The impact of settlement period on sales price

This study is an empirical investigation of the impact of settlement period on sales price while controlling for marketing period and standard explanatory variables. The hypothesized positive relationship between settlement period and sales price is confirmed by the results of this study. The estimated coefficient on settlement period is 0.0008 meaning that our market, on average, exacts a premium of 0.08 percent per day of settlement period beyond a norm of 60 days. The estimated coefficient on marketing period (a control variable) is –0.0003 meaning that our market, on average, requires a discount of 0.03 percent per day of marketing period. Our findings show the relative importance of settlement period in making real estate pricing decisions.     

Bank lending ‘manias’ in theory and history

A popular view of banking crises sees them as consequences of prior bank lending manias. Such manias are supposed to be especially likely in legally unrestricted banking systems, where banks can issue notes and are not subject to statutory reserve requirements. Here it is argued that the bank lending mania hypothesis (1) exaggerates the role of subjective factors, including bankers' confidence or optimism, as a stimulus to bank lending, and (2) is not supported by evidence from past, legally unrestricted banking systems.     

Company Tax Structure and Company Tax Incidence

This paper reviews conflicting theories of company tax incidence impliedby the alternative new and traditional views of dividends andexamines their contrasting policy implications. Whereas, under thetraditional view, closer integration of the corporate and personalincome tax systems is suggested, an alternative policy orientationemphasizing the non-distorting features of the classical system is impliedby the new view. Even if the traditional view is accepted, theimplications for design and reform of the company tax vary widely underalternative specifications of domestic and international tax policy objectives. Schedular alternatives to global income taxation are alsoconsidered.     

The “Rent-To-Own” mortgage and prepayment risk

The most important risk factor in the mortgage and mortgage-backed security market has been prepayment risk. Various innovations have arisen to deal with it but none hedge it fully. The Rent-To-Own (RTO) mortgage discussed here is a mortgage instrument that reduces or even reverses prepayment risk. It does so by creating an incentive structure within the framework of the mortgage contract that penalizes prepayment when interest rates are low and rewards it when interest rates are high. This is the opposite of standard mortgages. The RTO incentive structure is based on a unique buyout feature. Borrowers who want to buy out the financial interest of the lender may do so whenever they want, but the buyout price is a negative function of the market interest rates prevailing currently, that is, at the time of the buyout. Hence the lower these rates, the higher the buyout price. Other advantages of the RTO mortgage are also described.     

A General Theorem on the Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk

In this paper, the concept of absolutely riskier than is introduced to generalize Gollier's (Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 522–535) necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparative statics of a change in risk for risk averters. The restrictive assumption that the payoff function is monotonic in the risk is relaxed. The policymaker's choice problem, the newsboy problem, and a farmer's example are used to illustrate how easily the monotonicity assumption is violated. Finally, some important properties of the concept of absolutely riskier than, such as its relation with the concept of second-order stochastic dominance, are illustrated using the farmer's example.     

Heterogeneity in Financial Market Participation: Appraising its Implications for the C-CAPM

This paper presents empirical evidence that accounting for heterogeneity in financial market participation is important for evaluating the empirical performance of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM). Using the US Consumer Expenditure Survey as a common testing ground, I re-assess three well-known characterizations of the equity premium puzzle (i) the inconsistency of the representative agent's IMRS with Hansen and Jagannathan bounds; (ii) Mehra and Prescott's calibration of a large representative agent's risk aversion; (iii) Hansen and the Singleton's large structural estimates of the preference parameters based on aggregate data. In all three cases, the estimates of risk aversion conditional upon financial market participation are not as far from reasonable values as the corresponding unconditional ones. The differences suggest that part of the equity premium puzzle can be accounted for by the use of a representative agent assumption rather than a more appropriate "representative stockholding agent assumption.     

Optimal Consumption Taxes and Social Security Under Tax Measurement Problems and Uncertainty

A representative individual lives for two periods; works when young and depends on savings and a government operated social security system when old—the returns on both sources of income, when old, are random. Due to administrative problems the returns to savings are observed with some measurement error. Two alternative consumption tax systems are considered; the Registered Asset Treatment (RAT) and the Non-Registered Asset Treatment (NRAT). The advantage of the RAT is that it can perform a social insurance role while the disadvantage is that it imposes measurement error risk. Correlation between the random return on saving and its measurement error can provide a risk-hedging role that can be further strengthened by the RAT version. The NRAT version neither provides social insurance nor imposes measurement error risk. Both tax systems hedge against the uncertainties in the social security system. The taxpayer engages in precautionary saving in response to future uncertainty.     

