Borrower Self-Selection,Underwriting Costs,and Subprime Mortgage Credit Supply

In the U.S., households participate in two very different types of credit markets. Personal lending is characterized by continuous risk-based pricing in which lenders offer households a continuous distribution of borrowing possibilities based on estimates of their creditworthiness. This contrasts sharply with mortgage markets where lenders specialize in specific risk categories of borrowers and mortgage supply is stepwise linear. The contrast between continuous lending for personal loans and discrete lending by specialized lenders for mortgage credit has led to concerns regarding the efficiency and equity of mortgage lending. This paper sheds both theoretical and empirical light on the differences in the two credit markets. The theory section demonstrates why, in a perfectly competitive credit market where all lenders have the same underwriting technology, mortgage credit supply curves are stepwise linear and lenders specialize in prime or subprime lending. The empirical section then provides evidence that borrowers are being effectively sorted based on risk characteristics by the market.     

Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes

Public policy concerns increasingly have focused on subprime lending. Our research uses a survey of prime and subprime borrowers to address whether borrowers inappropriately are channeled to the subprime segment, if once having taken out a subprime mortgage borrowers are stuck in this market segment, and whether borrowers face higher costs by taking out subprime mortgages. We find that subprime borrowers are less knowledgeable about the mortgage process, are less likely to search for the best mortgage rates, and are less likely to be offered a choice among alternative mortgage terms and instruments—possibly making them more vulnerable to unfavorable mortgage outcomes. Our analysis of market segmentation confirms that typical mortgage underwriting criteria are most important in explaining whether borrowers obtain prime or subprime mortgages—higher credit risk borrowers are more likely to get a subprime loan. Our results further show that search behavior and other demographic factors including adverse life events, age, and Hispanic ethnicity contribute to explaining market segment, suggesting that borrowers may inappropriately receive subprime mortgages. While we find some persistence to market segment—borrowers are more likely to take out a subprime mortgage if their previous mortgage came from the subprime segment—we also find that market segment is not immutable. Analysis of the survey responses indicates that borrowers with subprime mortgages significantly are more dissatisfied with their mortgage outcomes. This is not surprising because subprime borrowers look worse across typical mortgage underwriting criteria. Consistent with policy concerns, however, despite holding constant these and other factors, taking out a mortgage in the subprime segment, by itself, appears to increase dissatisfaction with mortgage outcomes. We do not provide a definitive answer to the question of whether subprime lending, on balance, serves homebuyers well by providing access to mortgage credit to those otherwise constrained, or rather serves homebuyers poorly by inappropriately assigning them to a market where costs are high and the ability to transition to more attractive prime mortgages remains low. Our analysis, however, does provide some empirical support for concerns raised by critics of subprime lending, and for this reason justifies continued public policy debate and analysis.     

An Early Assessment of Residential Mortgage Performance in China

The residential mortgage market becomes a financial engine for the booming residential housing development and sustained economic growth in China. Our study provides the first rigorous empirical analysis on the earlier performance of residential mortgage market in China based on a unique micro dataset of mortgage loan history collected from a major residential mortgage lender in China. We found that while the option theory fails to explain prepayment and default behavior in the residential mortgage market in China, other non-option theory related financial economic factors play major roles in determining the prepayment and default risks in China. We also found that borrower’s characteristics are significant in determining prepayment behavior, hence may be used as an effective tool for screening potential high risk borrowers in the loan origination process. Adopting a risk-based pricing in residential mortgage lending in China can improve the efficiency of the market, and enhance the credit availability to the most needed households, i.e., the younger households, blue-collar workers, lower income households, and help them become homeowners.     

Subprime Lenders and Mortgage Market Completion

Without a subprime market, some borrowers by virtue of poor credit history, unstable income, and other characteristics are unable to qualify for a mortgage. With a subprime market, there is a more complete credit supply schedule with the market pricing for poorer credit quality in the mortgage rate. By completing the capital market, subprime lenders reduce borrowing constraints. The result is a social welfare gain. Low-credit applicants otherwise denied funding are able to qualify by paying higher interest rates in exchange for offering more equity or lower loan-to-value ratios. This prediction is consistent with the subprime applicants financing or refinancing their mortgages at relatively low loan-to-value ratios.     

Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.     

Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law

This paper estimates the effect of North Carolina's high-cost mortgage law on the subprime mortgage market in that state. The results indicate that creditors sharply restricted lending to higher risk consumers in North Carolina following passage of the law. Creditors did not restrict lending in neighboring states or to lower risk consumers in North Carolina. These results suggest that the restriction in North Carolina was due to rationing in response to higher costs imposed by the law. The findings of this study are of importance beyond North Carolina. Other states and municipalities have proposed or passed similar or more restrictive laws. These laws risk taking back some of the gains in credit availability that lower income and higher risk consumers gained in the 1990s.     

The impact of CRA agreements on community banks

We develop three empirical models to identify the impact of Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) agreements on the mortgage lending behavior of small banking institutions during the period 1990–1997. CRA agreements are pledges banking institutions make to extend levels of credit to targeted populations and are often used by institutions to reaffirm their commitment to the goals of the CRA. We hypothesize that CRA agreements increase the level of competition for mortgage loans in the targeted area, which in turn causes a reduction in the quantity of mortgage credit to be supplied by community banks. Consistent with the quantity hypothesis, the results show that CRA agreements are associated with less mortgage lending, including lending in lower-income communities (CRA lending) and in minority communities (minority lending), by small community lenders. Evidence does not support a second hypothesis – that community banks respond to the increased competition by providing credit to riskier individuals.     

The Economics of Low-Income Mortgage Lending

The presumption that mortgage markets for low-income borrowers and neighborhoods are underserved by lenders has led to a variety of increased government interventions on the supply side of the housing market. Although many studies of low-income lending at the neighborhood level have been published, none is from the firm's perspective. We adopt such a framework to test the twin propositions that the low-income mortgage market is no different from the non-low-income mortgage market and that the low-income mortgage market is underserved.We examine empirically whether the operating costs including credit losses, revenues, and profits of savings and loan institutions engaged in more low-income lending differ systematically from those that do less low-income lending. We find that firms engaged in more low-income mortgage lending have higher costs than those engaged in less low-income lending, which is consistent with higher credit risk for low-income loans. Nevertheless, these firms are no more profitable than those that do less low-income lending, which is inconsistent with a market for low-income mortgage lending that is currently underserved.     

GSE Activity and Mortgage Supply in Lower-Income and Minority Neighborhoods: The Effect of the Affordable Housing Goals

I estimate the credit supply effect of the Underserved Areas Goal (UAG), which establishes GSE purchase goals for mortgages to lower-income and minority neighborhoods. Taking advantage of discontinuous census tract eligibility rules and abrupt changes in tract eligibility, I find some evidence of a small UAG effect on GSE purchases and mortgage originations, without crowding-out of FHA and subprime lending. The results also suggest that the GSEs exploit the law??s lack of precision-targeting, yielding effects that might diverge from the law??s intent.     

Risk versus Demographics in Subprime Mortgage Lending: Evidence from Three Connecticut Cities

This paper analyzes patterns in subprime residential mortgage lending using 2006 Home Mortgage Act Disclosure data for the cities of Bridgeport, New Haven and Waterbury, Connecticut. The analysis applies models presented in earlier research and has the objective of assessing the relative importance of demographic versus risk factors in subprime mortgage lending decisions. Regression equations are estimated for census tracts and individual borrowers and include demographic variables and property risk measures. The results find race and ethnicity to be significant determinants of subprime lending in the borrower equations that include the full set of risk measures. Neighborhood educational levels are found to have an inverse and often significant association with subprime mortgage loans. Property risk measures present mixed results regarding their significance in subprime lending, suggesting that risk may have played less of a role in loan originations in 2006 than it did in earlier studies.     

