain the increase in share prices and trading volume of target firms before their merger announcements that have conventionally been attributed to either insider trading or market expectation. We use Financial Times (FT) coverage as a proxy of merger expectation and search for relevant articles for 783 UK target firms between 1998 and 2010. We identify a total of 1049 rumour articles and find that the FT market expectation proxy explains a small percentage of the target price run-ups. Results are strong during the sample period, even though the magnitude for both returns and trading volume tends to decrease within recent years. There is also a strong contemporaneous relation between abnormal returns and trading volume. Unexplained increases in target prices and trading volume may be attributed to insider trading.     

Earnings management and abnormal returns: Evidence from the 1970–1972 Price Control Regulations

We examine the association between abnormal returns and earnings management in the context of price control regulations to test the construct validity of the earnings management model. Abnormal returns are used as a market–based measure, and discretionary accruals are employed to measure earnings management. Our results support the hypotheses that (1) price control regulations affect firms' security prices negatively, (2) firms make income–decreasing discretionary accruals to increase the likelihood of price increase approval, and (3) firms that are affected most negatively by the regulations manage earnings more aggressively. We conclude that the earnings management model we use in this study is capable of predicting opportunistic discretionary accruals.     

Multiproduct firms and price-setting: Theory and evidence from U.S. producer prices

Using micro-data on U.S. producer prices, we establish three new facts about price setting by multi-product firms. First, firms selling more goods adjust prices more frequently but on average by smaller amounts. Moreover, their fraction of positive price changes is lower and the dispersion of price changes is higher. Second, price changes within firms are substantially synchronized, which plays a dominant role in explaining pricing dynamics. Third, firms selling more goods have greater within-firm synchronization of price changes. A model with trend inflation and firm-specific menu costs where firms are subject to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks matches the empirical findings.     

Do switching costs make markets more or less competitive? The case of 800‐number portability

Do switching costs reduce or intensify price competition if firms charge the same price to existing and new consumers? I study 800‐number portability to determine how switching costs affect price competition under a single price regime. AT&T and MCI reduced their toll‐free services prices in response to portability, implying that reduced switching costs increased competition. Despite rapid market growth, gains from higher prices to “locked‐in” consumers exceeded the incentives to capture new consumers. Prices on larger contracts dropped more, consistent with greater lock‐in for larger users. Price changes between portability's announcement and implementation are consistent with rational expectations.