Conduit Entities: Implications of Indirect Tax-Efficient Financing Structures for Real Investment

As well known, companies shift income from high to low tax jurisdictions. Typically, profit shifting is achieved by direct financing structures whereby companies use debt finance in the high tax entity and equity finance in the low tax entity. However, certain tax policies can lead to indirect financing structures whereby a conduit entity provides an opportunity to achieve at least two deductions for interest expenses for an investment made in the host country. The effect of direct and indirect financing structures on real investment is compared.     

“Investor sentiment” and the closed-end fund puzzle: A 7 percent solution

Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that the irrational noise trader model of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) ... is consistent with the published evidence on closed-end fund prices. ... However, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler provide no indication of how much of the variability of a closed-end fund's discounts and premiums is due to such investor sentiment. Using the signal extraction technique of French and Roll (1986) to measure noise, this article estimates that on average only 7 percent of the variance of a standardized measure of weekly changes in discounts and premiums can be attributed to noise-trading activity. Investor sentiment, therefore, seems to account for very little of a closed-end fund's discount and premium variability over time.     

The Impact of Risk-Based Premiums on FDIC-Insured Institutions

This paper examines the effect of a series of announcements leading to the approval of risk-based deposit insurance premiums on returns to stockholders of commercial banks. Utilizing risk-weighted capital ratios and measures of overall risk, we group banks according to one of the nine-tier insurance categories subsequently defined by the FDIC. During the period in which the new insurance system was considered and approved, we found that stockholders of well-capitalized, healthy banks experienced wealth changes significantly different from those experienced by less than well-capitalized, less than healthy banks. Although many argued the premium range in the initial insurance schedule was insufficient, the results show that this initial risk-basing marked an important change in the relative burdens imposed by FDIC insurance.     

What is the Truth About the Scale of Japanese Banks' Bad Debts? Is the Situation Manageable?

In January 1998, the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF, 1998) released figures which suggested that the Japanese banking industry';s bad debts might be as high as ¥77 trillion (since revised upward to ¥87.5 trillion, if cooperative-type institutions are included; Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA), 1998). This compared with the previous official estimate of ¥28 trillion. The revelation was designed to do three things: (1) to convince investors, at home and abroad, who had long suspected that the true level of bad debts was much higher than the authorities (and the banks) were willing to admit to, that the authorities were sincere in their quest to enhance disclosure by local financial intermediaries; (2) to stifle opposition to the government's plans to use up to ¥30 trillion (since increased to ¥60 trillion) of public funds to stabilize the financial system¹ by underlining the gravity of the situation facing the Japanese economy; and (3) to pave the way for the introduction of more transparent reporting by the banks in April 1998 when a regime of prompt corrective action (PCA)² was scheduled to commence. This article explains the evolution of bad debt disclosure by the Japanese banking industry and assesses the significance of the latest figures. In particular, it highlights the extent to which accounting forbearance has been, and continues to be, used to mask the true level of the banks' bad debts and refutes the claim that the industry's bad debt burden peaked in 1995. The banking industry's ability to handle the continuing bad debt problem, in the face of a significant impairment of economic capital and the market's relentless drive for full disclosure and transparency, also is assessed.     

Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises

In a world of high capital mobility, the threat of speculative attack becomes a central issue of macroeconomicpolicy. While first-generation and second-generation models of speculative attacks both have considerablerelevance to particular financial crises of the 1990s, a third-generation model is needed to make sense of thenumber and nature of the emerging market crises of 1997-98. Most of the recent attempts to produce such amodel have argued that the core of the problem lies in the banking system. This paper sketches another candidatefor third-generation crisis modeling—one that emphasizes two facts that have been omitted from formal modelsto date: the role of companies' balance sheets in determining their ability to invest, and that of capital flows inaffecting the real exchange rate.     

A New Approach to Group Structure, Burden Sharing, and the Equilibrium Provision of Public Goods

In the received model of the voluntary provision of a pure public good, the usual practice is to proceed from assumptions about the group characteristics to inferences about an implied outcome. The approach advocated in this paper reverses the traditional direction. Assuming a Nash equilibrium, we ask how to characterize the diverse set of group characteristics which will support it. Approaching the problem from this angle we define three crucial characteristics of a group-equilibrium: consumer's free rider inducing supply, zero contribution-inducing wealth and voluntary surplus tribute which is the amount by which a person's actual income exceeds his/her zero-contribution inducing wealth. Defining these indicators we show how they form the foundation of a complete mapping between the distribution of individual characteristics of a group, and equilibrium public good supply. Certain questions such as the interaction between size of the group and heterogeneity of incomes and tastes not yet adequately addressed are shown to yield easily to this approach.     