美国猎杀贷款的法律规制与启示

美国次级贷危机的发生,次级贷款营销和发放环节中存在的诱导性、不公平的行为即猎杀贷款是一个重要原因。随着我国的金融管制放开、利率放开和金融创新的推进,极有可能也会有类似情况出现,有必要通过对美国猎杀贷款现象及法律规制研究来完善我国对于此类现象的法律监管。本文对猎杀贷款的表现、美国法律对猎杀贷款的规定进行研究,对美国相关法律存在的问题进行分析,结合我国目前现状,提出应借鉴美国这方面的经验和教训。     

CRA Lending in a Changing Context: Evidence of Interaction with FHA and Subprime Originations

This article uses a unique demonstration program to examine the interaction of CRA-related lending with subprime and FHA lending activity. Specifically, the empirical analysis identifies the extent to which the origination of a CRA mortgage substitutes for FHA and subprime originations during the period 1998–2006. The results suggest that in the years prior to the expansion of the subprime market (1998–2001), the origination of CRA loans carried a small substitution effect with respect to FHA originations, with little to no impact on subprime originations. Conversely, during the years of the subprime industry’s growth (2002–2006), CRA originations substituted at a much higher rate for high-cost originations. These findings are suggestive about the dynamic role of community reinvestment lending within the changing context of the broader mortgage market. To the extent that CRA originations carry lower foreclosure risk than many subprime products, they also carry implications for the extent of neighborhood externalities in the wake of the subprime foreclosure crisis.     

The impact of securitization on the expansion of subprime credit

This paper investigates the relationship between securitization activity and the extension of subprime credit. The analysis is motivated by two sets of compelling empirical facts. First, the origination of subprime mortgages exploded between the years 2003 and 2005. Second, the securitization of subprime loans increased substantially over the same time period, driven primarily by the five largest independent broker/dealer investment banks. We argue that the relative shift in the securitization activity of investment banks was driven by forces exogenous to factors impacting lending decisions in the primary mortgage market and resulted in lower ZIP code denial rates, higher subprime origination rates, and higher subsequent default rates. Consistent with recent findings in the literature, we provide evidence that the increased securitization activity of investment banks reduced lenders' incentives to carefully screen borrowers.     

State Foreclosure Laws and Mortgage Origination in the Subprime

Foreclosure procedures in some states are considerably swifter and less costly for lenders than in others. In light of the foreclosure crisis, an empirical understanding of the effect of foreclosure procedures on the mortgage market is critical. This study finds that lender-favorable foreclosure procedures are associated with more lending activity in the subprime market. The study uses hand-coded state foreclosure law variables to construct a numerical index measuring the favorability of state foreclosure laws to lenders. Mortgage origination data from state-border areas shows that lender-friendly foreclosure is associated with an increase in subprime originations, but has less effect on the prime market.     

Disparities in Mortgage Lending,Bank Performance,Economic Influence,and Regulatory Oversight

This study investigates factors affecting changes in the disparity of home mortgage denial rates between white and minority loan applicants in the U.S. during the period 1991–1997. We develop a two-stage least-squares regression model that incorporates applicant-level characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, regional economic data, and bank-specific data as explanatory variables. Some have argued that mortgage lenders were under increasing pressure from industry regulators to extend additional credit to minorities and low-income groups during the period under study. The model includes each institution's periodic CRA rating as a proxy for regulatory influence. An alternative explanation is that market forces, such as improvements in economic conditions and in bank financial condition and performance, affected default loss estimates and credit standards in a way that disproportionally benefited minority and low-income applicants. The empirical findings are consistent with the latter hypothesis. We conclude that policy makers should consider the impact of market factors when assessing the allocation of mortgage credit in a particular demographic market. The findings also underscore the importance of controlling for lender assessments of credit risk when evaluating compliance with CRA and fair lending statutes.     

