A comparison of alternative models for estimating firm’s growth rate

The growth rate plays an important role in determining a firm’s asset and equity values, nevertheless the basic assumptions of the growth rate estimation model are less well understood. In this paper, we demonstrate that the model makes strong assumptions regarding the financing mix of the firm. In addition, we discuss various methods to estimate firms’ growth rate, including arithmetic average method, geometric average method, compound-sum method, continuous regression method, discrete regression method, and inferred method. We demonstrate that the arithmetic average method is very sensitive to extreme observations, and the regression methods yield similar but somewhat smaller estimates of the growth rate compared to the compound-sum method. Interestingly, the ex-post forecast shows that arithmetic average method (compound-sum method) yields the best (worst) performance with respect to estimating firm’s future dividend growth rate. Firm characteristics, like size, book-to-market ratio, and systematic risk, have significant influence on the forecast errors of dividend and sales growth rate estimation.     

Labor market equilibria under limited liability

This paper explores the impact of limited liability on labor market equilibria. Assuming risk-neutrality, the effect of limited liability on production decisions is neutral. It is demonstrated that neutrality of the production decision will not hold under safety-first type of risk aversion. In particular limited liability generally decreases usage of capital. The changes in the quality of labor depend on the magnitude of complementarity between capital and labor and on whether the output clasticity of labor is greater or less than unity. Hence it is possible for limited liability to decrease the usage of labor and capital and hence reduce output.     

Board meetings,committee structure,and firm value

In this study, we examine the determinants of board monitoring activity and its impact on firm value for a broad panel of firms over a six-year period from 1999 to 2005. During this period, Congress and the exchanges promulgated regulations that increased pressure upon firms for more independent and active boards. Economists have debated whether board activity and externally imposed regulations benefit or harm firms. We develop and examine several proxies for board monitoring and examine the relationship between board monitoring activity, firm characteristics, and firm value in a structural equation framework. One set of our proxies is based on the number of annual board and Audit Committee meetings. We show that prior performance, firm characteristics and governance characteristics are important determinants of board activity. We also show that the board monitoring is driven by corporate events, such as an acquisition or a restatement of financial statements. We find that board activity has a positive impact on firm value. Our results also indicate that the external pressure has had a salutary effect and recent regulations have led to some increase in firm value. A second set of proxies is based on the shift to a fully independent Audit, Compensation and Nominating Committees. We find that firms increased the independence of these Board committees following the enactment of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.     

THE IMPLICATIONS OF OECD GROWTH FOR SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS

This paper examines the role of OECD growth on South African exports using a vector error correction model. In the long run both OECD growth and the real effective exchange rate were found to influence South Africa's export performance, while in the short run, the real effective exchange rate was found to be an important driver of export growth. The policy implications that emerge from the study underscore the importance of fully exploiting current trading relationships, diversifying South African export destinations and enhancing competitiveness.     

Board monitoring,firm risk,and external regulation

We examine the relationship between board monitoring and firm characteristics using a broad sample of firms over the 8 year period from 1996 to 2003. We find that board independence and monitoring is negatively related to firm risk in the absence of external regulation. In addition, we find that external regulatory and political pressures affect the level of board monitoring, especially after the increased focus on board composition by the stock exchanges beginning in 1999 and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We find that the sensitivity of the negative relationship between board monitoring and firm risk decreases in the post 1999 period suggesting that firms have increased board monitoring in response to external regulations. We also find that these external regulations have had an asymmetrical impact on high-risk firm. In our empirical analysis we also control for other factors that affect board monitoring and find that firms in which the CEO has longer tenure and greater equity ownership have less board monitoring activity and that there is a negative relationship between the level of board monitoring and the level of shareholder rights.