Interest-only and principal-only mortgage strips as interest-rate contingent claims

Interest-only (IO) and principal-only (PO) mortgage strips are valued in a stochastic interest-rate environment. The prepayment rate of the underlying mortgages is affected by two considerations not present in the pure financially rational model: (1) The property owner's holding period is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution, resulting in the possibility of prepayment due to the sale of the property (i.e., prepayment that is too early based on market interest rates); and (2) borrowers are assumed to face heterogeneous transaction costs related to refinancing the existing mortgage, and delay refinancing when market conditions make it optimal to do so (refinancing too late). Properties of IO/PO strips are identified by the finite difference method.     

Dual VATs and Cross-Border Trade: Two Problems, One Solution?

In recent years, two distinct but related questions have been raised with respect to value-added taxes (VATs). Concern has been expressed over whether it is desirable or even possible for both national and subnational governments in federal countries such as India, Argentina, and Russia to impose VATs. One reason for thinking that such subnational VATs are unlikely to be workable on a destination basis is the problem of cross-border trade. Of course, this same problem also arises within the European Union, where there is no EU VAT. Drawing upon Canadian experience, we argue that not only is it possible to have two-tier or dual VATs on a destination basis in a single country but that the existence of dual VATs may help deal with some of the problems of cross-border trade.     

The Information Content of Bank Examinations

We identify three types of information from bank examinations—auditing information from verifying the honesty and accuracy of the bank's books, regulatory discipline information about the treatment of the bank by regulators, and private information about bank condition. We estimate these information effects by comparing the cumulative abnormal market returns associated with examinations in which the CAMEL rating remained unchanged, improved, and worsened. All three information effects are found to be greater for banks entering the examination process with unsatisfactory ratings from prior examinations. The only consistently strong effect found is that examination downgrades appear to reveal unfavorable private information about bank condition. The evidence also suggests that the information may reach the market in part through loan quality data released in quarterly financial statements.     

Statement no.133 proposed legislation on enterprise resource banks (The “Baker Bill”, H.R. 3167)

Statement no.133 proposed legislation on enterprise resource banks (The Baker Bill, H.R. 3167)May 6, 1996     

The Impact of Taxing Unemployment Insurance Benefits on Unemployment Duration and Post-unemployment Earnings

In 1979, unemployment insurance benefits became taxableincome for recipients with income above a specified threshold.Further legislation in 1982 lowered the income threshold. Thispaper uses the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) database to evaluate the effects of the 1982 change on the compensatedduration of unemployment and post-unemployment earnings. The1982 episode is a particularly useful natural experimentbecause the treatment group (those newly subject to benefittaxation) is the middle income category and the two controlgroups (those whose benefits were already taxed and those whosebenefits still were not taxed) are the high and low income categories.If the two control groups show similar trends in unemploymentduration (or post-unemployment earnings) and the treatment groupshows a strikingly different pattern, this is compelling evidenceof a tax effect. The empirical results suggest that taxing unemploymentbenefits reduced the affected workers' mean compensated durationby more than a week, but did not have a statistically significanteffect on their post-unemployment earnings.     

Corporate Real Estate and Stock Market Performance

An interesting question in corporate real estate literature is whether real estate can improve the stock market performance of property-intensive non-real estate firms. Using a data set comprising 75 non-real estate corporations that own at least 20 percent properties, this paper empirically assesses and compares the pair-wise return, total risk, systematic risk and Jensen abnormal return performance of composite (with real estate) and hypothetical business (without real estate) firms. We employed Morgan Stanley Capital International world equity index instead of a local market index to provide some insights into the performance of the local market relative to the global market during the 1997–2001 volatile periods experienced by many Asian countries. Our results suggest the inclusion of real estate in a corporate portfolio appears to be associated with lower return, higher total risk, higher systematic risk and poorer abnormal return performance. It is therefore likely that non-real estate firms own properties for other reasons in addition to seeking improvement in their stock market performance. Further research is needed to explore the main factors contributing to corporate real estate ownership by non-real estate firms.     

Incentives and Product Variety in an Aging Economy

This paper presents a new method to clarify intergenerational effects of the demographic change in industrialized countries, i.e., the trend of aging. Recognized effects of aging are twofold; a disincentive effect and a product variety effect. The results are consistent with the empirical findings in Cutler et al. (1990). With the evidence, our model predicts that diminished fertility represents a problem rather than an opportunity, and that diminished mortality represents an opportunity rather than a problem.