Do Predatory Lending Laws Influence Mortgage Lending? An Analysis of the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law

In this paper, we examine the effect of the 1999 North Carolina predatory lending law on mortgage activity in that state as compared to other states in the Southeastern United States. Using 1998–2000 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, we find that the North Carolina law reduced the overall level of subprime mortgage lending activity. Furthermore, we find that the North Carolina decline was caused by a decline in loan application volume and not by a change in loan denial rates, suggesting less aggressive marketing in that state after the imposition of the law. Finally, the impact of the legislation was different by both the type of financial service provider and borrower. Specifically, non-bank subprime lending contracted faster in North Carolina when compared to the control group, while both minority and low-income applicants were also less likely to get loans following the legislation. These results have wide ranging policy implications given that several predatory lending proposals are currently before Congress, as well as proposed in almost forty other states.     

美国次级住房抵押贷款危机的原因及影响

需求大于供给导致美国次级住房抵押贷款快速增长,"贷款—分散"模式链条上各主体的收益激励结构和次级贷款品种设计导致的次级债市场扭曲繁荣,进而导致次级债危机。次级债危机将在较长的时间里困扰美国经济,但是从次级贷款支持证券及其衍生产品的分档设计可以预测该市场的绝大部分投资者不会因次级债危机而受到损失。     

Banks’ lending behavior and monetary policy: evidence from Sweden

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the aggregate data about bank loans which may hide significant information about the monetary transmission mechanism. This study, by disaggregating bank loans data and using the relevant interest rates in Sweden, investigates the behaviour of banks after a monetary policy tightening. By using an unrestricted VAR model and impulse response analysis, our results show that a shock on the policy rate affects the main components of the banks’ loan portfolios differently. Initially, banks do not reduce lending to firms and households and they present a sluggish reaction concerning the relevant interest rates. On the contrary, they reduce lending to mortgage credit institutions significantly since real estate lending can be considered as a risky long-term investment. Moreover mortgage credit institutions reduce lending for housing purposes to non-bank public. This reduction is mainly driven by flexible rate loans and loans secured on tenant owned apartments. Consequently, theses actions have a significant effect on real economic activity, by amplifying the initial shock from the tightening monetary policy. The latter result provides evidence of the bank lending channel in Sweden working via mortgage lending and could be very important for policy makers.     

Unintended Consequences of Risk Based Pricing: Racial Differences in Mortgage Costs

The following analysis focuses on the role that risk pricing has had in the allocation and access to mortgage funds, specifically how it results in cost differences by race. Using a sample of fixed-rate first lien mortgages, we control for the risk characteristics of borrowers and assets. We find that borrowers with comparable credit quality experience significantly higher costs for mortgages in neighborhoods with a high density of minority households. Further, when the pricing differential is controlled for in a model of mortgage default, there is no support for neighborhood price differences. This finding illustrates a potential inequity that results from efficient/risk pricing in mortgage underwriting.     

From new deal institutions to capital markets: Commercial consumer risk scores and the making of subprime mortgage finance

The investment fueled US mortgage market has traditionally been sustained by New Deal institutions called government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Known as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the GSEs once dominated mortgage backed securities underwriting. The recent subprime mortgage crisis has drawn attention to the fact that during the real estate boom, these agencies were temporarily overtaken by risk tolerant channels of lending, securitization, and investment, driven by investment banks and private capital players. This research traces the movement of a specific brand of commercial consumer credit analytics into mortgage underwriting. It demonstrates that what might look like the spontaneous rise (and fall) of a ‘free’ market divested of direct government intervention has been thoroughly embedded in the concerted movement of calculative risk management technologies. The transformations began with a sequence of GSE decisions taken in the mid-1990’s to implement a consumer risk score called a FICO^® into automated underwriting systems. Having been endorsed by the GSEs, this scoring tool was gradually hardwired throughout the industry to become a distributed and collective ‘market device’. As the paper will show, once modified by specific GSE interpretations the calculative properties generated by these credit bureau scores reconfigured mortgage finance into two parts: the conventional, risk-adverse, GSE conforming ‘prime’ and an infrastructurally distinct, risk-avaricious, investment grade ‘subprime’.